Ignoble robbers : bandits and pirates in the Roman world by Reardon, GD
Ignoble robbers: 
bandits and pirates in the Roman World 
by 
Gail Reardon (B.A. Hons.) 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Tasmania / 	H.0,;1-124j 
(July 1997) 
This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of higher 
degree or graduate diploma in any tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge 
and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, 
except when due reference is made in the text of the thesis. 
g2gbda--- 
Gail Reardon 
This thesis may be made available for loan and limited copying in accordance with the 




Ignoble robbers: pirates and bandits in the Roman world 
This thesis begins with an examination of the Roman definition of banditry and 
piracy in the law codes. The close association between war and banditry, despite the 
formal importance of the iustum bellum, is revealed by the descriptions and 
terminology of the surviving literary authorities. Piracy is often referred to as being 
'maritime banditry', since it was regarded as differing little from banditry, except that it 
occurred on the ocean. The position of bandits and pirates in the criminal 'ranks' was 
the lowest, and thus to the Roman sources, latro was a strong term of abuse 
associated with great dishonour. The unpredictable tactics of bandits and pirates also 
prompted the attitude that they were akin to a force of nature, such as a storm, and 
were thus an unpreventable occurrence. 
The second chapter discusses Hobsbawm's theories of social banditry and their 
applicability to the bandits and pirates of the Roman period. An examination reveals 
that 'social bandits' were not an ancient phenomenon, and that there was no perception 
of them as such, and suggests that local populations did not regard them as 'Robin 
Hoods'. Local support for bandits and pirates seems to have been limited mainly to a 
smaller group composed of their 'partners in crime', who harboured them and received 
stolen goods. Those who became bandits and pirates, for example deserters and 
shepherds, are often cited as being driven to banditry for reasons of poverty, and their 
motivation was to support themselves. An analysis in chapter threee of the activities of 
the Bagaudae in the late empire reveals them to be bandits rather than rebellious 
peasants. The attitude of abhorrence towards these criminals is seen in the harsh 
punishment of their acts and the popular reaction to their deaths, as detailed in chapter 
four. The fact that a man was considered a bandit was seen as a justification for his 
death. Retribution through capital punishment could be carried out instantly, or in a 
number of ways after interrogation and torture, such as beheading or crucifixion. 
Infamous bandits' deaths played a further role as entertainment for the crowds. The 
placing of such prisoners in triumphal processions also testifies to the attraction for 
seeing these prisoners in a humiliated position. 
Finally, a combination of the factors mentioned above and the value of personal 
gloria and triumphs in the Roman ethos strongly influenced the response to policing 
banditry and piracy, as seen in an analysis of a number of Roman laws, battles in the 
provinces and wars against bandits and pirates. The evidence from the empire 
suggests that attitudes had not changed though methods of policing had improved. 
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Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the Roman response to the activities of 
bandits and pirates in the Mediterranean, during the period from the late third century 
B.C. to the end of the fourth century A.D., though examples relevant to the analysis 
will be cited from outside this timeframe. 
Chapter 1 examines the importance of the Roman definition of bandits and 
pirates. The legal definition which states that enemies were those against whom a war 
had been declared and that others were latrones or praedones reveals that such terms 
could be used to refer to many forms of violence. There was, however, a close 
association in practice between war and banditry and piracy. Often the opinions of the 
literary sources on the nature of a conflict dictate the employment of the label of 
bellum or latrocinia. These opinions derived frequently from a judgement that the 
methods used to attack people and property, such as ambushes and plundering, were 
those used by bandits. Pirates used similar methods, operating on water as well as 
land, and thus the terminology applied to bandits is often simply transferred to pirates. 
An examination of the legal and literary sources reveals that bandits and pirates have 
the dubious distinction of being considered by the Romans as the lowest criminals in 
the scale of infamy. The dangers posed by them, together with their prevalence, were 
such that they were a legitimate reason for avoiding legal liability. The terms latro and 
praedo were thus associated with treachery and great dishonour to a Roman and 
consequently were often used in application to political enemies. 
Modern interpretations of the phenomenon of banditry in the Roman world are 
discussed in Chapter 2. Many studies on ancient banditry have been particularly 
influenced by the studies of Hobsbawm on banditry. He argues that many bandits' 
activities were motivated by a social concern, and thus uses the term 'social bandit' in 
his discussions of bandits, seeing their activities as a form of social protest. He argues 
that they were perceived by the local community as 'Robin Hoods' and were well- 
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regarded. However the difference between the perception and the reality of banditry is 
significant. An analysis of evidence of many examples of banditry reveals the 
inherently selfish motives of bandits, dictated often by necessity. The evidence 
indicates also that far from acting with the support of local communities, bandits and 
pirates were frequently considered a menace to inhabitants. Those who formed 
connections with bandits and pirates were often motivated by an interest in making 
money, and were the business associates or patrons of these criminals. This is also 
evident from the legal texts, which reveal that Roman efforts to subdue banditry and 
piracy were often directed specifically at their receivers and harbourers. The emphasis 
on the betrayal of bandits in the legal texts also suggests that bandits could not operate 
freely with the support of the community. It has been argued that the evidence of the 
literary sources on banditry from the empire demonstrates a reflection of the popular 
desire for a 'social bandit'. However the grim reality of the common threat of bandit 
attacks suggests otherwise, and the examples of bandits in these writers seem to be 
used instead for the purpose of demonstrating that the emperor's power was not 
always absolute. The motives of those who turned to banditry, particularly those who 
are often identified as bandits, the shepherds and deserters from the army, are also 
examined. Frequently the causes of outbreaks of bandity and piracy were caused by 
poverty. The notion that social banditry was also a form of rebellion is examined in 
Chapter 3 through an analysis of the sources for the activities of the Bagaudae, from 
the emergence of the Bagaudae in the late third century in Gaul to the early fifth century 
A.D. The outbreaks of violence caused by the Bagaudae have been interpreted 
variously, for example as peasant rebellions. However an examination of the often 
scanty evidence indicates that the Bagaudae were bandits rather than peasant rebels. 
The abhorrence of banditry and piracy was expressed also by the manner and 
severity of the punishments given to bandits and pirates. Chapter Four discusses the 
nature of the punishments. The evidence in particular of the legal sources reveals that 
there was no legal or social prohibition against killing a bandit or pirate, and in fact 
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there are instances of a failure to kill them being heavily condemned. The satisfaction 
felt at the deaths of bandits also became a form of entertainment for the crowds in the 
arena, with a demand for notorious bandits to be sent to Rome as drawcards for the 
shows. Captured bandits and pirates also featured as one of the spectacles in the 
triumphal processions of their conquerors during the Republic, for the crowd's 
enjoyment of their humiliation. 
Chapter five evaluates the Roman responses towards policing banditry and 
piracy, which emerges through a discusson of the history of their reaction to these 
outbreaks, beginning during the Republic in 229B.C., when as an emerging power 
Rome sent an expedition to counter the piracy of the Illyrians. Small attacks of bandits 
and pirates were countered by the individual victim or the local community, and this 
principle of self-defence against small-scale attacks was consistent throughout Roman 
history. However armed forces were used to control larger incursions by bandits and 
pirates. The responsibility for suppressing these attacks was that of the Roman 
provincial governor. Provincial commands were not always popular with the Roman 
elite, partly because of the nature of the policing duties they would have to perform 
against bandits and pirates. Such foes were not considered noble enemies, nor were 
the literary sources inclined to regard them as worthy of record. Many examples reveal _ - 
that even in antiquity it was recognised that frequently the uppermost concern of the 
Roman commander was not the successful suppression of crime, but the hope of 
triumphal reward for his victories. A triumph was the highest honour a commander 
could receive, and was not easily achieved by fighting in skirmishes against bandits 
and pirates. Warfare however provided a far better opportunity to achieve personal 
glory in a victorious battle. Thus there are examples of magistrates who deliberately 
provoked war against those considered to be bandits or pirates, in the hope of 
achieving a triumph in their desire for gloria. The importance of the Romans' 
ambition for glory is highlighted as one of a number of factors which helped create the 
situation in the late Republic in which pirates proliferated over the entire 
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Mediterranean, attacking corn supplies, kidnapping people from along the Italian 
coasts, and not only attacking cities but even beseiging them. They had indeed become 
a formidable enemy. Thus commands which encompassed the province of the entire 
Mediterranean were necessary. Piracy after the command of Pompey and its continued 
but reduced existence under the early principate is also examined. The measures which 
were established under the principate which had the effect of establishing more 
efficient policing of banditry and piracy are discussed also, together with a survey of 
evidence for the later empire. 
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Chapter One: Defining the bandit and pirate 
(i) The meaning of commonly used terms 
Banditry and piracy constitute forms of violence which were committed outside 
the parameters of the use of violence permitted by Roman laws and accepted by 
society, namely warfare and contests in the arena. Ulpian in the Digest defines such 
violence as illegal by using a comparison between 'formal' and 'informal' violence, 
"Hostes sunt, quibus bellum publice populus Romanus decreuit uel ipsi populo 
Romano: ceteri latrunculi uel praedones appellantur." 1 Thus the strict legal 
definition of banditry is derived from a comparison with warfare, so that virtually any 
violent action other than a formally declared war was covered by the term 
latrocinium. 2 Any action in which a group of men ambushed or raided others could 
be called banditry, so that the term covered a broad range of activities. Varro suggests 
that latro had come to mean 'bandit' as a result of the ambush technique, "...either 
because they are in manner like soldiers with a sword, or because they 'lie' (latent) to 
make ambushes." 3 To ambush and plunder for booty were common attributes of a 
bandit. 4 Creatures that lie in hiding and wait for their prey are described as 
1 Dig. 49.15.24 and Q. Mucius' definition at 50.16.118 is very similiar: "Hostes' hi sunt, qui 
nobis aut quibus nos publice bellum decreuimus: ceteri 7atrones' aut 'praedones' sunt.". At 47.9.3.1 
someone is regarded as storming a ship who seizes something as if in very battle with a ship; 
"Expugnare videtur, qui in ipso quasi proelio et pugna adversus navem et ratem aliquid rapit, sive 
expugnet sive praedonibus expugnantibus rapiat." MacMullen (1963) p224 briefly notes the 
difference between 'official' and 'unofficial enemies. 
2 Shaw (1984) p6 similiarly: "...almost every kind of violent opposition to established authority 
short of war was subsumed under the catch-all rubric of latrocinium...". Not all latrocinium 
however, was necessarily 'opposition to established authority', though there were those who were 
termed latrones who were, particularly in the late Republic, because of their own personal political 
ambition; Sextus Pompey, and Catiline, for example. Cicero renounces Catiline's activity as banditry 
not war, In Cat. 1.27. 'Typical' bandits had no such opposition except in the sense that they opposed 
being captured by 'the establishment'; their violence was simply for the purpose of booty. 
3 Varro De Ling. Lat. 7.52: "<At nunc viarum obsessores dicuntur latrones,> quod item ut 
milites <sunt> cum ferro, aut quod latent ad insidias faciendas." 
4 Quintilian Inst. Orat. 12.7.3, comments that to live life accusing people and to be led by reward 
to charge defendants was the closest thing to banditry: "Itaque ut accusatoriam vitam vivere et ad 
deferendos reos praemio duci proximum latrocinio est...". 
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lbandits'. 5 
The terms latrocinium and latro were not confined simply to the archetypal lone 
bandit or group of bandits waiting by the roadside to challenge victims to 'stand and 
deliver', or pirates waiting on the high seas, but also included were diverse examples 
of violence which the modern world prefers to separate into different categories for 
precise identification, for example inter-tribal warfare, guerilla warfare, rebellions 
against Roman rule, slave revolts, political disputes, privateering from enemy states, 
mercenary work and so forth. 6 
Although the word latro began with the meaning 'hired men and developed into 
'bandit', they nevertheless continued to have the potential to act as mercenaries. 7 
The mercenary aspect of banditry and piracy at times played a significant part in their 
activities, particularly in the piracy encountered by the Romans in the late Republic. 
The word latro had changed from its original 'mercenary' meaning by the time of 
Cicero to signify lbandit'. 8 Varro's explanation is that latrones were originally 
those men hired to be at the side (latus) of the king, whose wages were in Greek 
called Adrpov and that the older playwrights (such as Plautus) also occasionally 
referred to ordinary soldiers as latrones. 9 Shaw notes in his explanation of the 
5 Pliny N.H. 9.144; 9.145; 10.109. 
6 See also: Humbert (1904) p991; De Ruggiero & Barbieri (1942) p460; MacMullen (1966) p255; 
Flam-Zuckermann (1970) p456; Garlan (1978) p2. 
7 The law covers the possiblity that money could be borrowed to pay hired bandits to kill a father, 
Dig. 48.9.7. 
8 The Oxford Latin Dictionary (1982) p1107 gives 'hired soldier, mercenary' as the first meaning of 
latro. 
9 Varro De Ling. Lat. 7.52: "Latrones dicti ab latere, qui circum latera erant regi atque ad latera 
habebant ferrum, quos postea a stipatione stipatores appellarunt, et qui conducebantur: ea enim rnerces 
Graece dicitur Adrpov. Ab eo veteres poetae nonnunquam milites appellant latrones. <At nunc 
viarum obsessores dicuntur latrones,> quod item ut milites <sunt> cum ferro, aut quod latent ad 
insidias faciendas." (Skutsch, (1985) p208n34 notes that latro is thought to be derived from 
Aarpeiiw, to work for hire or pay.) Similiarly also Festus, 412: "Stipatores appellantur corporis 
custodes, quos antiqui latrones vocabant, id est mercennarios qui cum ferro velut stipati circumdant 
regum corpora."; Paulus Diaconus, 105: "Latrones antiqui eos dicebant, qui conducti militabant, 
dn-o 777s- Aarpelds-. At nunc viarum obsessores dicuntur, quod a latere adoriuntur, vel quod latenter 
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word's deriviation from the LATR root that "Both in the classical Greek polis and the 
early Roman Republic the professional soldier who fought for pay (that is, a 
mercenary) remained an outsider to the social world of the state, stigmatized precisely 
by the fact that he laboured for a wage in the quintessential role normally held by the 
ultimate insider, the citizen." 1° The word latro, by the time of the first century B.C., 
had long held a derogatory association. By this time latrones were 'bandits' who 
were as Shaw puts it, 'private men of violence', though he argues that although they 
were 'outsiders', they were still linked to society and were never 'total outsiders or 
"enemies". 11 As will be argued later, they were the enemies of all. By the time of 
Juvenal, the word latro had developed away from the 'mercenary' meaning to the 
extent that when he caustically consoles a man defrauded of ten thousand sesterces, he 
reminds him of the greater danger to his possessions posed by a 'hired bandit', not just 
a bandit. 12 
Despite the Roman dislike of latrones, when they were in extremis they were 
compelled to use bandits as mercenaries in the army. Griffith notes some examples of 
mercenaries being used in the Roman army, who are with one exception, identified as 
being a certain 'nationality', for example, Gauls, Celtiberians, Cretans and 
Thracians. 13 There are other examples, however when on occasion, bandits are 
specifically identified as being enrolled. After Hannibal's victory at Cannae in 
216B.C., Zonaras claims that the Romans were virtually enrolling anyone, including 
those 'past their prime', and promising pardons to criminals and freedom to slaves, as 
well as recruiting Azio-rds- Tf nvag. 14 Livy's account confirms that 8000 volunteer 
insidiantur." Cf. also Ennius Annals 55; 481-2 and Skutsch's commentary p206-8 & 699; Servius, 
In Aen. 12.7; Praeconius Stilo, frag. 11; Isidorus Hisp., Etymologiae 10.160 (Migne, PL, 82, 
384). Plautus, one of the veteres poetae, uses it in this sense in Miles Gloriosus, 74 & 949; 
Poenulus 663 & 666; Trinummus 599; in Bacchides frag. 7, a latro is defined as one who sells his 
life for gold, "...(latro) suam qui auro vitam venditat...". 
10 Shaw (1984) p2'7; also p26& 28. 
11 Shaw (1984) p28. 
12 Juvenal Sat. 13.145. 
13 Griffith (1935) p234-5. 
14 Zonaras 9.2. 
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slaves (volones) were armed, and that an edict was issued declaring that those who 
had committed capital offences or were debtors were promised pardon or release from 
their debts; according to Livy 6000 such men were armed. It is likely that these men 
included mercenary bandits, since banditry was a 'capital' offence. Livy makes a point 
of excusing this edict as a last desperate attempt to save a state which could not afford 
to be too choosy; in such a situation, he says, 'honour yields to expediency', (cum 
honesta utilibus cedunt). 15 It is then hardly surprising and perhaps explicable why 
there is no mention of bandits by Livy. 
Both Antony and Octavian are said to have used a certain Cleon, a bandit leader 
who operated from the Mysian Mount Olympus. In c.40B.C. Cleon attacked those 
who were levying money for Q. Labienus, (who had been sent in 43 or 42B.C. to 
obtain Parthian support by Brutus and Cassius) thus 'making himself useful to 
Antony'. 16 Later during the battle of Actium he left Antony and joined Caesar's 
forces, earning as reward a Mysian priesthood and the control of a part of Morene. 17 
Under the Empire, Marcus Aurelius is said to have even 'made the bandits of 
Dalmatia and Dardania soldiers' for the war against the Marcomanni. 18 The source 
for this information however is the unreliable Historia Augusta. It provides certain 
other information in this context. It claims that there was a plague raging at the time, 
and that the state was facing not only the Marcomanni but also the Germans. Marcus 
Aurelius is said to have trained slaves for the army, enlisted gladiators (calling them 
15 Livy 22.57.11 & 23.14.3. 
16 Dio 48.26.5; Strabo, 12.8.9; MRR, 2.363-4. 
17 Corocotta, a bandit in Spain, is said to have annoyed Augustus to the extent that a price of a 
million sesterces was offered to the man who captured him alive. It seems that Corocotta himself 
approached Augustus however, and was given the amount of the reward. (Dio 56.43.3.) What really 
occurred can only be a matter for speculation. No 'real' bandit would be given his own reward. 
Neither was it customary to set a reward. Shaw (1984) p44 perhaps rightly, suggests that Augustus 
was just buying off a 'troublesome but powerful local baron'. Certainly Corocotta was getting away 
with 'daylight robbery' somewhere. 
18 Marcus Antoninus 21. (latrones etiam Dalmatiae atque Dardaniae milites fecit.) Aurelius' 
biographer, Birley (1966) p218, has no qualms about stating the entire section as fact. 
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obsequentes) and the Diogmitae, or Greek military police, and hired (emit) Germans 
to fight their countrymen. Two new legions were gathered also for the forthcoming 
wars. Lastly, due to lack of resources, the Historia Augusta claims that M. Aurelius 
held an auction of palace goods, from gold pocula to paintings to finance these 
efforts. 
The slaves who were being trained are said to have been called voluntarii by M. 
Aurelius, after the example of the Punic volones after Cannae. This 'public relations 
exercise' might be expected in such a situation: that an emperor in a similarly 
inglorious and desperate position to the Romans battling with Hannibal under the 
Republic would deliberately evoke the more glorious past in an attempt to defend his 
enlistment of these recruits by calling on tradition to provide it with more 
respectability. Similarly defensive is the naming of the gladiators as the 'obedient'. 
Other sources confirm some of the items claimed in the Historia Augusta. 
Ammianus Marcellinus corroborates that a widespread plague was rampant under 
Verus and M. Aurelius. 19 The enrolment in A.D.170 of two new legions is found in 
an inscription and Zonaras confirms that palace furnishings were sold in the forum to 
raise funds for the army. 20 It would seem unwarranted then to disbelieve completely 
the reference to enrolling Dalmatian and Dardanian tribesmen or 'bandits' in the army 
when other points in that particular section are substantiated by external evidence. 21 
In contrast to the usual Roman reluctance to deal with mercenaries, in the east, 
Josephus' dealings with bandit mercenaries were more open. He declares how his 
method of ensuring the peace in Galilee was first to persuade the people to actually pay 
the bandits as mercenaries, and then summoning the strongest bandits, gained an oath 
not to enter the area until sent for or unless their payment was in arrears, and ordered 
them not to attack the Romans or their neighbours. His reasoning was that it was 
19 Amm. Marc. 23.6.24. Aso HA, Verus 8: the plague being brought back from the east by 
Verus; and M. Antonius 28.4: plague continuing in 180A.D. C.I.L. III 5567 records the lues in 
182. 
20 C.I.L. III 1980; Zonaras 12.1. 
21 See Burian (1960) 47-49 who compares them with Tacitus' account of Tacfarinas. 
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better for people to pay a small amount willingly than suffer having their possessions 
plundered.22 Josephus also tells how he levied an army which included some 4500 
mercenaries whom, he adds, 'he trusted especially'. 23 Obviously he was aware of 
the general opinion of mercenary bandits and their (un)trustworthiness, for he would 
not feel obliged to defend his position in regard to the mercenaries otherwise. Issac 
argues that these mercenaries would not join a Roman army regardless of the incentive, 
but does admit that they would rob anyone, whether Jewish or not at any other 
time. 24 The reverse may also be said to be true; the Roman army did not want 
Judaean bandit mercenaries. Josephus claims that at one point he even released a 
bandit mercenary who had been hired by the inhabitants of the city of Sepphoris to 
attack him. On hearing of the approach of Jesus the dpxultymjs- with his bandit gang 
though a betrayal, Josephus captured him and then allowed him to leave if he was 
repentant and gave his loyalty to Josephus. 25 He does not say what incentive was 
given to Jesus to retain this loyalty. 26 
Romans officially hired mercenary bandits and pirates according to the sources 
only rarely. Other Hellenistic states were not so exclusive. Pirates and bandits were 
often hired or protected by such powers. 27 The practice of semi-official use of 
pirates, or what later came to be called 'privateering'; that is, unofficial permission to 
carry out acts of piracy on another state or country without any formal pay except the 
booty from the raids, was utilised famously against Rome by Mithridates VI Eupator 
of Pontus, who encouraged the pirates of Cilicia during his battles with Rome. Certain 
places, such as Cilicia in the last century B.C. and Crete were notorious for their 
propensity to produce mercenary pirates. 28 
22 Josephus The Life 77-78. 
23 Josephus B. J. 2. 583 (2.20.8). 
24 Issac (1984) p181. 
25 Josephus The Life, 104 - 111. 
26 Another example of mercenaries in Judaea: Josephus Ant. 20.121: the bandit Eleazar was invited 
to take part in a retaliatory attack. 
27 See Griffith (1935); at p263 he comments, "...piracy and mercenary service were mutually 
sympathetic trades." 
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A declaration of war was a necessary proclamation of 'openness' of intent; it 
was an essential element in deciding whether an action was legally war or banditry. 
Rich notes that "In the Hellenistic world an undeclared war in the sense of a war 
begun by stealth which took the enemy by surprise was regarded as improper...". 29 
He cites Polybius, who describes the Aetolians' actions in the late third century B.C. 
as 'continually plundering Greece', and thus carrying out 'war-like acts 
unannounced'. 3° Their behaviour was seen as essentially bandit-like. 31 On the 
Roman world, Rich comments: 
...a war can be said to be indictum providing the state's intention to go to war 
has been made public in some way so that the war is not sprung on the enemy by 
surprise. Bellum indicere was often used not to denote any specific formal act, 
but to mean something like "to make public, or publicly make a war 
decision". 32 
An important factor in a iustum bellum (interpreted here as meaning 'proper war 
rather than 'just' war) was whether there had been a formal declaration. 33 A 
declaration meant that the enemy had not been surprised, had not been 'ambushed', a 
tactic common to both bandits and pirates. Two passages from Cicero declare that no 
war is proper unless satisfaction had been demanded or unless a warning or notice had 
been given and a public declaration made. 34 In the second century A.D. Aulus 
28 Plutarch Pompey 29.1 says that in the time of Pompey, Crete was only second to Cilicia for 
producing pirates. See Ormerod (1924) Ch. 2 and Griffith (1935) for mercenaries in the Hellenistic 
world. 
29 Rich (1976) p56. 
30 Polybius 4.16.4: Airtaol yoDy ming red rpdtup xptigewot Kai Ago-Te-tiovre-s- auvextas-
`Ekld8a, Kai n-o.lepot,s. dvorayy61-rous. Oeepovres- TroilAdic. The Aetolians again are specfied for 
their lack of declaration and indiscriminate plundering at 18.5.1-3. 
31 Cf. Diod. Sic., 34/35.2.2 & 34/35.2.29 who compares the Sicilian slave shepherd bandits to 
bands of soldiers. The Romans sent some hastily gathered troops against Spartacus and his forces, as 
it was not seen as war, but a raid similar to banditry. (Appian B.C. 1.116.) 
32 Rich (1976) p106. 
33 Shaw (1984) p6 sees iustum bellum as referring to a 'real' or 'genuine' war. See further, Watson 
(1993), ch3 for a discussion of the traditions of the 'just war' and declarations of war. Braund (1993) 
p197 notes "...[piracy] was more usually regarded as improper war - for Ulpian, undeclared war." 
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Gellius commented that 
"The reason for an ovation and not a triumph is when either the wars were not 
declared properly and were not carried out with a proper enemy, or the name of 
the enemy is low and is not fitting, that of slaves or pirates, or when with 
surrender quickly made, a 'dustless'...and bloodless victory occurs." 35 
Gellius adds ignominy to the formal reasons why a battle fought against pirates and 
bandits was not seen as a iustum bellum. Such terms require that the opposing sides 
have prior knowledge of the other's intentions. An example of this in practice is 
recorded by Livy, when in 200B.C. the Acarnanians with Macedonian help from 
Philip plundered and burnt Attica and returned home with 'all kinds of booty'. This, 
Livy says, was the provocation (irritatio); a 'iustum bellum' was then fought after a 
declaration had been decreed. 36 Any concealment of war-like intent was therefore 
secretive, underhand and ultimately seen as bandit-like. 
The close relationship between latrocinium and war is also, in Ulpian's 
definition, acknowledged by the laws, for on many occasions the dividing line 
between them could be very thin or nonexistent. The very fact that it was felt 
necessary to formulate a law that there had to be a formal declaration to be a 'war' is 
indicative of the similarity between them. In early Greek society, Shaw notes, banditry 
34 De Off. 1.36: "Ex quo intellegi potest nullum bellum esse iustum, nisi quod aut rebus repetitis 
geratur aut denuntiatum ante sit et indictum." The second is a fragment from De Re publica, cited 
by Isidorus: "Nullum bellum iustum habetur nisi denuntiatum, nisi indictum, nisi repetitis rebus." 
35 Noct. Att. 5.6.21. 
36 Livy 31.14.10: "Et irritatio quidem animorum ea prima fuit; postea iustum bet/urn decretis 
civitatis ultro indicendo factum." Also at 42.18.1 Perseus of Macedon in 172B.C. was declared an 
enemy since he was not only preparing a iustum bellum in the manner of a king, but also carrying 
out clandestine crimes of banditry and poisoning, unsuitable activities for a king, "...quippe quem 
non• iustum modo apparare bellum regio animo, sed per omnia clandestina grassari scelera 
latrociniorum ac veneficiorum cernebant." Another example of banditry used as provocation; Tacitus 
claims that Rhescuporis, king of one half of Thrace, coveting the other half sent out groups of bandits 
as causes for war on hearing of the death of Augustus, "Enimvero audita mutatione principis 
immittere latronum globos, excindere castella, causas bello." (Ann. 2.64.) 
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and war appear indivisible,37 and despite the protests of Roman writers, in Roman 
society there were often similarities in practice between war and latrocinium.38 To 
plunder for booty is a characteristic action and motivation shared by Roman armies, 
bandits and pirates. Livy at one point describing plundering in Bruttium in 205B.C. 
seems to be uncomfortably aware that there is little difference between the actions of 
the Romans and those of the Bruttian 'bandits', and excuses the Romans plunderings 
as the result of an 'illness'. He claims there was 'Iatrocinium rather than iustum 
bellum' being carried out between the Numidians and the Bruttians, but defends the 
Romans soldiers' actions because as the result of 'some sort of disease' they also 
joined in, going into the fields as far as permitted in their plundering raids. 39 The 
description 'iustum bellum' in one sense derives from a pompous sense of Roman 
snobbery, that 'barbarians' could only commit banditry. Despite their apparent 
sophistication however, the Roman military on occasion still used methods that would 
otherwise be called 'banditry'. 40 
The dangers posed by enemies and bandits were so similar that they are often 
mentioned in the same phrase in the laws, for example; a borrower was not responsible 
for the attacks of bandits or enemies; a slave was not labelled a fugitive if he escaped 
37 Shaw (1984) p24. Also Ormerod (1924) p71 f. 
38 Alston (1995) pl Intro., notes that the army in the early Republic "...was, like the armies of 
many other ancient city states, a citizen militia, gathered every summer to fight the enemies of the 
state in wars which sometimes appear more like extended bandit raids." 
39 Livy 29.6.2: "Latrociniis magis quam iusto bello in Bruttiis gerebantur res, principio ab 
Numidis facto et Bruttiis non societate magis Punica quam suopte ingenio con gruentibus in eum 
morem: postremo Romani quo que milites jam contagione quadam rapto gaudentes, quantum per duces 
licebat, excursiones in hostium agros facere." The Bruttii are earlier said to have trained their soldiers 
through banditry, 28.12.9. Note also 22.9.5 where Hannibal's soldiers delight in booty and plundering 
rather than peace and quiet. 
40 In this context the perception of St. Augustine is apparent: "And so with justice removed, what 
are kingdoms except a great group of bandits? And what are bandit gangs except little kingdoms?" 
(Remora itaque iustitia quid sunt regna nisi magna latrocinia? quia et latrocinia quid sunt nisi parua 
re gna?) De Civ. Dei 4.4. Cf. also Curtius Rufus, Hist. Alex. 7.8.19, who has the Scythian 
envoys say to Alexander: "At tu, qui te gloriaris ad latrones persequendos venire, omnium gentium 
quas adisti latro es." Garlan (1978) p2 briefly notes that the " —vocabulaire de la piraterie interfere 
largement avec celui de la guerre (reguliere)...". 
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from an enemy or bandits, and it was possible to make a gift mortis causa because of 
the proximity of death from enemies or bandits. 41 Cicero declared that no oath 
should be sworn with a pirate because he was not a proper enemy, yet paradoxically he 
was still the common enemy of all; "...nam pirata non est ex perduellium numero 
definitus, sed communis hostis omnium; cum hoc nec fides debet nec ius iurandum 
esse commune."42 He acknowledges that these criminals were enemies of the 
individual Roman in a practical, life-threatening sense in contrast to the formal legal 
definition. 
Banditry and piracy or rather the method of plundering attacks could be used to 
begin a war, as a tactic in avoiding outright war or in war itself. Although legally and 
morally there was a large gap between war and banditry, there could be little practical 
difference in the actual fighting. 43 Livy records that in 196B.C., the Thebans and 
Boeotians, angry at a murder they believed was done with Roman connivance and 
"lacking an army or a leader", are said to have turned to banditry which was "closest to 
war", by coming upon some soldiers in taverns, on others as they travelled, luring 
them to their hiding places into an ambush, or to deserted inns by a trick. 44 In the 
41 Dig. 13.6.18.pr; 21.1.17.3 and 39.6.3.pr. See also the laws listed in n146. Also Seneca De 
Ben. 6.15.8: "The wall keeps us safe from enemies and from sudden attacks of bandits..." (Muros 
nos ab hostibus tutos et a subitis latronum incursionibus praestat...); and he reminds Lucilius that 
both an enemy and a bandit are able to cut his throat: "Cogite posse et latronem et hostem admovere 
iugulo tuo gladium...". Ep. Mor. ad Luc'. 4.8. 
42 De Off. 3.107. He also mentions this notion briefly against Verres: "praedones...qui cum 
hostes communes sint omnium...", In Verr. 2.4.21. It is also echoed by the Elder Pliny: "...piratis 
etiam omnium mortalium hostibus transituros fama terrentibus...", N.H. 2.117. Polybius makes a 
similar statement about the Illyrians after their outbreak of large-scale piracy in 231 - 229B.C.: "oti 
ydp ncrlv, dAyld Tram, rare KOLPObg 1X01301./g ervat oweBatve Toiic 'I AAuptotic." On the 
Illyrians, Dell (1970) p36 observes that an Illyrian leader's main task was to 'lead the Illyrians in war, 
that is raiding.' 
43 Strabo 17.1.53 writing on nomadic tribes in southern Egypt, comments that they were neither 
many nor warlike, though they were once thought to be so because of the banditry they inflicted on 
defenceless people. Cf. Demosthenes, First Philippic 23, where he suggests a small force be chosen 
to commit banditry (Aucr-reziet0 against Philip since 'regular battle' was not yet possible: cf.also 
Pausanias, 1.7.3. 
44 Livy 33.29.2: "...proximum bello quod erat...". A similar wish to avoid battle prompted 
Masinissa in his war with Numidian Syphax to retreat with his few followers to a mountain and carry 
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end, Livy says, these crimes were committed not only from hatred of the Romans, but 
from greed for booty, for any money the soldiers carried. This last reason is typically 
the motivation of bandits and pirates, but of state armies too. The intertwining of 
banditry and war is denied by the Roman writers on a moral level, yet aknowleged on 
a practical basis. When the Romans invaded the country of the Volsci in 378B.C., 
after their borders had been raided by the Volscians, Livy says they plundered in a 
much better manner, laying waste the land not in 'the manner of banditry', like the 
Volsci, but severely, with more time and using a 'proper anny'. 45 Such a description 
of the retaliatory raids using the same methods as their opponents, slandered as 
banditry, demonstrates the hypocrisy of Livy's (and ultimately the Roman) position, 
and the fluid nature of the dividing line between war and banditry. It is not surprising 
then that deserters, veterans and even auxiliaries in the army could turn to banditry. As 
Shaw observes, "The professional soldier was...always a potential bandit."46 
During the Second Punic War in 213/2B.C. as a subterfuge to disguise his 
advance on Tarentum, Hannibal arranged for almost eighty Numidian horsemen to 
ride ahead, killing those they met, so that those living nearby would have the 
impression of bandits raiding rather than that of an approaching army.47 Earlier in the 
war in 215B.C. the Romans had been harassing and raiding the Campanians, who had 
- 
gone over to Hannibal. Livy reports that the Hirpini and the Samnites sent 
ambassadors to Hannibal to complain that the proconsul Marcus Marcellus from his 
base at Nola was sending out destructive raiding parties, 'not in maniples. but in the 
manner of bandits', (jam ne manipulatim sed latronum modo). 48 The use of banditry 
as a means of provocation in war was implemented by both sides, not only non- 
out banditry raids, 29.31.11. 
45 Livy 6.31.6. 
46 Shaw (1993) p314. 
47 Livy 25.9.3: "...ut praedonum magis quam exercitus accolis species esset."; Polybius 8.26.4. 
says that some people were to be captured, rather than killed, while others reported their presence in 
the town. 
48 Livy 23.42.10. 
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Romans. Occasionally it was difficult for even comtemporaries to decided whether a 
foe was committing war or not. Tacitus comments that the Parthian king Vologeses in 
A.D.62 decided to go to war with the Armenians since their ruler, the Roman-backed 
king Tigranes, seemed to have gone to war with a neighbour; he had been plundering 
the border country Adiabene "...too widely and too long..." for it to be banditry. 49 
Despite the legal importance of a formal declaration of war, an important factor 
in labelling an action 'banditry' rather than 'warfare' was a moral judgement of the 
situation, not from the purposes of the people committing the violence, important for 
purposes of identification today, but from the manner of the attacks and the size of 
the band. 5° Fronto comments that "(those whose) plunderings caused disasters, I 
consider in the category of bandits rather than of enemies...". 51 Lucius Licinius 
Crassus, the consul in 95 B.C., in search of a triumph is reported by Cicero to have 
destroyed 'certain people' (significantly unnamed) who were unworthy of the name 
'enemy', "...quosdam in citeriore Gallia nullo illustri neque certo duce neque eo 
nomine neque numero praeditos uti digni essent qui hostes populi Romani esse 
dicerentur, qui tamen excursionibus et latrociniis infestam provinciam 
redderent...".52 
Livy's opinion on the Romans' disagreements with the Veientes in Etruria in the 
early fifth century B.C., was that at one point, the matter could be considered 
"...neither peace nor war...the matter was closest in appearance to banditry", because 
the Veientes retreated from the Roman legions, but raided the fields in their 
absence.53 Sallust describes the disorganised combat in a battle in the Jugurthine 
49 Tac. Ann. 15.1: "...quippe egressus Armenia Tigranes Adiabenos, conterminam nationem, 
latius ac diutius quam per latrocinia vastaverat..." 
50 MacDonald (1984) p77 notes the same disregard for purpose in the Greek world: "...the Greeks 
used the same vocabulary to describe all piratical behaviour, regardless of motivation." 
51 Principia Historiae 2.3: "...<direp>tiones clades ediderunt, latronum potius quam hostium 
numero duco." 
52 Cicero De Inv. 2.111. Compare Varro 1.16.2 lamenting the banditry of 'certain peoples' 
(quosdam) in Sardinia and Spain with a similar lack of nomenclature. 
53 Livy 2.48.5: "Ex eo tempore neque pax neque bellum cum Veientibus fuit; res proxime 
formam latrocinii venerat." Garlan (1975) p25 claims that this and other examples that Livy 
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War, following an attack by the Moorish and Gaetulian cavalry on the Romans, as a 
fight "...more like banditry than war, without standards, without order, horsemen and 
footsoldiers mixed together, some yielding, others being cut down... ". 54 Tacitus 
views the skirmishes against attacking tribes in Britain after the capture of Caratacus in 
A.D.51 as bandit-like, because of their disorganisation; because they were sometimes 
carried out unordered and without the knowledge of the military leaders, and for the 
motives of anger or booty, in place of the more honourable gloria. 55 The 
disorganisation of bandits is emphasised by ancient authors because they did not have 
the formality of the Roman army system, though even to simply raid and disappear 
requires some elementary form of organisation and planning among the attackers. 56 
That the notion of disorganisation seems synonymous with banditry is noted by 
Matthews over the confusion between the two sorts of 'Arabs' in Ammianus; for 
ancient writers, "...all of the race were described at will as robbers and bandits; this is 
perhaps how Ammianus could assume that the province of Arabia was formed because 
of the disorder of its people."57 
The overriding factor in labelling some actions as banditry was essentially a 
matter for the writer's opinion and his moral judgement. Despite its usefulness as a 
describes as not quite war "...cast doubt not so much on the information of the historian.. .as upon the 
possibility - given his inadequate concepts and anachronistic vocabulary - of his characterising, let 
alone of his understanding, what really happened so long before." 
54 Sallust Jugurthine War, 97.5: "...pugna latrocinio magis quam proelio similis fieri. sine 
signis, sine ordinibus equites peditesque permixti...". (This is not a derogatory but a descriptive 
adjective of the confusion, for otherwise Sallust praises the Romans' virtus.) Livy has a similar 
theme at 8.34.10; without military discipline, 'blind fortune in the manner of banditry would take the 
place of the sacred ways of war': "...iussu iniussu pugnent, et non signa, non ordines servent, 
latrocinii modo caeca et fortuita pro sollemni et sacrata militia sit...". 
55 Tac. Ann 12.39: "Crebra hinc proelia, et saepius in modum latrocinii per saltus per paludes, ut 
cuique sors aut virtus, temere proviso, ob iram ob praedam, iussu et aliquando ignaris ducibus...". 
56 Flam-Zuckermann's opinion on the efficacy of the bandit 'pack' however is extreme: "Ce qui fait 
la force de la meute, c'est son unite d'action, l'intensite des relations entre ses membres et 
l'infaillibilite de sa direction." 
57 Matthews (1989), p348. In 399A.D. a certain Valentinus of Selga gathered slaves and farmers 
who had gained experience by fighting bandits to resist Tribigildus and his Goths. (Zos. 5.15.5.). 
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tactic in war, to use raiding and plundering as a strategy was not highly esteemed. To 
fight 'bandit-fashion' was not an honourable method of warfare; it was seen as the 
refuge of cowards, for desperate, treacherous, deceitful men who couldn't or wouldn't 
fight in open battle; in short to the Romans to fight like a bandit was to be associated 
with the very qualities ascribed to bandits and pirates. To fight courageously in open, 
declared battle was seen as an effective method of obtaining gloricz, but to covertly 
ambush and plunder, to fight like a bandit, was not. 58 Ancient writers refer 
disapprovingly to those who fought in the manner of banditry, and a comparison of 
the tactics of those fighting against the Romans to latrocinium was an effective form 
of disparagement. The methods of various tribes were often denigrated by the writer 
patronisingly referring to them as 'banditry', although their formal legal status may 
have been that of an enemy in a war. Today it evident that these tribes were acting in 
this manner for various reasons, such as hunger or rebellion; but the label of banditry 
is for the ancient authors both a descriptive and derogative adjective used to refer to 
their methods, regardless of their formal status, not their intent in acting in such a 
manner. For example, the Ligurian Ingauni fought both on land and on sea against 
the Romans, beginning in 182B.C. After they besieged the Romans in their camp 
during a truce, Livy has the commander, L. Aemilius Paulus, exhort the soldiers to 
fight by first blaming the deceit of the enemy (fraudem hostium) which was against 
the law of nations (contra ius gentium) and then showing how shameful it was for the 
Romans to be besieged by the Ligurians, whom he deprecates as mere 'bandits' rather 
58 The image of Proculus, who lived in Albingaunum in the second half of the third century, suffers 
from his alleged descent from bandits; he is described by the writer of the Historia Augusta as 
"...domi nobilis sed maioribus latrocinantibus..." and despite being a tribune, the stigma of banditry 
overshadowed his deeds: "...idemque fortissimus,ipse quoque latrociniis adsuetus , qui tamen armatam 
semper egerit vitam. nam et multis legionibus tribunus praefuit et fortia edidit facta." Proculus is 
said to have 'destroyed' the Alamanni, though there is a derogatory aside attached: "n am 
Alamannos...non sine gloriae splendore contrivit, numquam aliter quam latrocinandi pugnans modo." 
The besmirching of his name is easily accounted for by the fact that he was involved in an attempt to 
usurp imperial power, which was foiled by Probus. (HA, Quad. Tyr., 12 - 13; Eutropius, 9.17; 
CIL 3738). Cf. also the derision of Philip the Arab as the son of an Arabian bandit,. Epit. De Caes. 
28.4. 
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than proper enemies, "...quantus pudor esset...ab Liguribus, latronibus verius quam 
hostibus iustis, Romanum exercitum obsideri." 59 The general's speech ends with 
the comment that before the siege, the Romans could scarcely find them as they 'lay 
low', the usual cowardly action of bandits, "...scrutantes ante devios saltus abditum 
et latentem vix inveniebamus." 6° The Romans eventually broke from their 
compound onto the Ligurians, who are portrayed as having become complacent, not 
taking up their arms until they were sated with food and drink, and then going out 
disorganised. After this description it is no surprise to hear that they were completely 
routed after the brief 'semblance of a fight'. Later, when the Ingauni had surrendered, 
the pilots and sailors on the raiding ships were taken and 32 other ships 'of this kind' 
were captured by. the duumvir.61 Livy's account is designed to paint the enemy 
Ligurians as ignominious cowards, and this is emphasised by the references to their 
'plundering ships' (they did not fight in formal battle on the water either) and to the 
shame they would incur if beaten by 'bandits'. Ironically, if the Ligurians had been 
operating on a smaller scale, (Livy claims 15,000 Ligurians were killed and 2300 
captured), it is probable that the campaign would not have been defined as war. It 
was no doubt the large number of the slain that gave general Aemilius Paulus his 
triumph, rather than the less than outstanding performance or achievements of the 
Roman army. It was the manner of their battle that easily enabled Livy to portray 
them as bandits, despite their enemy status. 62 Similarly, Livy's account of the 
Volsci tribe in their dispute with Rome in 378B.C. He heavily emphasises the 
cowardice of the Volscians' actions, saying that they carried out raids hastily through - 
their trepidation (per trepidationem), fearing the enemy's courage (virtutem 
metuens), and that since they feared drawing the Roman army out, raids were carried 
59 Livy 40.27.9-10. 
60 . vy 1.,1 	40.27.13. 
61 Livy 40.28.7-8. Plutarch Aemil. 6.3 says they were sailing as far as the pillars of Hercules with 
their 'piratical boats' (cncdOcat iretpanicois-). 
62 Their reputation was such that Servius In Vergilii Aeneidos Libros 11.715, quotes Nigidius' 
opinion of the notorious Ligurians as "...latrones, insidiosi, fallaces, mendaces" 
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out only on the borders.63 What were seen as the methods of banditry were thus 
easily manipulated by pro-Roman writers to cast a slur on Rome's opponents. 
Sertorius is said to have been admired by his 'barbarian' Spanish allies because he 
introduced Roman military methods and channelled their frenzy into formal battle-order 
and an army from, Plutarch comments, a 'great group of bandits'. 64 The 
Sarmatians and the Quadi, on raiding Pannonia, are described by Ammianus as 'more 
suited to banditry than open war'. 65 In Tacitus' account of the war begun in A.D.17 
in northern Africa, Tacfarinas, the leader of those fighting Rome, is said to have 
drawn his army from 'wanderers accustomed to banditry for plunder and robbery', 
and then used it in plundering raids in a war that continued sporadically despite defeats 
from proconsular armies until A.D.24. 66 The Romans though were not deterred from 
using these 'barbarian bandits' in their armies. Tacitus decribes the Mauri attached to 
the Roman forces in Africa in A.D.69 as suited to war through banditry and 
plundering.° 
The practical similarities and interweaving between war and banditry resulted in 
63 Livy 6.31.6-7: "...populatio itaque non illi vagae similis, quam Volscus latrocinit more, 
discordiae hostiumfretus et virtutem metuens, per trepidationem raptim fecerat, sed ab iusto exercitu 
iusta ira facta, spatio quoque temporis gravior. Quippe a Volscis timentibus ne interim exercitus ab 
Roma exiret incursiones in extrema finium factae erant...". Livy 28.32.9 similarly deprecates the 
Spanish Ilergetes through the voice of Scipio Africanus, who argues that their rebellion in the late 
third century B.C. deserved punishment even though they were bandits who only had strength for 
plundering, burning and stealing, not for fighting in battle-line. After the description of the 
subsequent defeat of the tribe, Livy's final comment (28.34.2) is that there would have been fewer 
casualties if the battle had been fought on more open ground, thus enabling an easier escape for them: 
"Minus cruenta victoria fuisset, si patentiore campo et ad fugam capessendamfacili foret pugnatutn." 
Cf. Polybius 11.31-35 who includes the name of the rebellion leader, Andobales, which Livy either 
did not have or purposefully omitted. If deliberate, it further emphasises the anonymity and 
insignificance for the Romans of such peoples. 
64 Plutarch Sertorius 14: "...Aucm7p1ou peydAott...". 
65 Amm. Mar. 17.12.2: "Quibus ad latrocinia magis quam aperto habilibus Marti...". This is 
echoed at 29.6.8: the Sarmatians and the Quadi were "...ad raptus et latrocinia gentes aptissirnae...", 
and previously at 16.10.20: the Sarmatians are "...latrocinandi peritissimum genus...". 
66 Tacitus Ann. 2.52: "...vagos primum et latrociniis suetos ad praedam et raptus congregare. dein 
more militiae per vexilla et turmas componere...". 
67 Tacitus list. 2.58. 
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the situation in which to distinguish between a 'bandit' and a formal enemy of the 
Roman state could in certain instances be impossible for a victim. For legal purposes, 
however, it could be crucial. The capture of a male traveller by hostes affected his 
status as a citizen and consequently his ability to leave a legally binding will. It seems 
that a decision on his status could rest merely on an official declaration of war and 
whether or not his captors had officially been declared 'enemies'. For the captive, the 
distinction between formal hostes and certain groups of latrones could thus be 
difficult, as Ulpian acknowledges, 
If anyone is uncertain whether he is a captive or is watched over by bandits, he 
is not able to make a will. But if he does not know that he is sui iuris and thinks 
that, through error, that because he has been captured by bandits, he is a slave, 
as if of the enemy, or a legate who thinks that he is no different from a captive, it 
is decided that he is not able to leave afideicommissum. 68 
Obviously a victim could identify formal battle-lines between enemies as part of a war, 
but skirmishes could be problematic. War may have been formal on the Roman's 
behalf; the enemy's or bandits' concern with such matters could be negligible. 
The Romans did not have a law specifically concerned with pirates 69 (piratae), 
though they are mentioned, for example, as reasons for foregoing liability. 70 They 
did however have laws which refer to praedones in addition to latrones. The word 
praedo has two usages in Latin71 : one is a legal term used to refer to someone who 
68 Dig. 32.1.1: Si incertus quis sit, captiuus sit an a latrunculis obsessus, testamentum facere non 
potest. sed et si sui iuris sit ignarus putetque se per errorem, quia a latronibus captus est, seruum 
esse uelut hostium, uel legatus qui nihil se a captiuo differe putat, non posse fideicommittere cerium 
est, quia nec testari potest, qui, an liceat sibi testari, dubitat. At 49.15.19.2: "A piratis aut 
latroni bus capti liberi permanent." 
69 As Berger (1953) p361 notes also. 
70 The word pirata only occurs six times and piratica once in the Digest; 4.9.3.1; 13.6.18 (three 
times); 14.2.2.3; 44.7.20 (piratica) and 49.15.19.2. 
71 OLD: "1. One who lives by robbery, a brigand; a pirate. 2. (leg.) One who takes illegal 
possession with mens rea (opp. bonae fidei)." (p1429). Berger (1953) p642.: "A robber, pillager; in 
a broader sense, any possessor in bad faith (possessor malae fidei) who seized another's property 
without legal grounds." 
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usurps another's property (land, for example, or an inheritance) and uses it. 72 These 
praedones were theoretically liable to prosecution, as they occupied land for example, 
and were therefore more 'visible' and not as mobile as the raiding and pillaging bandits 
and many laws dealt with them. 73 The other usage is the more common 
'bandit/plunderer' meaning. Both terms are used to describe someone who takes 
another's property without their permission. 
The familiar, non-legal use of praedo can not only refer to bandits but also to 
pirates, a situation which suggests that the Romans categorised pirates as maritime 
bandits, which is implied also by the lack of a specific law dealing with the punishment 
of pirates; they were simply to be judged as bandits. 74 The dual role of this praedo 
can cause a difficulty in deciding whether the writer means a bandit or a pirate, though 
the context usually makes it clear. For example, Ulpian wrote concerning the capture 
of a ship that someone was seen as storming the ship who seized something when 
fighting with the ship, whether he stormed it himself or seized it from the attacking 
praedones.75 This obviously refers to pirates, through it is not always translated as 
such. Significantly, in a further clause in the same law, Labeo rules that this edict 
should apply not only to ships, but to houses and villas, because bandits could attack 
both; "Labeo scribit aequum fuisse, ut, siue de domo siue in villa expugnatis aliquid 
rapiatur, huic edicto locus sit: nec enim minus in marl quam in villa per latrunculos 
a broader sense, any possessor in bad faith (possessor malae fidei) who seized another's property 
without legal grounds." 
72 Watson's Digest uses the terms 'usurper' or 'grabber' for this praedo. 
73 Digest 5.3.11.1; 5.3.13.8; 5.3.13.13; 5.3.19.2; 5.3.22; 5.3.25.3; 5.3.25.5; 5.3.25.7: 5.3.25.17; 
5.3.28; 5.3.31; 5.3.31.1; 5.3.31.4; 5.3.36.3; 5.3.36.4; 5.3.36.5; 5.3.38; 5.3.39.1; 5.3.40: 5.3.40.1; 
5.3.46; 7.1.12.4; 9.4.13 (A noxal action (an action taken for damage caused by slaves) can be 
sustained by praedones); 10.3.7.4; 11.3.13.1; 12.6.55; 13.6.16; 13.7.22.2; 16.3.1.39: 25.5.1.3; 
26.10.3.15; 29.4.1.9; 41.2.5; 43.16.10; 46.3.34.9; 50.17.126 "Nemo praedo est, qui pretium 
numerauit." 
74 Braund (1993) p205-6 notes the interweaving of bandits and pirates. 
75 Dig. 47.9.3.1 "Expugnare videtur, qui in ipso quasi proelio et pugna adversus navem et ratem 
aliquid rapit, sive expugnet sive praedonibus expugnantibus rapiat." Neither Scott's or Watson's 
Digest translations use 'pirates' for praedonibus; they use 'brigands' (Watson) or 'robbers' (Scott). 
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inquietamur uel infestari possumus."76 
The phrase 'maritime bandits' or 'banditry', using latro, latrocinium or 
maritimus praedo when referring to piracy, is found elsewhere. Cicero often uses 
praedo in addition to pirata when referring to pirates in his speeches against Verres; 
that it has a general sense meaning 'robber' is indicated when at one point he refers to 
inland farmers who have never feared a sea-going praedo, "...qui nomen numquam 
timuissent maritimi praedonis...". 77 In other texts he claims that the Etruscans were 
a maritime people for the sake of banditry (causa latrocinandi), and expresses his 
disbelief that the (pirate) Cretans and (bandit) Aetolians could think that to commit 
banditry (latrocinari) was honourable. 78 Cornelius Nepos wrote that Themistocles 
made the sea safe by pursuing the maritimos praedones." Under the chapter 
heading of BeIlum Piraticum, which was added by a later copyist, Florus refers to the 
Cilician pirates as latrones twice before using pirata." Livy uses this phrasing 
several times. He describes how a Roman fleet was spied off the coast during the 
Punic War in 217B.C. from one of the watchtowers the Spanish used as a lookout for 
76 Dig. 47.9.3.2. 
77 Cic. In Verr. 2.5.70. Interestingly, Cicero doesn't once use pirata in his speech De Imp. Cn. 
Pompei, delivered in 66 (after Pompey's success against the pirates the previous year) in order to 
support Manilius' law to give Pompey command of the war against Mithridates. He refers to the 
pirates 14 times, always with praedo; sections 31; 32 (three times); 33 (six times); 35; 52; 55; and 
63. It suggests that Cicero considered praedo a better word rhetorically, carrying the negative 
overtones associated with the word 'bandit' more strongly and effectively than pirata. Quintilian 
objected to archipirata ending a sentence on metrical gounds, Inst. Oral. 9.4.64, "...Ciceronem 
carpant in his, Familiaris coeperat esse balneatori, et non minus dura archipiratae.", and also at 
9.4.97. 
78 De Repub. 2.9 "...nam e barbaris quidem ipsis nulli erant antea maritumi praeter Etruscos et 
Poenos, alteri mercandi causa, latrocinandi alteri." and 3.15 "vitae vero instituta sic distant, ut Cretes 
et Aetoli latrocinari honestum putent...". (For Aetolian banditry and their attitude towards glory and 
piracy, see Thuc., 1.5.) Similarly, Justin, 43.3.5 on the Phoceans in the time of King Tarquin: 
"...piscando mercandoque, plerumque etiam latrocinio mans, quod illis temporibus gloriae habebatur, 
vitam tolerabant." 
79 Nepos Vit. Them. 2.3. 
80 Flor. 1.41; Forster, p. xii of Loeb edition of Florus, 1929. The disturbances in Asia gave a 
boldness to those "...perditis furiosisque latronibus...", and under their leader Isidorus committed 
piracies (latrocinabantur). 
24 
pirates (latrones). 81 Under the events of 348B.C. Livy records that the winter was 
so bitter that Gauls on the Alban hills came down to pillage the countryside and coastal 
areas. The sea was "infested with fleets of Greeks" and the two sides clashed. "the 
maritime bandits with the land", but despite a battle both groups withdrew uncertain of 
the victor.82 The Blyrians, Liburnians and (H)Istrians are described as "fierce races 
and famous for the most part from their maritime banditry". 83 In the summary of 
Livy's book 68 is the statement, "M. Antonius praetor in Ciliciam maritimos 
praedones lid est piratas] persecutus est." 84 The explanatory gloss demonstrates 
how this phrasing later disappeared so completely in favour of the more precise pirata 
for pirates that it was felt necessary to give an explanation. 85 Other examples are 
found in Eutropius, Festus, Horace, the declamations ascribed to Quintilian, the 
writings of both Senecas, (the Elder uses pirata often), Strabo, Valerius Maximus and 
Velleius Paterculus. 86 The widespread usage of this phrasing indicates that there 
81 • •vy Li 22.19.6: "...speculis et propugnaculis adversus latrones utuntur." 
82 Livy 7.25.4. "...praedones maritimi cum terrestribus...". 
83 Livy 10.2.4. "...gentes ferae et magna ex parte latrociniis maritimis infames...". 
84 Weissenborn & Miiller, (eds) Tin i Livi Ab Urbe Condita, (Berlin 1881), p151. Other Livian 
examples: At 5.28.3, reporting that three Roman gift-bearers sent to Delphi in 394B.C. had been 
intercepted by Liparean pirates (piratae), he notes that it was their custom to divide the booty as if 
public banditry, "Mos erat civitatis velut publico latrocinio partam praedam dividere." The Lipareans 
were attacking a ship belonging to the Romans, who were, being from Etruria; - considered allies of 
their enemies the Carthaginians, as the Etruscans had a treaty with the Carthaginians who had levied a 
payment of 30 talents on the Lipareans in 396 (Diod. Sic. 14.56.2 and Ogilvie, (1965), p689). 
Ogilvie comments that the Lipareans' "...seafaring freedom, [is] vulgarly termed 'piracy'...". Raiding 
however was an effective way of annoying an enemy, and it stopped short of formal war. It 
epitomises the Digest definition that those not publically declared enemies are bandits. In this 
description of the Lipareans' actions therefore, Livy 37.12.1 thus both denigrates the Romans' 
opponents and accurately (in the broad Roman sense of 'accurate') defines their actions. In the early 
second century, the Spartan Hybristas was making the sea unsafe with his fatrocinium. Other 
references at 38.32.2; 40.18.4; 40.42.1 and Per. 128. 
85 St. Augustine De Civit. Dei 4.4 uses both pirata and latro to refer to the pirate who is 
supposed to have met Alexander the Great. The story probably comes from Cicero (De Repub. 3.14), 
but whether Augustine repeats the latro from Cicero cannot be ascertained from the Ciceronian 
fragment. 
86 Eutropius 3.7; Festus Brev. 12 (Cilices et lsauros, qui se piratis ac praedonibus maritimis 
iunxerant...); Horace Epode 4; Pseudo-Quintilian Decl. Maiores, 6.4.1; 6.6.15: 9.4.5 (infestum 
25 
was, at least among the upper classes, a tendency to think of pirates as sea-going 
bandits. As most types of violence other than properly declared war were simply 
called latrocinium, piracy was regarded similarly, being merely a sort of 'watery 
banditry', and was covered by the same terminology. 87 
The difficulty for the translator in deciding whether praedo refers either to 
banditry or piracy is evident in the different versions of Ulpian's definition between 
bandits and enemies. It seems more probable that it refers to pirates. (" ...ceteri 
latrunculi uel praedones appellantur"), though it is has been interpreted and translated 
as being two variations on 'bandit'. Watson's Digest gives 'robbers or bandits' for 
this definition, though for Quintus Mucius' explanation at 50.16.1 1 8 (' latrones aut 
praedOnes 1), 'brigands or pirates' is given. Scott's Digest offers 'robbers and 
brigands' for both. Shaw translates it as 'bandits or plunderers'. 88 Braund does feel 
it refers to piracy, though he views Ulpian as "...responding not only to theoretical 
considerations, but to the realities of banditry and piracy in his world. Bandits took to 
the sea, while pirates operated on land." 89 However Ulpian's main focus in this law 
is to define as enemies those upon whom the Romans had publically declared war, or 
whom had declared war on the Romans, rather than to define pirates or bandits. 
Enemies were liable to attack by land or sea, so that when Ulpian continues to say that 
latronibus mare); 9.5.6; 9.12.13; 9.20.7; 9.20.25 (maria latrociniis infesta); 9.21.6: 12.20.21: the 
younger Seneca De Ben. 7.15.1 (infesta latrociniis litora); the elder Seneca Cont. 1.2.8, "...simul 
terras et maria latrocinantes..."; Strabo 11.2.12; at 14.5.6 he describes Cilicia Tracheia as naturally 
suited to Auartfpta on land and sea; Trogus Prol. Hist. Phil. 39: "Ut Syriam I udaei et Arabes 
terrestribus latrociniis infestarint..."; Val. Max. 6.9.15, Julius Caesar was captured "...a maritimis - 
praedonibus..."; Veil. Pat. 2.31.2: he says Gabinius' law was introduced since the pirates terrified the 
world "...belli more, non latrociniorum..."; 2.73.3, Sextus Pompey is said to have infested the sea 
"...latrociniis ac praedationibus...". 
87 A writer on modem south-east Asian piracy comes to the same conclusion: "Despite the variety of 
acts encompassed by definitions of piracy, it is reasonable io suggest that most piracy is simply 
robbery or banditry made distinctive only by the fact that it occurs on water." (Vng. (1995) p65.) 
Hobsbawm (1969) p26 briefly comments similarly on Asian piracy. 
88 Shaw (1993), p305. 
89 Braund (1993) p196. Humbert (1904) p991 also takes it to mean les pirates'. 
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'the rest are bandits or pirates', he is not so much 'responding to reality' in this law, as 
covering both the land and sea operations of enemies. In addition, it seems appropriate 
to interpret praedones as 'pirates' in these laws for the reason that it was unnecessary 
for the jurists to include two words meaning 'bandit' in a compact definition if they 
simply wanted to refer to bandits; latrunculus and latro covers a wide spectrum of 
offenders, including 'plunderers'. Braund sees it as 
scarcely surprising, therefore, that our sources seldom offer neat distinctions 
between 'bandit' and 'pirate': all-embracing terms like latro and leistes are used 
to encompass bandits, pirates and others, 'since', as Shaw rightly observes, "all 
form part of a common threat to the same provincial order". 9° 
Such terms would seem to derive less from the feeling that they are a 'threat to 
provincial order' than from a pragmatic recognition of the methods both use; raiding, 
plundering, sudden attacks and ambushes, kidnapping and ransom are all methods 
employed by both bandits and pirates to obtain booty. It did not matter to the Romans 
whether a latro attacked on the coast road or in the mountains or on the sea; he was 
still a bandit. 
(ii) The transition from latro or praedo to hostis 
It was possible to move from the status of bandit to enemy simply by increasing 
the scale of activities. The most well-known example of this change is that of the 
Cilician pirates in the late Republic, whose raids had increased in size and daring to the 
extent that their attacks had extended to the Italian coasts, and had even destroyed a 
fleet in Ostia.91 The close proximity of this threat to the Roman state prompted a 
hasty change to enemy status for the pirates. The tribune Gabinius proposed in 
67B.C. that unlimited imperium be given to Gnaeus Pompey to conduct a war against 
the pirates, since they were now conducting raids as if enemies, "...since in the 
90 Braund (1993) p196 quoting Shaw (1984) p14. Dell (1967) p349n23 notes the diverse meaning 
of A9crrpuck referring to a passage in Strabo 7.5.10 on Illyria which could be interpreted as either 
banditry or piracy. GarIan (1978) p2 also notes the application of both terms for piracy and banditry. 
91 Cic. De imp.33; Dio, 36.22. 
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manner of war, not piracy, the pirates now terrify the world with their fleets, not with 
secret expeditions and even pillaged certain towns of Italy... "92  They had clearly 
demonstrated their openness of intent, but had not changed their methods of attack. 
Appian claims the pirates themselves recognised that their status had changed, 
disdaining the name of pirates, "...now holding the name of pirates in ill-esteem, 
calling their pay 'soldiers' pay'. Appian also refers to the fears that such a war 
caused because it did not conform to the usual rules of war, since the enemy would 
appear and disappear.93 
The notorious bandit Maternus in the late second century A.D. began his 
activities with a small group of accomplices, but after gathering a larger group with the 
lure of booty, Herodian says they "...no longer had the rank of bandits but of 
enetnies."94 He continues with an account of the bandits attacking cities, releasing 
prisoners, and overrunning 'all' of Gaul and Spain, which so enraged the Emperor 
Commodus that he sent letters to the provincial governors, accusing them of 'laziness' 
or 'indifference' (Aq°vil(a) and ordered troops against Maternus and his company. It 
would seem more probable that the change in classification, the 'promotion' to enemy, 
occurred after they overran large areas, rather than before, (as Herodian has it), with 
Commodus' letters officially declaring them enemies. 95 
The size of the attack however, was no guarantee that the ancient writers would 
accord the attacker enemy status, despite his official standing. The outbreak caused by 
92 Veil. Pat. 2.31.2. "...cum belli more, non latrociniorum, orbem classibus iam, non furtiuis 
expeditionibus piratae terrerent quasdamque etiam Iraliae urbes dinPuissent...". 
93 App. M it h . 92-93: "...d8oeoCarreg iSi rd T3P Awn-tap &owl, iitcrOo)c i-KaAovv 
art-panu1)-m(06s." St. Augustine's anecdote about the pirate meeting Alexander the Great contains a 
pointed comment about differences being only in size; when asked why he committed piracy, the pirate 
retorted "Why do you?...because I do it in a small boat, I am called a latro; because you do it with a 
great fleet, you are an imperator." (De Civitat. Del 4.4.) 
94 Herodian 1.10.1. " 	 Auartai, (aid voile-pc "div IxEcv deittuia." Also noted by 
Braund (1993) p196n4. The translator of the Loeb (1969) p61 Whittaker, notes that it was "Probably 
the formal declaration of a iustum bellum." 
95 Shaw (1984) p45 sees the declaration of Maternus and allies as enemies as at an 'unspecified 
point', but given the apparent negligence of the provincial governors to act and the power of the 
emperor to declare war, it seems probable that it was Commodus' decision. 
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Tacfarinas in Africa eventually summoned the Roman army. A Numidian auxiliary, he 
is said to have soon become a deserter and gathered together 'wanderers accustomed to 
banditry, for booty and plunder', organised them into his army, and 'finally was made 
leader of the Musulamian tribe'.96 He had support from other African tribes, the 
Mauri (or Moors), the Cinithians and later the Garamantians, and together they 
persistently continued to cause the Romans problems for several years from A.D.17 to 
24 through their raids and sieges, despite defeats inflicted by several proconsuls' 
efforts.97 His tactics were those the Romans called banditry, and the label of a 
bandit was applied to him, though he was classified an enemy. Tiberius is said to have 
been furious at the effrontery of Tacfarinas when he sent an embassy demanding 
territory for himself and his army, and threatening war if it was not forthcoming, 
because he was a desertor et praedo acting in the manner of an enemy. 98 Yet 
Tiberius must have declared Tacfarinas a formal enemy, for Tacitus' account of 
Tacfarinas' activities begins, "In the same year, war (bellum) began in Africa with 
Tacfarinas as the leader of the enemy (hostium)."99 Tacitus refers to Tacfarinas 
drawing the Mauri into the bellum and dividing his exercitus on the Roman model. 
The first proconsul to face him, Furius Camillus, leading his legion and the auxiliaries 
towards the hostem, is said to be worried in case they tried (since they were only 
'bandits', is the inference) to escape the bellum through fear.M° Camillus inflicted a 
defeat, but Tacfarinas was annoyingly resilient, and soon renewed the bellum, raiding 
and plundering villages and finally surrounding a Roman cohort. Many of the cohort 
fled, cowardice for which the new proconsul Lucius Apronius, more concerned by the 
disgrace than the gloria hostis, had every tenth man flogged to death. 101 There are 
96 Tacitus Ann. 2.52: "...mox desertor vagos primum et latrociniis suetos ad praedam et raptus 
congregare, dein more militiae per vexilla et turmas componere, postremo non inconditae turbae sed 
Musulamiorum dux haberi." 
97 Tacitus Ann. 2.52; 3.74. 
98 Tacitus Ann. 3.73. He is also referred to as a latro in the same paragraph. 
99 Tac. Ann. 2.52: "Eodem anno coeptum in Africa bellum, duce hostium Tacfarinate." 
100 Tac. Ann. 2.52. 
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many other references to the 'war' and 'the enemy' in this account, whilst it is made 
clear by Tacitus at the same time that Tacfarinas and his forces were morally regarded 
as bandits. 102 By Roman standards, Tacfarinas was a bandit, but his incursions were 
on a large scale, and the dangers posed by and the damage caused by his army was 
such that he warranted the status of enemy.M3 By today's definition, he was not a 
bandit at all, but the leader of a Numidian tribe the Musulamians. The 'wanderers' 
accustomed to banditry that he gathered were probably in reality the 'nomadic' 
Musulamii in the first place, rather than that which has generally been accepted, that 
Tacfarinas collected groups of bandits, and then was also declared leader of the 
Musulamii. 104 It is only Tacitus' deprecation of them as 'those accustomed to 
banditry' (and he does not specifically call them 'bandits' but 'wanderers') which is 
misleading and led to misinterpretation. The 'banditry' of Tacitus was the raiding and 
plundering they carried out as tribespeople. 
These standards and attitudes towards bandits/enemies are again evident in the 
case of Viriathus. Together with his army in Lusitania he fought Roman forces for 
several years, from about 147 till 139B.C. Almost no writer that refers to Viriathus 
fails to mention that he 'was a bandit' before he became a leader. Appian, the source 
of most information about the campaigns, does not call him a bandit directly, but he 
describes Viriathus operating in the manner characterised by the Romans as bandit-
like, with tactics of attacking and swiftly retreating, ambushing Roman forces and 
plundering. 105 There is also a digression in which he refers to the 'other groups of 
101 Tac. Ann. 3.20 - 21. 
102 Tac. Ann. 3.21, 3.74, 4.13, 4.23 - 26. 
103 Aurelius Victor de Caesaribus, 2.3 distills all this down to banditry only; " ...compressaque 
Gaetulorum latrocinia, quae Tacfarinate duce passim proruperant." 
104 Accepted by Syme (1951) p115 and Dyson (1974) p163 who argues that "While preying on the 
Romans within the province he also won support in the Musulamii who found themselves harassed by 
the advance of these same settlers.", and sees Tacfarinas as providing an "extraordinary leadership to 
merge this combination of bandit and tribesmen." This assumes his gang was only attacking 
Romans, but if they were 'typical' bandits, their targets would not be restricted to Romans, but to the 
wealthy and those who possessed what they needed in way of provisions, who would include the 
Musulamians. 
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bandits' (Aucrafpta iroAAd eLUa) who, following Viriathus' example, were plundering 
Lusitania. 106 Other writers were not so subtle or restrained. Livy describes Viriathus 
beginning as a shepherd, then becoming hunter, from that to a bandit and progressing 
to be the leader of a 'proper' anny. 107 Cicero, in a discussion of bandits' division of 
booty, after Bardulis of Illyria, then refers to Viriathus of Lusitania. 108 Florus has a 
similar 'cursus' to Livy, but omits the shepherd part of his career. 109 Dio has him as 
a shepherd and a bandit, then a leader. 11° Strabo, like Cicero, simply calls him 'the 
bandit Viriathus', 11  and Frontinus says he went from being a bandit to a 
commander. 112 The author of de Viribus Illustribus lists Viriathus' beginnings as a 
mercenary, then a hunter, bandit and genera1. 113 Orosius says he was a shepherd and 
a bandit and then 'the greatest terror to all Romans'. 114 Velleius Paterculus calls him a 
bandit leader. 115 In Eutropius, he was first a shepherd, then a bandit leader. then 
'considered a liberator of the Spanish against the Romans'. 116 Diodorus Siculus has a 
twist on the usual story, with Viriathus first as a shepherd in conflict with wild beasts 
and bandits, then being chosen as a leader by the people, and gathering bandits round 
him, then with success, proclaiming himself no longer a bandit but a ruler (8f/vdcrnig), 
who fought the Romans. After this fragment from Photius, however, the next 
fragment simply begins with 'Viriathus, the bandit leader' (6 Ajcrrapxos). 117 
105 App. Sp. 62 and 67 attacking and retreating; 63 ambush, and 64 plundering tarpetania. 
106 App. Sp. 71 and also 73 (Auarripton, dikk)v). 
107 Livy Per. 52 "...primum ex pastore venator, ex venatore latro, mox iusti quo que exercitus dux 
factus...". 
108 Cic. De Off. 2.40. 
109 Florus 1.33.15: "Qui ex venatore latro, ex latrone subito dux atque imperator..." 
110 Dio Frag. 22.1: "...Aucrrds- re ytyome -v 1K trolitttios; Kai perci Tor/7o Kai cy-rparqyas." 
111 Strabo 3.4.5: "...Auctrij 06ptdetp...". 
112 Frontinus Strat. 2.5.7: "Viriathus, ex latrone dux Celtiberorum...". 
113 Auct. De Vir. III. 71. 
114 Orosius 5.4 "...pastoralis et latro...maximo terrori Romanis omnibus fuit." 
115 Veil. Pat. 2.1.3. 
116 Eutropius 4.16: "Pastor primo fuit, mox latronum dux, postremo tantos ad bellum populos 
concitavit, ut adsertor contra Romanos Hispaniae putaretur." 
117 Diod. Sic. 33.1.1 -5. 
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In all the stories of Viriathus' beginnings, though they may vary in other 
components of his career, with the exception of Appian who just implies it, no writer 
fails to say that Viriathus was a bandit. Though he had become an 'enemy' of the 
Roman people, he was still regarded as a barbarian bandit. This is no doubt an 
important reason why the treaty negotiated with Viriathus in 140B.C. by a desperate 
proconsul was considered disgraceful. Q. Fabius Maximus Servilianus, with his army 
defeated and driven against the cliffs, literally with his back to the wall came to an 
agreement with Viriathus. The treaty was ratified by the Senate, but only briefly. Q. 
Servilius Caepio, who replaced Servilianus in the province, complained to the Senate 
that the treaty was most unseemly for the Roman people. 118 This criticism is echoed 
in other texts; one fragment from Livy comments that Fabius Maximus 'stained' his 
record by making the treaty, and another fragment is more critical, declaring that he 
made a disgraceful peace (deformem pacem) with the enemy. 119 Diodorus calls the 
treaty 'unworthy of the Romans' (dvae(oug Tovatwv). 120 It seems difficult to believe 
that the treaty could be anything more than an attempt to extricate the Roman troops 
from a difficult position. The conditions of the treaty were that all of Viriathus' 
followers held the land they then occupied. 121 The lack of territory among the 
Lusitanians seems to have been responsible for the outbreaks of plundering and war 
with the Romans during the 150's and 140's B.C. 122 Rubinsohn-argues that the 
Senate intended to uphold the treaty, "...even if only temporarily (till the end of the 
Numantine war) or over a longer period of time." 123 In his view the treaty might have 
lasted longer if the complaining Caepio had not pressured the Senate from Spain. 124 
An alternative view is that the Senate ratified the treaty for a very short term to pacify 
118 App. Sp. 70 "...Inicrre:Ue 'Pavalow dupenarrd-rag etpat." 
119 Livy Per. 54 and Oxy. Per. 54. 
120 Diod. Sic. 33.1.4. 
121 App. Sp. 69. 
122 Rubinsohn (1981) p189 and App. Sp. 60, 61, 69 and 75. 
123 Rubinsohn (1981) pp194-199. 
124 Rubinsohn (1981) p202 and App. Sp. 70. 
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Viriathus, while waiting for the new year in which they could conduct another levy, 
for Appius Claudius and the tribune Tiberius Claudius Asellus had prevented two 
levies being conducted in one year. 125 Caepio cannot have been the only man in the 
Senate who considered this treaty unworthy of the Romans. His 'insistent prodding' 
apparently only when he arrived in the province may also be due to the fact that only 
on his arrival did he fully comprehend the situation and the need for more troops to 
counter Viriathus' bandit tactics. 126 The Senate gave Caepio permission to secretly 
annoy Viriathus, and seemingly only after his insistent letters, according to Appian, 
decided to break the treaty and declare war once again. However, this delay may also 
have been caused by the time needed to levy the troops in the new year (139B.C) and 
transport them to Lusitania. 
After the death of Viriathus, the Lusitanians were defeated and given land on 
which to settle, which, importantly, was then land of the Romans' choosing. This 
resulted in a peace on the Romans' terms, when they had the upper-hand, a more 
acceptable solution for Roman pride. As Cicero later said, 'no oath should be sworn 
with a pirate'; 127 a treaty with a bandit accorded him an equality of status with which 
no Roman would have been content. Viriathus' death also reveals Roman lack of 
scruple when dealing with someone they considered a bandit. Viriathus sent three 
close associates, Audax, Ditalco and Minurus, to negotiate peace -With Caepio, who 
promptly bribed them sucessfully to betray and assassinate Viriathus. 128 Caepio is 
generally considered responsible by most ancient writers for Viriathus' 
assassination, 129 though Rubinsohn following Diodorus in considering that the three_ 
125 Rubinsohn (1981) p199 and Livy, Oxy. Per. 54. 
126 Rubinsohn (1981) p202. 
127 Cic. De Off. 3.107. 
128 Diodorus names them as Audas, Ditalces and Nicorontes, but Livy Oxy. Per. 54, concurs with 
Appian. 
129 App. Sp. 74; Livy Per. 54 and Oxy. Per. 54; Val. Max. 9.6.4; de Vir. III. 71: Eutropius 4.16 
says they killed him through fear of Caepio and Orosius says they did it for the money, 5.23.15. 
Florus 1.33.17 erroneously gives the blame to M. Popilius Laenus, with whom Viriathus had been 
attempting to negotiate before Caepio. 
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followers attempted to save their own skins and offered to kill Viriathus, and that it 
was Caepio's political enemies who subsequently gave the 'initiative and the blame' to 
him. 13° Diodorus' version has a convincing ring. He says the conspirators told their 
leader that they would persuade Caepio to conclude a peace, as Viriathus wanted to end 
the war, and then approached Caepio to guarantee their safety if they assassinated 
Viriathus. That Viriathus may have wanted to end the war is, as Rubinsohn notes, 
supported by details in Appian about the reduced size of Viriathus' army and the need 
for provisions. 131 For Caepio, there was no stigma attached to killing someone 
considered a bandit or having him killed, and bandits were often killed through 
betrayal. His delight at having three close followers of such an enemy approach and 
offer to kill him in return for their own safety can be easily imagined. Little wonder 
that he was 'easily persuaded' and exchanged (no doubt eager) pledges with the 
conspirators. 132 In either version, however, the Romans do not emerge covered with 
glory from their war with Viriathus. Though they were formal enemies, Viriathus was 
still regarded as a bandit and they treated him accordingly. 133 
(iii) Bandits and pirates in the scale of infamy 
Latrones and praedones occupy a special position of being considered the most 
perfidious and dangerous criminals in the Roman world. 134 This status was later used 
in Christian terminology. Christian authors adopted the use of the term /atrones in 
their descriptions of the struggles between Christians and demons. The 'evil' latro or 
Ajaric is often seen as representing the Devil or his demons, particularly in allegorical 
130 Rubinsohn (1981) p203. 
131 Rubinsohn (1981) p200, and Ap. Sp. 68. 
132 Diod. Sic. 33.21. 
133 Shaw (1984) p36, referring to Tacfarinas and Viriathus, notes that "...the Roman state effectively 
maintained its categorization of them as bandits." Perhaps the ignominious nature of his death roused 
some sympathy for Viriathus: see for example the eulogies in Appian, (Sp. 75) who praises him 
highly as a (barbarian) commander; and Livy, (Per. 54) who describes him as a vir duxque ma gnus 
(!) 
134 Shaw (1984) p20 - 23 notes this in relation to their punishments compared to that of other 
criminals. 
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interpretations of the parable of the Good Samaritan, where the man robbed by bandits 
is viewed as a man suddenly surprised by demons. 135 
The jurist Callistratus on punishments wrote that "Grassatores, who do this for 
the sake of booty, are regarded as closest to bandits." 136 There does not appear to be 
an obvious difference between a grassator, a "highway robber, footpad", and a latro, 
a "brigand, robber, bandit". 137 The word grassator is not commonly used; it occurs 
only once in all of Cicero's work, for example. Why then does this law differentiate 
between the two? In other sources are indications that the grassator was regarded as 
an urban menace, the dictionary's 'footpad'; perhaps to be equated with the modern 
city's mugger, whereas latrones tended to be 'rural' phenomena. 138 Some writers 
use grassator simply as a variation for latro, 139 but several grassatores are to be 
found in the town or city. Manilius claims that under one constellation is born the 
grassator, "feared in the middle of the town." 140  Petronius has Encolpius relieved of 
his sword in Cumae by a soldier whom Encolpius calls "...either a charlatan or a 
nocturnal grassator". 141  On days when giving crowd entertainments such as a sea 
fight on an artificial lake, Augustus is said to have placed guards in the city to prevent 
grassatores. 142 That grassatores were not considered the equivalent, but a 'lesser' 
135 See Bartelink (1967) p12 - 24. Pliny Ep.10.96.7 reports Christians had sworn not to commit 
banditry. 
136 Dig. 48.19.28.10: "Grassatores, qui praedae causa id faciunt, proximi latronibus habentur." 
137 OLD (1982), p772 and p1007 respectivley. Berger (1953) p483 under Grassator simply says 'see 
Latro' . 
138 Symmachus Ep.2.22 (A.D. 382-83) mentions the danger in the countryside from banditry and 
prefers to stay within the safe confines of the city. 
139 e.g. Dig. 19.5.20.1, mules stolen by grassatores; Ammianus Marcellinus 24.2.4 describing a 
Saracen leader; Paulus Sententiae, 5.3.4., after using latro twice. 
140 Manilius Astronomica 5.649 "...grassatorque venit media metuendus in urbe." 
141 Petronius Satyricon 82.3 & 82.4. (Heseltine in the Loeb uses 'footpad', (1913, 1956 reprint).) 
142 Suet. Aug. 43.2: "quibus diebus custodes in urbe diposuit, ne raritate remanentium grassatoribus 
obnoxia esset." The Loeb translates it as 'footpads'. (J.C. Rolfe, (1913, 1979 reprint)). Other 
examples of grassatores in the urban environment: The elder Pliny, regaling the reader with stories of 
the virtues of dogs, notes the case of Volcatius, who returning from 'near the city', was defended by his 
dog when attacked by a grassator,"...e suburbano redeuntem...canis a grassatore defendit..."; and so 
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criminal than latrones is evident in a further clause in Callistratus' law: if they attack 
with a sword and plunder, they receive 'capital punishment', usually meaning death, 
especially if they have committed the offence often and on the roads; the rest were sent 
to the mines or islands. 143 Thus those who behaved like latrones were given the 
punishment appropriate for bandits. Latrocinium was punished severely, and its 
perpetrators almost always received capital punishment. 144 To ambush, attack and 
plunder was considered an abysmal crime, worthy of death. This may account for 
another distinction between bandits and other thieves drawn by Ulpian. He advised 
that partners were not compelled to be responsible for losses which occurred through 
unexpected or unavoidable events, and if for example, an evaluated herd had been 
given to a partner which perished through fire or banditry (latrocinium), the loss 
would be shared by the partners; but if the herd had been taken by thieves (fures), it 
was to the detriment of the man who had accepted the herd, because he ought to have 
been responsible for its security. 145 One reason for this differentiation may be that 
thieving did not involve the raiding and pillaging of banditry, as distinct from the 
too was the senator Caelius, who was attacked by armed men at Placentia. (N.H.8.144). Juvenal has 
Umbricius complain of the things to be feared in Rome; places are still robbed though locked up, and 
the grassator attacks suddenly with his sword, "interdum et ferro subitus grassator agit rem..." (Sat. 
3.305) though he goes on to say that this happened whenever the Pomptine march and Gallinarian 
pines' were being patrolled, "...armato quotiens tutae custode tenentur et Pomptina palus et Gallinaria 
pinta sic inde huc omnes tamquam ad uivaria currunt." In Green's translation of Juvenal he uses 
'street-apache'. (Juvenal - The Sixteen Satires, transl. P. Green, Penguin, (London 1967) p.98. 
143 Dig. 48.19.28.10: "et Si cum ferro adgredi et spoliare instituerunt, capite puniuntur, utique si 
saepius atque in itineribus hoc admiserunt: ceteri in metallum dantur uel in insulas relegantur." 
144 e.g. Dig. 49.19.28.15; see also ch.4. 
145 Dig. 17.2.52.3: "Damna quae imprudentibus accidunt, hoc est damna fatalia, socii non 
cogentur praestare: ideoque si pecus aestimatum datum sit et id latrocinio aut incendio perierit, 
commune damnum est, si nihil dolo aut culpa accident eius, qui aestimatum pecus acceperit: quod si 
a furibus subreptum sit, proprium eius detrimentum est, quia custodiam praestare debuit, qui 
aestimatum accepit." (Here pereo must mean 'perish' or 'destroy', not just 'lose', else there would be 
little difference between losing a herd to latrones than to it being taken by fures.) Compare with 
Dig. 19.2.9.4: the Emperor Antoninus (Caracalla) decreed in a rescript that a man who had hired a 
flock of goats, only to have them driven off by latrones, could not be held responsible for the 
accident. 
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cattle-rustling fures, who would be more interested in ensuring the safety of their 
booty for future profit, and it also seems to indicate the numbers involved in bandit 
gangs were usually large enough to disregard the members of a whole household, let 
alone a single shepherd, so that in this sense banditry would be hard to foresee or 
guard against. Presumably a shepherd, who was expected to guard the herd from 
thieves, could not withstand the onslaught of marauding bandits. 
Another reason for the distinction between bandits and other criminals is that 
bandits and pirates were often seen as unpreventable forces, the human equivalent of 
natural phenonema which wreaked havoc. 146 The laws in particular demonstrate an 
acknowledgement of bandits as a constant and inevitable problem: it was possible to 
protect property or person against other terrors, but storms, pirates or bandits were 
overwhelming forces, and if the victim was fortunate enough to survive, then no 
liability was attached to them. 147 They are the only criminals to be considered an 
146 So too Shaw (1984) p8-9. 
147 Digest 4.9.3.1 states that a person entrusted with property is liable for it, even if the property is 
lost without his fault or it is damaged, "...nisi si quid damno fatali contingit." An amendment by 
Labeo adds that if anything is lost through shipwreck or pirates, an exeception is granted. cf . the 
Codex Justinianus (CJ) (234AD) 4.34.1: if deposits left with someone who has been killed are lost 
through an attack of bandits or another chance event, the heir of the person killed is not held 
responsible; and CJ 4.24.6 (225 AD) a creditor is not compelled to take responsiblity for pledges 
lost through chance events, such as attacks of bandits; also CJ.4.65.12. Dig. 12.4.5.4: things that 
could possibly happen to a slave setting off to be manumitted included being killed by bandits, crushed 
by the collapse of a stable or being run over, (CJ. 6.46.6.pr. (532 AD) an example of a slave about 
to be manumitted being attacked by bandits or enemies) and cf.40.2.15.1; a slave could be manumitted 
if he assisted his master in battle, protected him from bandits, healed him when ill, or uncovered a 
plot; 13.6.5.4: a borrower was not responsible for something happening through old age, disease or 
something being seized by bandits; neither for (13.6.18.pr.): the deaths of slaves, attacks of bandits or • 
enemies, traps of pirates, shipwreck, fire, or fugitive slaves. These were unpreventable events, 
"...quibus resisti non possit...", the recognised hazards involved in travelling. (However if something 
was borrowed for use at home and was then taken abroad, then the borrower was liable for disasters due 
to pirates, bandits and shipwrecks. cf also 44.7.1.4 and Theodosian Code 4.20.1 (379AD) a debtor 
should pay the full amount unless his fortunes were destroyed by banditry, shipwreck or fire) Dig. 
17.1.26.6: accidental happenings - robbery by bandits, shipwreck or illness; 17.2.52.3 partners not 
liable for losses due to fire or banditry; 19.2.9.4 hirer of goats not liable if bandits drove them off, cf. 
CJ 4.65.1; Dig. 19.2.33-34 the owner of a farm only owes the tenant the return of the rent if the 
tenant is hindered by a person the owner is unable to prevent because of his greater strength or power, 
as if it happened through a bandit attack; 21.1.17.3 a slave is not classed as a fugitive if he runs from 
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overwhelming and unpreventable force so as to justify such an exoneration from legal 
liability. This comparison of their devastating effect to a natural disaster is found also 
in agricultural advice. The placement of farms, crops, walls and even beehives could 
be done so as to minimise the damage done by bandits and meteorological phenomena. 
Columella suggests that land will usually bring a profit unless it fails through storms or 
bandits. 148 There are also references in other sources casually equating the force of 
bandits and pirates to unpreventable disasters. Cicero comments that sailors were 
accustomed to tell tales of storms and pirates. 149 The Cilician pirates in the late 
Republic are said to have had the same effect as a storm in closing the sea to ships. 150 
The island of Aenaria or Pithecusae gained the reputation of having the strength to 
repel fleets, pirates, monsters and storms. 151 If all else failed, the superstitious could 
place their faith in the power of charms to ward off bandits; travellers could hope that 
an enemy, bandit, fire, or building collapse; 23.3.5.4: complications concerning dowries if a father is 
captured by enemies or bandits; 26.7.50.pr.: a tutor is not compelled to pay if the property of the 
pupillus is lost through bandits, also CJ 5.31.8; Dig. 27.1.13.7: a tutor's non-appearance could 
only be excused through illness, the condition of the sea, the weather or banditry; 35.2.30.pr.: an heir 
is liable to losses caused by the deaths of slaves and animals, thefts, plundering, fire, building 
collapse, shipwreck, bad debts and the force of enemies, pirates or bandits; 39.6.3.pr.: it was possible 
to make a gift mortis causa not only for the reason of illness, but from the proximity of death either 
from enemies or bandits or the cruelty or hatred of powerful men or when about to travel by sea; 
42.5.12.2: taking possession of land could be impossible due to flooding or on account of the power 
of bandits; 49.16.14.pr.: unless a soldier proved that he was delayed by illness bi -by being detained by 
bandits, he was listed as a deserter; 50.17.23.pr.: fault is not attributed in the case of accidents to and 
deaths of animals which happen without blame, the escape of slaves not usually guarded, plunderings, 
riots, fires, floods and the attacks of bandits. 
148 Columella De Re Rustica 1.7.1: "...nisi Si caeli major vis aut praedonis incessit...". He also 
recommends that beehives should not be placed within very high walls, though he then acknowledges 
that it could be necessary to do so from fear of bandits, (9.5.3), and that (9.6.4) a brick wall could help 
hinder fire and plundering bandits. (Aesop Fabulae 157 has a bandit robbing a hive.) Varro Res 
Rusticae (1.12.4) notes that it is easier to protect houses built on higher ground from the sudden 
attacks of bandits, and regrets (1.16.2) that it is not possible to cultivate 'many outstanding lands' 
because of the banditry of the neighbours, such as 'certain peoples' in Sardinia and in Spain near 
Lusitania. 
149 Cic. Pro Mur.4. 
150 Florus 1.41. 
151 Fronto ep.3.8.1. 
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the right front foot of a chameleon tied to the left arm by hyaena skin might protect 
them from banditry and other nocturnal terrors, 152 or that perhaps a vulture's heart, 
which was even more efficacious, would afford protection from attacks not only of 
bandits, but of snakes, wild beasts and the anger of powerful men. 153 The younger 
Seneca comments that to lose money through 'lust or gambling' was iniquitous, but to 
lose it though fire, banditry or another 'sad reason' was not. 154 Epictetus, noting that 
under the principate there was no longer wars or 'great banditry or piracy', asks 
whether the emperor could also prevent sickness, shipwreck, fire, ,earthquake or 
lightning. 155 
The prevalence of bandits also provided a convenient excuse for the unexplained 
absence of 'nuisances': for example, Teuta, who enjoyed a brief rule of the Ardiaeans 
in Illyria in the late third century B.C., imprisoned several envoys from Rome and 
killed others. On learning of the Romans' decision to go to war against her, Teuta is 
said by Dio to have become panic-stricken and blamed the disappearance of the envoys 
on bandits. Whether the Romans believed this or not, its plausibility was sufficiently 
credible for them to halt their campaign to demand the surrender of the bandits.I 56 As 
the bandits were not forthcoming, the war proceeded. A similar pretext was used by 
Octavian who, Suetonius says, suspected the praetor Quintius Gallius of concealing a 
weapon at an audience, later had him removed from the tribunal by soldiers and 
tortured, and then ordered his execution. Suetonius claims that Octavian himself was 
responsible for the man's torture and execution, adding with gory detail that Octavian 
personally tore the man's eyes out. He adds that Octavian wrote that the man had 
attacked him, and after his banishment, subsequently died through 'shipwreck or the 
ambushes of bandits' (latrones). 157 Appian's account broadly follows Octavian's, 
152 Pliny N.H. 28.115 - though even Pliny found this suggestion by Democritus amusingly 
ridiculous and only quotes it for purposes of refutation. 
153 Pliny N.H. 29.77. 
154 Seneca De Ben. 7.16.3. 
155 Epictetus 3.13.9-10 & 13. 
156 Dio 12.49.5; Zonaras 8.19. 
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though he is suspicously free from any responsibility for Gallius' fate. In this version, 
Gallius plotted against Octavian and then had his praetorship removed by his 
colleagues, his house destroyed by the people, and his life condemned by the Senate. 
When Octavian finally entered the scene, though he was the object of the plot, he 
mildly ordered him to join his brother with Antony in the East. After boarding ship 
Gallius was never seen again. 158 The Suetonian version could be malicious gossip, 
but allowing Gallius to depart was a propitious method of removing his presence from 
the city, and a cunning manoevre which then allowed him to be dealt with, away from 
the public gaze. If there was such a violent outcry against him from the people, even if 
it had been organised by Octavian's supporters, the effort involved indicates that 
Gallius was more than a minor nuisance to Octavian. If, as Carter says, Octavian 
would not have tortured him for risk of alienating people, then neither would a show 
of benevolence in allowing Gallius to depart have damaged this support. 159 But even 
if Gallius was not tortured, the disappearance, which could easily be blamed on 
shipwreck or bandit attack without any apparent association to him, was most 
convenient for Octavian. 16° 
Bandits and pirates therefore had an unenviable and infamous reputation. 161 
To a Roman, to be associated with the name of banditry was particularly invidious and 
dishonourable. Cleon, who had acted as a bandit for Antony and Caesar, and who 
was given a priesthood, is said to have transgressed a custom against eating pork and 
157 Suet. Aug. 27.4. Carter (1982) p123-4 dates this to late 43 or early 42B.C. and thinks that 
Suetonius' version of events is unlikely, as torturing free men was not permitted, and that Octavian 
would not have wanted to alienate the uncommitted at this stage. 
158 Appian B.C. 3.95. The younger Pliny puzzles over the disappearance whilst travelling of people 
he had known, wondering whether they had been killed with their slaves or by them. (Ep.6.35.) 
159 Carter 1.c. 
160 According to HA Car. 3.8, Caracalla had Pompeianus (Ti. Claudius Aurelius) killed in a 
manner so as to appear that bandits were the culprits. Ironically bandits may have been responsible; a 
subterfuge would seem unnecessary given that many others were killed by Caracalla's orders quite 
openly. 
161 Braund (1993) p198 notes the unacceptibility of pirates to the Roman elite in reference to the 
harsh punishments given. 
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is condemned by Strabo as evincing the bandit's character, as a 'corrupter of sacred 
things'. 162  Cicero has a speaker muse that that the differences between peoples' 
customs could be so vast that some peoples thought banditry was honourable, "Vitae 
vero instituta sic distant, ut Cretes et Aetoli latrocinari honestum putent...", while to 
the upper class Roman mentality, to commit banditry was a shameful deed. 163 
Similarly Caesar wrote that the Germanic people regarded banditry committed outside 
their land no disgrace, and was useful for training youths. 164 According to Suetonius, 
the Claudian family rejected the praenomen Lucius, after two Claudii with the name 
were convicted, one of murder, the other of banditry. 165 Velleius Paterculus 
condemns Sextus Pompey with the comment that "he was not ashamed to make the sea 
unsafe with piratical crimes freed by his father's leadership and arms." 166 A law in the 
Digest decrees that a son could be disinherited if his father referred to him with an 
insult such as 'bandit', "...et Si cum convicio dixerit 'non nominandus' uel 'non 
filius meus', 'latro', 'gladiator', magis est, ut recte exheredatus sit..." . 167 The third 
century emperor Philip 'the Arab' is sarcastically insulted with a remark in the 
Epitome de Caesaribus that Philip was born in the lowliest place, with a most noble 
father;- a leader of bandits. 168 Another law records Hadrian's judgement of the case 
162 Strabo 12.8.9. 
163 Cic. De Republica 3.15; De Off. 1.128, "Latrocinari...re turpe est...". In De Oratore 3.65, 
he has a speaker declare that the Stoics say those who are not wise are slaves, bandits, enemies, or 
madmen, "...omnes qui sapientes non sint servos, latrones, hostes, insanos esse dicunt...". Cicero 
Ad Fam. 15.17.2 reports the death of Publius SuIla with careless indifference, "Some say it was by 
bandits, others from indigestion", (alii a latronibus, alii cruditate dicebant). Plut. Mar. 6: at the 
time of Marius' command in Further Spain in 114B.C. after his praetorship, Plutarch says banditry 
there was still considered most honourable. 
164 Caesar De Bello Gallico 6.23: "Latrocinia nullam habent infarrziam, quae extra fines cuiusque 
civitatis fiunt atque ea iuventutis exercendae ac desidiae minuendae causa fieri praedicant." 
Pomponius Mela 3.2.3 also notes that the Germans were not ashamed of banditry, "ius in viribus 
habent, adeo ut ne latrocinii quidem pudeat...". 
165 Suet. Tib.1.2. 
166 Veil. Pat. 2.73.3: "...cum eum non depuderet vindicatum armis ac ductu pains sui mare infestare 
piraticis sceleribus." 
167 Dig. 28.2.3. 
168 Epit. De Caes. 28.4: "Is Philippus humillimo onus loco fuit, patre nobilissimo latronum 
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of a man who killed his son while hunting because he was committing adultery with 
his stepmother, the father was deported to an island because his actions were seen to be 
more in accordance with those of a bandit than of a father. 169 
Cicero declared that Catiline's refusal to go into exile was so strong that he 
would rather suffer the ultimate dishonour: "..he would rather be killed committing 
banditry than live as an exile." 170 As an example of the method of 'amplification' as a 
useful technique in rhetorical description, Quintilian says that a man who is merely 
wicked (improbus) may through exaggeration become a 1atro. 171 Cicero in 
particular uses latro and praedo for rhetorical effect in his speeches. Frequently 
labelled in this fashion are his political enemies Catiline, Clodius and Anthony and 
others. 172  Shaw sees men defined as latrones because their position, their 'outlaw' 
ductore." The Arabs had a reputation for banditry due to their nomadic lifestyle and plundering raids, 
eg Pliny N.H. 6.125, Strabo 16.1.26. Further, see Matthews (1989) p346ff. 
169 Dig. 48.9.5.pr.: "...quod latronis magis quam patris iure eum interfecit: nam patria potestas in 
pietate debet, non atrocitate consistere." Also at 48.5.40.4, Papinian's opinion was that a man could 
still be married to a woman exiled for her association with bandits as she had not been convicted of 
adultery, "Mulierem ob latronum societatem exulare iussam citra poenae metum in matrimonio 
retineri posse respondi, quia non fuerat adulterii damnata." Compare with CJ 5.17.2-3 (449 AD): a 
woman had grounds for proceeding with divorce if her husband was (amonst many other things) a 
bandit or a hider of bandits; a man had similar grounds if his wife was not a bandit, but a patron or 
supporter of bandits (latronum fautricem). 
170 Cic. In Cat. 2.16: "...latrocinantem se interfici mallet quam exsulem vivere." 
171 Quint. Inst. Orat. 8.4.1; cf. 9.4.23; 11.3.175. 
172 Included here under the individual's name are Cicero's references to him as a bandit, or to his 
associates and supporters and their activities. The use of this terminology was not restricted to his 
speeches, but also appears in letters to and from his correspondants. Catiline: In Cat. 1.27: 1.31; 
1.33; 2.2; 2.7; 2.22; 2.24; 3.17; Pro Mur. 84; Pro Sulla 70. Gabinius: Post Reditum in Sen. 
11; De Prov. Cons. 9; 11; De Domo Sua 126. Clodius: De Domo Sua 24 (archipirata); 107; 
122; 140; 147; Pro Sestio 1; 2; 26; 27; 34; 39; 76; 81; 130; 144; In Piso. 11; 30; Pro Milo 10; 
17; 18; 30; 55; Pro Caelio 78; De Paradoxa Stoic. 4.27; 4.28; 4.30; (The Loeb translator of the 
Paradoxes, Rackham, p252 notes that Paradox 4 is a 'hardly veiled attack on Clodius'); Ad Att. 4.3.3; 
Ad Q.fr. 2.1.3; 2.2.3. Vatinius: In Vat. 15; 19. Piso: In Piso. 25; 26; 57; 64; 96. Julius 
Caesar: Philippics 2.5; 2.6; Ad Au. 7.18.2; 14.10.1. M. Antonius: Philippics 2.9: 2.62; 
2.87; 3.29; 4.5; 4.9; 4.15; 5.6; 	5.18; 	5.23; 5.30; 6.3; 6.4; 6.12; 	8.9; 	11.4; 	11.7; 	11.10; 	11.14; 
11.32; 11.36; 12.12; 12.15; 12.17; 12.20; 12.26; 12.27; 13.10; 13.16; 13.18 (archipirata); 13.19; 
13.20; 13.26; 13.29; 14.8; 14.10; 14.21; 14.27; 14.31; Ad Fam. 	10.5.3; 	10.6.1; 	10.14.1; 	10.15.1 
(Plancus to C.); 10.15.4; 10.23.3 (Plancus to C.); 10.24.3 (Plancus to C.); 12.2.2; 12.12.2 (Cassius 
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status placed them outside the state, and that "...once bandits had been defined as men 
who stood in a peculiar relation to the state, the label latro was available to be pasted 
on any "de-stated" person." 173 Bandits however were labelled thus from a judgement 
on their methods, rather than their relation to the state, and that once they had achieved 
a reputation as the worst sort of human being, this reputation together with the violent 
tactics used by men such as Catiline, made it an opportune word for Cicero to use for 
his political enemies, to express his abhorrence, rather than the notion that they had 
become 'de-stated'. 
Varro records that some writers attribute the name of a certain provision-market 
or macellum to the fur Macellus who previously lived in that location and whose 
house had been demolished by the state. 174 In a fragment of another work by Varro 
there is more detail; it says that Numerius Equitius Cupes and Romanius Macellus used 
to practice banditry (latrocinium) in many places and when they were driven into 
exile, their possessions were confiscated and their houses demolished. In this version, 
they both lived in the same house, so that the Macellum is named after one, and the 
forum Cupedinis after the other. 175 This aetiology is almost certainly false. If either 
of these bandits ever existed and were exiled, it is highly improbable that a market-
place would be named after one of them. The purpose of destroying the house was to 
erase any evidence of the existence of dangerous criminals who threatened people's 
lives; those associated with the shameful practice of banditry were not worthy of the 
honour of being remembered at all, let alone in this manner. 
to C.); 12.14.1 (Lentulus Spinther to C.); 12.25b.6; 16.27.2; Ad Brut. 9.2. Dolabella: Ad Fam. 
12.12.2 (Cassius to C.); 12.14.1 (Lentulus Sp. to C.); 12.15.2,3,4,5,7 (Lentulus Sp. to C.); Ad 
Brut.14.1; 16.1 (Brutus to C.). 
173 Shaw (1984) p23 and (1993) p307. 
174 Varro De Ling. Lat. 5.147. 
175 Varro Antiq. Rerum Human. 9.frag.1. Festus (125) says it was named after the bandit Macellus 
and when he was condemned, the censors decided to sell food in his house. Donatus ad Ter. Eun. 
256, quotes Varro Ant. Rer. Human. Platner and Ashby record three macella in Rome in A 
Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome (London 1929) p322-3. It would seem unlikely that that 
other two macella, built by Augustus and Nero respectively (the Macellum Liviae and Macellem 
Magnum), would also retain the name of a bandit. 
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In the terms of the Roman world, a bandit or pirates was one who used certain 
methods in pursuit of booty. To steal through plundering, to wait in concealment, to 
ambush and attack, these were all attributes of latrones and praedones. The 
distinction between banditry on land and banditry on the sea was often ignored, as the 
outcome was the same, regardless of the method of travel. But these characteristic 
actions were also utilised at times by the Roman army and other formally declared 
enemies, and so the morally upright tone used when referring to bandits by ancient 
writers often has an unconvincing hypocritical ring. The fact that such bandits became 
formal enemies because they had increased the sze of their group and the scope of their 
banditry, or, even though they were officially enemies, were still labelled 'bandits' 
serves to emphasise the sometimes artificial nature of the legal separation between 
formal enemies and these criminals. As Cicero notes, they were enemies of each 
individual, who could strike the traveller down anywhere, like a fatal disease or 
sudden storm. As bandits, however, these unannounced deeds of raiding and 
plundering and ambush and others of kidnapping and ransom earned them a scurrilous 
reputation which no Roman envied and to which great shame and dishonour were 
attached. 
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Chapter Two: Social banditry 
E. J. Hobsbawm's theories concerning bandits in society have been immensely 
influential on studies of banditry in the ancient world, particularly, through his 
identification of 'social bandits'. 1 His studies draw together examples of banditry 
from many countries all over the world, ranging from the sixteenth to the twentieth 
centuries. The present chaper aims to investigate whether or not his interpretations of 
and terminology for banditry from these times however are applicable to the bandits in 
the Roman world. 
Hobsbawm's concern with social banditry involves only a certain type of bandit, 
"...namely those who are not regarded as simple . criminals by public opinion...[but 
who constitute] a form of individual or minority rebellion within peasant societies."2 
These bandits are seen as criminals by the state, but by their peasant society are 
considered heroes to be helped and supported, in return for which the peasants are not 
regarded as prey by this type of bandit.3 These bandits, excluding the 'professional 
underworld gangs' and 'mere freebooters', he places into three main groups, the noble 
robber or Robin Hood, the primitive resistance fighter/guerilla or haiduk, and the 
avenger.4 In these various forms these bandits all express peasant discontent, and 
their only 'programme' is "...the defense or restoration of the traditional order of 
things 'as it should be'.. .They right wrongs, they correct and avenge cases of 
injustice... ". 5 Hobsbawm, as Shaw observes, deals with the perception of these 
men as Robin Hoods, in identifying them as social bandits. 6 However, despite his 
misgivings, Shaw views the compositions of the elite in the Roman empire as 
reflecting the fact that the 
"type of the social bandit existed in popular belief, imagination and 
1 E. J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, Manchester (1959) and Bandits, London (1969). 
2 Hobsbawm (1969) p13. 
3 Hobsbawm (1969) p13-14. 
4 Hobsbawm (1969) p15. 
5 Hobsliawm (1969) p21. 
6 See Shaw (1984) p4-5 for criticism of the methodology of Hobsbawm's approach. 
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communication. ..beyond doubt ...because the image of the bandit was a useful 
one that could be exploited in contrasting just and unjust ideals of power in the 
ruling class itself. But barely beneath this use of the bandit as a foil to the tyrant, 
the unjust ruler and the unfair judge, is a powerful image of fearsomely 
compelling dimensions generated by people who desired that some such man 
could be found. They desperately wanted a saviour from the present networks of 
power in which they were enmeshed, a man who could rescue them from their 
oppression and who could provide for a genuinely just social order, a 
paradise. 7 
For Shaw, it is the idea itself that bandits acted in this manner that constituted a social 
protest. He argues that the reality of banditry was that as there were few genuine 
social rebels, it was a "...form of political anachoresis, leading...to the formation of 
another state patterned on an existing type." 8 
Do the ancient writers reflect this idea of social protest? Shaw explores this 
theory through the stories of two well-known bandits, Bulla Felix from Cassius Dio, 
and Maternus from Herodian. Herodian is the only source who describes the 
activities of Maternus in detail; two references in the Historia Augusta only refer 
fleetingly to the deserters who ravaged Gau1. 9 Do Maternus' deeds as reported by 
Herodian reveal any evidence of the popular perception of him as a 'Robin Hood' 
7 Shaw (1984) p50-51. 
8 Shaw (1984) p51. Others however have followed Hobsbawm's arguments and terminology; 
Flam-Zuckermann (1970) p460-61; GarIan (1978) p4-5; K. Hopwood (1989) p174; Van Hoof (1988) 
p120 sees as Robin Hood figures bandits such as Bulla Felix, Matemus, Isidorus at the head of the 
Boukoloi in Egypt and Claudius, who is said to have dared to greet and kiss Septimius Severus. (Dio, 
75.2.4). Thompson (1952) p15 sees Bulla as a "...mere kindly robber, a homely Robin Hood...", in 
contrast to Maternus, which he likens to the difference between robbery and "...something like 
revolution." Drinkwater (1984) p369 commenting on Thompson, views both Bulla and Matemus just 
as successful bandits. Minor (1971) p35-6 also sees Bulla's actions as Robin Hood-like in a 
"...localist protest against Roman economic oppression." MacMullen (1966) p193 calls Bulla, 
Claudius, Amandus and Aelianus 'folk heroes'. 
9 HA, Pesc. Nig. 3.4: "...[Pescennius] ipse missus erat ad comprehendendos desertores, qui 
innumert Gallias tune vexabant." and Commodus 16.2: "et ante bellum desertorum caelum arsit." 
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figure? 
Persuading others to accompany him, Matemus deserted from the army and 
shortly afterwards had gathered many men 'of dubious character' into a band. 1 ° This 
gang then overran and plundered villages and fields. This behaviour would seem to 
eliminate Matemus at once from the 'social bandit' category, for a social bandit would 
not attack the property of those working the land, the peasants, on whose behalf he 
was supposedly protesting. 11 Nothing in the rest of Maternus' career as a bandit 
suggests any altruism in his actions or such a perception of them. Having raided lands 
and villages, his successes enabled him to buy the support of a greater crowd of 
criminals, who then attacked cities, releasing prisoners for their support, and he is said 
to have operated over Gaul and Spain, burning and plundering cities. 12 About 
A.D.186, Commodus ordered the provincial governors to move against him. 
Herodian says that learning of the force being massed against them, the band moved to 
Italy. The Historia Augusta indicates that there was a battle fought by one governor, 
Pescennius Niger, against the gang, and as a result of his 'honourable conduct' of the 
matter, he was recommended to Commodus. 13 The reliability of the Historia 
Augusta however is dubious, and it seems improbably that Pescennius Niger would 
be recommended to the emperor on the meagre basis of a fight with bandits which only 
resulted in forcing them from Gaul into Italy. 
After moving into Italy, Herodian says Matemus organised a plan to assassinate 
Commodus and so rule the empire himself. 14 He thought to mingle with his 
followers in praetorian uniform at the annual festival of the Hilaria, where revellers 
dressed in various disguises, and so in this manner get close to Commodus. 15 As 
Herodian 1.10.1 : "Mdrepvac v TL arpartthrus^ 	irp6repou, iroAAci se Kai Secyci 
roAizifaag. r7fi, re rdeim AL ITthi, Kal irelaas- h-epovg cirro 	v at'rciw pytav crvparroSpdvai, 
xelpa irokli)v KaKoOpyou, ev dAIy p dOpolaas- xp6141), rci gem irptOra 	re- Kai ciypois. 
e mrpexcav eAdare-vev...". 
11 Hobsbawm (1969) p14. 
12 Herodian 1.10.1-2; see Dyson (1974) p150 similarly about Viriathus. 
13 HA, Pesc. Niger 3.5: "in quo officio quod se honeste gessit...". 
14 Herodian 1.10.3. 
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this plot was betrayed by some of his men, Herodian speculates that it was provoked 
by jealousy, at having an emperor instead of a bandit leader.I 6 Maternus was seized 
on the day preceding the festival and beheaded, while his men received 'worthy 
punishments'. This final plot sounds rather far-fetched and Shaw argues that it turns 
"...almost completely into myth..." and that this part of the story is "...almost 
completely dismissable as empirical fact." 17 However Herodian's translator notes 
that this story had been doubted and cites coin evidence which includes a medallion 
showing Salus and Hilaritas together, dated to early A.D.188. 18 This reassurance 
emanating from the coins seems to lend some veracity to the story that something 
occurred on or around the festival of the Hilaria, so lacking an alternative explanation 
for the coin evidence, Herodian's story cannot be dismissed completely. 
Maternus is portrayed as a ruthless and ambitious bandit. It is doubtful that 
Herodian had the type of the 'social bandit' in mind or that he reflected public opinion 
of him as one. In fact the one deed that could be construed as benefiting his fellow 
man, that of releasing prisoners, is explicitly explained by Herodian as giving them 
their freedom in return for their support once freed. Herodian does not imply that this 
was the act of an altruistic man, a Robin Hood, nor that it was perceived as such, but 
portrays it as the deed of a self-serving criminal. Indeed, Maternus apparent 
ambitions to replace Commodus suggest that he was a would-be usurper who was 
labelled a bandit by the emperor. 19 Herodian also uses this label for Maternus and his 
account does not suggest an attitude to him different from the prevailing one regarding 
bandits. 
15 Herodian 1.10.5-6. 
16 Herodian 1.10.7: "...006vos yap atrro6s. és roUro n-apaZuvev el Sr) 41eAAov dvrilaroi) 
OecnrOrov lacy gacnAea...". It might be suspected however that Herodian was provoking Roman 
comments along the lines of 'we've got one already' with this comment. 
17 Shaw (1984) p45-6. 
18 Whittaker (ed. and transl.) Herodian Loeb edn., London 1969, p66-7n1. See further Mattingly 
and Sydenham (1923-) vol. 3 p359, and Mattingly (1968) vol. 4, clxiii, clxxxi, and table on cli. 
19 See MacMullen (1963) pp221-225 for the use of such terms for pretenders. Commodus moreover 
'lay low' after the attack and went about with guards. 
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Nearly twenty years later, another so-called 'social bandit', Bulla 'Felix', made 
himself notorious with a band of 600 men plundering Italy for two years during 
A.D.205-6. Nothing is known of him except that he was an Italian, though several of 
his exploits demonstrate a familiarity with Roman military proceedure, which might 
suggest that he was a deserter from the army. 20 The greater part of Dio's account of 
Bulla consists of various stories about his antics, which suggest that Dio gathered his 
stories of Bulla from various informants and put them together. 2I Why does Dio 
include this story of Bulla in his history? There is a fragment which contains a 
principle of Dio's thought on the composition of his history. Dio declared that he 
intended "...to write of the great deeds achieved by the Romans in peace and war 
worthy of memory...".22 He repeats this in his summary of the events in A.D.6, 
saying that many wars occurred; that pirates overran many places, so that Sardinia was 
under military rule for some time, and that there were rebellions in some cities. He 
justifies the lack of any other detail about these occurrences by explaining that many 
things not worth mentioning happened, and that he would write of the greatest events, 
those worthy of mention. 23 Dio, like many other ancient writers, preferred not to 
mention unworthy pirates and bandits, as a general principle. 24 Those who do appear 
in Dio's history feature because of some unusual aspect of their behaviour. Dio has 
several sections discussing the Cilician pirates and their depredations, unusual because 
of their size, strength and scope of their operations which provoked a war, and 
because Pompey was given an extraordinary command against them. 25 Claudius, a 
Dio 77.10; Zonaras 12.10. 
21 Millar (1964), p146 notes that in this section, "...the anecdotal character of Dio's work is 
particularly marked." 
22 Dio frag. 1.1: "...0i7.011&0 exo, avyypdOal ndvEr oaa -rols- Tawaiots- Kai Eipnvoliat Kai 
roAeitoDaL deltas^ pofpris. eirpdx077...". Millar, (1964), p33. 
23 Dio 55.28.2-3: "oel pevrot seal repl rrdvran, abrejv dKptilac, effeeilCor iroAAd re ydp cis 
iKdOTOLS" Kai ooK dewAoya avvrwex017, seal °Mb/ di/ AeirroAoyriOevra 695eArjacce. rd ye 
pmfinic ntios- dela KeglaAatakrar, TAO Teti I' peyterrow, 06." 
24 Also Braund (1993) p209. See Harris (1980) p129f who notes one of the reasons for the paucity 
of evidence on the slave-trade is the reticence of writers to refer to the slave- traders and their despised 
occupation; Bradley (1987) p46 similarly comments on their 'low social esteem'. 
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bandit briefly described as overrunning Judea and Syria in the early 190's A.D. is 
mentioned for the occasion on which he approached Septimius Severus as if a tribune, 
greeted and kissed him and escaped without being discovered or taken later. Dio 
comments that it was 'an incredible deed'.26 
Bulla was unusual for several reasons. He was 'lucky' to have survived two 
years as a bandit operating in Italy itself with the forces of the emperor against him, 
and his gang was particularly large. He is portrayed as having a remarkable lack of 
greed for a bandit, apparently taking only part of his victims' property and releasing 
them, and using craftsmen and then releasing them 'with a gift besides'. 27 He is also 
notable for his cheek and cleverness. He is supposed to have lured and captured the 
centurion pursuing him, and in a mock tribunal he dressed as a magistrate, and ordered 
the centurion to return with a message to his 'masters': "Feed your slaves, so they 
don't commit banditry."28 Bulla's gang is reported to have included imperial 
freedmen, but this order may well have been mocking. Through the use of bribes he 
evaded Severus' men and reports from contacts in situ enabled him to pick his targets 
precisely. In addition he is said to have prevented two of his men from being thrown 
to the wild beasts by the ruse of visiting the prison where they were being held and in 
the guise of a governor claimed that he needed such men and had them released into his 
custody.29 
Dio's repetition of these anecdotes of an unusual bandit however does not 
necessarily imply that he wrote him into his history to reflect popular desire for a 
'social bandit' as a means of contrasting 'just and unjust ideals of power'. 3° An 
account of this type might have been more fitting for Dio's history of the reign of 
25 Dio 36.20 - 36.28. 
26 Dio 55.2.4: "...irpaylia vapaao(orarov...". 
27 Dio 77.3. 
28 Dio 77.5: 	"elyyrAAr rols- Oecnrarais crov on robs- 8o6Aovs- 1116 rpeOcre. rya iv) 
Aucrreixacrt." 
29 Dio 77.3. 
30 Shaw (1984) p50 - 51. 
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Caracalla, for example, whom he hated, than Severus, under whom his career 
benefited, whom he knew personally, becoming an amicus of the emperor and about 
whom his account has been described as being 'not unfavourable'. 31 It might be 
suspected that the monk Ioannes Xiphilinus, who made the epitome of Dio books 36 - 
80 in the eleventh century, 'edited out' any unfavourable comments on Bulla, of whom 
he would doubtless have approved. 32 Bulla Felix sounds too good to be true, but 
this and his other unusual characteristics constitute a curiosity well worth reporting for 
Dio. 
Shaw argues that in the stories of Bulla Felix and Maternus, one of the 
continuities in perception is that "...the big bandit often appears in the context of (and 
frequently in the aftermath of) the usurpation of power by a new emperor whose 
legitimacy is always suspect." 33 Commodus had been in power for ten years by the 
time Matemus' attempted assassination was planned, but Shaw then argues that the 
bandit may also appear 
...at a critical point where the reigning emperor has reached a crisis of 
legitimacy, as in the case of Commodus who had become so unimperial in his 
conduct as to be susceptible to the charge of tyranny. The bandit is less a 
positively constructed alternative form of power than he is a symbol of what the 
emperor should be. 34 
Matemus' very actions however, cast doubt on this theory. Raiding and plundering 
are hardly the glorious deeds of a good emperor. 
At the time of Bulla's banditry, Septimius Severus had been sole emperor for 
several years, and Dio begins the book in which Bulla's story is contained with the 
deeds, of Severus which commemorate the tenth anniversary of his accession. 35 
Severus' legitimacy does not seem to be in question. Was Bulla a 'symbol of what the 
31 Millar  (1964) p150; 138-9. 
32 Cf. Millar (1964) p2. 
33 Shaw (1984) p48. 
34 Shaw (1984) p48. 
35 Dio 77.1. 
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emperor should be'? Dio was not strongly critical of Severus' leadership. Bulla was 
an unusual bandit, but he was still a bandit, with the accompanying unsavoury 
reputation. These bandits are placed in juxtaposition with the 'legitimate central 
power', but this is less a result of the authors' reflection of popular wishes for his own 
ideological propaganda, than of the reasons why they were recorded in the first place. 
Such bandits are unusual precisely because the emperors did in some way become 
involved (in Severus' case with Claudius, a direct contact) with these people who were 
otherwise unworthy of record. The deeds of the emperor were significant, and the 
bandits who were involved with them were raised in 'newsworthy' stature by the 
emperor's involvement. The writers contrast the bandit with the emperor, but this is 
not to elevate the bandit. Their accounts do however contrast the importance in the 
imperial ideology of the emperor as the bringer of peace and security, with his apparent 
inability to control a mere bandit. 36 In a world in which so much depended on the 
will and power of the emperor, to those whose careers depended on him, such stories 
of bandits' insolence serve to illustrate that the emperor could not quite control 
everyone all the time. When the news of Matemus' attacks reached Commodus, he is 
said to have become enraged, and in his letters threatened the governors for their 
negligence. Such bandit attacks could be seen as diminishing his absolute auctoritas 
over all people. It made him look foolishly impotent. This is stated more specifically 
in Dio. Severus, who had taken an interest in the hunt for Bulla, was angered that "... 
in Britain he was winning wars through others...", but he himself could not succeed 
against a bandit in Italy. The emperor despite all his power appeared weaker by 
comparison to his commanders. 37 Such stories may perhaps also have provided 
amusement at the emperor's expense, for those whose lives and careers were in the 
36 Braund (1993) p199ff dicusses the 'ideology of eradication' particularly in regard to piracy. 
37 	• Dio 77.10.6. Dio may also have made more of this story because at the beginning of Severus' 
reign, the emperor had decided that the praetorian guard should be drawn from all legions, a move 
which was seen as leaving the young men of Italy no choice but to turn towards banditry and 
gladiatorial fighting. (75.2.4-6.) In the HA, Severus 18.6 he is described as 'an enemy to bandits 
everywhere'. However given the dubious reliability of this source, this may not be Severus' own 
portrayal, as Shaw (1984) p43 suggests. 
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hands of the emperor, to hear that bandits could be insolent, and in Bulla's case, dare 
to send orders to the emperor about his slaves. This does not however imply that they 
approved of the bandit himself. The emperor's auctoritas had merely had its image 
dented slightly and his pride wounded. 
It has often been suggested that bandits must have possessed significant local 
community support or sympathy to survive. 38 Hobsbawm saw this support as 
deriving from the poor peasants; Van Hoof felt there was a 'natural alliance between 
the poor and the brigand'.39 Horsley claims that "Some of the extant evidence shows 
quite clearly that ancient brigands no less than more recent Robin Floods enjoyed the 
support and protection of the people." 40 However the evidence indicates that bandits 
did have their supporters and associates, but they were their 'partners in crime', or 
those now called 'fences', people who were involved on a quid pro quo basis, rather 
than being from any broader section of society. These partners could even be 
members of bandits' families. One law even gives more lenient penalties for those 
who harbour bandits because of their connections through blood or marriage ties. 41 
38 e.g. MacMullen (1966) p193 claims there was a widespread sympathy 'felt or half-felt' towards 
bandits; Flam-Zuckermann (1970) p460-1; Hopwood (1989) p175: "Bandits seem to have enjoyed 
considerable support in their local communities, a fact recognized by the Roman lawyers who realised 
that such support was essential for the bandits to survive...". Hengel (1977) p49 goes against this 
trend: "As a rule the rural population were grateful when a governor took a hard line against the plague 
of robbers, which was widespread and from which they suffered severely." and also Matthews (1989) 
p346. 
39 Van Hoof (1988) p122. 
40 Horsley (1979a) p51. However, his citations tend to point to the fact only that these bandits had 
supporters who fell into the category of receivers or harbourers. Dig. 48.3.6.1 (see below); P. Oxy. 
1408, dated between A.D.210 and 214 concerns the repetition of an order by Baebius Uncinus, a 
prefect in Egypt to the strategi of Heptanomia and Arsindite nome to search out bandits. In the 
accompanying edict, he declares that "...to destroy bandits separately from their harbourers is not 
possible it is clear to all...", but with these people removed, punishment would be swift. He 
acknowledges that there were 'many methods' of harbouring them - some did so because they were their 
associates in their deeds, and continues with 'others not sharing', but there the fragment ends. P. Ant. 
87 contains fragments of an interrogation of a man about his connections with bandits and about 
suspects from a village. 
41 Dig. 47.16.2 (Paulus) Those who kept at their place a bandit either related by blood or marriage 
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The laws promise penalties equal in their harshness for receivers and harbourers of 
bandits as those for bandits themselves. Those who let bandits go free for a mercenary 
motive, i.e. for payment, deserved the (death) penalty of bandits. 42 
Banditry was a means of allieviating poverty for the desperate, but bandits 
ignored the poor not so much from 'fellow-feeling', but precisely because the poor did 
not possess anything they could stea1.43 It is difficult to find strong evidence to 
are not to be acquitted and not to be punished quite as severely: for their crime is not equal to that of 
those who, not being related, harbour bandits. 
42 Also Shaw (1984) p37-8. Laws on receivers or harbourers: The Lex de provinciis praetoriis in 
early 100B.C. (Crawford et al. (1996) p2310, orders allied kings of the east to prevent harbouring; 
Dig. 1.18.13.pr.: Ulpian ruled that recept ores be imprisoned, 'without whom a bandit was not able 
to hide long'. Dig. 47.9.3.3 & 4: Labeo ruled that receivers were held liable, since they had 
committed a crime no less than the attackers: "...quia receptores non minus delinquunt quam 
adgressores.". Dig. 47.16.1.: Marcian on receptatores: "The worst kind of person is the receiver, 
without whom no one is able to lie low for long; and it is ruled that they be punished just as if they 
were bandits. In the same case are regarded those who, when they are able to apprehend bandits, 
through money received or part of the takings, let them go." Dig. 48.3.6.1 Antoninus Pius, when 
proconsul in Asia in A.D.134/5 (dating from Eck, (1970) p210) made an edict that irenarchs 
apprehending bandits should question them about their associates (socii) and receivers (receptatores). 
(Shaw (1985) p37 in this context says that the laws on rustling "...had to specify that receivers were 
to be punished "in accordance with their social rank": by exile from Italy for a period of ten years or 
some other less aggravated form of punishment." The Digest however at 47.14.1.3 imposes a lesser 
penalty for those of higher rank for the actual perpetrators of rustling; 47.14.3.3 gives exile for 10 
years for receivers or harbourers of rustlers, without mentioning their status.) Also C. J. 9.39.1 
(A.D.374) & 9.39.2 (A.D.451) (cf. C. Th. 9.29.1&2): A receiver of bandits is subject to corporal 
punishment or loss of means according to the qualitas of the person and the opinion of the judge. In 
C.J. 5.17.8.2-3 (A.D.449), a woman had grounds for divorce if (among other things) her husband was 
a bandit or a receiver of bandits (latronum susceptor), and a husband similiarly if his wife was a 
supporter or patron of bandits (latronum fautrix). C. Th. 7.18.7 (A.D.383) Anyone with deserters or 
bandits on his farm would have the farm annexed, and if the owner was not aware of the bandits on his 
property, then capital punishment was the penalty for his managers. Paulus, Sententiae, 5.3.4: 
receivers were to be given the same punishment as bandits, for 'as their receivers suffered, their greed 
was halted'. 
43 Horsley makes this point in support of the social banditry argument, (1979) p437 and (1979a) 
p45. Blok (1972) p496 commenting on Hobsbawm wrote that "Rather than actual champions of the 
poor and the weak, bandits quite often terrorized those from whose very ranks they managed to rise, 
and thus helped to suppress them." Examples of the poor as immune from bandit targets: Apuleius, 
Met. 1.15.9: "What can bandits take from the poorest traveller?"; Juvenal, Sat. 10.22: "...an 'empty' 
(vacuus) traveller will sing openly at a bandit."; (cf. Ovid Tristia 2.1.271 for the girded traveller and 
bandit) the younger Seneca, Ep. Morales 14.9: "A bandit passes by a destitute (nudum) man; even 
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support arguments that certain bandits actually aided the poor. Bandit and pirate 
sympathy for the poverty-stricken was probably restricted to a particular section of the 
poor; themselves. Horsley claims that Seneca's statement that a bandit passes by a 
poor man is 'indicative'.44 Seneca says this as part of a philosophical discourse in 
which he recommends methods of avoidance of various perils such as the anger of 
powerful men.45 One of his suggestions to protect oneself from 'the mob' is to 
possess nothing that may be snatched by an insidiator and to carry the minimum 
amount of booty, and it is in this context that his comment on bandits occurs. A 
moralising statement that 'bandits pass the poor' however cannot be taken as evidence 
that they actually helped the poor. Horsley also cites a story of bloodshed by the 
Maratocupreni, from a village near Apamea in Syria in A.D.369, who travelling 
disguised as merchants and soldiers attacked "...opimas domos et villas et 
oppida... ".46 That they attacked the wealthy is no surprise; they are an obvious 
target for thieves. In another disguise, that of a ratio nalis and his retinue, they 
attacked the house of a wealthy man in a town, by behaving as if he had been 
proscribed and condemned to death. They took even the furniture and escaped. 47 
Again however, there is no indication that 'the poor' derived any benefit from their 
booty; Ammianus comments that the Maratacupreni had built themselves houses, 
which were destroyed when their owners were repressed by the Romans.48 
Horsley's last citation is that of the anomalous Bulla Felix's injunction to the centurion 
to 'tell his masters to feed their slaves so they don't commit banditry. Even if this 
outrageous message was actually sent, it does not demonstrate that Bulla had a "more 
systematic concern" for the poor in general but mistreated slaves. 49 Nor can this one 
on a busy road, he is peaceful to a poor man." Lucian, The Dream or the Cock (Gallus) 22 has the 
Pythagorean cock declare that his poor master Micyllus needn't worry like a rich man about a Avarrjs 
taking his gold or digging through his walls. 
44 Horsley (1979a) p52. 
45 Seneca, Ep. Mor. 14.7-8. 
46 Amm. 28.2.11. 
47 Amm. 28.2.13. 
48 Amm. 28.2.14: "...lares versi, quos ambitiose luctuosis aliorum dispendiis construxerunt." 
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instance be taken as indicative of the motives of most bandits. Strabo describes 
bandits of the Alps sparing the people in the plains - but for a purely pragmatic reason; 
in return for supplies of food and other materials, because the poor soil in the high 
Alpine area was not productive enough for them to provide for themselves. 50 Galen 
tells of one anonymous group of inhabitants who certainly did not support one 
particular bandit; in their hatred they left the body of the bandit by the road where he 
had been killed by a traveller, glad to see it eaten by the birds. 5 I When Herod 
captured the bandit Ezekias and his henchmen and had them executed, the people of 
Syria, whose areas Ezeldas had been attacking, were filled with praise for Herod. 52 
The pretender Athronges in Judea and his supporters carried out bandit raids both on 
Romans and local inhabitants.53 
Those who chose to associate themselves with crime did not all belong simply to 
a particular section of the population. It was not unknown for the wealthy, particularly 
in the later empire as evident from the laws, to have some form of involvement in 
banditry, whether through actual participation, receiving or harbouring, or 
patronage. 54 Plutarch claims that in the surge of piracy from Cilicia in the late 
49 Horsley (1979a) p52. 
50 Strabo 4.6.9. 
51 Galen On Anatomical Procedures, 1.2 (221): "...cal' 	ytuovs- en-exatpop ecrOtotieeptli rip 
crthpart It-0g 7131, 	 Apuleius Met. 8.17 has village inhabitants attack an approaching 
multitude, assuming they were bandits, setting dogs on them and hurling stones from the rooftops. 
52 Josephus B.J. 1.205 (= Ant. 14.160). Josephus also comments that the bandits in Judea were 
killing their own people, and bothered 'few Romans', Ant. 17.285. 
53 Jos. B.J. 2.60-65 = Ant. 17.278-284. 
54 Also Shaw (1985) p37 - 38. Callistratus in the Dig. 48.19.27.2 cites mandates which cover 
punishment of leading citizens who had actually committed banditry themselves. They were to be 
chained and an account of their deeds sent to the emperor. According to Dig. 3.3.19 (Ulpian) a 
defendant could change his procurator if in the power of bandits. Until the later empire, laws which 
discriminated between honestior and humilior when giving penalties did not apply to latrones, who 
were even lower than humiliores, i.e. the lower rank received the harsher penalites, see e.g. Garnsey 
(1968) 147f; Millar (1984) 127f; p147; MacMullen (1986) 152f; Bauman (1996) ch.11. However 
laws which gave lighter sentences to those of higher rank for involvement in banditry are more 
prevalent in the second half of the fourth century: C. Th. 9.29.2 (A.D.383 & 391) (C.J. 9.39.1 
(A.D.374)) Harbourers were to face corporal punishment or loss of means according to rank and the 
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Republic, some of those who were wealthy, or illustrious or men of 'superior intellect' 
joined the pirates on their boats, which Plutarch explains by saying such men felt this 
brought them a 'certain distinction'. Broughton identifies them as many of the pirates 
whom the Romans encountered in their campaigns: Zenicetes of Olympus, Isidorus, 
Seleucus, Athenodorus (the plunderer of Delos in 69B.C.), Nico, and 'many tyrants' 
in Cilicia Tracheia. 55 The wealthy were of course not a united class clandestinely 
supporting banditry and piracy in various forms, any more than the poor. The affluent 
were obvious targets since they had possessions worth stealing, and they were 
tempting not only to rob but also to kidnap. 
For some wealthy men, an incentive to become wealthier was thus offered 
through association with bandits or pirates. Cicero condemns Verres for acting in the 
manner of pirates, who despite the fact that they were the 'enemies of all', nevertheless 
become the 'friends of some', not only sparing them, but increasing their wealth with 
booty. In such a way they bought friendly contacts in coastal towns where the pirates 
might want or need to enter. Thus, Cicero says, they corrupted the formerly law-
abiding town of Phaselis on the Lycian coast near Cilicia, by first trading with it, and 
then entering into alliance with it. 56 Cicero's rhetoric implies that the whole town 
opinion of the judge; the interpretation gives cudgelling for a harbourer of lower status and a fine for a 
melior. C. Th. 1.29.8 (C.J. 1.55.6)(A.D.392) blames patrocinia, the protection of powerful men 
for the increase of crimes and abolishes it "Removeantur patrocinia, quae favorem reis et auxilium 
scelerosis inpertiendo maturari scelera fecerunt." The interpretatio mentions in particular their 
protection over defendants or criminals (reos) and latrones. See also the laws cited above that give 
receivers of higher rank a lesser punishment. 
55 Plut. Pomp. 24.2: "4877 Si Kai xpr)itaal 8waroi 'cal yeve -ot Aaprrpoi Kai ró Opoveb. 
detoOlievoc 61a0pe-tv &Spey evePatvoi, 1ç rd AucrrptKci Kai ILETE1X0V, cis- Kai 86eav mid 
Kai ctSblortfilav -roD pyou ISepovros. Cf. also Appian Mith. 92. Broughton (1959) p522n112: 
Zenicetes fought against Servilius Isauricus (q.v.). Isidonis: Florus 1.41; Plut. Luc. 12 says he was 
killed by Lucullus. Seleucus: App. Mith. 78; Plut. Luc. 13; Orosius 6.2.24 & 3.2. Athenodorus: 
Phlegon III 606 (= Jacoby FGrH 257.12.13, p1164); Nico: Cic. In Verr. 2.5.79. Cilician leaders: 
Strabo 14.5.10. Broughton includes Athenio from Dio 27 fr.93, but as the Athenio in this fragment 
carries out a raid on Messana in Sicily, this is perhaps to be identified as the Athenion of the second 
Scilican slave rebellion. 
56 Cic. In Verr. 2.4.21. 
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was converted to piracy, for this is what he alleges Verres did to Messana in Sicily. It 
would only be necessary however to become 'friendly' with the powerful or those in a 
town in a position to buy goods and supply provisions and equipment and so forth. 
Those who disapproved could be silenced by threats of violence or even economic 
arguments. 
Another indicator that although bandits and pirates had links with 'local 
society' 57 in the forms of their criminal associates, there was not a great deal of 
widespread community support, may be found in the length of their careers. If local 
society supported such men, then they might be expected to succeed as criminals for 
some time. The careers of most bandits however seem to have been relatively brief, 
though definitive 'statistics' are impossible because of the nature of the sources, which 
either ignore bandits and pirates completely, or only mention their unusual and 
interesting features, which rarely included the length of their career, if indeed it was 
known. Cassius Dio, having lived during the time of the apparently altruistic Bulla's 
activities in Italy, was in a position to be able to record that the life of Bulla Felix's 
gang ended with its leader after only two years. 58 
The duration of Maternus' banditry can be determined also, though less easily 
and precisely. Herodian dates the episode simply by saying that shortly after the 
execution of the praetorian prefect Tigidius Perennis (Herodian and Dio call him 
Perennius) for treachery against Commodus, another plot was formed against him by 
Maternus.59 No exact date for the appointment of Perennis is known, but A.D.185 
has been given as the earliest date for his execution. 6° Maternus must then have 
57 Shaw (1984) p37. 
58 Dio 77.10.1; 77.10.7. 
59 Herodian 1.10.1. Cf. Dio 72.9-10.1, HA Comm. 6.2 for death of Perennis. 
60 Whittaker (Herodian, Loeb vol.1 1969) p43 places the appointment of Perennis at 182 at the 
earliest; he was a colleague (according to Dio 73.10.1, cr -uvapxos.) of praetorian prefect M. 
Tarruntenus Paternus and succeeded him after Paternus' execution for involvement in a conspiracy, 
dated to ?A.D.182 (Dio 73.5.1) Since the HA, Comm. 14.8 claims that none of the praetorian 
prefects appointed by Commodus held their offices for longer than three years, Perennis' death would 
then have occurred in A.D.185 See also PIR 1 p316-7. 
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deserted soon after this (rather than formed the plot soon after this, as Herodian seems 
to imply, for the plot would have been in existence a lengthy period before 187) and 
begun to build up his gang of followers. He was active at least in 186 and his plan to 
kill Commodus was foiled prior to the festival of the Hilaritas in late March A.D.187. 
Thus as a bandit Matemus lasted slightly longer than two years at the most. 
A few bandits achieved unusual longevity in their criminal careers. Cicero cites 
from the fourth century B.C. Diogenes the Cynic as saying that Harpalus, a certain 
praedo regarded as felix', was 'testimony against the gods' because he lived as a 
bandit for so long, though infuriatingly Cicero does not say how long. 61 Strabo 
similarly writes that Selurus, called the 'son of Etna', had been overrunning the region 
around Mt. Etna 'for a long time' with his bandit raids. 62 Here the contemporary 
nature of the source is no help, for Strabo is vague despite the fact that he himself had 
seen Selurus torn to pieces by wild beasts in the forum. 63 In 106B.C. a certain C. 
Titinius Gadaeus in Sicily was condemned to death, but escaped and lived as a bandit 
for two years until the Sicilian governor P. Licinius Nerva bribed him with promises 
of safety to infiltrate and betray the stronghold of a slave rebellion in 104, as he had 
killed many free men, but apparently not any slaves in his time as a bandit.64 In the 
east in A.D.54 Felix the procurator of Judaea captured the dp,rAoo-7-75s- Eleazar son of 
Dinaeus (ben Dinai), who had been committing banditry for some twenty years. 65 
Josephus adds that the number of bandits crucified and people punished for their 
association with Eleazar were countless. 66 It would appear from this statement that 
61 Cic., De Nat. Deorum 3.83: "Diogenes quidem Cynicus dicere solebat Harpalum, qui 
temporibus illis praedo felix habebatur, contra deos testimonium dicere quod in illa fortuna tam diu 
viveret." 
62 Strabo 6.2.6. 
63 Coleman (1990) p53 dates it the late 30'sB.C. 
64 Diod. Sic. 36.3.5-6. Bradley (1989) p71 suggests that Titinius was a Roman citizen to judge 
from his name, but that the "...oddity of the cognomen Gadaeus might suggest that he was in fact a 
former slave." This is suggested more by the fact he was chosen to enter the slaves' headquarters than 
by his name. 
65 Josephus B.J. 2.253; he gives a less precise reference in Ant. 20.121, that Eleazar had lived in 
the mountains for many years. 
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the local community were behind Eleazar and his accomplices. In context however, 
this is less certain. Prior to his capture, Eleazar's gang had been involved in a Galilean 
revenge attack on Samaritans. According to Josephus, one or several Galileans 
travelling in a group to a festival were murdered at Gema (Ginae) in Samaria by some 
of the inhabitants.67 Ventidius Cumanus, procurator A.D.48 - 52, was approached 
by the Galileans for justice, but did not act swiftly enough, and the Jewish masses 
together with Eleazar and his bandits attacked certain Samaritan villages, killing 
inhabitants and sacking and burning villages. 68 In the Jewish War, Josephus says 
only that the people had as their leaders Eleazar and Alexander in their raids against the 
Samaritans; in the Antiquities, Alexander is omitted and the people are said to have 
invited Eleazar to help.69 Eleazar was not so much providing a service in return for 
their support, but was hired as a mercenary for his help as part of their informal army. 
When Cumanus did not respond, for whatever reason, with Roman justice, they 
resorted to revenge with the aid of mercenary bandits, who would be amply paid by 
the booty sacked from the Samaritan villages. The alliance was formed from 
expediency than from the "...close relationship between the brigands and the people 
who support them, protect them and even call on their aid." 7° After the burning of 
the Samaritan villages, Cumanus sent out cavalry and troops against the Jews, killing 
66 B.J. 2.253. 
67 B.J. 2.232 has one only killed; Ant. 20.118 has many; as Feldman comments, the killing of 
one would probably not have roused such fury. ( ed. Josephus, Jewish Antiquities Loeb edn., 
Cambridge, Mass. 1965.) 
68 B.J. 2.234-5; Ant. 20.120 - 122; Tacitus Ann. 12.54. B.J.2.233 says Cumanus did not act 
because he had other matters to attend to; in Ant. 20.119 Josephus goes further and claims that 
Cumanus had been bribed by the Samaritans to ignore it. After an investigation by Ummidius 
Quadratus, the governor of Syria, Cumanus and others were sent to Rome, where he was tried and 
banished. Tacitus' account, which is at odds with Josephus', claims that Cumanus and Felix (whom 
Josephus has as Cumanus' successor: B.J. 2.247; Ant. 20.137), procurators in Galilee and Samaria 
respectively, were behind the bandits themselves, sending bands against one another and receiving 
booty. Here Quadratus was given authorisation by Claudius to judge them and he put Felix among 
the judges who condemned Cumanus. In this version, there is no community support for the bandits. 
69 B.J. 2.235; Ant. 20.121: "...Borgia:" 'EArdCapoP TOP rot) ae -tvalov irapatra,Vorwre-s-...". 
70 Horsley (1979a) p57. Issac (1984) p179-180 also sees popular support for bandits in the story of 
Eleazar. 
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many and imprisoning many others, including some of Eleazar's men. 7I Cumanus 
had also carried out reprisals on the local inhabitants earlier when Stephanus, an 
imperial slave, had been attacked and robbed of his belongings on the road to 
Bethoron. Cumanus sent soldiers to bring the inhabitants (or the leading inhabitants) 
in chains to him and to sack the villages. 72 That the villagers did not 'pursue or arrest 
the bandits' has been seen as evidence that they in fact supported them. 73 There are 
other reasons which explain their inaction, however; the villagers themselves were not 
attacked and lost none of their own possessions, and a lack of enthusiasm to pursue 
armed and dangerous bandits on behalf of others is understandable. Their 'inaction' 
does not necessarily indicate support. 
That Eleazar should act as a mercenary is not an isolated incident in Judea. On 
the arrival of Josephus himself in Sepphoris, the inhabitants lured the dpxtAvcr-als-
Jesus and his 800 men from the border of Galilee with the promise of money to attack 
Josephus. The attack was foiled when one of Jesus' men betrayed it to Josephus. 74 
Josephus however released Jesus once the bandit had repented and promised loyalty to 
him. Josephus demonstrated a similar policy earlier in Gischala in the mid 60's A.D. 
when he sent for the strongest of the bandits and persuaded the people to pay them off, 
saying that to pay a small sum to them as mercenaries was preferable to having raids 
on their property. 75 
Eleazar's twenty year career as a bandit, it might be argued, could only have 
71 B.J. 2.238, Ant. 20.124. 
72 B.J. 2.228ff; Ant. 20.113ff. Issac (1984) p179 also notes other instances by Varus, governor of 
Syria c. 6 - 4B.C.: Roman troops transporting corn and arms to the legion was attacked near Emmaus 
by Athronges and his band; Emmaus was later burnt on Varus' orders. (B.J. 2.60ff & 71: Ant. 
17.278 & 291.) Similarly he had Sepphoris in Galilee burnt after a raid on its arsenal by a Judas, son 
of the bandit leader Ezekias, who had been captured earlier by Herod. (B.J. 2.56 & 68: Ant. 17.271 
& 289.) 
73 Horsley (1979a), p57. 
74 Josephus Vita 104 - 111. He is probably the same Jesus at Vita 200; a Galilean named Jesus 
with 600 men was hired in Jerusalem again by Josephus' enemies. Josephus no doubt regretted that he 
had released him after the first plot. 
75 Vita 77 - 78. 
61 
been possible with the support and protection of the people. There is little evidence of 
Eleazar's activities until he was invited to accompany the retaliations against the 
Samaritans, though it was known at the time that he was responsible for many 
murders. 76 It might reasonably be thought that this would not inspire general 
community support. If did not cause banditry on a sufficient scale to bring himself 
to the attention of the Romans, as Bulla and Maternus and Eleazar eventually did, or 
provoke the local inhabitants to revenge, then it is unusual, but not impossible for 
Eleazar and his men to have succeeded in living as bandits for twenty years without the 
support of the local population. This is not to say that he did not have his 'contacts' 
and criminal associates in the community; he probably did, but not the support of the 
whole community. The very isolation and secrecy of bandits' lairs was their protection 
rather than the goodwill of the local society. 77 Even Hobsbawm concedes that 
'Robin Hoods' could not last longer than two or three years. 78 
Given the general unpopularity of and paucity of local support for bandits, it was 
generally those who were desperate who were forced to become these criminals. One 
group who turned to bandity were deserters. 79 Maternus was a former soldier. and 
76 Both Horsley (1979a) p57n59 & (1981) p414n16; and Issac (1984) p181 cite the rabbinic sources 
regarding Eleazar which say that in his case, the "...regular sacrifice of atonement for an unknown 
murderer was discontinued, and he began to be called Ben Harazhan, son of the murderer." (Issac). 
(Mishnah, Sotah 9.9; Eleazar is also mentioned in Kelim 5.10; Talmud. Keth. 27a : Cant. Rab. 
2.18.) 
77 Eleazar might have been paid to paid to stay away, but this is pure speculation. 
78 Hobsbawm (1969) p46. 
79 Laws on desertion: C. Th. 7.18.7 and 7.18.7.1 (A.D.383) punishment through confiscation of 
the farm on which deserters or bandits were hidden; C. Th. 7.18.14 (Cf. 3.27.2) (A.D.403) 'public 
vengeance' allowed against bandits and deserters; C. Th. 7.18.15 (CJ. 12.45.3) (A.D.406) those 
who desert to plunder and commit banditry 'do not evade the severity of a judge'; C. Th. 9.14.2 
(A.D.391) punishment to be meted out on the spot, as if a bandit, to a soldier plundering fields. Jones 
(1964) p648 notes that there were episodes of desertions after the battle of Adrianople in 378 and after 
barbarian invasions in A.D.403 and 406, when morale was low after defeat. Other examples of 
deserters committing banditry in the second half of the fourth century (also MacMullen (1966) 
p195n4); Libanius Or. 18.104 says Julian collected an army from those who had been with 
Magnentius and were forced into banditry afterwards; though Zosimus' version (3.7) differs, saying that 
Julian before being Caesar, employed Charietto, a 'barbarian plunderer' with his gang, to counter the 
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the unrest caused by his gang was referred to as the bellum desertorum." 
Spartacus is said to have been a deserter at one point in his life. 81 Shaw in his 
discussions of the cases of desertion from the army to banditry focuses on the factors 
of the harsh life in the army and of 'enforced desertion', which occurred when the 
local commander tried his luck as a usurper and his soldiers were then classified as 
deserters. 82 In addition, he suggests that veterans who may not have had the skills to 
be farmers, or the wish to go into business or were forced out of the army by ill-
health, became bandits. 83 They need not have automatically turned to banditry 
however. Veterans gained a privileged status upon leaving the army. The idea that 
those who gave up these earned privileges to become hunted criminals would seem to 
be less likely than might first appear. They did not do so in large enough numbers to 
warrant legislation until the mid-fourth century. 84 Furthermore, if veterans were 
forced to retire early through illness, this would presumably also prevent the ex-soldier 
from making a living through banditry. 85 
Quadi bandit tactics with his own. St. Basil Ep. 268 in A.D.377 wrote of the road into Thrace being 
full of bandits and deserters; and Zosimus 5.22 mentions deserters in Thrace in A.D.400/401 after the 
battles against Gainas the Goth. Symmachus Ep. 7.38 (A.D.398) mentions the soldiers threatening 
the roads in Campania. Flam-Zuckermann (1970) p462 also notes instances of deserters turned bandit. 
80 Herodian 1.10.1 : "...arpantirras pep trporepop...", and HA, Comm. 16.2. 
81 Florus (2.8.8) says he began as a mercenary in Thrace, then became a soldier, a deserter, a latro 
and finally a gladiator. 
82 Shaw (1984) p30. 
83 Shaw (1993) p314. 
84 Codex Justinianus 12.46.3 (A.D.353): "Those veterans who from negligence of life don't 
cultivate the land nor accomplish anything honourable but give themselves to banditry, are, stripped of 
all privileges of veterans, subject to penalties from the competent governors of the provinces." 
(Veterani, qui ex neglegentia vitae neque rus colunt neque aliquid honestum peragunt, sed latrociniis 
sese dederunt, omnibus veteranorum privilegiis exuti poenis competentibus a provinciarum rectoribus 
subiciantur.) Cf. Codex Theodosianus, 7.20.7 (A.D.353): The law was more lenient regarding the 
punishment of veterans. Veterans 'differed from the rest in punishments' so that they were not thrown 
to wild beasts, or beaten. (Dig. 49.18.1.pr.). Sallust In Cat. 28.4 says Catiline's associate Manlius 
was able to gather men in Etruria, particularly bandits, of which there were many in Etruria, some 
from Sulla's veterans who had been settled there and whose 'luxurious living' had left nothing left of 
their plunder. 
85 With the exception of these veteran soldiers, the age of those actively involved in banditry and 
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There were other conditions in which soldiers turned to banditry. A twist on the 
situation of enforced desertion through the commander's attempt at usurpation is the 
example given in Dio, when it was the legitimate ruler who changed the rules. Tacitus 
claims that in the first century A.D., to get the money needed to send centurions on 
leave, soldiers turned to banditry, thieving or 'servile services'. 86 Septimius Severus 
changed the practice of drawing the praetorian guard only from Italy, Spain, 
Macedonia and Noricum, in favour of recruiting them from all the legions. Dio says it 
was 'most clear' that this change forced those Italians who had been in the army to 
become bandits and gladiators. 87 It is not possible to ascertain whether any soldiers 
or sailors deserted to become pirates, though it probably did occur. 88 
piracy are usually (and not surprisingly) said to be young. They were obviously those fit enough to 
withstand the rigours of such an existance. In the 190's B.C. the Romans were forced to send four 
triremes to counter a certain Spartan named 'Hybristas' whose piracy with the 'youth' of Cephallenia 
(cum iuventute Cephallanum) was causing difficulties with supplies from Italy. (Livy, 37.13.12) 
Octavian is said to have destroyed the people of the islands of Melita and Corcyra Nigra on the 
Dalmatian coast because of their piracy. Most were sold into slavery, but the youth were killed. 
(Appian, 111.16.) Apuleius has his hero Lucius 'the ass' stolen by a group of young bandits (Apul. 
Met. 4.7), who are joined by another group of bandit youths( 4.8) and a search for new young men to 
replace those killed is also suggested, (7.4). 
86 Tac. Hist. 1.46: "...per latrocinia et raptus aut servilibus ministeriis militare otium 
redimebant." Cf. also Josephus Ant. 17.269-270 for a mention of 2000 of Herod's disbanded 
soldiers who continued fighting. 
87 Dio 75.2.5-6. 
88 The army had extensive powers over the local community. Soldiers were permitted to requisition 
supplies, shelter and transport, and even people to help with the transportation of their goods; see 
Alston (1995) p58. Alston p53 notes that soldiers were seen as "...being beyond the normal workings 
of the law, a privileged group, protected by the emperor and their own political power. The 
swaggering, bullying soldier could do what he liked, confident that behind his actions was the power 
of the emperor." (Further, see MacMullen (1963) pp85-9 and Campbell (1984) p243-254 on demands 
made by soldiers to civilians and complaints by civilians about the military, and Mitchell (1976) 
pp106-131. MacMullen (1966) p195 suggests those soldiers sent into areas to pursue 'bandits' or 
others gained a love of pillage themselves and became outlaws.) This confident attitude and ease of 
requisition from local civilians may have tempted some soldiers to desert and put their training to good 
use in banditry. As seen previously, often there was only the official definition to distinguish between 
war and banditry. In their time as bandits, without the rigours of army discipline, any booty would 
then belong to them without the divisions involved in dividing it up amongst the rest of the army. 
Their experience in Roman procedure would furthermore assist their evasion of pursuit and capture. 
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One of the most frequent causes of piracy and banditry cited in the sources was 
poverty. The motivating force behind tribal raids (banditry') is often attributed to 
poverty, particularly by Strabo, following his source Posidonios, who often related 
poverty to the scarcity of natural resouces. 89 Among those peoples who are said to 
have turned to banditry are the Greeks and Trojans, 'in need' after the Trojan War," 
the mountainous Lusitanians (because of poor land), 91 inhabitants of mountainous 
regions in general, whom he considered were prone to banditry, but on whom the 
government of 'good men' could be a civilising force, 92 several small, poor tribes 
around Comum,93 those living in the Corsican mountains,94 the Bessi in the 
Haemus Mountains in Thrace, (said to be called bandits even by bandits!), who 'led a 
wretched life',95 the Achaei, Heniochi and Zygi, who descended from the poor land 
of the Caucasus Mountains to the Black Sea with their light boats to practise 'sea 
banditry' and kidnapping,96 some tribes around the region of the Armenian and 
Median Mountains, 97 and those (not surprisingly) of Cilicia Tracheia ('Rough' 
Maternus almost epitomises the arrogant soldier, the miles gloriosus, who deserted and terrorised the 
locals. Cf. Apuleius Met. 9.39 where a soldier demands the ass from its latest owner, the gardener, to 
carry the luggage of the governor. Also Millar (1981) p67-8. 
89 See Strasburger (1965) 40 - 53 on the influence of Posidonius' writings and his interest in piracy 
not only in the accounts of Strabo, but those of Plutarch and Appian. Flam-Zuckermann (1970) 
p457n2 lists the many mountainous areas mentioned for their banditry under the Empire, and Shaw 
(1984) p42n114 lists the tribes, which as he notes, would over time cover virtually everyone else 
except the Romans. See P. Brule, La Piraterie critoise hellenistique, Paris 1978 for argument against 
geographical explanations of piracy and Walbank's review CR 30 (1980) p82 - 83 for criticism of his 
alternative theories. 
90 Strabo 1.3.2 and cf. 3.2.13. 
91 Strabo 3.3.5. Diodorus Siculus (5.34) reports that impoverished young men among the 
Lusitanians would form large bandit gangs in the mountains and descend on the Iberians for plunder. 
92 Strabo 2.5.26. 
93 Strabo 4.6.6. 
94 Strabo 5.2.7. 
95 Strabo 7.5.12 (Atmp613coL) 
96 Strabo 11.2.12 & 17.3.24. Similarly Justin, 43.3.5 who comments that the Phoceans in the 
time of Tarquin supported themselves by 'banditry of the sea' (latrocinio mans) because of the 
'smallness and poverty' of their land (exiguitate ac macie terrae). 
97 Strabo 11.7.1. 
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Cilicia), where, he says, the land was 'naturally suited' to banditry 'on land and sea'. 
The large tribes who lived byond the mountains on the plains could be raided, and 
there was a supply of timber, harbours and secret anchors available for boats. 98 After 
the defeat of Viriathus in 139B.C., his conqueror Caepio still ceded the remnants of 
his forces enough land 'so that they would not commit banditry from want'. 99 
Appian claims that many of the pirates turned to piracy as a result of their poverty, 
from the loss of both 'livelihood and country'. The Cilicians' numbers were said to be 
swelled by those from the Syrian, Cyprian, Pamphylian, and Pontic areas. and those 
who were escaping the upheavals caused by war in the east. Appian describes their 
predicament with the statement that they 'preferred to do wrong rather than to suffer 
It has been argued that poverty and overpopulation were responsible for an 
upsurge in Illyrian piracy which eventually led to raiding on a larger scale from about 
231B.C. and under Teuta to war with Rome in 229. Linked again to the poor quality 
of the land resources, the Illyrians' piracy was at first in order to gather food, and so 
the targets for their attacks were the agricultural areas rather than the towns. 101 The 
poverty and hunger of the mistreated slaves in Sicily is said to have been behind the 
first Sicilian slave war. 1 °2 During the second slave rebellion in Sicily men who were 
98 Strabo 14.5.6. Cf. also 16.2.18 for the Ituraeans and Arabians in Syria on Mt. Libanus who 
preyed on plains people below. Not all banditry was synonymous with poverty in Strabo, however. 
The Alpine (H)elvetii, despite apparently being 'rich in gold', are said to have been turned to banditry 
against the Cimbri by their greed. (4.3.3) Strabo suggests that the Tyrrhenians (Etruscans) had 
become pirates after the loss of strong government and that it was 'likely' that it was after they were 
organized into separate cities by their violent neighbours that they left their 'fortunate land' for piracy, 
(5.2.2). Ormerod, (1924) p154 suggests that Tyrrhenian piracy was originally a means of self-defense 
against other aggressors from the sea, possibly from Greece, or the islands of Corsica, Sardinia and 
Elba. 
99 Appian lb. 75. 
100 Appian Mith. 92; (transl. by White, Loeb edn, Appian (1912)) 96; see Magie (1950) p236ff for 
the Sullan treatment of the cities of Asia Minor after the second Mithridatic War, such as the 'razing of 
cities' and the persecution of those who had supported Mithridates; cf. also Dio 36.20.2 for the impact 
of war on the cities and the fugitives from such sentences. 
101 Polybius 2.5.1-2; 2.6.8 and Dell, (1967) p356-8. 
102 Died. Sic., 34/35.2.2 & (Const. Exerpta) 27. 
66 
free but poor are said to have taken the opportunity to steal cattle and plunder stored 
crops, and murdered witnesses to prevent reports of their pillaging. 103 Josephus 
records that Petronius, the Syrian governor from A.D.39 to 42, was asked in an appeal 
from Jewish leaders to inform the Emperor Gaius that because the land was not sown, 
banditry would result from the subsequent inability to pay the tribute. 1 °4 Bulla Felix 
was joined by poorly paid or unpaid imperial freedmen. 105 Cassius Dio has Maecenas 
in his speech to Augustus proffer the advice that the 'strongest and most vigorous 
men' and those 'in need of a livelihood' should be enrolled in the army, which would 
prevent them from being forced to turn to banditry for a living. 106 In the fifth century 
many in Gaul were forced into banditry by barbarian raids. 107 Exiles, guilty criminals 
and debtors were also among those who were forced to commit banditry. They were 
among a group of some 4000 men taken from Sicily to Italy in 210B.C. during the 
Punic War, who had been living by banditry and plundering. 108  C. Titinius Gadaeus, 
who infiltrated and betrayed the stronghold of a revolt of some Sicilian slaves in 
104B.C., was an escaped condemned criminal." The last task undertaken in a war 
in Spain in 195B.C. by the consul M. Porcius Cato, was to put a halt to banditry from 
the castrum at Bergium. Bandits were said to have taken it over, and made it a 
receptaculum praedonum, from which raids were being made on 'pacified lands'. A 
leader from the Bergistani is said to have escaped from it and approached Cato, whose 
soldiers attacked the walls, while those inside occupied the citadel. It is likely that 
103 Diod. Sic., 36.5.6 & 11. 
104 Josephus Ant. 18.274. Also Issac, (1984) p179. See also Jos. Ant. 15.344-348 for the people 
of Trachonitis, whose banditry was a living, and who stole from one another. 
105 Dio 77.10. 
106 Dio 52.27.4-5. 
107 See below on the Bagaudae. 
108 Livy 26.40.17.18. 
109 Diod. Sic., 36.3.5-6. Caesar claims that the forces of the Egyptian king's commander Achillas 
included many condemned criminals and exiles. This is a piece of slanderous political invective 
containing standard derogatory elements; the rest of the 20,000 strong army allegedly consisted of 
Gabinius' soldiers who had become accustomed to Alexandrian licentiousness and lax discipline, those 
collected from the praedones and latrones of Cilicia and Syria, and fugitive slaves. (B.C. 3.110). 
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many of these 'bandits' were those defeated or left homeless by the war. 11° This is 
supported by a report that the Bergistani near Tarraco had twice previously revolted 
and been subdued by Cato; after the second time, 'all' were sold. 111 Bergium is 
northeast of Tarraco, and it is probable that the bandits had escaped to Bergium from 
this enslavement. However Livy says that excluding those men who had seized the 
citadel and their relatives, Cato then directed the quaestor to sell the 'other Bergistani' 
and had the praedones killed. 
It is possible to identify slaves as bandits in particular. Bulla Felix was said to 
have had 'many of Caesar's slaves' with him. 112 In the laws slave bandits in general 
are used only to provide examples for a law; the lex Aquilia concerned the 
ramifications of killing or wounding another's slave; the example given is that the 
killing of another's slave who was a bandit lying in ambush was not a punishable 
offence. 113 Under another law a slave could not carry out piracies on the orders of his 
owner with impunity, though he could only be charged after manumission. 114 
There was a particular group of slaves who frequently appear committing 
banditry in the sources; the shepherd bandits. They were so often linked to banditry 
that they were considered virtually synonymous with bandits. 115 Shepherds were in 
many ways similar to bandits, being mobile armed men living in remote areas, usually 
the mountainsides, removed from the direct control of authority and from contact with 
communities. Varro (ironically) recommends fit young men to be herdsmen on the 
trails, as they should be swift enough to follow the herd, strong enough to throw a 
weapon and protect it from wild animals and bandits. 116 Shepherds and banditry had 
110 Livy 34.21. 
111 Livy 34.16.9-10. 
112 Dio 77.10.5. 
113 Dig. 9.2.4. Also in Mos. et Rom. Leg. Coll. VII 3.1: "si quis servum latronem occident, 
lege Aquilia non tenetur, quia <iniuria> non occidit." 
114 Dig. 44.7.20. 
115 Also Shaw (1984) p31. See also L. Robert 'Bergers Grecs' Hellenica VII (1949) 152ff. 
116 Varro Res Rusticae, 2.10.1-4. 
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been linked together from the beginning, in the mythical tales of Rome's origins. In 
Livy's version, Romulus and Remus, found by the shepherd Faustulus and raised 
among the shepherds, as young men are said to have wandered over the mountainsides 
for game, and would not only stand against wild beasts but also attacked latrones and 
relieved them of booty. This booty (which then became theirs) was then divided up 
among the shepherds (it was not returned to its owners), while their own band was 
'growing daily'. 117 In addition they become involved in a dispute for the very bandit-
like activity of raiding Numitor's property with their band. 118 Here Romulus and 
Remus are shepherd bandits in all but name, but for obvious reasons. Livy does not 
call the revered 'founders' of Rome by this name. 119 
The notoriety of shepherd bandits was due in large pan to the fact that those who 
were involved in revolts or uprisings (particularly slave revolts) were shepherds who 
had been or were alleged to be involved in banditry. Viriathus the Spanish 'bandit' for 
example, was said to have begun as a shepherd.'" In 97B.C. after slave revolts 
which included shepherd bandits had been repressed on Sicily in the late 100's, the 
praetor L. Domitius Ahenobarbus in Sicily had a shepherd crucified for illegally 
possessing a weapon (a spear). As the shepherd had only killed a particularly large 
boar which was subsequently presented to Domitius, the punishment is cited as an 
example of unnecessary severity. 121  Domitius had forbidden the use of weapons in 
Sicily specifically in order to drive out banditry, and a shepherd with a weapon was 
117 Livy 1.4.8ff. 
118 Livy 1.5.3 f. 
113 For other versions involving the shepherds, see Dion. Hal., 1.79.6ff; Varro, R .R . 2.1.9; 
Plutarch Romulus 6ff; Florus 1.1.3; Servius 1.273; Origo gentis Romanae, 21ff.; Eutropius 1.1-3 
states outright that Romulus founded the city at 18 while committing banditry among the shepherds 
(cum inter pastores latrocinaretur) and that Numa Pompilius gave laws and customs to the Romans 
who thanks to their 'custom of battles were thought to be bandits and semibarbarian'(!) (qui 
consuetudine proeliorum jam latrones ac semibarbari putabantur). Shaw, (1984) p23 calls Romulus 
and Remus 'shepherd chieftains of bandit gangs'. Dionysius of Halicarnassus also records a version of 
the beginnings of Rome in which certain wanderers grouped together and lived there by banditry and 
herding. (1.10.2) See Ovid Fasti 2.370; 3.63 for them fighting bandits. 
120 Diod. Sic. 33.1.1; Livy, Per. 52; Dio, Fr. 22.1; Orosius 5.4; Eutropius 4.16. 
121 Cic. In Verr. 2.5.7; Quint., Inst. Or. 4.2.17; Val. Max. 6.3.5. 
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thus considered an almost certain bandit candidate. 122 
In Livy there is a brief reference to a slave movement in Apulia in 185B.C., in 
which shepherds are described as 'making the roads and public pastures unsafe with 
their banditry', which resulted in 7000 being condemned after a quaestio by the 
praetor L. Postumius. 123 It has been suggested that these 'shepherd bandits' were in 
reality slave worshippers of Dionysus creating riotous disturbances against the 
suppression of the Bacchic cult which had begun in 186B.C. 124 Toynbee suggests 
that these bacchanals, calling themselves /3ovtc6Aot (pastores) of Dionysus, were 
misinterpreted by Livy as two separate movements of 'shepherds' and bacchanals, but 
were in fact one. 125 However, there are a number of factors which suggest that it was 
an uprising of slaves. It is unlikely that those protesting at the suppression of the 
Bacchanalia in the Apulian area consisted solely of slaves, including slave shepherds 
(there surely were not 7000 slave shepherds in Apulia alone), given that those involved 
in the Bacchic cult elsewhere included citizens, and even nobiles quosdam viros 
feminasque. 126 It seems incongruous that only the Apulian members of the cult would 
retaliate in such a manner, given that those in Rome had fled, not attacked, their 
oppressors. 127 Livy gives the number of shepherds in the rebellion as 7000. Yet the 
figure he supplies for those involved in the Bacchic 'conspiracy' overall was also 
around 7000, which casts doubt on the existence of an equal number of slave 
bacchanals in Apulia alone. 128 They did not all flee to Apulia and arrange to stage 
122 Val. Max.  6.3.5. 
123 Livy 39.29.8-9: "Magnus motus servilis eo anno in Apulia fuit. Tarentum provinciam L. 
Postumius praetor habebat. Is de pastorum publica infesta habuerant, quaestionem severe exercuit. 
Ad septem milia hominum condemnavit: multi inde fugerunt, de multis sumptum est supplicium." 
124 Toynbee (1965) vol 2, p320-21, expanding on Frank (1927) p130 (from Bradley (1989) p43n38), 
and more recently, Bauman, (1990) 334 - 348 and (1992) 37 - 38, who argues they were both slaves 
and Bacchanalians who were committing brigandage to collect funds for the cult. 
125 Toynbee p321. 
126 Livy 39.13.14. Bauman (1990) p341 follows the careers of those involved. 
127 Livy 39.17.4 -18.1. 
128 Livy 39.17.6: "Coniurasse supra septem milia virorum ac mulierum dicebantur." At 39.15.8, 
they are described as multamilia. 
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resistence from there; moreover why did the banditry occur only in Apulia when it 
began in Etruria and the consuls were eventually given the task of destroying omnia 
Bacchanalia throughout tota Italia? 129 Finally Livy again refers to the shepherd 
rebellion and to the suppression of the Bacchanalia in 184B.C., but they are clearly 
mentioned as separate entities: "And Lucius Postumius the praetor, to whom the 
province of Tarentum had come, punished large conspiracies of shepherds, and carried 
out the remainder of the quaestio of the Bacchanalia." 130 In his previous reference to 
the slave uprising, Livy had stated that many were executed, but also that many had 
escaped, so it is not surprising that Postumius was still pursuing them. It seems 
improbable too that they would be pursuing funds for the cult through banditry whilst 
the Romans were trying to subdue them. 131 In this context of violent unrest by slave 
shepherds, Livy describes the rebellion using a term which described the actions of the 
pastores in a Roman sense - that is, latrocinium. Livy generally describes slave 
uprisings as 'conspiracies' and there is no exception for this occasion; in addition, 
since this was a significant uprising on a large scale but not war, the violence is called 
'banditry'. 132 
Shepherd bandits appear in a significant role in fomenting revolt which resulted 
in the First Sicilian Slave War, which began in about 135B.C. 133 According to 
Diodorus Siculus, it was provoked by the many wealthy Sicilian landowners who 
mistreated their slaves and did not provide them with sufficient clothing or food, so 
that they turned to banditry to make up the deficiency. 134 They attacked and killed 
travellers at first and then progressed to attack the homes of those unable to protect 
129 Livy 39.8.3; 18.7. 
1 " Livy 39.41.6: "Et L. Postumius praetor, cui Tarentum provincia evenerat, rnagnas pastorum 
coniurationes vinclicavit, et reliquias Bacchanalium quaestionis cum cum exsecutus est." 
131 Bauman, cited above. 
132 Livy's use of conspiracy at: 4.45.1; 22.33.2; 32.26 (x4); 33.36.1 (x2); 39.29.8; 39.41.6; and 
Frank (1927) p130 notes that he also uses it of the Bacchic cult, 39.8ff. 
133 The beginning of the revolt has been conjectured at 135B.C.; see further Green (1961) 28 -29; 
Bradley (1989) Appendix 2 p140 - 141. 
134 Diod. Sic., 34/35.2.2 & (Const. Exerpta) 27. Also Jacoby (1926) for Posidonius (87, Fr 108). 
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themselves against a concerted body of men. After Eunus, a slave and charlatan 
'magician' in the city of Enna was approached concerning rebellion, a group of 400 
armed slaves under his leadership was assembled one night to attack Enna, where they 
were joined by many of the city slaves. 135 The slaves became considerably more 
organised and militaristic in their leadership and planning of the rebellion, in which 
owners were killed, Roman forces defied, and whole cities captured. 136 After the first 
three days Eunus had 6000 armed slaves under his command, which rapidly increased 
to over ten thousand men, whom Diodorus describes as Isoldiers'. 137 They were 
joined after a month by another group of rebellious slaves from Agrigentum and 
surrounding areas. This additional revolt was led by Cleon, who was a Cilician from 
the Taurus Mountains (and thus Diodorus comments, accustomed to banditry from 
childhood), who was a horse herdsman and bandit in Sicily. 138 After overrunning 
Agrigentum, his band of 5000 then swelled the numbers of Eunus' army. 139 Diodorus 
claims the numbers raised eventually totalled 200,000 and Livy describes these figures 
earmy , .140 as an Regardless of the precise number, the slaves were sufficient to hold 
off Roman forces in a war that lasted several years until it was finally repressed by the 
consul P. Rupilius in 132B.C. 141 
The banditry of these slave herdsmen therefore was not a manner of 'guerilla' 
protest against their treatment. The shepherds were not acting as bandits against their 
masters nor on their behalf, as if for example under orders to take the booty to them; it 
135 Diod. Sic., 34/35.2.12, Florus 2.7. 
136 eg Diod. Sic. 34/35.2.11f; 15; 18; 20; 43ff. 
137 Diod. Sic., 34/35.2.16. He earlier describes the bands of robbers as being like groups of soldiers. -- 
(34/35.2.2) 
138 Diod. Sic., 34/35.2.17 & 43. Diodorus does not say that he had been forced into banditry from 
poverty; rather he seems to imply that it was the inevitable continuation of his Cilician upbringing. 
139 Diod. Sic., 34/35.2.17. 
1 " Diod. Sic., 34/35.2.17; Livy, Per. 56, gives Cleon a force of 70,000. Florus (2.7.6) says 
Eunus' forces in total numbered 60,000 and Orosius (5.6) says 70,000. 
141 Diod. Sic., 34/35.2.20ff; Cic. In Verr. 2.3.125; Livy Per. 59; Orosius 5.9.8; Val. Max. 2.7.3, 
6.9.8, 9.12.ext.1 (MRR 1.498). See also Wiseman (1964) pp21 - 37 for the road-building at this 
time to facilitate the suppression of shepherd banditry. 
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was not a means of revenge but a means of living. Diodorus clearly says their 
banditry, like many other (non-shepherd) bandits, was to support their own existence. 
When they did protest and revolt against their owners, their method was open rebellion 
and warfare, with those originally small and scattered bands of shepherd bandits at its 
core. 142 
Banditry by slaves, though not necessarily by shepherds, appears to a lesser 
extent but again as a means of survival, not protest, in the Second Sicilian Slave War. 
The actions of Publius Licinius Nerva, the governor of Sicily in 104B.C., are cited as 
a significant provocation of this rebellion. He began hearings for slave manumisions 
after a senatorial decree that citizens of allied states should not be held in slavery in 
Roman provinces. 143  After some 800 had been freed however, he put a halt to the 
proceedings, bowing to the pressure, it is alleged, of the slave owners and/or bribery. 
The slaves who had gathered in hope of manumission withdrew to sanctuary at the 
shrine of the Palici. There they turned to banditry for supplies; as Bradley notes, there 
was little alternative for survival. 144 Open slave revolt in Sicily increased after this 
point, developing into a war which took four years to suppress, ending in 100B.C. 145 
The dangers posed by the large numbers of slaves and of slave shepherds and 
142 Diod. Sic. , 34/35.2.2 & 30. See further, Green (1961); Shaw (1984) p40; Bradley (1989) ch.3. 
143 Diod. Sic., 36.3.1ff; Cassius Dio, 27.93, who omits mention of the decree. 
144 Dio, 27.93.3; Bradley, (1989) p72. 
145 Diod. Sic., 36.10; Cic. In Verr. 2.3.125 mentions 'Athenio and his fugitives'. Florus claims that 
the leader of one of the rebellious groups of slaves, the Cilician Athenion, was a pastor; Diodorus 
(36.5.1) says he was a Cilician and an 0/Kayo/log, or manager or overseer; it is probably unlikely that 
there were two leaders of two secondary rebellions in both slave wars on Sicily who were Cilicians and 
pastores. Bradley, (1989) p76 suggests he was a magister pecoris. See Verbrugghe, (1975) 189 - 
204 on the many similarities in events in the accounts of the two slave wars, which he suggests were 
the result of Diodarus' source Posidonius gaining his information from oral sources in Sicily who 
confused the two rebellions. Strasburger (1965) esp. pp43, 49-50 also notes the similarities between 
Posidonius' description of this revolt and the descriptions of Plutarch and Appian on the increase in 
piratical activity. There is a single brief uncorroborated reference in the Historia Augusta, Gallieni 
4.9, to another servile bellum on Sicily in the early 260's A.D. which was 'barely repressed', and 
which also involved 'wandering bandits'. It may have been added to 'spice up' the list of misfortunes 
in the Empire carried out allegedly in contempt of the Emperor Gallienus, Despite its dubious 
veracity, it demonstrates the continuing link between slaves and bandits in the Roman mind. 
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herdsmen in particular on the latifundia in Italy, who had the potential to revolt or like 
bandits and pirates to be used as armed gangs or as part of larger armed forces in 
political disputes, were well-known in the late Republic. Marius in 87B.C. gathered a 
large force of farmers and herdsmen from Etruria. 146 Those involved in Spartacus' 
rebellion included shepherds. 147 In his defence of Cluentius, Cicero argues that 
Cluentius' overseers (vilici) did not assault the pastores of Ancharius and Pacenus, 
but were defending their master's property as they were accustomed to do in disputes 
between shepherds. I48 One of the (many) charges he lays against Verres was that he 
took money from Sicilian landowners for releasing their slaves whom he had charged 
with conspiracy. The slaves allegedly involved were the vilicus of one owner: the 
vilicos pastoresque of another and a third owner, Apollonius, was placed into prison 
for not producing a magister pecoris charged with conspiracy in a rebellion. 149 In 
another speech, Cicero sarcastically suggests that some public records, claimed to have 
been 'lost' while travelling, must have been stolen by literature-hungry shepherds, a 
comment which indicates that it was recognised that travellers were harassed 
particularly by shepherd bandits at that time. 15° 
It has been claimed that Catiline incited slave herdsmen to recruit them for his 
forces. 151 Bradley however argues that Catiline did not incite them, and that the slaves 
in his army are best described as fugitives. One of Catiline's allies, - Marcus Caeparius, 
was to travel to Apulia to incite the shepherds specifically, but was prevented by his 
arrest. 152 The slaves in Apulia seem to have begun their own revolt but independent 
146 Plutarch, Marius 41; Appian, B.C. 67; also Iulius Exsuperantius 4, and Granius Licinianus 16F 
(cited by Wiseman (1971) p27n5) for shelter in Etruria given to Sertorius and Carbo in 82. 
147 Plutarch, Crassus 9.3; Appian, (B.C. 1.116) says slaves and freedmen from the land joined him. 
148 Cicero, Pro Cluentio 16-1. Cicero also defended Marcus Tullius whose villa had been attacked by 
an armed gang of slaves owned and sent by P. Fabius. See also Brunt, (1971) p551-557 on 'Violence 
in the Italian countryside'. 
149 Cicero, In Verr. 2.5.15ff. 
150 Cic. Pro Place°, 39. 
151 Wiseman, (1971) p27; others' acceptance of slave involvement cited in Bradley, (1978) p329n2. 
152 • Cic. In Cat. 3.14; Sallust, Cat. 46.3; 47.4; Bradley (1978) p332. 
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of the Catilinarian conspirators, though they may well have been prompted to take the 
opportunity while attention was on Catiline. 153 Cicero rhetorically sighs with relief 
that much bloodshed had been spared because Catiline had not gained control of the 
'Italian tracks and herdmen's quarters'. 154 
Cicero claims his enemy Clodius used shepherds from the Apennines in Etruria, 
among his 'other nefarious deeds. 155 Cicero also charges Gaius Antonius with the 
intention of rousing a fugitivorum bellum with pastores. 156 Pompey is said to have 
raised a 'levy' of about 300 slave herdsmen from Apulia during the civil war.I 57 M. 
Caelius Rufus sent Milo to the area around Thurii to stir up the pastores in 48B.C., 
though he did not succeed. 158 
During the empire, in the disturbances in Judea following the death of King 
Herod, the aspirant to the throne Athronges, a former shepherd, proclaimed himself 
king and with his four brothers raised bands of supporters and carried out raids until 
they were suppressed. 159 In the same summer as the defeat of Tacfarinas (A.D.24), a 
former soldier in a praetorian cohort, Titus Curtisius, called on the 'fierce country 
slaves' to revolt, again in the Apulian area, around Brundisium. The movement was 
quashed however by the quaestor Curtius Lupus who had the responsibility for 
keeping order on the calles. 160 In A.D.54 one of the counts on which Domitia Lepida 
was condemned was that her slaves in Calabria through lack of restraint were 
'disturbing the peace of Italy'. 161  A letter written between A.D.169 and 172 records 
153 Sallust, Cat. 30.2; 42.1; Bradley, (1978) 331-335. 
154 Cic. Pro Sestio, 5.12. Bradley, (1978) p332n24 notes that there is no evidence that this was in 
any case Catiline's intention, but it demonstrates the fear of shepherds' conversion into armed forces. 
155 Cicero, De aere alieno Milonis (Schol. Bobbio), 172.13St (in Crawford (1994) p290); 
Philippics, 12.23; Pro Mil. 26: "Servos agrestis et barbaros, quibus silvas publicas depopulatus 
erat Etruriamque vexarat, ex Apennino deduxerat..."; Mil. 50; 55; 74; 87, (Wiseman (1971) p27). 
156 Asconius 87. 
157 Caesar, B.C. 1.24. 
158 Caesar, B.C. 3.21. 
159 Jos. B.J. 2.60-65 = Ant. 17.278-284. Cf. B.J. 2.57-59 = Ant. 273-277 for Simon, a former 
slave of Herod's and another aspirant to the throne after Herod died, who committed banditry. 
160 Tacitus, Ann. 4.27. 
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the constant suspicion of pastores; innocent hired shepherds complained of frequent 
harassment by both the local stationarii and the magistrates at Saepinum and 
Bovianum, who claimed that the slaves were fugitives and that their pack animals were 
stolen. 162 The Emperor Maximinus (235-238) is reputed to have been a 'good' 
shepherd in his youth; with his band of young men he was supposed to 'lie in wait for 
bandits and defend his own people from attacks'. 163 
By the fourth century, the words 'shepherds', 'rustlers' and 'bandits' were 
equally interchangeable in the laws. 164 In A.D.364 cattle rustling had become such a 
problem in Italy throughout the areas of Picenum, Flaminia, Apulia, Calabria, 
Bruttium, Lucania and Samnium that a decree was issued forbidding the ownership of 
horses, except for senators, distinguished men, veterans, those administering 
provinces, decurions and those who had carried out military service 'under arms'. 
Others risked being punished as cattle thieves (abactores). 165 Another decree was 
issued a few days later to the governor of Campania, with the aim of weakening the 
efforts of Iatrones, which forbade pastores on imperial property and the procurators 
and managers of senators owning a herd of horses, or face the punishment of 
abactores. 166 As Shaw notes, the powerful landowners were thought to be 
collaborating with the pastores and overseers in their banditry - if they were not 
161 Tacitus, Ann. 12.65. Also see ILS 961 for more trouble from Apulian slaves. 
162 CIL IX 2438 = FIRA 1 no. 61. Similarly, Marcus Aurelius relates how he and a companion 
out riding approached two pastores who alerted one another: " 'Vide tibi istos equites', in quit, 'nam 
liii solent maximas rapinationes facere.' " (Front°, Ep. 2.12, A.D.143). Also Shaw, (1984) 
p31n79. MacMullen (1974) plff describes the problems of the isolated shepherds, having among other 
things, to contend with bandits. 
163 HA, Max. 2.1. Shaw (1984) p36 translates latronibus insidiaretur as 'he went on raids with 
bandits'. This is incongruous with the context, which is favourable, praising his virtute inter omnes 
milites clarus, for example when he joined the army, and is without any sentence indicating that he 
'mended his ways' to become iustus. See also the portrayal of Jesus as a 'Good Shepherd', John 10.1, 
7-11. 
1 " By A.D.292 the crimes of latrones and pastores were considered the same in law, C.J. 9.2.11. 
165 C. Th. 9.30.1. (30 Sept. 364). 
166 C. Th. 9.30.2. (5 Oct. 364). See Dig. 47.14 for laws dating from Hadrian which include forced 
labour and the punishment commonly given to bandits, death, as penalities for cattle thieves. Also 
Sent. Pauli, 5.18, and Mos. et Rom. Leg. Coll. 11. 
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actually directing the raids on other properties, with their private bands of armed 
men. 167 Later in A.D.409 it was forbidden to give children to shepherds to be raised, 
or else be seen as an associate of bandits. 168 Such laws also point to the inability or 
inadequacy of the local authorities to keep control in many areas of Italy at this time.I 69 
One group of shepherd bandits who appear in both historical and literary sources 
are the shepherds or boukoloi on the Egyptian coast around Alexandria. 170 Strabo 
claims that the Egyptian kings set guardians at the village of Rhacotis (later Alexandria) 
to watch the harbour of Pharos against (particularly Greek) foreigners, and that the 
area around the village was given to the boukoloi who also acted as guards. 171 Later 
Strabo refers to Pharos as being guarded 'by the shepherd bandits' (rro igovir6Awv 
Aocrr6v) who attacked ships which attempted to enter the harbour. 172 Winkler rightly 
distinguishes between the historical accounts of boukoloi at Pharos and the pseudo- 
realistic accounts of The Boukoloi in the later Greek novels of Achilles Tatius, 
Heliodorus and Lollianus, though he regards as belonging to the latter rather than the 
former Dio's account of an uprising in Egypt attributed to the Boukoloi in A.D.171/2 
He argues that there was no continuity between the two groups and suggests that the 
name Boukoloi was adopted by a "...native Egyptian movement of resistance against 
167 Shaw (1984) p32. 
168 C. Th. 9.31.1. (At the end of the western Empire, this law neatly marks the repression of the 
custom which featured in the Romulus and Remus myths of the beginning of Roman history.) Cf. 
HA, Probus 16.6: Probus after subduing Isauria in A.D.280 settled veterans there with the condition 
that the male children be sent into the army at 18, so that they would not learn to commit banditry. 
Why they should become bandits is not explained; presumably it was implied, through association 
with the Isaurians who were notorious for their banditry. 
169 In A.D.399 another edict outlawed the use of horses by shepherds in the provinces of Valeria and 
again Picenum. Any accomplice dornini or procurators faced exile. (C. Th. 9.30.5). 
170 The historical reality of shepherd life differs markedly from the idyllic view of shepherd life 
portrayed in pastoral poetry, in which the "...most common themes and motifs in the genre are 
concerned with unhappy love, the absence or death of friends, the ideal nature of rural life and the rural 
environment, the making of music...the values of peace, leisure, simple contentment, love, affection 
and friendship..." etc. AJ. Boyle, (ed. & transl.) The Eclogues of Virgil, Melbourne (1976) p6. 
171 Svabo, 17.1.6. 
172 Strabo 17.1.19, citing Eratosthenes. 
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foreigners. ..as a conscious identification with the oldest story of their forefathers' 
proud freedom from non-Egyptian control." 173 Julius Caesar however mentions that in 
his day the people of Pharos plundered 'in the manner of bandits' the ships which 
were unwise or unfortunate enough to land there and that he himself feared similar 
problems in entering the harbour. 174 This suggests that there was in fact some 
continuity in the form of a tradition of violence towards outsiders, called banditry by 
those attacked, from inhabitants in the area of Pharos. 
Dio's account is as follows: 
And those called the Boukoloi started an uprising in Egypt and moved the other 
Egyptians to revolt under a certain Isidorus, a priest. First in women's clothes 
they tricked the Roman centurion, as if wives of the Boukoloi, who were going 
to give gold to him for their husbands. When he approached they cut him down 
and sacrificing the companion with him they swore an oath on his entrails and 
ate them. Isidorus himself was the best of all in bravery. Then defeating the 
Romans in Egypt in pitched battle, they were within a little of capturing 
Alexandria, if Cassius had not been sent from Syria against them and conducted 
his strategy so as to break their agreement with each other and to separate them 
from each other, for because of their desperation and their numbers he did not 
dare to attack them as a whole, and thus quarrelling, he conquered them. 175 
The organised and open behaviour of these Boukoloi is not the usual hit and run 
tactic of bandits and pirates. The element of religious ritual, the killing and sacrifice, 
which Winkler sees as anecdotal and included for dramatic reasons in a traditional 
narrative formula, and the fact that the leader Isidorus was a priest, may indicate an 
alternative beginning to the uprising. 176 These factors suggest that a religious 
173 Winkler (1980) plal. See also Morgan, (1982), 221- 265. 
174 Caesar B.C. 3.112. 
175 Dio (Xiph.) 71.4. Also mentioned as the Bucolici milites in the HA, Marcus Antoninus 21.2 
and Avidius Cassius 6.7. 
176 Winkler (1980) p178. 
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grievance may have been the inspiration behind the disturbance, and that the military 
skills of the shepherds were hired by the aggrieved. The hiring and deployment of 
agricultural workers as armed forces had occurred at other times in Africa alone; 
Tacfarinas in the early first century in Numidia had gathered 'wanderers accustomed to 
banditry' as part of his army. 177 Angry rich young aristocrats summoned armed 
supporters from the farm workers in Libya in the late 230's, who formed a 'great 
crowd' of followers. In a manner similar to the Boukoloi, the young men approached 
the procurator against whom their wrath was directed, with their weapons hidden 
under their clothing and their supporters behind them, and under the pretext of 
discussing payment of fines, stabbed him. The crowd of peasant workers then 
prevented any retaliation by the guards. 178 The Circumcellion uprisings in Africa in 
the fourth century were probably named after the itinerant workers who wandered 
'around the cellae on properties, and provided the muscle for Donatist minds who 
were directing the disturbances, though the 'army' could at times exceed its 
authority. 179 
Dio's account should not be wholly dismissed as 'fiction and anecdotal 
hi story'. 180  It is possible that the 'Boukoloi uprising' received its name from the 
boukoloi around Alexandria whose military skills were used in a similar fashion to the 
later forces of the Circumcellions, as instruments of revenge for a particular religious 
grievance, from which point the trouble escalated. It seems unlikely that a 'native 
Egyptian resistance movement' with apparently no continuity to the boukoloi of pre-
Alexandrian times would pluck their name from those people placed hundreds of years 
previously in the area around the harbour of Pharos. 181 
177 Tacitus Ann. 2.52. 
178 Herodian 7.4.3f; HA, Gordiani, noted by MacMullen, (1966) p198. 
179 eg. St. Augustine, Contra Ep. Parmen. 1.11.17. MacMullen, (1966) p200-1; Jones, (1959) 
p294-5. 
180 Winkler (1980) p181. 
181 Winkler (1980), p181. MacMullen (1964) pp185-6 and 191-2 notes the decline in the Egyptian 
religion. 
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Another aspect of bandit life which might be thought to strengthen the argument 
in favour of social bandits is their organisation. They are said to have had equitable 
systems of justice and for the division of plunder. These seemingly egalitarian 
arrangements, it might be argued, could have their origin in a background of poverty 
and from a sense of injustice at the system that forced them out of society and into their 
outlaw status. In a discussion on justice, Cicero reveals that there was a general belief 
that bandits and pirates, the quintessential 'lawless' people outside the rules of the rest 
of society, had their own system of justice; "...leges latronum esse dicuntur, quibus 
pareant, quas observent." 182  He gives as an illustration of this justice the example of 
an archipirata who should make an impartial division of booty or risk being killed or 
deserted by his gang. Any member who stole from another would also risk expulsion. 
He cites as examples of bandit leaders who distributed the booty evenly Bardulis of 
Elyria and Viriathus in Lusitania. 183 His comment is unfortunately the only extant 
mention of this aspect of Bardulis' rule in the early to mid fourth century, so his 
reasons for acting thus may only be conjectured. Viriathus however receives more 
extensive praise in Diodorus Siculus for his division of booty. Viriathus was said to 
be even-handed in his distribution, rewarded his men on the basis of merit and 
bravery, and did not take his own share from the common portion. 184 In the eulogy 
for Viriathus, his own share of the spoils was said to be no greater than that of an 
ordinary soldier's. 185 This may well have been clever leadership on Viriathus' part, 
for Diodorus continues, because of this' the Lusitanians 'willingly went with him into 
danger' and gave strong loyalty to him over the years of the war with Rome. Viriathus 
would obviously not want to risk alienating his supporters. 186 Significantly. such 
182 Cic. De Off. 2.40. 
183 Cic. De Off. 2.40. 
184 Diod. Sic., 33.1.5 and 33.21a; repeated in Appian, lb., 75. 
185 Diod. Sic., 33.1.5. Cassius Dio (22.73) speaks of Viriathus' physical attributes and his 
astuteness, humility and the fact that he carried out war not for the power but for the love of it: 
OLAmIlepos- Kal EY/v(11E12os. 
186 Rubinsohn (1981) p192-3 on Viriathus' motives suggests that his 'love of war is as close to the 
reasoning behind Viriathus' actions as is possible to ascertain, as there is no sign of Virathus' patriotic 
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alienation may have led to his death. During the negotiations with the consul Popillius 
Laenas in 139B.C., Viriathus is said to have not only killed some of the leaders of 
those who had deserted from the Romans, who had been demanded for punishment 
(among whom was his own father-in-law, Astolpas), but handed over the remainder of 
the deserters to Popillius, who then had their hands cut off. 187 Needless to say, this 
would not engender trust among other supporters. It is then less surprising that the 
three who agreed to betray and assassinate Viriathus after a shady deal with Q. Caepio 
were said to be Viriathus' friends. It seems that they saw it as a situation where it was 
'either him or us'. 188 
The risk of betrayal among bandits and pirates was a very real danger. The belief 
that gangs of bandits and pirates possessed their own rules does have a basis in reality. 
They were 'lawless'; that is, they did not follow the laws of the rest of society, but 
they were not without rules and customs of their own, from sheer necessity. 189 Even 
Cicero recognised that equal division of booty was based on the reasoning that the 
leader's life was forfeit if he didn't, rather than on any social ideals. The same 
practicality is at the basis of the prohibition of theft or fraud between members of a 
group. If it did not exist, then the life of the band itself would be shortlived. 
Spartacus is said to have divided plunder impartially. 190 A tale of Liparean piracy in 
which the proceeds of a pirate raid on a Roman ship were divided among 'the 
community' has given rise to a comment that the Liparean islanders had a 
'communistic organisation.' 191 The original statement in Livy was that "Itlos erat 
idealism for Iberia. He also notes at p195 that not all Iberians wanted to be 'liberated'. 
187 Diod. Sic. 33.7 for relations with his father-in-law; Dio 22.75 for the handover. 
188 Diod. Sic., 33.21; Appian, lb. 74; Livy, Per. 54; Florus, 1.33; Eutropius 4.16: Orosius 5.14; 
de Viribus Illustribus, 71. See also Rubinsohn (1981) p203. 
189 Apuleius' bandits in The Golden Ass or Metamorphoses cast lots for various tasks: to choose a 
lookout, (4.6); to choose how to kill a captive girl (6.27); to decide on a new leader, (7.9); even to 
the (probably deliberately exaggerated) ridiculous extent of serving food, (4.8). 
190 Appian B. C. 1. 116. Romulus and Remus are said to have shared their booty with the 
shepherds. (Livy, 1.4.9) 
191 Onnerod (1924) p157. Garlan, (1978) p4 sees it as evidence of a "...lien «structurel» entre la 
piraterie et l'Etat: la piraterie y faisait plus ou moms figure d'«institution publique», d'«industrie 
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civitatis velut publico latrocinio partam praedam dividere." 192 The Roman ship had 
been captured according to Livy by Liparean 'pirates' in 394B.C. Plutarch's version 
differs in that the Lipareans thought the Roman ship was a becalmed pirate vessel and 
took it back to land and put them and their goods up for sale, thinking them pirates. 193 
The ship did not contain ordinary merchants however, but official envoys on a visit to 
Delphi to present a massive gold bowl. Both versions attribute the release of the 
envoys to an important magistrate on the islands, a certain Tima(/e)sitheus. It might be 
thought difficult to believe that the Lipareans would not, having taken the ship and 
seen the inhabitants, have realised that the Romans were not pirates. The two 
accounts seem to be the result of different traditions from both sides who, since they 
were in a state of 'almost war', called the other side 'pirates'. 194 It seems unlikely that 
the division of the booty was 'communistic'; Buck argues that the piracy was not 
"...actually publicum, but with a measure of popular and official support." 195 In a 
state of not-quite war, acts of piracy to which officials turned a blind eye to, could be 
effective harassment whilst not provoking outright war. The 'privateers', in return for 
their work, would be able to divide the plunder among themselves. 196 It is possible 
that in this instance the 'privateers' went too far and captured the wrong ship, forcing 
Timasitheus to intervene, for which he was duly rewarded by the Romans. 
Rhetorical exercises include statements which imply that there was a belief that 
the qualities of loyalty and trust were held to be of some value by pirates and 
bandits. 197 Obviously loyalty existed to a certain extent between members of a band 
d'Etat»." 
192 Livy 5.28.2. 
193 Plutarch Camillus 8. The capture by pirates is also mentioned in Diod. Sic. 14.93: Val. Max. 
1.1.ext.4. 
194 Ogilvie (1965) p689. 
195 Buck (1959) p38. 
196 Similarly, Buck, (1959) p38. 
197 Quintilian Dec. Min. 267.12 "Ego publicam appello fidem, quae inter piratas sacra est, quae 
inter armatos hostes indutias facit..." and Dec. Min. 343.12 "Fides supremum rerum humanarum 
vinculum est, sacra inter hostes, sacra (quod nuper comperi) inter piratas...". See also Vogt (1974) 
pp78-79. 
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or their gang would not survive. Bandit gangs nevertheless had a tenuous existence. 
Several notorious bandits perished through betrayal by those close to them. 198 Bulla 
Felix is said to have been betrayed by his mistress. 199 Others were betrayed by their 
bandit associates, such as Viriathus, Maternus, and Jesus the dpxtAuarrig, a 
mercenary bandit in Judea who was betrayed by one of his men who deserted to 
Josephus." The Bergistani bandits, mentioned above, are said to have been betrayed 
by a princeps Bergistani, who invited the Romans to put a stop to the banditry . 201 
The example of Lydius in Isauria demonstrates the risks of alienating support. 
After plundering Pamphylia and Lycia in A.D.277-8, he took refuge from Roman 
troops in the Lycian town of Cremna, which was situated on a cliff with deep ravines 
on one side. Facing a food shortage he is said to have driven out those who were too 
old or young to be of use in the siege. The Romans drove them back, whereupon 
Lydius is said to have had them thrown down one of the ravines. It would be hard to 
expect strong support from the townspeople after this, and the supply tunnel which 
was built to go beyond the Roman camp was subsequently revealed by a woman 
informer. Conditions became worse; Zosimus says all inhabitants of the city were 
killed except some of Lydius' closest allies. Lydius was eventually betrayed by one of 
his men whom he had punished for inaccurate shooting by being stripped and beaten. 
With the information from the informer, the Romans were able to shoot Lydius, who 
though mortally wounded, still had some of his men executed and made the rest swear 
not to capitulate. This oath however did not prevent them surrendering after his 
death.2°2 
Betrayal is a significant factor in explaining why local support for bandits was 
on a lesser scale then many claim. The more people who knew of their existence 
198 Issac (1984) p171 (Ekhah Rabbah 3.6), notes that bandits killed a man who had joined their 
gang and then betrayed them. 
199 Dio 77.10.7. 
200 Herodian 1.10.7.; Josephus The Life 104-111. 
201 Livy 34.21.2. 
202 Zosimus 1.69-70. 
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surely increased the risk of betrayal. There are several rescripts which dealt with the 
matter of the credence or otherwise of counter accusations made by latrones who had 
been betrayed, which indicates that the betrayals of the well-known bandits above were 
not unusual occurrences. 203 Shaw claims that betrayal was in fact the "...principal 
mechanism by which the governor was expected to repress banditry... ".204  Relying 
on more local support than was absolutely necessary would then be very dangerous; 
once captured, there could be no 'honour among thieves'; if the information was not 
volunteered, there was no hesitation in using torture. 
If loyalty among gang members could be tenuous, so too could their loyalty be 
to those who had hired them. Frontinus and Polyanus tell of the siege of Ephesus in 
287B.C. by the Macedonians, in which the leader of the pirates, Mandro or Andron, 
hired by the Ephesians, was bribed by the Macedonians to betray the city. Once the 
Macedonians had captured the city however, the pirates were paid and sent away from 
Ephesus immediately, since their untrustworthiness was proven. 205 The Cilician 
pirates who were allied with Sertorius in the late 80's B.C. are said to have disagreed 
with him at one point. Plutarch says Sertorius was seized with a wish to live on some 
quiet islands heard about in a sailor's tale, and the pirates, disdaining peace and 
wanting booty, left him. They went to the aid of a certain Ascalis who was attempting 
to restore himself to the throne in Mauretania. Sertorius subsequently entered the fight 
on behalf of those opposing Ascalis. 2°6 Plunder, not loyalty, was the more important 
creed.207 Cilician pirates are portrayed as equally unreliable in the case of Spartacus. 
He wanted to cross to Sicily and so made agreements and gave gifts to the pirates, but 
they are said to have then 'deceived him and sailed away'. 208 It has been suggested 
203 Dig. 48.18.1.26. 
204 Shaw (1984) p16. 
205 Frontinus 3.3.7; Polyaenus 5.19. 
206 Plutarch Serf. 7-9. 
207 Cf. Heliodorus' comment that bandits considered money more precious than life, and relationships 
were measured in terms of monetary gain, Aeth. 1.32 & 33. 
208 Plutarch Crassus 10.3-4. 
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that the reason for this might have been the proximity of Crassus' troops. 209 Plutarch 
however preferred to emphasise their 'treachery'. Josephus is careful to add that he 
'trusts especially' the bandit mercenaries in his army .210 
The untrustworthiness and treachery associated with bandits is evident in a few 
inscriptions among those that record people 'killed by bandits'. A number record that 
the victim was 'deceptus a latronibus'. 211 The phrase interfectus or occisus a 
latronibus is a customary formula in the inscriptions; it was a fact of life, or rather, of 
death.212 One inscription is testimony to the suffering caused by bandits. The victim 
was a man who "...a latronibus atrocissima (sic) mortem [per]pessus est...". 213 One 
traveller testifies to his adventure on a journey: "Profectus sum et inter vias latrones 
sum passus; nudus saucius evasi cum meis; Saldas veni" . 214  Another, not so  
fortunate, was killed in a notorious area: "Antonio Va[len]tino princi[pi] leg. XIII 
gemin[ae inter]fecto a latro[ni]bus in Alpes Iul[ias] loco quod appellatur 
Scelerata...".215 Such inscriptions have been found in many places in the empire and 
demonstrate that bandits could strike at any time; they were an unpredictable but 
constant threat to travellers. 216 
The reality of bandit life was a harsh one. Frequently people began such a life 
from the need for a means of existence. Often they did not survive long, at times 
209 J. P. Brisson, Spartacus, Paris (1959) p232. (cited in McGushin (1994) p151.) 
210 Josephus B.J. II 583 (11.20.8). 
211 CIL III 8830 = ILS 5112 Dalmatia; CIL VI 20307 = ILS 8505 Rome;C/L XIII 3689 
Belgica, Treveri: "o crudele nefas, tulit hic sine crimine mortem damnatus, periit deceptus fraude 
latronum." 
212 Also noted by Shaw (1984) p10. 
213 AE (1934) 209 Dalmatia. Similarly, CIL VI 234 = 1LS 2011 Rome: "Genio exercitus, qui 
extinguendis saevissimis latronib. fideli devotione Romanae dx1spectationi et votis omnium satis 
fecit". 
214 CIL VIII 2728 = ILS 5795 Numidia. 
215 ILS 2646 near Tergeste. 
216 CIL 11 1389 Baetica; 2813; 2968; 3479 = ILS 5928 Tarraconensis. CIL III 1559 = ILS 8009; 
1579; 1585 = ILS 8021 Dacia; 2399 = ILS 8514; 2544 = ILS 8506 Dalmatia; 8242; 14587 = ILS 
8504 = AE (1901) 19 Upper Moesia. Cf. CIL VIII 15881 = ILS 5505 Africa and CIL 2544 = 
ILS 8506 Dalmatia also for bandits. CIL XIII 259 Aquitania; 2282; 22647 Lugdunensis: 6429 
Upper Germany; ILS 8507. 
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betrayed by members of their own band or captured by pursuers. The 'laws' of such 
bandits were essentially those dictated by the expedient needs for survival. Whether 
motivated by need or greed, this made the acquisition of booty an imperative, which 
made the wealthy an obvious target. Thus they ignored the poor, not because they had 
their support or a wish to spare them. These men were pragmatically selfish, not Robin 
Hoods, ignoring those who had nothing they could take. Their associations with 
lawful society were formed with those whom they needed as receivers, harbourers or 
patrons. In the later empire, the patronage of the powerful was so common that it was 
blamed for the increase in crime, and banditry in particular. The literary souces use the 
unusual bandits to demonstrate that the emperor could occasionally not maintain 
complete authority over everyone. Bandits were outside the control of society, the law 
and even the emperor. Bulla Felix and Maternus however are not portrayed as 
alternatives with 'just power' in contrast to that of the emperor; they are /atrones, with 
all the derogatory overtones associated with the word. They commit crimes and 
receive their due punishment. The emperor's temporary inability to control them may 
also be seen in the stories of Dio and Herodian, thereby providing amusement by the 
diminution of his all powerful image. 
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Chapter Three: Social banditry II. A late imperial example: the case of 
the Bagaudae 
In the mid 280's A.D. the Bagaudae emerged in the Aremorican region 
between the Seine and the Loire in Gaul, and during the first half of the fifth-century 
in Gaul and Spain , as one group of people among many in the later Empire causing 
outbreaks of violence in the provinces. Thompson saw them as the oppressed peasant 
class who revolted against the ruling classes and intended to separate from the empire 
and establish their own independent state.' Drinkwater views the third-century 
Bagaudae as a movement of 'dislocated peasants' who in the absence of leadership 
from the Gallic aristocracy in the third-century 'crisis' were under the leadership of the 
remaining lesser lights: "...aristocrats, yeomen, or even visionaries and bandits." 2 
The Bagaudae in the fifth century he sees as external communities outside Roman 
control, composed of refugees resisting the reconquest of the north of Gaul by 
Rome. 3 In contrast to Drinkwater, Van Dam argues that these Bagaudae were under 
the leadership of local traditional aristocrats, whose 'revolts', as seen by the centre, 
"...often represented attempts by local citizens to revive a Roman administration that 
was abandoning them."4 Whittaker sees the Bagaudae generally as "...perhaps no 
more than extreme forms of local armies of dependants, taking aim at the traditional 
domini-curiales of the civitates."5 
Diocletian turned his attention to the first outbreak of unrest attributed to those 
labelled 'Bagaudae' in Gaul after the defeat of his rival Carinus in A.D.285. 6 Under 
the joint leadership of Aelianus and Amandus, the 'rural people' had plundered land 
1 Thompson (1952) p18. 
2 Drinkwater (1984) p368. 
3 Drinkwater (1992) p215. 
4 Van Dam (1985) p53. 
5 Whittaker (1993) p288. 
6 Aurelius Victor De Caesaribus 39.17: Namque ubi comperit Carini discessu Helianum 
Amandumque per Galliam excita manu agrestium ac latronum, quos Bagaudas incolae vocant, 
populatis late agris plerasque urbium tentare...". 
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and attacked cities. Diocletian appointed Maximian to deal with the Bagaudae, and he 
subsequently 'restored peace to Gaul'. 7 
The name Bagaudae which became Bacaudae in later sources, is thought to 
derive from the Celtic word for war, 'baga' and the suffix 'aud', to form a word 
meaning 'fighter' or iwarrior'. 8 Minor argues that the native Celts in western Gaul 
called the "...peasant insurgents Bagaudae...who if involved in a rebellion or 
insurrection, would be styled 'rebels' or insurgents'. 9 Aurelius Victor writing in the 
mid-fourth century, is the earliest to mention the Bagaudae by name. He mentions that 
the appellation was derived from local inhabitants: "...quos Bagaudas incolae 
vocant...". 1 ° This word, applied by the Celts, may have been used as a designation 
for local bandits, which was then taken up and transmitted by the sources mistakenly 
as a more official title of a gang or a tribe. In this way it is possible that bagaudae 
became the Bagaudae. Van Dam notes another example of a name of a bandit gang 
designated by locals." Sidonius Apollinaris in a letter to Bishop Lupus commends 
the bearers of the letter to the bishop, for they needed his help in tracing a man who 
sold a female relative of theirs who had been kidnapped. They had travelled to the 
Arvemian region in Gaul and discovered there that the woman had been taken by the 
Vargi. Sidonius explains that this was the name the natives called the local bandits. 12 
--- 
In this fashion, the name Bagaudae did not degenerate to become a synonym for bandit 
7 Aurelius Victor, De Caes., 39.17; Eutropius, Breviarium 9.20.3; Paeanius Versio Graeca 
historiae Romanae Eutropii, 9.20.3; Hieronymus, Chronicon a. Abr. 2303; Prosper, Chronicon, 
938 (Chronica Minora ed Mommsen, I, 445); Chronica Gallica anni DXI, 443 (Chron. Min. I, 
643); Jordanes, Romana, 296; Marianus Scottus, Chronicon 3.302.2 (in Migne, PL vo1147, 692); 
Orosius, Hist. adv. pag., 7.25.2; Passio Typasii, I; Theophanes Chronographia a.m. 5788; 
Zonaras 12.31. See also Minor (1971) p154f. 
8 Minor (1975) p320. 
9 Minor (1975) p320. 
10 Aurelius Victor 39.17. Orosius 7.52.2: "...quos Bacaudas vocabant..." and Jordanes 296, 
"...quos Bacaudas dicunt...". These sources seem to support the report of Aurelius Victor. The other 
ancient writers claim that they named themselves. 
11 Van Dam (1985) p31. 
12 Sidonius Ep. 6.4.1: "...hoc enim nomine indigenas latrunculos nuncupant...". 
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as Drinkwater suggests, rather it began as such. 13 
Minor prefers 'rebels' as a translation for Bagaudae, citing Paeanius' Greek 
version of Eutropius and his explanatory interpolation for 'Bagaudae'; "...this is the 
name meaning native tyrants...", 14 seeing it as meaning 'rebels of the 
countryside'. 15 However, as he notes, rtippavos- may also be translated as 'usurper' 
or 'robber'. 16 Minor then cites Salvian, who declares that "...we call them 
rebels...whom we compel to be criminals." 17 
A constant theme in Salvian's treatise De Gubernatore Dei, written in the fifth 
century, is a highly moralistic criticism of the injustices he sees inherent in the Roman 
administrative system in Gaul. He describes the rich oppressing their victims the poor 
in terms which depict the rich as robbers who act for their own financial advantage but 
to the detriment of society. At one point, for example, he describes the Roman state as 
dying from the chains of tribute as if strangled by the hands of bandits, with the rich 
profiting from the poor. 18 Preceding the treatment of the Bagaudae, Salvian 
compares the curiales or tax-gatherers to 'tyrants' (tyranni) and bandits (latrones); 
asks where the entrails of widows and orphans were not devoured by the leading men; 
and declares that no-one was immune from the devastation of plundering banditry, 
except those like bandits themselves. 19 He then declares that people were forced by 
13 Drinkwater (1984) p370, and (1989) p201. 
14 Paeanius Versio Graeca, 9.20.3, "...6volia se lb-rw rovro rupcivuous 8rplovv 
ernxwplous-..." 
15 Minor (1975) p321. 
16 Minor (1975) p3211. Strabo 12.8.8 for example uses it to describe Cleon, who rose to power 
among a gang of bandits. 
17 Salvian De Gub. Dei 5.24 "...vocamus rebelles, vocamus perditos, quos esse compulimus 
criminosus." 
18 Salvian De Gub. Dei 4.30-31: "[Romana respublica] qua adhuc vivere videtur, tributorum 
vinculis quasi praedonum manibus strangulata moriatur, inveniuntur tamen plurimi divitum, quorum 
tributa pauperes ferunt, hoc est, inveniuntur plurimi divitum, quorum tributa pauperes necant." 
19 Salvian De Gub. Dei 5.18: "Quae enim sunt non modo urbes, sed etiam municipia atque vici, 
ubi non quot curiales fuerint, tot tyranni sum? Quamquam forte hoc nomine gratulentur, quia potens 
et honoratus esse videatur. Nam et latrones ferme omnes gaudent et gloriantur, Si atrociores 
admodum quam sunt esse dicantur. Quis ergo, ut dixi, locus est, ubi non a principalibus civitatum 
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public prosecution to flee to the barbarians such as the Goths or Bagaudae, though 
they were unlike the Romans in many customs. 2° He does not criticise the 
barbarians, but merely notes their 'cultism dissimilene. He then explains that those 
who did not flee to the barbarians were forced to be barbarians, rather than Romans, 
and thus introduces the Bagaudae. He depicts them as people who were 'plundered, 
broken, killed' by 'evil and cruel judges' and who afterwards lost their Roman 
citizenship. 21 He repeats the charges against the judges, declaring that the people 
began to be like barbarians after they were "...strangled and killed by the banditries of 
the judges".22 Salvian does not specify what the 'barbarian' activities of the 
Bagaudae were, but the inference to be drawn from the previous linking of the 
Bagaudae with the Goths and other barbarian groups is that they were carrying out 
(barbarian-like) plundering raids. Salvian specifically does not use the word latrones 
in reference to the barbarian tribes or the Bagaudae; they are not the object of his 
criticism and such a usage would obviously undermine his argument. He keeps such 
rhetorically effective and emotive barbs for the Roman bureaucracy, carefully only 
observing that the barbarian tribes were 'different'. When Salvian calls the Bagaudae 
'rebels' whom the Romans 'forced to be criminals', therefore, it must be viewed as a 
distorted rhetorical exaggeration equal to that of calling judges' decisions 'banditry'; 
the reality is more prosaic and less dramatic. 
The situation in Gaul in the late third century differed from the Gaul of 
Salvian's time. Prior to the Bagaudae in A.D.285, the last major disturbance caused 
by the advances of the Franks, Alamanni, and Lugii (Longiones) into Gaul. had been . 
viduarum et pupillorum viscera devorentur et cum his ferme sanctorum omnium? ....Nemo itaque 
horum tutus est neque ulli admodum praeter summos a vastatione latrocinii populantis immunes, nisi 
qui ipsis latronibu.s. pares." 
20 Salvian De Gub. Dei 5.21. 
21 Salvian De Gub. Dei 5.24: "De Bacaudis nunc mihi sermo est, qui per malos iudices et cruentos 
spoliati, afflicti, necati, postquam ius Romanae libertatis amiserant, etiam honorem Romani nominis 
perdiderunt." 
22 S'alvian De Gub. Dei 5.26: "... ut latrociniis iudicum strangulati homines et necati inciperent 
esse quasi barbari, quia non permittebantur esse Romani." 
90 
countered in A.D.277-8 by Probus and his subordinates. 23 After the barbarian 
incursions Gaul seems to have been relatively peaceful until the Bagaudae raids. The 
Bagaudae in A.D.285 do not appear to have been forced by desperation into banditry 
after the attacks of barbarian hordes. Groups of bandits may have been operating the 
country in Aremorica ,who then formed or were gathered into a single large gang of 
bandits under the joint leadership of Aelianus and Amandus, which then carried out 
plundering on a large scale, similar to that of Bulla Felix and Maternus. Bandit raids 
by those nebulously termed 'rural people' by the sources however, does not 
necessarily denote peasant rebellion, merely those originating from a rural area in 
Gau1.24 
The targets of the Bagaudae do not seem to indicate that their unrest was an 
uprising of peasants against injustices. In the account of Aurelius Victor, the 
Bagaudae had not only attacked cities but had plundered fields widely. 25 In the 
Panegyric to Maximian delivered in A.D.288 or 289, Mamertinus speaks of "the 
evil...of the two-shaped monsters in these lands...", which Maximian had repressed. 
This passage has been generally accepted as an allusion to the Bagaudic activities in 
Gaul in A.D.285 The evil occurred when 
...ignorant farmers sought the habit of a soldier, when the ploughman imitated 
foot-soldier, when the shepherd the cavalryman, when the rustic plunderer of 
his own crops the enemy barbarian. Which I pass over quickly: for I see that 
you through pietas prefer the oblivion of that victory than glory. 26 
23 Zosimus 1.64-8; SHA Probus 13.5ff; Orosius 7.24; Zonaras 12.29. 
24 For exmple, Aurelius Victor 39.17 calls them 'rustics and bandits': "...excita manu agrestim ac 
latronum.."; Eutropius 9.20.3 "rusticani"; Orosius 7.25.2: "...collecta rusticanorum manu..."; 
Mamertinus Panegyric 4.3: "...ignari agricolae..."Chronica Gallica a. DXI, 443, "rusticos"; 
Jordanes Romana 296, Prosper Chronicon 938; Marianus Scottus Chronicon 3.302.2 and 
Hieronymus Chronicon a Abr. 2303 all call them 'rustici'. 
25 Aurelius Victor 39.17 "...populatis late agris plerasque urbium tentare...". 
26 Pan. Lat. X (II) 4.3-4: "...cum militaris habitus ignari agricolae appetiverunt, cum arator 
peditem, cum pastor equitem, cum iwstem barbarum suorum cultorum rusticus vastator imitatus est? 
Quod ego cursim praetereo; video enim te, qua pietate es, oblivionem illius victoriae malle quam 
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In this passage there is an indication that these people had become bandits, 
without the author specifically calling them latrones. Mamertinus calls them 'the 
plunderers of their own crops'. If this was indeed a peasant revolt or rebellion against 
Rome, then to destroy their own or others crops and livelihoods would seem a curious 
method of reaction. For peasants who had become bandits, however, the plundering 
of fields for the purposes of provision or terrorisation seems explicable. 27 Nixon in 
his commentary on the Panegyric notes that Mamertinus, although "...clearly 
embarrassed by the subject, at least knows and divulges something about the origins of 
the movement, and doesn't dismiss the rebels as bandits tout court...". 28 It is 
possible however that Mamertinus intentionally avoided the mention of latrones 
altogether in this context. Instead he elevates the status of the rustici whom 
Maximian had been delegated to fight. He does not describe these opponents as 
'bandits' (as he may well have done if their actual status was more worthy and 
therefore open to denigration), but depicts them as 'imitating' (the more worthy) 
footsoldiers, equites and (formal) enemy barbarians. 29 Despite his claim that 
Maximian would prefer the oblivion rather than the glory of this victory. Mamertinus 
attempts to make these foes more glorious. This panegyric is addressed to the 
commander sent to fight the Bagaudae, who would not be pleased by a reference to his 
battles with rustic bandits, unworthy and inglorious foes. It is primarily for this 
reason that Mamertinus 'passes over the matter quickly'. In addition, Mamertinus 
originated from Gaul, and may have possessed some information pertaining to the 
origins of the Bagaudae and its meaning of 'bandit', and thus been doubly reluctant to _ 
name them.30 
gloriam." 
27 Cf. Matemus, who plundered 'villages and fields', "...irpara 'Aims- re Kai dypoir e7ropexoni 
6111crreve-v...". (Herodian 1.10.1) 
28 Nixon (1978) p205. 
29 Drinkwater (1984) p349 sees this piece of comparison as an actual description of the Bagaudae 
organization, that they had created "...a sort of militia (comprising infantry and cavalry)...." 
30 Nixon (1978) p183. 
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There are reports by later Christian writers that a Theban legion used by 
Maximian against the Bagaudae in 285 had actually mutinied rather than fight them. 
Jullian suggests that the officers of the legion had not regarded the Bagaudae as 
honourable enemies since they were bandits and thus refused, a theory which 
Thompson considers 'improbable'.31 The matter was confused as the later writers 
identified the Bagaudae as Christians, and thus the troops were presented as refusing 
to persecute Christians. 32 Without more substantial evidence, much weight cannot be 
placed on these later reports, but Jullian's theory that the officers did not wish to fight 
bandits is not as improbable as Thompson considers. It might be wondered however 
if they would dare refuse on these grounds. 
In contrast to Mamertinus' account of the Bagaudae is his praise of the 
command of Maximian against his former subordinate Carausius and his allies the 
Franks in A.D.288 or 289 Carausius is labelled a pirate (pirata), and as Nixon points 
out, like the Bagaudae is never named. 33 In contrast to the Bagaudae however, and 
paradoxically, Carausius is, in a sense, a foe of enough worth to be called a pirate. 
But Mamertinus still makes fighting against 'pirates' more palatable and more glorious 
by recounting a tale about Hercules and pirates. The story was that the name 'Victor' 
had been added to Hercules' title in gratitude by a man who had been aided by the god 
in defeating pirates attacking his merchant ship. Thus for Maximian, who as the 
Caesar was portrayed as being Hercules to the Emperor Diocletians's Jupiter, the chore 
of overcoming pirates had been among the 'duties of his divinity for many 
centuries'. 34 Since the god Hercules could condescend to fight pirates, it was 
therefore not without glory for Maximian to follow his example. In this way, 
31 Eucher Passio Acaunensium martyrum 4; Passio SS. Mauritii et Thebaeorum 1 - 2 (Acta 
Sanctorum Sept. VI p345); Vita S. Baboleni, in Jullian (1920) p44-45; Thompson (1952) p16n19. 
32 Van Dam (1985) p54. 
33 Nixon (1978) p212; Pan. Lat. X (II) 12.1. 
34 Pan. Lat. X (II) 13.5: "Hoc enim quondam illi deo cognomen adscripsit is qui, cum pirateas 
oneraria nave vicisset, ab ipso audivit Hercule per quietem illius ope victoriam contigisse. .4deo, 
sacratissime imperator, multis iam saeculis inter officia est numinis tui superare piratas." 
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Mamertinus emphasises the nobler aspects of Maximian's battles, and "...anything 
embarrassing is glossed over." 35 This panegyric brings out the paradoxical attitude 
of the upper-class writers to any mention of piracy and banditry. It was the standard 
practice to slander enemies with insults of latro, praedo or pirata, and Max imian 
follows this tradition in his comments on the unnamed Carausius. Carausius however 
had more status as an opponent than real, but very low status bandits such as the 
Bagaudae, so paradoxically his denigration by Mamertinus would not reflect badly on 
the commander fighting him. For Mamertinus to laud a victory over bandits however 
would imply an inglorious beginning for the 'Herculean' Maximian, as Diocletian's 
deputy. 
Aelianus and Amandus had gathered the local bagaudae or bandits and 
terrorised the countryside and urban centres until subdued, behaviour similar to other 
bandits whose gangs operated on a large scale, such as Bulla Felix or Matemus. The 
'purpose' or 'aim' of the group seems to have been no more than a search for booty. 
Van Dam suggests they may have had grander designs, for there are a few coins 
surviving that appear to give the title 'Augustus' to Amandus, but their authenticity is 
suspect. 36 
For the fourth century there is no record extant of the Bagaudae. Ammianus 
Marcellinus however remarks on the banditry 'throughout' the Gallic provinces in 
A.D.369. Minor sees this as "...proof of acute provincial unrest in Gaul." 37 This is 
not borne out by Ammianus, who merely describes the bandits' eye for profitable 
trade; they watched the 'frequented roads' and attacked 'without distinction anything 
rewarding'. 38 One of the many victims was Constantianus, the tribunus stabuli and 
35 Nixon (1978) p182. 
36 Van Dam (1985) p30. Reservations about the authenticity expressed by Webb (1933) p579, and 
outright distrust by Drinkwater (1989) p198n3. If such evidence were authenticated, then Aelianus and 
Amandus would then appear to be would-be usurpers who had gathered their own army, probably 
consisting of bandits or mercenaries. 
37 Minor (1971) p125. 
38 Arnim. Marc. 28.2.10: "Haec inter per Gallias latrocinium rabies saeva scatebat in perniciem 
mu/forum, observans celebres vias, fundensque indistanter quidquid inciderat fructuosum." 
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relative by marriage to the Emperor Valentinian, who was killed in an ambush. 39 His 
death does not signify a revolt or unrest in the Gallic provinces, only the success of 
ruthless bandits. Ammianus reports this episode briefly and it might be suspected that 
he refers to the bandits only as a means of introducing the death of Constantianus. 
There seems no other cause for mentioning this episode, as he does not record anyone 
being sent against the bandits, or their suppression. It may have been to provide a 
public obituary for Constantianus, whom Ammianus may have known, and wished to 
honour in his history.° Ammianus too did not wish to prolong a history with 
'unworthy details'. Earlier, he wrote of Jovinus' battles against the Alamanni in Gaul 
in A.D.365-6, during which 6000 Alamanni were killed and 4000 wounded. After 
describing the 'brilliance' of these deeds, Ammianus declines to say anything about 
other 'less worthy battles' in various parts of Gaul because they produced nothing 
successful and it was not fitting to draw out a history with 'ignoble minutiae'.41 This 
reticence provides a possible reason for the the dearth of information about the 
Bagaudae for the fourth century in particular. If there were any outbreaks, they were 
too small to be worth noting, even if reports of their activity arrived at Rome. Any 
possible attacks were probably controlled by local officials. 
The earliest evidence of the Bagaudae in the fifth century demonstrates the skill 
in banditry of these men, rather than a continuation of a peasant protest. The imperial 
general Stilicho sent Sarus in A.D.407/8 against the usurper Constantine, who had 
crossed from Britain and was attempting to add Gaul to 'his' territory. Sarus defeated 
one of Constantine's commanders, and captured a sizeable amount of booty. After this 
success he lay siege to Constantine at Valentia but was forced by two of his generals to 
withdraw. In trying to retreat across the Alps to Italy, he was forced to dye the booty 
39 Amm. Marc. 28.10.10. 
40 Matthews (1989) pp10-11. 
41 Amm. Marc. 27.2.11: "Praeter haec alia multa narratu minus digna conserta sunt proelia, per 
tract us varios Gallianum, quae superfluum est explicare, cum neque operae pretium aliquod eorum 
habuere proventus nec historiam producere per minutias ignobiles decet." 
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to the Bagaudae, in return for passage through the mountains. 42 There is little 
indication of a rebellion or 'separatist revolt' here.43 The mountain passes offered an 
ideal opportunity for banditry, and the Bagaudae took it. Van Dam suggests they 
were "...surely no more than local inhabitants who were taking advantage of the 
difficult terrains to extort tribute from an army that had recently plundered a town."44 
This may have been the situation, but mountains often held bandit strongholds (Cilicia 
and the Taurus mountains, for example), and there may have been latrocinium in the 
area for some time which does not appear in the sources until a spectacularly 
newsworthy robbery such as this took place. Sulpicius Severus notes St Martin was 
attacked by bandits when crossing the Alps in the middle of the fourth century. 45 
A section of the comic play Querolus or Aulularia dated to the early fifth 
century has been seen as providing support for the notion that the Bagaudae were 
rebellious peasants.46 Yet the passage suggests banditry, rather than revolt or 
rebellion. The old man Querolus declares that he wants to be a powerful man able to 
rob; his Lar claims that Querolus wants banditry, not power, and suggests that he go 
live by the Loire. Since the Loire is in the Aremorican area, this has been seen as a 
reference to unrest in that area. 
Querolus Si quid igitur potes, Lar familiaris, facio ut sim privatus et potens. 
Lar 	Potentiam cuiusmodi requiris? 
Quer. 	Ut liceat mihi spoliare non debentes, caedere alienos, vicinos autem et 
42 Zosimus 6.2.5: "Kara8pati6vrow 82 - arou 	Kcavcrravrivou urparriyow perci peyta-rqs- 
8vvaoretag, wake 8i.euta077 7rovtg, rr)v Adam diraaav 8wp1iodge -vos- rocs- 7repi rcks 
"AAirecs- diravrtloautv abry BaKaMaLg, 51ras etipvxwptac nap' airrwv rOx7.7 rqç erri rt), 
'IraAlav napo8ov. 
43 Minor (1971) p131. 
44 Van Dam (1985) p49. 
45 Sulpicius Severus Life of St. Martin 5.4ff. Strabo 4.6.9 also notes the tradition of banditry in 
the Alps. 
46 Thompson (1952) 18-19. Van Dam (1985) p47 sees it as evidence of local Gallic private citizens 
exercising authority. 
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spoliare et caedere. 
Lar 	Ha ha he, latrocinium, non potentiam requiris. hoc modo nescio edepol, 
quemadmodum praestari hoc possit tibi. tamen invent: habes quod exoptas. 
vade, ad Ligerem vivito. 
Quer. 	Quid turn? 
tar 	fllic iure gentium vivunt homines, ibi nullum est praestigium, ibi sententiae 
capitales de robore proferuntur et scribuntur in ossibus, illic etiam rustici 
perorant et privati iudicant, ibi totum licet. si  dives fueris, patus 
appellaberis: sic nostra loquitur Graecia. o silvae, o solitudines, quis vos 
dixit liberas? multo maiora sunt quae tacemus. tamen interea hoc sufficit. 
Quer. 	Neque dives ego sum neque robore uti cupio. nob iura haec silvestria. 
Lar 	Pete igitur aliquid mitius honestiusque, si iurgare non potes. 47 
The Lar's paragraph describing what Drinkwater views as 'silvan freedom' rather than 
latrocinium, outlines a life lived according to the rules of what may be seen as bandit 
'rough justice 1 .48 The description used by the Lar of this life, that of 'capital 
sentences pronounced under an oak tree and recorded on bones' is a comically 
sarcastic comment on this 'justice'; the capital sentences are 'recorded' or carried out 
on the bones of the 'guilty'. The phrase 'men live there under the ius gentium' 
similarly is a play on the usual legal terminology. The law of the people is that of the 
bandit gang. 49 That this justice is not a part of any enticing 'silvan freedom' is also 
47 Emrich (1965) p67-8. The precise meaning of 'patus' is unknown; Thompson (1952) p19 
presumes it is of Celtic origin, while Van Dam (1985) p47 suggests it is a corrupted Greek word 
(Traxus-, rich) or a Celtic one meaning 'master'. The context makes the general sense clear, which 
seems closer to the latter suggestion; in a mercenary life of bandit rule where privati give 
judgements, the rich would hold sway. Querolus, not being a rich man, sees instantly that he would 
be at a disadvantage in such a society. 
48 Drinkwater (1992) p210 who rules the play as inadmissable evidence because the life described in 
the Loire "...was not considered to be illegal: in particular it could not be classed as latrocinium..." 
and is in the end unsure what it refers to. 
49 Cf. the example in Cicero De Off. 2.40; if the archipirata did not share spoils equably, then he 
faced death or abandonment by his comrades: "...qui archipirata dicitur, nisi aequabiliter praedam 
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demonstrated by the fearful response of Querolus to the Lar's suggestion and his 
subsequent refusal to associate himself with such 'forest laws' after hearing of this 
'justice'. The Lar suggests he look for something 'more honourable' than these laws; 
banditry was infamous for its inherent lack of honour. 
If the passage is seen to refer to banditry in Gaul, it is likely then that the 
author of The Querolus had the banditry of the Bagaudae in the Loire region in mind 
when making this reference. Without a specific reference to the Bagaudae, however, it 
can only be a probable rather than a conclusive reference to them. 
In A.D.435 Bagaudae are again said to be involved in a revolt against Rome. 
The Gallic Chronicle of 452 records that at this time Further Gaul 'separated' from 
Roman society, following the leader of the rebellion, Tibatto, and that almost all those 
in slavery in Gaul conspired in Bacaudam. 50 Salvian writing in the 440's described 
the Bagaudae as those who had lost their citizenship. 51 
An indication that it may have been large-scale banditry is that these people are 
said to have conspired 'in Bacaudam'. Thompson notes that it means "...not a 
peasant who took part in the movement but the movement itself." 52 This phrase 
suggests banditry, bagauda, which was caused by barbarian plundering raids in the 
Gallic provinces in the 430's. In A.D.435, the Burgundians are recorded as being 
dispertiat, aut intelficiatur a sociis aut relinquatur...". 
50 Chronica Gallica A. CCCCLII 117 a. 435 (Chron. Min. p660) : "Gallia ulterior Tibattonem 
principem rebellionis sectua a Romana societate discessit, a quo tracto initio omnia paene Galliarum 
servitia in Bacaudam conspiravere." Sigebortus Gemblacensis Chronographia ann. 435: ''Gallia 
citeriore a Battone principe in rebellionem commota, conspiravere in Bagaudam omnia paene 
Gallorum servitia." Cf. also the mention of the rebellion in John of Antioch frag. 201. Thompson 
(1952) plInl suggests they may be rural serfs, followed by MacMullen (1967) p212n22. Van Dam 
(1985) p45 suggests that servitia refers to anyone in a subordinate status and that the Chron. Gall. a. 
435 & 437 references are to one region near Auxerre where the citizens requested the intervention of 
Saint Germanus, and then Tibatto, whom Van Dam suggests was a local aristocrat, over the remission 
of taxes. 
51 Salvian 5.24: "...postquam ius Romanae libertatis amiserant. etiam honorem Romani nominis 
perdiderunt." 
52 Thompson (1952) pl In3. 
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destroyed in war by the Huns sent by the Roman commander Aetius. 53 The Goths 
had also been rampaging in Gaul, attacking towns neighbouring their own: in A.D.436 
the town of Narbo was relieved from the Goths' lengthy siege by Litorius. 54 Such 
barbarian raids provide an alternative to Salvian's explanation that the rich were 
squeezing the poor in helping to explain why the Bagaudae were active at this time. 
Rural people became bandits, forced perhaps by poverty into banditry, by having to 
flee their property, or by its destruction by barbarians. There seem to have been 
slaves included among them, but this is not necessarily a 'slave rebellion' or 
'separation' from Rome. It is also possible that Tibatto took the opportunity while 
Roman (or barbarian) forces were occupied with the Burgundians and the Goths to 
rule with a gang of bandits in the Aremorican area. If it was such a large servile 
'rebellion', which involved separation from Gaul, other sources are surprisingly silent. 
Salvian would surely not have lost the opportunity to include a large rebellion caused 
by wicked Roman administrators (perhaps he omits the outbreak because it wasn't 
caused by them) and Prosper ignores it, featuring the attack of the Visigoths and 
Burgundians for those years as more significant events. What would have been 
achieved in any case by a separation from Rome? It would effectively cut off any 
military help from Rome against the barbarians, and create a new enemy in the Roman 
forces. 
The date when Tibatto and his crew were subdued is problematical. Prosper 
says Litorius broke the siege at Narbo in A.D.436 and in A.D.437 fought the Goths 
with Hun auxiliaries. 55 Sidonius Apollinaris in his Panegyric to Avitus has Litorius 
fighting the Goths in Narbo with 'Scythian' (Hun) horsemen after subduing the 
Aremoricans.56 The Gallic Chronicle however says that with Tibatto's capture, the 
53 Prosper Epitoma Chronicon 1322 a.435: " Eodem tempore Gundicharium Burgundionum regem 
intra Gallias habitantem Aetius bello obtrivit pacemque ei supplicanti dedit, qua non diu potitus est, 
siquidem ilium Chuni cum populo suo ab stirpe deleverint." 
54 Prosper Epitoma Chronicon 1324 a. 436: "Gothi pacis placita perturbant et pleraque municipia 
vicina sedibus suis occupant, Narbonensi oppido maxime infesti. quod cum diu obsidione et fame 
Iaboraret, per Litorium comitemab utroque periculo liberatum est..." 
55 Prosper Epitoma Chronicon 1322 a. 435 & 1326 a. 437. (Chron. Mm. I 475). 
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movement subsided in A.D.437, which has usually been accepted as the year in which 
it ended, giving the Bagaudae a two year 'rebellion'. 57 From the accounts of Prosper 
and Sidonius, who were contemporaries, it appears the siege was lifted in 436, and 
that Litorius dealt with the Bagaudae before he did so. The chronological shortening 
reflects the lessening of the significance of the unrest fomented by the Bagaudae, from 
a two year rebellion to a gang plundering an area for a few months. Given the 
outbreaks of barbarian attacks and plundering in Gaul, there would be upheavals, with 
people displaced and forced into banditry, or who alternatively, seized the opportunity 
caused by the barbarians to carry out a bit of freebooting in the confusion. A further 
piece of evidence pointing to the fact that the separation from Rome or rebellion against 
the ruling classes did not exist is that in 451 the Aremoricans were among the 
auxiliaries in Aefius' army fighting Atilla and the Huns. 58 As Van Dam comments, 
it seems inexplicable if there had been a 'province-wide' revolt of Aremorica against 
Rome.59 
Tibatto is said to have been active again in A.D.444/5 in Aremorica. The only 
evidence for this is from Constantius' Vita Germani. The Alans, settled near Auxerre 
by Aetius, are said to have confiscated land from the landowners, instead of the usual 
method of sharing it, and fought the evicted landholders. 6° Bishop Germanus is said 
to have interceded with Goar, leader of the Alans, for a settlement, and then travelled 
to Ravenna to seek an indulgence. During his absence, however, 'Tibatto' raised a 
56 Sidonius Apollinaris Carm. 7.244 - 8: "...nova bella iterum pugnamque sub ipsisl jam patriae 
muris periurus commovet hostis.I Litorius Scythicos equites turn forte subactol celsus Aremorico 
Geticum rapiebat in agmenl per terras, Averne, tuas..." 
57 eg. Thompson (1952) p16; Drinkwater (1989) p195; Minor (1971) p137. 
58 Jordanes Getica 36.196, and Sidonius Carm. 7.547-9. Also noted by Thompson (1952) p20 and 
Van Dam (1985) p48. 
59 Van Dam (1985) p48. MacMullen (1966) p212 asks why the Bagaudae would wish to separate 
from an imperium that had become 'the sorriest excuse for an empire'. 
60 Vita Germani 28.40; Chron. Gall. 127 a. 442 (Chron. Min. I 660): "Alani, quibus terrae 
Galliae ulterioris cum incolis dividendae a patricio Aetio traditae fuerant, resistentes armis subigunt et 
expulsis dominis terrae possessionem vi adipiscuntur." See also Van Dam (1985) p46. 
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revolt in Aremorica. Aetius suppressed the revolt and in A.D.446 Flavius Merobaudes 
celebrated in his panegyric to Aetius this victory over 'Aremorica'. There has been 
dispute over the apparent second appearance of Tibatto, though it has been generally 
accepted.61 The actions of the Alans provide a basis for local unrest, and the local 
Bagaudae might well have been involved as their experience would be welcomed by 
people placed into position of being virtual outlaws. It seems improbable that Tibatto 
would still be leading the Bagaudae however; once captured, his release is unlikely. 
Minor argues that Tibatto was not known to have been executed after being captured, 
and so lived on.62 It was expected that a bandit leader would be executed: it would 
have been more remarkable if he had not. Constantius may have confused the 
A.D.445 uprising for the one in A.D.435 and mistakenly inserted Tibatto's name as its 
leader. 
A brief record in one source suggests that the Bagaudae in addition had become 
mercenary bandits, hired for use in arguments by local political rivals. The Chronica 
Gallica in A.D.448 says that a doctor Eudoxius, 'a crooked but cunning man', 'stirred 
up the Bagaudae' and then fled to the Huns, perhaps caused by his identification as 
directing Bagaudae activity. 63 
Bagaudic activity is recorded in Spain in the 440's. As in Gaul, barbarians 
were overrunning Roman territory. The Suevi were active in Spain form the late 
430s's, moving over provinces, and gaining control over three of the five 
provinces. 64 The Bagaudae were active in Tarraconensis, a province not affected to 
61 Minor (1971) p142n74 notes the query, though believes Tibatto 'lived on to rebel again' Also - 
accepted by Thompson (1952) p16; Van Dam (1985) p46; Drinkwater (1989) p195. 
62 Minor (1971) p142n74. 
63 Chron. Gall. 133 a. 448 (Chron. Min. I 662): "Eudoxius arte medicus, pravi, sed exercitati 
ingenii, in Bacauda id temporis mota delatus ad Chunos confugit. Drinkwater (1992) p214 calls 
Eudoxius himself one of the Bagaudae. Minor (1971) p143 finds it a 'mysterious' incident. 
64 Minor (1971) p144; Van Dam (1985) 51-2. Hydatius Lemicus 114 (Chron. Min. II 23) Rechila 
king of the Suevi attacked Baetica (A.D.438); 119 (Chron. Min. II 23) (A.D.439) He entered Emerita 
Augusta in Lusitania; 123 (Chron. Min. II 24) (A.D.441) By this date he had Baetica and 
Carthaginiensis in his control. 
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the same extent by the Suevi. A Roman commander Asturius was sent to 
Tarraconensis in A.D.441 and there killed a 'multitude of Bacaudae'. 65 It has been 
assumed that the reason for Asturius' deployment there was the Bagaudae. 66 
However with the Suevi active in two-thirds of the provinces in Spain, it seems 
possible that he was sent to deter this threat, from a defensive position at 
Tarraconensis, and to prevent the Suevi from attempting to move into Gaul over the 
Pyrennees. While in the province he took no action against the Suevi, but killed a 
number of bandits or bagaudae. 67 This was also the position of Flavius Merobaudes 
in A.D.443, who replaced the recalled Asturius. He "...broke the arrogance of the 
Bacaudae of (the town of) Aracelli." 68 The Suevi posed a greater threat through the 
loss of territory, but the Roman forces had the strength to deal with plundering 
Bagaudae whilst in the region. The inability of the Roman forces to counter the 
barbarian Suevi is evident when in A.D.446 a third commander, the magister militum 
Vitus, was sent against the Suevi, but did not succeed and Baetica and Carthaginensis 
were subsequently plundered.69 A peasant revolt or rebellion in Tarraconensis 
against the very forces who were protecting them seems improbable. 
Two entries in Hydatius suggest that Bagaudae bandits in Spain had formed an 
alliance with or were working as mercenaries for the Suevi, who had made more 
territorial acquisitions. In 448 Rechiarius, who succeeded Rechila as king of the 
Suevi, had invaded 'further regions' for booty." In A.D.449, a certain Basilius 
dared with his Bagaudae band to kill Roman foederati in the church at Tyriasso, and 
Bishop Leo in the same assembly. 71 In the same year, Basilius and Rechiarius 
65 Hydat. 125 (Chron. Min. II 24): "Asturius dux utriusque militiae ad Hispanias missus 
Terraconensium caedit multitudinemBacaudarum." 
66 Thompson (1952) p16; Minor (1971) p145; Van Dam (1985) p52; Drinkwater (1989) p196. 
67 It seems feasible that the name bagaudae could have spread to northern Spain over the centuries. 
68 Hydatius 128 (Chron. Min. II 24): "brevi tempore potestatis suae Aracellitanorum frangit 
insolentiam Bacaudarum." 
69 Hydatius 134 a. 446. (Chron. Min. II 24). 
70 Hydatius 137 a. 448 (Chron. Min. II 25). 
71 Hydatius 141 a. 449 (Chron. Min. II 25): "Basilius ob testimonium egregii ausus sui 
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plundered the Caesaraugusta region and entering the cities of Ilerda through a trick, 
took captives.72 These entries strongly suggests that the Suevi were using Bagaudae 
in their expansion over Spanish territory, rather than that the peasants were rebelling 
against the Romans, whose power over the area was obviously minimal. References 
to the Bagaudae then disappear from historical sources, though there is a mention of 
banditry at Bracara in western Spain in A.D.456. 73 
Often in examining those whom the Romans call bandits it is clear to the 
modern reader that these groups are in fact tribes who plunder, or political enemies and 
so forth. In the case of the Bagaudae however, this situation is reversed. Modern 
scholars have argued for various theories about the origin and purpose of the violence 
caused by Bagaudae, on the basis of often distorted, misleading and scanty primary 
sources. Important souces such as Mamertinus and Salvian, who do not categorise 
Bagaudae as 'bandits', have their own biases and propaganda purposes which cause 
them to specifically avoid this label or indeed from naming them altogether. The myth 
arose that those in Aremorican Gaul who were trusticit and who fought Roman forces 
were fighting against Rome. It was only when such bandit gangs became too 
powerful and incurred the attention of the Roman army that they were in this position. 
Those who were bandits in Gaul and Spain for various reasons, forced into banditry 
through barbarian raids in Gaul, economic hardship or simply became bandits, were 
not a peasant class united against Rome; they were forced to be the 'enemy of all', as 
all bandits were; they must have preyed upon those working the land who had not lost 
their property in some way, in order to obtain provisions. 
congregatis Bacaudis in ecclesia Tyriassone foederatos occidit. ubi et Leo eiusdem ecclesiae episcopus 
ab isdem, qui cum Basilio aderant, in eo loco obiit vulneratus." 
72 Hydatius 142 a. 449 (Chron. Min. II 25): "<Rechiarius mense Julio ad Theodorem socerum 
profectus Caesaraugustanam regionem cum Basilio in reditu depraedatur. inrupta per dolum Ilerdensi 
urbe acta est non parva captivitas>" 
73 Though it does not specifically refer to Bagaude and could be barbarian plundering, not bandits'. 
Hydatius 179 a. 456: "In conventus parte Bracarensis latrocinantum depraedatio perpetratur." (Chron. 
Min. II 29). For Christian hagiographers' praise of Bagaudae, see Van Dam (1985) pp53 -5. 
103 
Chapter Four: Punishments for banditry and piracy 
Roman laws concerning banditry and piracy ultimately derive from the law in the 
Twelve Tables, set up in 451/50B.C., regarding the punishment of thieves (fures). If 
a theft was committed at night and the owner killed the fur, then the owner was 
deemed to have been acting within the law and the thief was killed lawfully or rightly 
(iure). 1 M. Porcius Cato, while conducting a war as consul in Spain in 195B.C., 
captured a castum which had been commandeered by bandits and had them summarily 
executed.2 This was accepted procedure. Cicero cites the law as forbidding a fur to 
be killed during the day even if he carried a weapon; if he used the weapon, the 
opponent should call out, so that witnesses could be called (lest he be charged with 
murder). That the law had scarcely changed, but was simply adapted to apply to the 
criminals of the later centuries is evident from Cicero's gloss: "...the Twelve Tables 
forbid a thief (fur), that is a robber (praedo) and bandit (latro), to be killed during 
the day... ".3  He also wonders at the fact that 'so many commit banditry with death 
placed on it'. 4 The Twelve Tables are still cited by Gaius in the Digest in the middle 
of the second century A.D. in the context of justifying the killing of a servus latro 
lying in wait for someone: "And so if I kill your slave bandit lying in wait for me, I 
will go free: for against danger natural sense allows self defense. The law of the 
twelve tables allow the killing of a thief caught at night...". Gaius also cites it in 
reference to thefts (furta). 5 By the time of the jurist Paulus, the late second/early 
third century A.D., the law justified the killing of a thief at any hour of the day: "If 
anyone kills a thief at night or by day when defending himself with weapon, he is not 
1 XII Tables 8.12 (Macrobius Saturnalia 1.4.19; Gellius 20.1.7). 
2 Livy 34.21.6. 
3 XII Tables 8.13; Cicero Pro Tull. 21.50: praedo may perhaps mean a pirate. Other refs to this 
law: Cicero Pro Tull. 20.47; Pro Milo. 9; Gellius 11.18.6; further see Crawford (1996) vol 2, 
pp609-12, esp. 612 for doubt that the rule that the victim had to cry out dates back to the XII Tables. 
4 Cic. De Natura Deorum 1.86 and see also 3.82. 
5 Dig. 9.2.4; 47.2.55. Also in Mos. et Rom. legum collatio VII 3.1 (Ulpian): "...si quis 
servism latronem occident, lege Aquilia non tenetur, quia <iniuria> non occidit." 
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held by this law..."6 A law from the middle of the third century reflects the opinion 
that he who killed a bandit was acting lawfully: "If as you say, you killed a man 
committing banditry, there is no doubt that he who advanced with the intention of 
killing you, is seen to have been killed rightly (iure)." 7 Capital punishment was 
from early times in Roman history the fate of those who attempted armed robbery. 
The Twelve Tables also contain (scarcely) reduced penalties for thieves in a lesser 
category, i.e., those who were caught in the act in daylight without using a weapon. 
They received the 'lesser' penalty of flogging if free men and were then surrendered to 
the power of their former prey. If they were slaves they were flogged and then flung 
from the Tarpeian Rock. 8 
Despite the law, a claim that a man who had been killed was a bandit, was 
considered largely justification for his death. If bandits were not killed in the heat of 
action, as it were, then they would be executed afterwards in any case. Cicero, in 
defending Milo on the charge of killing Clodius when they met on the Appian Way, 
argues at one point that the death of a 'bandit' was justification enough and cited the 
law of the Twelve Tables as support for his argument. 9 Quintilian suggest that it is 
perfectly acceptable to argue similarly: "...if it is permitted to kill a nocturnal thief, 
what about a bandit?" 1 ° Another method of defense in court, he suggests, was to 
6 Paulus Sententiae 5.23.9: "Si quis furem nocturnum vel diurnum cum se telo defenderet 
occident, hac quidem lege non tenetur...". (= Mos. et Rom. legem. Coll. 7.2.). 
7 C.J. 9.16.3 (4) (A.D.265): "Si, ut adlegas, latrocinantem peremisti, dubium non est eum, qui 
inferendae caedis voluntate praecesserat, iure caesum videri." Other references to the death penalty: 
Dig. 47.12.3.7; 48.19.27; 48.19.28.10 & 15; Paul Sent. 5.23.8 (= Mos. et Rom. leg. coll. 7.2); 
C. Th. 7.20.7 (= C.J. 12.46.3)(A.D.353); C.J. 3.27.1.1 (A.D.391); Justinian Inst. 4.3.2. Those 
associated with or hiding bandits also suffered their fate: C. Th. 7.1.1 (= C.J.12.35.9)(A.D.323) ; 
7.18.7 (A.D.383); 9.29.1 (= C.J. 9.39.1)(A.D.374); 9.29.2 (A.D.383; 391). The Romans were not 
the only people to enforce this penalty. The Gauls believed that the execution of those caught in theft 
or banditry (in furto aut in latrocinio) was more gratifying to the gods; Caesar De Bell. Gall. 6.16. 
MacMullen (1986) p148 lists the other crimes to receive the death penalty, prior to A.D.200 e.g. 
parricide, livestock stealing, arson, etc. 
8 XII Tables, 8.14 (Gellius 11.18.8). Also Gaius Inst. 3.189 and Gellius 20.1.7. 
9 Cic. pro Milo. 9& 10. 
10 Quintilian Inst. Or. 5.10.88: "...si furem nocturnum occidere lice:, quid latronem?" Quintilian 
later cites Cicero's pro Milo. 9 & 10 on this point at 5.14.18 & 19. 
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attack the person the opposition was attempting to vindicate: "He was killed, but he 
was a bandit..."; or to evade the question Did you kill the man?', reply with 'he was a 
bandit'. 11 The general feeling of heartlessness towards the fate of bandits is evident 
in Seneca's lament about the gladiatorial bouts at midday in the arena. Condemned 
criminals were forced to fight to entertain the crowd in the midday session. He 
complains about the brutality of the bouts, because the men had no defensive covering 
armour, such as helmets or shields, and because every fight ended with death, with 
little skill involved. The defence of this, he imagines, will be the argument that the 
criminal "...committed banditry, he killed a man.". Seneca however does not argue 
with the death penalty itself for bandits, agreeing that it was a deserving punishment 
for someone who had killed another. 12 His complaint is more about the deficiency of 
what might be called Roman 'sportsmanship'. In the late empire, when many 
deserters were turning to banditry, one law ruled that to overcome deserters and 
bandits, and to administer punishment if they resisted, was called a matter of 'public 
vengeance'. 13 
When caught, the pirate or bandit could be interrogated and tortured to obtain 
information about his associates. Cicero maintains a theme of outrage at the torture he 
claims Verres carried out on Roman citizens, whilst not torturing the pirate captain. 
Varus, a Roman citizen, was to be subjected to torture in 43B.C. to reveal his 
associates by Minturnians who believed him to be a bandit. He is said to have 
protested at the indignity of this treatment. 14 Octavian had tortured certain pirates 
responsible for 'troubling the sea with mysterious AgarriptoI'', who confessed that 
Sextus Pompey had sent them out. 15 Antoninus Pius, while proconsul in Asia in 
11 Quint. Inst. Or. 7.4.9: "Occisus est, sed latro..." and 9.2.12. 
12 Seneca Ep. Mor. 7.3-5: "Quia occidit ille, meruit ut hoc pateretur...". Also noted by Garnsey 
(1968) pp154-5; Bauman (1996) p81. 
13 C. Th. 7.18.14 (= C.J. 3.27.2) (A.D.403). Millar (1981) p71 notes that popular feeling against 
such criminals was not likely to wait for the governor to appear on his rounds of the province. 
14 Appian B.C. 4.28. 
15 Cicero In Verr. 1.1.13; 2.1.8 & 9; 2.5.65 (pirata escaped torture); 2.5.72 & 73; 2.5.118 & 119: 
2.5.162 & 163; 2.5.169; 2.5.170; 2.5.179. For Octavian, see Appian B.C. 5.77 (also 5.80): 
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134/5A.D., put out an edict instructing irenarchs that in the event that they captured 
latrones, they were to interrogate them about their associates and harbourers and send 
the transcript to the magistratus. 16 Ulpian in the Digest says he summarises a 
number of previous rescripts, a statement which indicates that it was customary 
procedure for such captives to be tortured. The law concerns the complications arising 
about the reliance that should or should not be placed in the testimony of bandits or 
their betrayers received under torture. It is essentially a warning not to rely on the 
tangle of accusations of banditry and counter-accusations from the accused, but to 
consider whether they should be believed once the case has been examined.I 7 
Another law mentions that it was often the custom to keep the condemned criminal 
alive after being sentenced, in order that a quaestio could be held to obtain information 
on his associates. 18 
Bulla Felix was interrogated by Papinian, the urban prefect. Papinian is said to 
have asked 'Why did you commit banditry?', to which Bulla replied, 'Why are you a 
prefect?'. After Bulla's interrogation and death his entire band of 600 men was broken 
up; whether it was, as Dio says, through the want of Bulla's leadership, or whether it 
was perhaps through inforrnation received from Bulla's interrogation which 
contributed to a forcible dispersion by authorities. Bauman suggests that Bulla was 
tried by Papinian under the lex Fabia de plagiariis, since he had kidnapped imperial 
freedmen and artisans. There is no doubt from Dio's account that Bulla kidnapped the 
skilled workmen and then released them, and Dio seems equally clear that the imperial 
freement in Bulla's band had joined of their own volition, since Dio specifically says 
that they were poorly paid, if at all. It would, in addition, seem unnecessary to try 
Bulla under the lex Fabia when he was already qualified as a latro to be 'tried' under 
"Aucrrilptd re aiiths^ dcbavij 	OdAaarrav 4voixAe-L....Kal 6 Karadp nva Apc770w cribUal3thy 
113acrdviCev, ol lIcy.anfwv crcids. neyov 
16 -• vig 48.3.6.1 (Marcian). 
17 Dig. 48.18.1.26. 
18 -.g. vz 48.19.29 (Gaius): "saepe etiam ideo servari solent post damnationem, ut ex his in alios 
quaestio habeatur." 
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the banditry laws which automatically applied the death penalty. 19 Bauman also 
claims that Bulla committed all four crimes listed in the Digest under the instructions 
to the governor to search out and punish trouble-makers in the provinces, particularly 
the sacrilegos, latrones, plagiarios and fures.20 Bulla was unarguably the last 
three, but Dio does not indicate that Bulla was at all interested in temple-robbing, 
which Bauman asserts is covered by the term latro.21 Bulla in fact seems to have 
been more interested in hijacking people and goods, since he is said to have had an 
intelligence system which allowed him to know of everyone leaving Rome or coming 
into port at Brundisium, who they were, what they were carrying and the quantities 
they had with them.22 
The importance attached to torture as a means of extracting information for the 
Romans about criminal associates is evident in an early fifth-century A.D. law in 
which provincial governors are instructed not to allow delays because of the 
Quadragesima or Easter in the questioning and torture of Isaurian bandits, in order to 
obtain the betrayal of their plans. 23 
Once condemned and tortured for information, in the public interest retribution 
was visited on the criminal swiftly, and carried out in the public eye. 24 The visible 
19 Bauman (1996) pp110-111. 
2° Dig. 1.18.13.pr. (Ulpian). 
21 Bauman (1996) p111n63. 
22 Dio 77.10.2-3. Cf. Cic. In Verr. 2.4.103f who claims that even the multitude of pirates had not 
attacked the temple of Juno on the island of Melita (which Cicero claims Verres had robbed) through 
reverence for its sanctity, though they passed it every winter (104). There were obviously wealthier 
targets. 
23 C. Th. 9.35.7. (= C.J. 3.12.8 (10)) (A.D.408); the Justinian version has 'in the questioning of 
bandits and especially of 'saurian ones' (in quaestionibus latronem et maxime Isaurorum). An earlier 
law had prohibited torture being used during the Quadragesima, C. Th. 9.35.4 (= C.J.3.12.5) 
(A.D.380). Other examples of torture being used on bandits appear in: Philostratus, Lives of the 
Sophists 541, in which a proconsul tortures a bandit convicted on many counts; P. Ant. 87 in the 
late third century features fragments of a record of a man being questioned about the associates of 
bandits from a village. There is mention made of torture being used to extract confession in lines 13 
and 14: (1.14) 'many tortures' (Sid rds- 13acrdmous- [rets.] yokicis. elprfrcaktem) The schoolbook, 75 in 
Dionisotti (1982) p105 (also MacMullen (1986) p156) gives the example of a bandit interrogated, 
tortured by the interrogator, beaten and then subjected to more torture before being executed. 
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nature of such punishments was on one level intended to have an exemplary 
purpose.25 A law specifically states that the purpose of 'fixing famosos latrones to 
a furca' in the places where they carried out banditry was to provide a deterrent to 
others from committing the same crimes and also to provide consolation to those 
whose relatives the bandits had killed on that spot. 26 
The poena could be inflicted in a number of ways. In the Digest, the formal 
definition of what was entailed in 'capital punishment' (poena capitis), was that it 
involved throwing the criminal to the wild beasts, or putting them to execution (by 
sword) or 'other similar punishments'.27 Cicero makes great play on the claim that 
Verres did not have the pirate leaders beheaded, as it was expected, yet on the other 
hand he had Roman citizens executed in this way, some in place of the pirates. 28 
Many infamous bandits were thrown to the wild beasts, but an exception to this was 
Maternus, who was beheaded on the same day as his capture. Commodus, who had 
been outraged by Maternus' attacks, did not want to display publically in the arena the 
man who had embarrassed him. 29 
Crucifixion, a slow and agonising death, was one of the 'other' means of 
24 Dig. 49.1.16 (Modestinus). 
25 See Coleman (1990) pp44 - 48 for an examination of the Roman penal aims for criminals as 
being those of retribution, humiliation, correction, prevention and deterrance: • for public displays 
involving execution, p49ff. 
26 	• Dig 48.19.28.15 (Callistratus): "Famosos latrones in his locis, ubi grassati sunt, furca 
figendos compluribus placuit, ut et conspectu deterreantur alii ab isdem facinoribus et solacio sit 
cognatis et adfinibus interemptorum eodem loco poena reddita, in quo latrones homicidia fecissent...". 
Also MacMullen, (1986) p151; Coleman, (1990) p46 & pp48-9; Bauman, (1996) esp. pp156-9 for a 
discussion of poenae metus. 
27 Dig. 48.19.11.3 (Marcian). See also 48.19.28 for gradations of capital punishment in general 
and 48.19.8.1 (Ulpian): governors were to use the sword rather than the axe, spear, club or noose, as a 
means of punishment. 
28 Cic. In Verr. 2.1.12; 2.5.67, 68, 71, 72 (also includes a claim that he had Roman citizens put 
ad palum), 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79; 2.5.156-57. 
29 Herodian 1.10.3 & 7. Other examples of beheadings: Appian Spanish Wars 68 (500 men under 
2 so-called A4arapxot, captured and beheaded); Plutarch Antony 67: The schoolbook 75 in 
Dionisotti (1982) p105. 
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execution. In such a manner public executions not only acted as a deterrent, but also 
as public entertainment. This and other such cruel deaths would have been considered 
revenge and some recompense for those who had suffered from banditry, in a society 
which held no sympathy for bandits or suffered from any romantic delusions about the 
reality of the ruthless viciousness of bandits and pirates. 30 One way in which they 
demonstrated their cruelty was to carry out crucifixions on their own captives. 31 
Hengel in his study on crucifixion points out that it was regarded as a death associated 
with the utmost shame and dishonour, because it was one that was not only given to 
slaves so often it was known as the 'slaves' punishment', but also to other criminals 
such as pirates and bandits. 32 The two thieves who were crucified on either side of 
Jesus Christ were actually Aucrrai. 33 A shepherd was crucified in Sicily by the 
praetor merely on the suspicion of being a bandit since he was carrying a prohibited 
weapon.34 The procurator in Judea in A.D.54 crucified the bandit accomplices of the 
bandit leader Eleazar. 35 
The horrific and cruel nature of crucifixion was well known, but, Hengel notes, 
there was scarcely a protest against its use in principle. 36 Together with the lack of 
protest was a reluctance to actually mention the distasteful subject of crucifixion on the 
part of some authors; others, particularly writers of fiction such as Petronius and 
Apuleius and the writers of Greek romances make mention of it as-a punishment for 
bandits and pirates with more freedom, since it provided a dramatic and gruesome 
30 MacMullen (1986) p151 comments they were considered "...wicked folk for whom hanging was 
literally too good.' 
31 Hengel (1977) p49. Apuleius Met. 6.31-2; Sallust list. 3.75McGushin (=3.9M.); Pseudo 
Quintilian, Dec. Mai. 5.16 (captives fear the cross: horrent cuncta crucibus), cf. also 9.6; Seneca 
Contr. 7.4.5 (cruces eorum qui non redimuntur); Xenophon, Eph. 4.6.2. 
32 Hengel (1977) p7ff; chs 4 - 8. 
33 New Test. Matthew 27:38; 27:44; Mark 15:27. 
34 Cic. In Verr. 2.5.7; Val. Max. 6.3.5; Quint. Inst. Or. 4.2.17. 
35 Josephus B.J. 2.253; cf. Ant. 20.160 for the deaths of other 'bandits'. In other instances, 
Josephus does not specify how the bandits were killed after their capture; B.J. 1.204 (= Ant. 14.159) 
Herod killed leader Ezelcias and many bandits in Galilee; B.J. 2.271 (= Ant. 20.5). 
36 Hengel (1977) pp36-7. 
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realism to a story. 37 For example, in the Satyricon, Petronius adds a touch of 
verisimilitude by having the provincial governor of Asia order captured bandits to be 
fixed to crosses, and post a guard to prevent the bodies being removed from the 
crosses for burial. It is primarily a plot device, introducing a story designed to prove 
the fickleness of women, for the guard seduces a newly-widowed woman in Ephesus, 
famous for her fidelity, from mourning for her husband. 38 
A law recorded by Callistratus in the Digest that bandits should be punished at 
the place where the crimes were committed, to act as a deterrent to others and to 
provide consolation (solacium) to relatives of those who had been killed in the 
vicinity. Hengel rightly interprets Callistratus' wording of the nature of the 
punishment to signify 'crucifixion'.39 The law begins: "Famosos latrones in his 
locis, ubi grassati sunt, furca figendos compluribus placuit...". 40 The word furca 
may be translated as either 'cross' or the ancient equivalent of a 'gallows', a forked 
wooden apparatus used for hangings. 41 The Christian influence on the compilers of 
the Digest is obvious from the lack of any references to 'crucifixion' or 'cross' in the 
entire Digest.42 For a summum supplicium commonly used for slaves and 
criminals, it is conspicuous by its absence. It is obvious that, as Hengel also notes, 
the word furca had replaced the 'holy' word 'cross' in these laws. 43 The Sententiae 
37 Hengel (1977) pp37-8; 48-9; 77. Apuleius Met. 3.9; 4.10 (patibulum); at 6.31-32 there is a - 
deliberate irony in the fact that the bandits suggest the very torments for a captive girl (burning alive, 
wild beasts, patibulion, torture) which they themselves could face if captured. Aesop Fabulae 157; 
Chariton Chaereas and Callirhoe 3.4.18 Pseudo-Manetho Apotelesmatica, 4.198: Firmicius 
Maternus Mathesis 8.22. 
38 Petronius Satyricon 111. 
39 Hengel (1977) p48. 
40 • g . pi 48.19.28.15. 
41 The Oxford Latin Dictionary (1982) p748 uses this Digest reference as an example of either 
meaning. Berger (1953) p480 gives as an explanation offurca: "An instrument with two prongs used 
for the execution of the death penalty by hanging the criminal." 
42 The furca appears seven times as a penalty in the Digest: 48.13.7.pr; 48.19.9.11: 48.19.28.pr; 
48.19.28.15; 48.19.38.2 & 3 and 49.16.3.10. The reference in 48.19.28.pr. is the point at which a 
mention of crucifixion or the cross might be expected to appear, at the beginning of a list of the stages 
of caPital punishment, but it does not: "summum supplicium esse videtur ad furcam damnatio." 
43 Hengel (1977) p40. 
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of Julius Paulus however escaped the Christian manipulation and lists the three 
summa supplicia as: "...crux, crematio, decollatio...". 44 
A well-known story involving the crucifixion of criminals is Julius Caesar's 
sentence on the pirates who captured him. Many of the stories associated with this 
episode are no doubt apocryphal, but the story does shed light on the manner in which 
the Romans dealt with pirates and how a privatus could take matters into his own 
hands. In late 75/4B.C. Caesar was sailing to Rhodes to study under the rhetorician 
Apollonius Molon.45 He was captured by pirates near the island of Pharmacusa and 
was probably held there.46 Plutarch and Polyaenus identify the pirates as 'Cilicians', 
though no other source identifies them as such. It is possible that Cilicians may have 
used the island as a base, but it is equally possible that they were pirates from another 
area. It is not surprising that the infamy of Cilician pirates at this time should cause 
later attributions of any pirate activity to them.47 Caesar was held for 38 days while 
the ransom was raised for him by his retainers from the nearby cities on the coast, 
including Miletus.48 
This period of detention gives rise to a number of apocryphal stories about 
Caesar's activities whilst in captivity. Velleius goes to the extent of justifying his 
inclusion of the bizarre story that Caesar did not take his shoes off or undo his belt day 
or night, in case changing his clothes caused him to come under suspicion from his 
44 Paulus Sent. 5.17; Hengel (1977) p33. 
45 See Ward (1975) pp267-268 and (1977) pp26-36 for dating of the incident to 75/4B.C. The 
sources are: Velleius Paterculus 2.41.3 - 2.42.3; Valerius Maximus 6.9.15; Plutarch Caesar 1.8 - 
2.7; Suetonius Vit. Jul. 4.1 -2 & 74.1; Auct. De Vir. III. 78 and Polyaenus 8.23.1. 
46 Val. Max. 6.9.15; Plut. Caes. 1.8; Suetonius Jul. 4.1. Plutarch (2.5) says when Caesar went 
after them, the pirate ships were still anchored near the island. 
47 Plutarch Caes. 2.2; Polyaenus 8.23. Plutarch (1.8) claims that at this time they already 
controlled the sea with their 'countless boats'. It could of course be argued that the other sources may 
have taken it as read that 'pirates' meant Cilician pirates. 
48 Vell. Pat. 2.42.1 says he was ransomed with the money from several cities: Plutarch says he sent 
all but three of his companions and slaves to various places to procure the money, and was held for 38 
days until the ransom came from Miletus; Suetonius concurs with Plutarch that he sent all but 3 of 
his comites servosque to raise the money, and was held for almost 40 days; Polyaenus says a servant 
called Epicrates was sent directly to the Milesians to borrow the money for his ransom. 
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captors. Velleius calls this detail 'most important' and argues it should not be omitted 
because it cannot be described more grandly. The reason given for this behaviour does 
not seem to make a great deal of sense, as it might be thought that the pirates did not 
care a jot whether he changed or not. This is probably a confused version of Caesar's 
tale of his captivity; it may be that the pirates did not allow him a change of clothing or 
that they had confiscated the rest of his baggage and Caesar did not dare remove his 
clothes lest they be stolen, too. Woodman in his commentary on Velleius notes a 
suggestion by Goodyear that removing his clothes may have caused his captors to 
think he was on the verge of trying to escape by swimming, though this too seems 
unlikely. Woodman suggests it was part of Caesar's psychological battle with the 
pirates, in addition to trying to inspire both 'fear and respect' in them. 49 These 
stories about Caesar during his captivity all evince his bravado and superiority over the 
pirates. Suetonius for example claims that he was in a state of summa indignatio 
throughout his captivity, and Plutarch relates that he would order his captors to cease 
conversation when he wanted to sleep, generally treat them as if they were attendant 
guards, and read them poetry and speeches (calling them unappreciative 'barbarians'). 
Such examples suggest a good deal of propaganda was promulgated after this episode. 
Caesar was, after all, at a great disadvantage in this situation, having been captured and 
- then held to ransom by pirates, a very inglorious and undignified position. There was 
also a certain dishonour associated with being kidnapped. A law in the Digest judges 
that an application to a magistrate, from which for example women, the young, the 
deaf and blind were excluded, was permitted however to someone who had been 
"...raped (or defiled) by the violence of bandits (praedones) or enemies.. •'•50 
Ulpian cites Pomponius' concurrence with this law, which dates this notion of 
49 Woodman (1983) p56. 
50 Dig. 3.1.1.6 (Ulpian): "Si quis tamen vi praedonum vel hostium stupratus est, non debet notari, 
ut et Pomponius air." The categories of those excluded are in 3.1.1ff. This is perhaps why the story 
spread that Caesar did not remove his clothes, to convey the impression that he was not 'defiled' by the 
pirates. 
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contamination to the early to mid-second century A.D. Can this however apply to 
Caesar's imprisonment in the late Republic? Given the nature of opinion about bandits 
and pirates at the time and that most of the tales seem to emphasise that the later great 
leader Julius Caesar was in control of the situation despite his actual status as a captive, 
it would suggest that there was also a notion of a loss of honour and dignitas in being 
kidnapped,at that time.51 
Another story of bravado attributed to Caesar is that involving the amount of his 
ransom. Valerius Maximus and Suetonius record that he was ransomed for 50 talents. 
Plutarch claims that the pirates initially asked for 20 talents but that Caesar laughed at 
them for not realising who he was and agreed to give them fifty. In reality this is 
highly improbable, given that this very large sum of money then had to be raised from 
a city or cities on the nearby coast, a task which took over a month. 52 
Once the ransom was paid, Caesar was released. Velleius says that he had 
'forced' the pirates to give hostages to the cities which had contributed money before 
the payment was handed over, but no other source records this and again it is unlikely 
for several reasons; Casear was in no position to force the pirates to do anything; and 
they would be unlikely to agree to send hostages for the reason of safety, as it is 
doubtful that the hostages would be released and the captors might doubly doubt the 
safety of the hostages, given that Caesar had plans for vengeance which he had been 
51 Compare Cicero In Verr. 2.5.144, where one of the charges against Verres is that Verres dared to 
imprison Roman citizens in the quarries at Syracuse, in the same confines as 'wrongdoing foreigners, 
criminals, pirates and enemies'. (Or where pirates would have been held if Vents hadn't released them 
all.) Millar (1984) p131 notes that during the Empire, "...temporary detention normally involved the 
defendant or convict being chained, and hence was regarded as inflicting infamia." Cicero does not 
mention vincula; it is the idea of degradation by association with vile criminals that he wishes to 
emphasise. Millar also notes (p132) a law in the Digest (4.6.10) which describes those in vinculis 
as being bound so that they cannot appear in public without indignity (sine dedecore). It is unknown 
whether Caesar was chained at any point during his capture or detention, but it is suspiciously notable 
that the sources stress his apparent freedom and auctoritas over the pirates. 
52 Butler and Cary (1966) p47 suggest that a comment in Plutarch's Crassus (7.5) attributed to 
Caesar ("Crassus, how great your delight will be hearing of my capture") is perhaps an ironic allusion 
to the fact that he was in debt to Crassus at the time and that the possibility of being 'repaid was not 
improved by this kidnapping. 
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airing in the pirates' hearing, a detail which is not as improbable as others. 53 Upon 
his release Caesar carried out his intentions for retribution immediately (in fact, 
Velleius places it on the night of the same day the ransom was paid). This incident 
provides an illuminating insight into the nature of the policing of piracy in the 
Republic. Caesar went straight to the coast and hastily gathered a fleet, even though he 
was, as Velleius points out, a privatus. The sources do not mention that this was a 
fleet commanded by any high-ranking official or aided by an official in the area; Caesar 
seems to have been acting on his own. Official authorisation in general does not 
appear to have been necessary as the local community was often the 'first line' of 
policing, since they were the ones affected by pirate or bandit activity, and were 
expected to defend themselves. The immediacy and speed of his revenge meant that 
Caesar did not have time to gather a large fleet from several cities, so there is a greater 
possibility that as Plutarch says, it came from Miletus only. 54 In this case, the 
sources do not say whose ships Caesar rounded up, only that they were 'on the 
spot'.55 The local merchants and the wealthy would however be among those who 
owned ships in the area; their trade would suffer from piracy, so it seems reasonable to 
assume that they would be among those who would take the opportunity to provide 
ships and crews to take their own revenge on these pirates. 
Plutarch says Caesar took the fleet to Pharmacusa (Velleius says they went 
"...in eum locum in quo ipsi praedones erant..."; presumably Pharmacusa is 
understood) and captured some (Velleius) or most (Plutarch) of the fleet and many 
men. Polyaenus' version that Caesar gave the pirates a magnificent banquet, drugged 
their wine and killed them while asleep, is in the realms of fiction. His last detail 
however, that Caesar then returned the money to the Milesians, has a more plausible 
ring; the return of the 50 talents would also have been a great incentive to the Milesians 
53 
 
Veil. Pat. 2.42.1; Plutarch 2.4 says he threatened them with hanging, but Suetonius 4.2& 74.1 
says the threat was crucifixion. 
54 Veil. Pat. 2.42.2 (contracta classe tumultuaria); Val. Max. 6.9.15 (continuo); Plutarch Caes. 
2.5 (e-i/016-); Suetonius /u/. 4.2 (non distulit quin e vestigio classe deducta persequeretur). 
55 Suetonius Jul. 4.2: "...e vestigio classe deducta..."; Butler and Cary (1966) p47. 
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to provide ships for the hope of its return. Caesar then placed his prisoners in 
custody, in Pergamum according to Plutarch, and went to the governor of Asia, M. 
Iunius Iuncus who was in Bithynia, either, as Velleius says, to obtain his sanction for 
executing the pirates or, according to Plutarch, to ask for direct action from him to 
punish them since he was proconsul. 56 Iuncus however was not in favour of anyone 
executing the pirates. Velleius depicts him as a timid man who did not approve of 
Caesar's 'bold' plans. When Iuncus' inertia became invidia, he declared he would 
sell the captives. Caesar then returned to the coast with 'incredible speed', 
significantly 'before any letters were received on this matter from the proconsul', 
removed the prisoners from detention and had them crucified. 57 Following Velleius, 
Plutarch says Iuncus declined to decide for the moment what fate the pirates should 
have, whilst at the same time 'casting longing glances' at the money Caesar had 
claimed from the pirates as booty (presumably excluding the ransom payment), which 
provoked Caesar to return promptly to the coast to crucify the pirates. 58 Suetonius 
uses this episode for the (ironic?) claim that it was evidence of Caesar's mercy. 
According to Suetonius, Caesar first ordered the pirates' throats cut before crucifixion, 
as he was 'most lenient' by nature (lenissimus), presumably on the grounds that it 
was a swifter death. If this anecdote is to be believed, then it is probably less a 
reflection of Julius Caesar's mercy than of his cunning and desire for immediate 
revenge. He had implemented retribution without the governor's authorisation and 
while the pirates were on the cross, there was the possibility that a letter could arrive 
from Iuncus prohibiting any such action, whereas cutting their throats meant an 
immediate and irreversible punishment. 
It is not recorded that any censure was forthcoming for Caesar's actions, in 
taking the initiative in the pirates' punishment. Since all the sources paint Iunius 
56 Veil. Pat. 2.42.3; Plut. Caes. 2.6. Ward (1977) pp26 - 36 unravels the textual problems to 
identify the governor as Iunius Iuncus and suggests he may be the Marcus lunius in an inscription 
from Pergamum, IGRP, 4.408. 
57 Veil. Pat. 2.42.1-3. 
58 Plutarch Caes. 2.7. 
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Iuncus as indolently lax, the probability that his reputation suffered is greater, though it 
might be wondered if his bad reputation came about because Caesar had acted on his 
own authority; Caesar's defence may well have been to slander Iunius for his 'failure' 
to act. Only a few years later in 70B.C. Verres' failure whilst governor of Sicily to 
execute a captured archipirata drew prolonged criticism from his prosecutor 
Cicero. 59 
Crucifixion however was a slow death. For quick crowd entertainment in the 
arena it was too long. 6° Throwing a bandit or pirate to the wild beasts provided both 
a faster spectacle with more 'action', and an entertaining death which provided the 
crowd with a psychological and emotional satisfaction and exultation at seeing one of 
the 'common enemies of all' come to an appropriate end. 61 The crowd was capable 
in fact of calling for particular bandits to be brought into the arena. The response of 
the emperor Gaius might have caused the crowd to quell its enthusiasm lest they share 
the same fate, for when they demanded a certain bandit named Tetrinius, Gaius is said 
to have replied that 'those demanding were Tetriniuses'. 62 Coleman suggests that it 
was customary at least from the time of Claudius that the damnati ad bestias were 
usually the midday entertainment, between the morning (venationes) and afternoon 
(munera) programme.63 Her translation of meridiani as 'lunch-time' might be taken 
to imply that it was a display considered to be of lesser importance to those carried out 
in the morning or the afternoon, that it was merely to fill in the time between, but this 
is misleading. Seneca's comment that he happened by chance to be at the meridianum 
spectaculum suggests that he attended a separate spectacle held specifically during the 
middle of the day. Certainly the time, money and effort expended on bringing such 
criminals to Rome would not be for a secondary 'performance' which may not have 
59 Cic. In Verr. 2.5.64 - 80 is a tirade on the theme of Verres' audacity in keeping the archipirata 
alive. 
60 See also Coleman (1990) p56. 
61 See also MacMullen (1986) pp150-1. Cf. Lucian Toxaris 59 also for criminals in the arena. 
62 Suetonius,Gaius 30.2. 
63 Coleman (1990) p5: Suetonius Claudius 34,2; Seneca Ep. Mot. . 7,3 -4; Tertullian Ad Na:. 
1.10.47. 
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been watched, and Seneca's comment that 'in the morning men were thrown to the 
lions and bears, at midday to the spectators' is testimony to the popular interest in such 
spectacles.64 
The leaders in particular of bandit and pirate bands are Mentioned in the sources 
as being sent to Rome to provide entertainment for the arena, even from the provinces, 
a situation akin to arranging for wild beasts to be brought in from remote areas for a 
show.65 During the reign of Nero, the procurator in Judea captured the infamous 
Eleazar, who had been committing banditry for some twenty years, together with many 
of his band. His lesser associates were crucified in Judaea, but Eleazar was sent to 
Rome. 66 A certain Selurus, 'son of Etna', who had been raiding the land around Mt. 
Etna in Sicily with his 'army' in the late Republic, was sent up to Rome as he had a 
certain notoriety and was used for a more elaborate display in which he was placed 'on 
high' on a tall scaffold, as if, Strabo says, to represent the mountain he no longer 
'ruled', which was then made to dramatically collapse onto the cages (also designed to 
break) of the waiting beasts below. Coleman sees Selurus as an 'insurgent slave', 
though he may not have been; it cannot be judged from his name alone and Coleman 
herself rules out that he was a runaway slave follower of Sextus Pompey. She is also 
puzzled by the fact that Selurus was sent to Rome for punishment when a local 
execution would have been a better deterrent against other slave revolts. 67 As a 
deterrent, other members of Selurus' gang (surely he was not the only one captured) 
may have been executed in Sicily for this purpose. One explanation why he was sent 
to Rome was a similar reason for sending wild animals to Rome for entertainment; 
Selurus was used as a drawcard, being the highlight of the entertainment. In the case 
of particularly notorious criminals bandit leaders, it seems they could be used not just 
for gladiatorial fights, but the more unusual and dramatic deaths, involving elaborate 
64 Seneca Ep. Mor. 7.3-4. 
65 See Coleman (1990) p50ff for the public favour such shows bestowed on the organisers. 
66 Josephus B.J. 2.253; Ant. 20.161. 
67 Strabo 6.2.6; Coleman (1990) pp53-4. 
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constructions or wild beasts. Strabo himself was sufficiently impressed by the show 
involving Selurus to make the only extant record of him. His account also reveals that 
he obviously possessed some detailed information about Selurus. He was not just an 
anonymous bandit being executed, but a specific bandit leader called Selurus from Mt. 
Etna in Sicily, who had raided the area with a large band for some time. How did 
Strabo know this? It was not only Strabo who must have known, but also the rest of 
the audience, for the point of the whole display, placing Selurus on a scaffold and 
literally dropping him in it, would have otherwise been lost on the crowds. One way 
in which such information was disseminated was through a form of advertising. For 
gladiator shows there were programmes (libelli) put out and sold, which listed the 
combatants.68 These programmes must also have included details on condemned 
criminals due to be executed. These executions were not only promoted in the 
programmes, but may also have been advertised in posters. Advertising the 
forthcoming deaths of notorius criminals such as bandits and pirates provided added 
spice to the proceedings for the spectators. They were not going to see anonymous 
criminals being executed, they were going to be entertained by watching a 'known 
criminal' getting his just desserts, an interest in seeing the 'baddie get his comeuppance 
in the end', a bloodthirstiness which is not absent from modern entertainment. Bulla 
Felix in the early third century was thrown to the wild beasts after —his fate had been 
publically announced, as a sort of 'coming attraction'. 69 That Bulla was given this 
penalty again suggests that he was not so much of a 'Robin Hood' figure as has been 
argued. If he was indeed a favourite with the populace, then publically executing him 
would serve an exemplary purpose, and demonstrate the auctoritas of emperor 
Septirnius Severus, who had taken an interest in his capture, but on the other hand 
would attract little public favour. If Bulla was 'well-regarded', then a swift execution 
out of the public eye on or shortly after his capture might have been expected. 
68 eg Cic. Phil. 2.97; Ovid, Ars Amat. 1.167; Hopkins (1983) pp25-6. 
69 Dio 77.10.7: "Kai &plots ge-rcl roDro bird tripenta -ros- 166077...". Ironically, Bulla had 
previously rescued two of his men from being thrown to wild beasts, 77.10.3. 
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Seneca claims that he was inspired to write on dementia by an utterance of 
Nero's. This was occasioned by the imminent execution of two latrones by the 
prefect Burrus. Burrus pressed Nero to record the men's names and the reasons for 
their execution. When Nero reluctantly acquiesced, Burrus handed over the charta 
and Nero exclaimed "Would that I had not learnt to write!". 70 It is unlikely however 
that this is an example of ckmentia towards 'real' bandits, who would have been 
executed without such dilemma. Suetonius records a similar version of this episode, 
but does not say that the man (he has only one awaiting execution) was a latro, only 
that he had been condemned to death.71 It has been suggested that both Burrus and 
Nero were attempting in this instance to avoid the odium of being seen to give people 
capital punishment. 72 This would be unnecessary in the case of bandits, so the 
condemned 'bandits' in this instance were probably labelled by the emperor with this 
name because they had offended him in some manner or they had intended (or were 
thought to intend) something worse, such as an assassination attempt. 
In the fourth century the throwing of Isaurian bandit prisoners to the wild 
beasts was apparently the spark for a large scale outbreak of violence from the 
Isaurians. The Isaurians were inveterate 'bandits', as the Romans would have seen 
them; Ammianus describes it as their custom to 'keep the peace often, but as often to 
make unexpected raids 1 . 73 In A.D.354 they changed this policy, from committing 
latrocinia occulta et rara to outright war when they were outraged by the indignitas 
(so Atnmianus reports they said) of some of their captive associates being thrown to 
the beasts at a spectaculum in the amphitheatre at Iconium in the region of Pisidia, 
which was 'contrary to custom' (praeter morem). 74 From the details Ammianus 
provides it seems that this was completely according to custom; to throw latrones to 
70 Seneca De Clem. 2.1.1-2. 
71 Suet. Nero 10.2. 
72 Bauman (1996) pp85-6. 
73 Amm. Marc. 14.2.1ff. Minor (1979) pp121-2. Cf. HA Probus 19.8 for Isaurian latrones in 
the gladiatorial fights at the entertainment in the arena after Probus' triumph in 281. 
74 Amm. Marc. 14.2.1. Hopwood (1989) p175 -6 argues this episode indicates local support for 
bandits. 
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the beasts was not out of the ordinary. This incident may well have been seized upon 
by the Isaurians as a pretext for a violent protest against the Romans, since as 
Matthews points out, they did not attack Iconium in revenge, but instead went in the 
opposite direction to prey on ships on the coast. 75 It is notable that the two things 
Ammianus records that they protested about were particularly understandable from the 
Roman viewpoint; the indignity of public execution and the fact that it was somehow 
against tradition. The complaint was not one of the mistreatment of Isaurians. It has 
been suggested that the phrase praeter morem may imply that they were of a rank 
normally exempt from this penalty, or that they were punished for crimes normally 
overlooked. Roman citizens could not technically be thrown to the beasts, since when 
prisoners were condemned, they automatically forfeited their citizenship. 76 However 
they may have been former citizens of some standing, who perhaps were patrons or 
protectors of bandits. 
Spectators were drawn to the sight of the detested criminals being given their just 
desserts.77 In the late Republic there is evidence to suggest that a public display of 
75 Amm. Marc. 14.2.2ff; Matthews (1989) p363. 
76 Dig. 48.19.12 (Macer): "itaque hi, in quos animadverti iubetur quiue ad bestias dantur, 
confestim poenae servi fiunt."; 48.19.29 (Gaius). Matthews (1989) p363. 
77 There was even a mime which featured a criminal being crucified. This criminal, named 
Laureolus, has been cited as the crucifixion of a bandit leader, possibly based on an historical figure, 
e.g. Diehl RE 12.1016; Hengel (1977) pp35-6; Coleman (1990) pp64-5; Shaw (1993) p322. The 
sources are Josephus Ant. 19.94, who mentions a mime performed during the reign of Gaius in 
which the criminal is crucified; Suetonius Gaius 57 identifies the mime as Laureolus, and cites an 
occasion in which the actor playing the title role vomited blood as he hurried off, which was then 
performed by other actors copying his actions somewhat over-enthusiastially so that there was an 
abundance of blood on the floor. Juvenal Sat. 8.187 expresses his disgust that Lentulus, a nobilis 
(8.199) was playing the part of Laureolus, and that the actor as a result deserved to be crucified: 
"Laureolum velox etiam bene Lentulus egit,1 iudice me dignus vera cruce." A scholiast on Juvenal 
8.187 explains: "Hic Lentulus nobilis fuit et suscepit servi personam in agendo mimo et deprehensus 
in falso cruci fixus est." Martial De Spectaculis 7 gruesomely describes the torments of a criminal 
(probably a slave) placed in the role of Laureolus in the arena, hanging on a real cross and then being 
savaged by a bear. 
Qualiter in Scythica religatus rupe Prometheus 
adsiduam nimio pectore pavit avem, 
nuda Caledonio sic viscera praebuit urso 
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condemned prisoners could be held by a provincial governor before the 'entertainment' 
began. This is revealed in one of Cicero's many criticisms of Verres, which also, 
allowing for exaggeration in Cicero's rhetoric, allows some insight into the attitude of 
the audience towards captured bandits and pirates. One of Verres' mistakes was that he 
did not display the captured pirate leader for public viewing before his execution. 
According to Cicero, it was customary, the consuetudo omnium that "...he who 
captured the leader of pirates or enemies willingly allows him to be openly before the 
eyes of all."78 He claims that the usual crowd had gathered to see it, "...ut solet 
fieri...videre cuperent." He continues with a description of the 'homines maritime 
Syracusis', who had 'trembled at his (the pirate's) very name', being cheated of 
watching his torture and execution.79 Cicero holds up in contrast Publius Servilius 
Vatia, proconsul in Cilicia 78 - 74B.C., who conducted campaigns over the provinces 
of Lycia and Pamphylia, and subdued the Isaurians beyond the Taurus mountains, 
non falsa pendens in cruce Laureolus. 
vivebant laceri membris stillantibus artus 
inque omni nusquam corpore corpus erat. 
denique supplicium... 
vet domini iugulum foderat ense nocens, 
templa vet arcano demens spoliaverat auro, 
subdiderat saevas vel tibi, Roma, faces. 
vicerat antiquae sceleratus crimina famae, 
in quo, quae fuerat fabula, poena fuit. 
Also Tertullian Adv. Val. 14. With the exception of Josephus Ant. 19.94, no source describes 
Laureolus as a bandit leader or even as a bandit. Diehl in RE cites the text of Joseph us as being the 
crucifixion of a Aucrrtat, 6ye-Ativ, though he notes the Juvenal scholiast suggests that he was a slave. 
The Loeb edition (1969) of Josephus' Antiquities however has crraupoltrat AnOkis- zyquiu. P1R 2 
L 132 notes doubt over the reading of Aucrra, and suggests "...potius autem persona ficta quam 
vera." The mime describes the punishment expected for a bandit and it is tempting to see it as 
including the death of a famous bandit, but there is no firm evidence that the mime featured a bandit 
leader, or even that Laureolus was a bandit at all (cf. the scholiast), still less that it was based on the 
existence of an historical figure. 
78 Cic. In Verr. 2.5.65: "...consuetudinem omnium tenetis - qui ducem praedonum aut hostium 
ceperit, quam libenter eum palam ante oculos omnium esse patiatur." 
79 In Verr. 2.5.65: "Homines maritimi Syracusis, qui saepe istius ducis nomen audissent, saepe 
timuissent, cum eius cruciatu atque supplicio pascere oculos animumqum exsaturare vellent...". 
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(later taking the cognomen Isauricus), activities for which he achieved a triumph. 
Cicero praises him for having caught more pirate leaders than anyone before him, and 
importantly, did not deny the populace the pleasure of seeing these captive pirates. 8° 
According to Cicero, Servilius virtually went 'on tour' with this iucundissimum 
spectaculum of his captives in chains through the towns he travelled through 
(probably on his return route to Rome), to the delight of the gathered crowds. It has 
been observed that one of the purposes behind the extremes of punishment such as 
crucifixion, wild beasts and so forth, was the utter humiliation of the criminal before 
his death. They were a form of mockery, further distancing the criminal from the 
audience's sympathy, and which allowed the spectators to feel morally superior. 81 
These parades of condemned criminals were part of this humiliation. Even the chains 
with which they were confined were seen as a further indignity. 82 
Eventually the practice of sending the notorious prisoners to Rome was made 
mandatory, since their executions provided an interesting spectacle for the crowds. 
Modestinus in the early third century quotes a law which directs provincial governors 
not to release condemned criminals to the wild beasts for 'public favour', or in other 
words, to increase their own standing with the populace, but were instead to consult 
the emperor if the prisoners possessed sufficient 'strength or cleverness' that they 
could be displayed to the Roman crowds. 83 
The ultimate parade of prisoners and simultaneous expression of victory over 
and humiliation of the vanquished duces of pirates and bandits occurred of course in 
the triumphal processions of their conquerors. 84 Just as their execution in the arena 
was enjoyed by the spectators, and hence they were sought after by the organisers, 
80 See Ch5 for Servilius' campaigns. 
81 Coleman (1990) pp46-7; Hengel (1977) p24 on indignity of crucifixion. 
82 — .g . Ill 4.6.10; Millar (1984) p132. 
83 Dig. 48.19.31.pr.: "Ad bestias damnatos favore populi praeses dimittere non debet: sed si eius 
roboris uel artificii sint, ut digne populo Romano exhiberi possint, principern consulere debet." 
84 For a description of the triumph and its components, see Gellius 5.6; Zonaras 7.21: Daremberg-
Saglio (1877) pp488 - 491; Versnel (1970) p95. Further on the image of the triumphing general, see 
Versnel esp. chs 2, 8 & 9. 
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their inclusion in such processions implies that the triuznphator knew they would not 
only testify to his strength as a commander, but also elicit a similar favour from the 
crowds. A triumph, like entertainment in the arena, was a spectaculum. 85 There 
were placards carried announcing such things as the places and peoples subdued, and 
even included pictures of the defeated leaders who were not present in the procession; 
at Pompey's triumph in 61B.C. for example, the images of the absent Mithridates and 
Tigranes were carried.86 These placards probably also declared the names and 
origins of bandit and pirate leaders present in the procession, for much the same 
reasons as they were advertised in the arena, to provide interest for the crowd and in 
addition to enhance the general's glory through their defeat, contrasting his present 
position of victory with their former importance. After the triumphal procession the 
prisoners were usually executed in prison.87 
There are references to such prisoners in the triumphal processions of those 
commanders who conquered pirates and bandits (or those peoples considered to be 
committing latrocinium). The importance of these prisoners in the triumph is evident 
from the effort to not only bring them from far-flung regions, but to hold them captive 
for some time, even years before a triumph was held. Servilius Vatia for his triumph 
in 74B.C. had taken the trouble to transport his pirate prisoners from Lycia and 
Pamphylia to Rome for this purpose. They were not Isaurians, since Cicero 
specifically describes the prisoners as pirates, and the Isaurians were inland 
dwellers. 88 As Servilius' last campaigns were those carried out in Isauria, it is 
evident that he had arranged for important captives such as these pirate leaders to be 
held prisoner from previous years until such time as they could be taken back to Rome 
85 e.g. Livy (36.13.15) has a Campanian envoy declare that he would not be dragged in chains 
through Rome as a spectaculum in a triumph; at 37.46.6 Livy describes a triumph as a mantficum 
spectaculum; Cicero In Verr. 2.5.77 says the duces hostium were included in the triumph as a 
pulcherrimum spectaculum for the Roman people. 
86 Daremberg-Saglio (1877) p489; Appian, Mith. 117. 
87 Daremberg Saglio (1877) p489; Cic, In Verr. 2.5.77; Livy, 36.13.15. 
88 See Ormerod (1922) for Servilius' campaigns, and in particular p37ff for discussion of the fact 
that Servilius did not enter the centre of pirate activity in Cilicia Tracheia. 
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for a triumph. 89 It may have been during this waiting period that the nobilissimus 
pirata Nico, as Cicero describes him, whom Servilius had captured, forced open his 
chains and escaped, but was unlucky enough to be recaptured by Servilius. 9° Given 
the effort expended on him, it is probable that he featured in the triumphal 
procession.91 Cicero says that generals 'who were triumphing kept enemy leaders 
living longer', so that the populus Romanus could enjoy the sight of victory.92 Such 
prisoners were kept in the prisons far longer than the condemned pirates and bandits 
being held for the next display in the arena, which Gaius acknowledges in the Digest 
could be a lengthy interval. 93 These inmates provoked outrage from authors on behalf 
of those unfortunate enough to be thrown into prison with them.94 
Cicero describes Servilius taking his prisoners through the towns and then 
extravagantly claims that his triumph was "...of all triumphs the most pleasing and 
enjoyable to the Roman people." His explanation of the crowd's attitude is that 
89 Sources for Servilius' triumph: Cicero In Pison. 58, In Verr. 2.1.57, 2.5.66; Val. Max. 8.5.6; 
Eutropius 6.3,5; Rufius Festus, Brev. 12; Claudian In Eutrop. 1.217; Pseudo-Asconius 237 Stangl; 
also CIL 1 2 .2.741 = ILS vol 1, no.36. 
90 Cic. In Verr. 2.5.79. 
91 Another example of a prisoner escaping before a triumph is in Livy 37.46.5: M'. Acilius Glabrio 
celebrated a triumph in 190B.C. for his victories against Antiochus and the Aetolians in 191. 
Damocritus, the Aetolian commander, had escaped from prison a few days previously and while being 
pursued, managed to kill himself with a sword (a weapon which he had obviously just snatched from a 
guard on the way out of the prison). There were 36 captivos nobiles in Acilius' procession; the Loeb 
translator (Sage, 1935) notes that in 37.3.8 Livy said there were 43 Aetolian principes brought to 
Rome, (among whom was Damocritus), and suggests that others had died or escaped. 
92 Cic. In Verr. 2.5.77: "At etiam qui triumphant eoque diutius vivos hosaum duces reservant, ut 
his per triumphum ductis pulcherrimum spectaculum fructumque victoriae populus Romanus 
percipere possit...". 
93 Dig. 48.19.29. 
94 eg. Cicero, In Verr. 2.5.144 and the Roman citizens in the quarry prisons; Livy, 3.58.3: Appius 
Claudius 'lay bound in prison among nocturnal thieves and bandits (iacere vinctum inter fures 
nocturnos ac latrones.); 38.59.10 similarly about L. Scipio: "...ut in carcere inter fures nocturnos et 
latrones vir clarissimus includatur...". Josephus is scathing about Albinus, procurator of Judea in 
A.D.62-64, whom he claims released those who were in prison for banditry in return for bribes from 
relatives, B.J. 2.272 - 273; Ant. 20.200 - 215 gives a different version but still blames Albinus for 
releasing bandits from prison. 
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"...there is nothing sweeter than victory, and there is no more certain evidence of 
victory than of seeing those whom you have often feared, being led chained to their 
execution."95 
A famous triumph which featured pirate leaders in the procession was that of 
Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus in 61B.C. It was an enormous triumph conducted over 
two days, which commemorated all Pompey's victories since 67B.C., against the 
pirates, Mithridates and Tigranes. The pirates had been defeated since mid-summer in 
67B.C., and Pompey returned from his campaigns in the east in late 62, receiving his 
triumph on the 28th and 29th September 61B.C., so as captives the pirates had been 
held about six years.96 It is a revealing indication of their immense worth to the 
general in terms of popular favour through his acclamation. Despite their popularity 
with the crowd, however, Plutarch seems to have been less impressed with the pirates 
than with other captives, since he begins his list of significant prisoners led in the 
procession with 'besides the pirate leaders....'. Among those that he considered worth 
identifying were a 'son of Tigranes'; Zosime, one of Tigranes' wives; Aristobulus, 
'king of the Jews' and a sister and five children of Mithridates. 97 Appian is even 
more impressed with the 'big names', choosing to provide slightly more detail than 
Plutarch about the prisoners, for example that the 'son of Tigranes' was also named 
Tigranes, and includes the names of Mithridates' fives sons and two daughters who 
were also in the procession. He does not mention any pirates by name but does note 
95 In Verr. 2.5.66. Cicero (2.5.67)subsequently asks ironically whether Verres had perhaps kept the 
archipirata alive so that the captive might be led before his own triumphal chariot, since after Verres 
had 'lost a Roman fleet and ruined a province', he would surely be given a naval triumph. 
96 References to the time taken to conclude the campaign against the pirates: Cic. De imp. 35 
(forty-nine days after he set out from Brundisium; Leg. Man. 35 (war finished by mid-summer 
67B.C.); Livy Per. 99 (within 40 days the seas were cleared, then finished the war by subduing them 
in Cilicia); Yell. Pat. 2.32.4 (in a short time); Plutarch Pompey 26 (western seas in 40 days; (28) all 
piracy cleared in under 3 months); Appian Mith. 95 (Pompey toured the western operations in 40 
days, then the eastern in the same time, which cleared the seas and then (96) finished off the last 
resistance in Cilicia in a short time); Florus 1.41.15 (all accomplished in 40 days); Dio 37 (in the 
same year (i.e. 67)); Eutropius 6.12 (a few months); Auct. de Vir. III. 77.5 (within 40. days). For 
the other dates, see MRR 62 and 61B.C.. 
97 Plutarch Pompey 45.4. 
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there was a 'crowd of captives and pirates who were attired in their native dress and 
were not bound' and that there were Cilician rulers (oi KuIliccou r6pavvot) in the 
procession. Unusually these prisoners were-not executed, with the exception of 
Aristobulus and the younger Tigranes, and moreover Pomepy sent all prisoners but the 
kings home.98 
In May 62B.C. Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus held his triumph for subduing 
the Cretan pirates during his campaigns while holding proconsular command for Crete 
from 68 - 65. His annoyance with Pompey for his interference with Metellus' 
campaign while on his own piracy campaign in 67 is well-known. This annoyance 
was justified, since Dio notes that Pompey had persuaded a tribune that the two leaders 
of the Cretans, Lasthenes and Panares, had surrendered to him, rather than to 
Metellus, thus deliberately depriving him of captives for his triumph. 99 
The triumphs of Servilius Isauricus and Pompey are notable for the fact that the 
sources refer specifically to pirates appearing in the triumphal procession. Other 
triumphs for victories predominantly over pirates and bandits which would also 
include them as prisoners in the procession, but are either not remarked on or not 
extant. These include for example the triumphs held by those with commands 
prompted by the outbreaks of piracy from Illy -ria in the late second century B.C., Cn. 
Fulvius Centumalus in 228B.C. for his victories against Queen Teuta and the Illyrians 
in 229B.C., and the triumphs of the consuls for 219B.C., L. Aemilius Paullus and M. 
Livius Salinator for their commands against Demetrius of Pharos in Illyria in that 
year.M For his defeat of the pirates operating from the Balearic Islands in 123B.C. - 
after a brief campaign, Q. Caecilius Metellus Baliaricus received a triumph in 
98 Appian Mith. 116-117. For the other sources who refer to Pompey's triumph, see MRR 
2.181. 
99 For the Cretans' surrender and Metellus' indignation in particular see: Veil. Pat. 2.40.5 (the 
poaching of captivos duces by Pompey from Metellus' triumph); Florus 1.42; 2.13.9: Appian Sic. 
6.2; Dio (Mph.) 36.19.3 
100. Fulvius: Degrassi (1947) 549-550; Eutropius 3.4. For the consuls of 219B.C.: Aemilius: 
Polyb.3.19.12; & 4.66.8; Livius: Auct. Vir. 111. 50; also Degrassi (1947) p550. 
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121B.C. 101 M. Antonius also held a triumph after his campaigns against the pirates 
during his command of Cilicia in 102B.C. 1°2 
The Romans' abhorrence of banditry and piracy is reflected in the severity of 
their laws, which justify the killing of a bandit if attacked, and the imposition of the 
death penalty if he was captured. The justification of this penalty was felt so strongly 
that those provincial governors who failed to impose capital punishment on pirates 
were duly criticised. The deaths of infamous bandits and pirates could also be used to 
provide a popular crowd entertainment in the arena. The captive leaders of bandits and 
pirates moreover were so highly regarded as a spectacle that they were even kept alive 
for years after they had been captured so that they could feature in the triumphal 
procession of their conquerors. The humiliation of the 'common enemies of all' was 
an important part of the process of retribution. 
101 Cic. Fin. 5.82; Act. Tr. Degrassi p82f; 560; Val. Max. 7.1.1; Pliny N.H. 7.142: Auct. Vir 
III. 61.6 
102 Plutarch Plut. 24.6; Degrassi (1947) 561-2. 
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Chapter Five: The Roman response 
(i) 'Community policing' 
Traditionally the first level of policing and defence throughout the Mediterranean 
was provided and organized by the local population or the person directly affected by 
banditry or piracy. The principle of the individual's self-defence in regard to bandits 
and pirates was one that survived throughout Roman history.' Cicero acknowledges 
that this notion of self-defence was expected and authorised by the laws, as indicated 
by the legality of carrying a weapon for the purpose of self-defence, not murder. 2 
This protected the individual, while communities organized other procedures. One 
method of passive defence used by communities from the earliest times was to position 
settlements away from the coast. 3 The Sicani, for example, said to be the first 
inhabitants of Sicily, built their villages on the 'strongest hills' because of the threat 
from pirates.4 Ormerod suggests that the Tyrrhenians (or Etruscans) used a more 
active strategy and that their own piracy actually developed after they built a fleet for 
the protection of their own coasts against other sea marauders. 5 The Massilians had 
placed a garrison on the Stoichades islands to counter piracy. This is described as 
being in 'ancient times' (=Am6v); by 181B.C. the Massilians were complaining to the 
Romans about Ligurian piracy. 6 Similar passive defence measures were also 
advised for land owners. Columella in the first century A.D. advised that a villa 
should not be built next to the road as a means of defence against the 'plundering of 
1 See Lintott (1968) p4 and pp22-34 for the laws' authorisation of self-help, and Shaw (1984) p18- 
19 who also notes the state's dependence on self-help. See also the laws listed in Ch4n1ff concerning 
the justification of killing bandits. 
2 Cic. Pro Mil. 11: "...etsi persapienter et quodam modo tacite dat ipso lex potestatem defendendi, 
quae non hominem occidi...". Lintott (1968) p23 and p120 identifies the law Cicero refers to as the 
Lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis; see also Dig. 48.8.1. 
3 This method was commonly used: see for example Thucydides 1.7 and Ormerod (1924) pp38 - 40. 
4 Diod. Sic. 5.6.2 (8v1 rag Aucrrds-). 
5 Onnerod (1924) p154. 
6 Strabo 4.1.10; Livy 40.18.4. 
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passing travellers', and that brick walls hindered bandits. 7 Varro recommended that 
houses be built on higher ground, as a protection against sudden attacks by bandits. 8 
Laws discuss the ramifications of bandit attacks on property and storehouses. 9 
Archaeological evidence records stout walls and towers on outlying farms and villas 
during the time of the empire. 10 
Another method of passive defence was to establish Roman coastal colonies. 
The earliest of these seems to have been Ostia in about 350B.C. The next colony, 
Antium, was conquered in 338, with colonists settled there and the inhabitants' 
piratical activities halted by the confiscation of their fleet. 11 Tarracina was established 
in 329 and other colonies followed throughout the third and early second centuries 
B.C. 12 Starr observes that the Romans were not 'enthusiastic sailors', since they did 
not maintain a navy and had to prepare a fleet for new campaigns, as seen for example 
by their response in 181B.C. to piracy, when the ships were let down from the 
slips. 13 The preferred reponse was to use the army on land. An infamous example 
of what has been called the Roman 'helplessness' on sea occurred in 349B.C. Greek 
pirates had already fought one inconclusive skirmish with the Gallic bandits who had 
come down to the coast. The efforts of the consul Camillus against them were 
similiarly inconclusive. Neither side wanted to fight on the other's terms: the Greeks 
were unwilling to land, and Camillus was unwilling to put to sea, so the army 
effectively prevented them from landing by its presence until the Greeks eventually ran 
short of supplies and sailed away. 14 The tendency to leave the ships in the slips until 
7 Columella R.R. 1.5.7; 9.6.4; also 1.71; 9.5.3 for other measures; MacMullen (1974) p4. See 
Val. Max. 2.10.2 for a tale attributed to Scipio Africanus. His reaction to bandits approaching his • 
villa was to employ members of his household as guards. 
8 Varro R.R. 1.12.4. 
9 C.J. 4.65.1 (A.D. 213); 4.65.12 (A.D.245). 
MacMullen (1963)(b) pp139-151. 
11 Starr (1943) pp57-8; also Ormerod (1924) p161; for Antium: Livy 8.14.8; Strabo 5.3.5: Florus 
1.5.10. Strabo says pirates from Antium were the subject of complaints from Alexander and 
Demetrius Poliorcetes. 
12 Starr (1943) p58; Thiel (1954) p12. 
13 Starr (1943) p60. 
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needed is matched by the custom of levying the army when necessary. Armies 
however were readied far more often, since obviously raids and wars fought on land 
were more frequent than maritime battles. The offices of duumviri navales classis 
ornandae reficiendaeque causa were not created until 311B.C. and each duumvir 
received a fleet of only ten ships, which was not a standing force. This does not 
suggest a powerful fighting force, and it probably deserves the tag 'insignificant'. 15 
Coastal or 'maritime' colonies could protect the coasts in the meantime. 
Through the fire beacons placed on a watch-tower or hill, coastal people were 
warned of the approaching danger from pirates. During the Punic War both sides used 
coastal watch-towers to signal the approach not of pirates but of the enemy fleet. In 
218B.C. the Sicilians' vigil in towers along the coast near Lilybaeum warned the town 
of the Carthaginian fleet. 16 In 217B.C. the watch-towers (speculae), which the 
Spanish had built partly as a means of defence against latrones around the coast near 
the Ebro river, were used by the Carthaginians, who saw the Roman fleet approaching 
and sent a signum to Hasdrubal. 17 Octavian fortified the Italian coast with 'many 
watch-towers' to prevent raids by Sextus Pompey's ships, and arranged for new 
triremes to be built at Rome and Ravenna. 18 Cicero gives a famous account of the 
rousing of defenders by watchmen in Sicily while Verres was governor. Watchmen 
(vigiles) and temple guards (custodes) in Agrigentum prevented Verres' slaves from 
carrying off a statue from the temple of Hercules by raising shouts to alert the town to 
an attack from an unexpected quarter. It was not, as Cicero says, a surprise attack 
from an enemy or pirates, (non hostium adventu necopinato neque repentino 
14 Livy 7.25-26; Thiel (1954) pp7-8. 
15 Livy 9.30.4. Ormerod (1924) p161; Starr (1943) pp57-8; Thiel (1954) pp9f gives it the 
ignominious title 
16 Livy 21.49.8 -10. Other examples of the use of speculae for attacks by land (during war) and sea 
in Livy: 23.27.4; 27.28.16; 28.7.1; 29.23.1; 31.24.4; 34.26.4; 37.23.1 & 5; 44.28.8; 44.29.3. For 
such towers, particularly in the Greek islands, see Ormerod (1924) pp41 - 49; (1924b) pp31 - 36, and 
Pritchett (1991) pp352 - 58, who also lists previous studies. 
17 Livy 22.19.6. Pliny N.H. 35.169 says the watchtowers were built by Hannibal. 
18 Appian B.C. 5.80. 
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praedonum impetu), the more usual threat, which he implies these guards would 
normally be watching for, but an attack by Verres' henchmen. According to Cicero, 
the inhabitants of the entire town were roused to arm themselves, and they then 
subjected the thieves to a stoning (lapidatio), which was enough to rout them. As 
Lintott suggests, such self-help was probably employed throughout Italy in smaller 
settlements and villages. 19 Verres also sent men to rob the temple at the more isolated 
community of Assorus. There the aeditumi and custodes sounded a warning signal 
on a horn to summon help from the land around the temple.20 
Appian tells of townspeople in Italy actually carrying out a hunt for bandits. 
During the proscriptions ordered by the Triumvirate in 43B.C., a certain Varus, one of 
the proscribed, first took to the hills, then stopped to hide in the marshy ground near 
Mintumae. It was at this time however, that the local Minturnians were conducting a 
, search through the marsh for bandits which uncovered the luckless Varus. They 
believed him to be a bandit, sentenced him to death, and intended to torture him to 
betray his associates, at which point he is said to have protested at the indignity of 
torture, since he was a former consul. The Mintumians did not believe this story (note 
the law in the Digest which warns of the claims from accused bandits), and he would 
probably have been executed by them if he had not been recognised by a centurion and 
subsequently beheaded as one of the proscribed. Syme asserts that Varus actually tried 
to pass himself off as a bandit. Since Yams was trying to avoid being killed in the first 
place, this is highly unlikely, given the summary justice meted out to bandits. 21 
In A.D.190 Commodus wrote to the town of Bubo in Lycia thanking 
magistrates, council and people for their efforts in supressing bandits, capturing some 
19 Cic. In Verr. 2.5.93: "...sicut erat antea semper consuetudo, praedonum adventum significabat 
ignis e specula sublatus aut tumulo...". For the defence at Agrigentum, In 
Linton (1968) pp6 - 15 also for discussion of lapidatio. 
20 • Cic. In Verr. 2.4.96. 
Verr. 2.4.94 - 95. 
21 Appian B.C. 4.28. There was no consul of this name; Syme, (1956) p208 suggests that he may 
have been one of 10 former praetors granted the consularia ornamenta by Caesar. Varus may have 
declared he was a former consul perhaps when the claim that he was a Roman citizen did not impress 
his captors, in the vain hope of evoking the respect held for that position and thus prevent his death. 
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and killing others. 22 Dio uses a telling phrase to describe the arrest of the Emperor 
Macrinus on the run in A.D.218: he was 'seized by the firstcomer (or 'anyone') as if a 
bandit'.23 Macrinus was arrested by a centurion, which Dio knew. However the 
phrase not only casts an intended slur on Macrinus, it reflects the principle of self-
defence which could be applied by all. 
The practice of leaving bodies of crucified criminals on display was one 
deterrent. Another method cited by Palladius was seen outside a church on the 
mountain of Nitria in north Africa. This consisted of three trees, each with a whip 
hanging from them, which constituted a promise of flogging to wrongdoers such as 
bandits if caught. 24 A law in A.D.451 directs provincial governors to procure 
civilians to help with the removal of bandits from properties. If they were not 
sufficient, due to the size of the band, then the army would be used. 25 
Such self-defence measures taken by individuals or small villages and towns 
were effective against relatively small groups of marauders. However once these 
bands became so large that they exceeded the capacity of local populations to cope 
with, then a larger power could be appealed to for help to suppress the marauders. As 
Rome became the strongest power in the western Mediterranean, it was found 
necessary for Roman magistrates commanding armed forces to become involved in the 
policing of banditry and piracy to protect Rome's friends, allies and trading routes. 
In the East, the role of protector had been assumed by Rhodes for many years 
until its position was eroded by the Romans in 167B.C. Strabo praises Rhodes for the 
fact that through its dominance over the sea, it had 'overpowered piracy' • 26 It was  
not altruistically motivated of course, such a strong naval force was necessary to 
protect their position as a trading power. 27 One third century inscription tells of three 
22 AE (1979) 624. 
23 Dio 79.40.5: "...crthU77560e1s0 	reapA rvx_irtyup, aim-rep TLS' A71070..." 
24 Palladius Laus. Hist. 7.3. 
25 C.J. 9.39.2. 
26 Strabo 14.2.5: "...Aucrrtfpta KaGene...". 
27 Magie (1950) pp71 - 3; 282n9; on the Rhodian record, Orrnerod (1924) pp132ff. 
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brothers, one of whom was killed fighting pirates, and the other two fighting 
Tyrrhenians. The Tyrrhenians were, as Ormerod suggests, probably also engaged in 
piratical activity. 28 
After the expansionist ambitions of Antiochus HI for the Seleucid empire had 
been defeated by the Romans with their allies Rhodes and Pergamum in 190B.C., at 
the conference in Apameia in 188B.C. Rhodes was given more control than any other 
Greek city-state over some of the former Seleucid territory. It gained a large 
proportion of Caria and the coast of Lycia, which Rhodes treated as subordinate 
provinces complete with governors. 29 Their status however was not popular with the 
Lycians, whose protestations and rebellions prompted the Romans to retract their 
'grant' of Lycia in 177B.C. Dissatisfaction also emerged in rebellions in the Carian 
towns of Caunus, Alabanda and Mylasa in 167B.C. Relations between Rome and 
Rhodes soured, beginning in 171B.C., when Peseus of Macedon sent envoys asking 
Rhodes to assume the role of peace negotiator if Rome should attack the Macedonians. 
The Rhodians declined, but there were those both on the Rhodian side who 
disapproved of the alliance with Rome, and those on the Roman side who were 
suspicious of Rhodian power. The situation deteriorated to the point that there was a 
suggestion by a praetor to declare war on the Rhodians. 3° This suggestion was not 
taken up, but in 167B.C. after conquering Macedon in the war against Perseus, the 
Senate 'freed' Lycia and Caria from Rhodes. 31 Furthermore the Rhodians were 
ordered to remove their garrisons from the cities of Caunus and Stratonicea, whence 
exiles had recently arrived in Rome, although the Rhodian aquisition of them pre-dated 
the grant in 188B.C.. 32 A Rhodian envoy subsequently complained that these 
measures would inflict a significant loss in revenue on Rhodes, since from Caunus and 
28 SIG 1225, dated to c. 225B.C.; Magie (1950) p282n9; Ormerod (1924) p130; on the 
Tyrrhenians, p152ff . 
29 Magie (1950) pp108 - 112. 
30 Magie (1950) p1 10n66. 
31 Polybius 30.5.12; Livy 44.15.1; Magie (1950) p1 10n67. 
32 Polybius 30.21.2; Appian, Mith. 23; Magie (1950) p1  10n68. 
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Stratonicea alone the income was said to be a yearly total of 120 talents. 33 In 
addition, a senatorial measure which was aimed at reducing the powerful Rhodian 
trading position and economy, and which ultimately had unforseen consequences for 
the rise of piracy in the Mediterranean, was to make Delos a free port. This had a 
significant impact through the loss of money raised from Rhodian customs duties and 
by enticing traders to the other port. 34 The decline in revenue and trading affected 
the funding for a strong naval presence. The diminished state of Rhodian power is 
evident twenty years later. In skirmishes in a war (called a bellum piraticum by 
Trogus) with the Cretans in 155B.C., the large Rhodian ships could not compete with 
the smaller Cretan ships which had greater manoeuvreability, and are compared by 
Diodorus to large bears being harried by little dogs who eventually succumb to such 
treatment, and the Rhodians as a consequence were said to be in the 'greatest distress', 
and resorted in part to superstitious use of amulets and spells, and to the strategem of 
appointing as magistrates those who had been rejected, in the hope of reversing their 
fortune. 35 The responsibility for conducting large-scale policing in the east now 
effectively lay with the strongest remaining power in the Mediterannean - Rome. 
(ii) Protecting the provinces during the Republic 
Once the local population could no longer cope with the attacks of bandits or 
pirates, the request was made for help. Complaints were originally directed to Rome, 
but later they were sent to the provincial official who was empowered to act. The 
'provincial governor' was the official in command, who had been granted the use of 
imperium in a province. They were usually consuls or praetors, or former consuls 
and praetors. A governor's imperium could be continued, or 'prorogued' after his 
year-long term of office had expired, to allow a certain task to be finished, such as a 
33 Polyb. 30.31.1 - 8. 
34 Polyb. 30.31.10-12; Magie (1950) p110, and see n69 for discussion of the amount lost from the 
revenue. 
35 1:5iod. Sic. 31.38; 31.43 - 45; Polyb. 33.16 - 17; Pompeius Trogus Pro!. Hist. Phil. 35; Magie 
(1950)p111. 
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war or subjugation of a rebellion.36 A law in the Digest later specifically directs the 
governors of provinces, as one of their judicial tasks of office, to seek out latrones 
and to punish them: 
It is fitting for a good and responsible governor to take care that the province 
which he rules is peaceful and quiet. This he will obtain without difficulty if he 
works carefully to free the province from wrongdoers and searches them out: for 
he must seek out temple-robbers, bandits, kidnappers and thieves, and as each 
wronged, punish him accordingly, and imprison their harbourers, without 
whom a bandit is not able to long hide. 37 
This law is derived essentially from the task of policing piracy and banditry which had 
been carried out by Republican magistrates. 38 Once the magistrate had decided to act, 
or had been directed by the Senate to act on a complaint, lacking a police force as such, 
he had the imperium to direct lesser magistrates, the army and navy in a policing role 
to quell the violence. 
Camillus when consul had attempted to curtail the raids of pirates on the coast of 
Italy in 349B.C. It was hardly a crushing victory and Livy describes it as 
'unmemorable'.39 This is a phrase which has important implications, for it is often 
applied to a magistrate's policing of banditry or piracy, when mentioned at all. 
Magistrates who carried out this task quietly and successfully might receive only 
brief mentions, if at all, in ancient writers. For example, in 114B.C., Marius was 
allotted the province of Further Spain, where, it is briefly noted, he subdued 
36 On provincial administration, see Magie (1950) pp159 - 60; Lintott (1993) p22f Richardson 
(1994) pp564-598. 
37 Dig. 1.18.13.pr. (Ulpian de officio proconsulis): "Congruit bono et gravi praesidi curare, ut 
pacata atque quieta provincia sit quam regit. quod non difficile obtinebit, si sollicite agat, ut malls 
hominibus provincia careat eosque conquirat: nam et sacrilegos latrones plagiarios fures con quirere 
debet et prout quisque deliquerit, in eum animadvertere, receptoresque eorum coercere, sine quibus 
latro diutius latere non potest. 
38 Cic. In Verr. 2.5.80 for example says that there was the expectation that during the summer 
months, praetors would go on a travelling inspection of their province. Braund (1993) pp201-3 notes 
the pride taken in suppressing piracy in the Greek world. 
39 Livy 7.26.13: "Cum Graecis a Camillo nulla memorabilis gesta res." 
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banditry.40 L. Caecilius Metellus, successor to Verres in Sicily in 70B.C., as 
propraetor conducted a campaign against pirates in Sicily. Cicero uses him as a 
contrast to the appalling record of Verres as governor. According to Orosius, Metellus 
successfully fought both a land and sea battle against the archipirata Pyrganion, 
"...who, with the Roman fleet beaten held possession of the port of Syracuse... and 
plundered it. 41 Metellus reversed many of Verres' decisions in his administration of 
the province, but then defended Verres and furthermore obstructed Cicero in the 
gathering of evidence for his prosecution. 42 Cicero notes that while his brother 
Quintus was governor of Asia from 61-59, latrocinia had been suppressed in Mysia, 
and that banditry on the 'roads and lands' in general had been subdued. 43 
Provincial officials' imperium allowed them to issue their own edicts, some of 
which were issued in their efforts to control banditry. The edict of L. Domitius 
Ahenobarbus is known to us and was well known in antiquity precisely because of his 
severity in enforcing it. As praetor of Sicily in 97B.C. he had banned the possession 
of weapons in an attempt to curtail banditry." The coming of the principate did not 
alter this process; in Egypt papyri give evidence of prefects' decrees which describe 
measures against banditry. In A.D.154 the prefect of Egypt, M. Sempronius 
Liberalis, declared that there would be a three month amnesty for people to return 
home who had fled through poverty from taxes and had stayed away from fear of 
proscription. He warns them against committing banditry or associating with bandits, 
since raids would be suppressed by epistrategi, strategi and soldiers. Anyone caught 
wandering about after the amnesty would be arrested and taken to him as a 'confessed 
40 Plut. Mar. 6.1. 
41 Livy Per. 98; Orosius 6.3.5. Cic. In Verr. 2.5.91 & 95 - 100 says that the pirate chief 
responsible for burning the beached Roman fleet and then sailing into the harbour of Syracuse in glee 
at this victory was called Heraclio. 
42 e.g. Cic. In Verr. 2.2.62 - 65; see MRR for 70B.C. for other sources. 
43 Cic. Qt. 1.1.25. 
" Cic. In Verr. 2.5.7; Val. Max. 6.3.5: "...cruci fait, quia ipse ad exturbanda latrocinia, quibus 
provincia vastabatur, ne quis telum haberet edixerat."; Quint. Inst. Or. 4.2.17. 
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criminal'.45 The prefect L. Baebius Aurelius Juncinus was conscientious about his 
duty to repress banditry. About A.D.210 - 214 he wrote to his strategi a second time, 
reminding them that in his first letter he had already written to order them to investigate 
banditry and warned of the dangers if they did not, and that he regarded this sort of 
matter as important, so he included with this letter his decree, which he wanted 
publically displayed, promising punishment to those who harboured bandits. 46 
The ethos prevalent in Roman upper class culture of pursuing individual glory 
through their achievments had a special significance in regard to their military 
performance in general, and to their policing role in particular, while in possession of 
public office in a province. It was not simply the case that once an aspirant to a 
position had been elected, he was content with the title and was prepared to be given 
any province for the honour to serving the Roman res publica. In the first instance, 
not all public office holders were enthusiatic about provincial commands. Like many 
city dwellers today, provincial areas were regarded by the inhabitants of Rome as 
barbarian backwaters devoid of culture. The use of exile as a threat and punishment is 
testimony to the strong attraction of the city, and the comments made by Ovid, sent 
into exile to Tomis on the Black Sea, in the Tristia provide an example of (albeit 
elegant) complaint about this punishment. Cicero, who was himself very pleased to 
return to Rome after his exile in 58, tells a self-deprecating story against himself and 
his feeling of importance about his achievements while quaestor in Sicily in 75B.C. 
He imagined that his quaestorship would be the talk of Rome, but was deflated when 
he arrived back in Italy at Puteoli to discover that someone there had so little interest 
and information about such matters that they thought that Cicero had been in Africa. 
He says that he took care then to keep himself in the 'public mind' by making sure his 
presence in Rome was being 'seen by the public eye'. 47 This no doubt contributed to 
the reasons why Cicero refused a province after his praetorship in 66. During his 
45 B.G.U. 372; translation in Lewis and Reinhold, (1955) pp374 - 5. Cf. P. Oxy 3364 (A.D.209) 
for imperial edicts ordering people home and a fine of fifty thousand sesterces for sheltering them. 
46 /3 . oxy. 1408. 
47 Cic. Pro Planc. 64-66; cf. Cic. Ad Fam. 2.12.2-3; Richardson (1994) p593. 
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consulship in 63 he was allotted the richer province of Macedonia, but again declined 
and it was given to his fellow consul C. Antonius Hybrida, who wanted a province, in 
place of Cisalpine Gau1. 48 Those who, like Cicero, were more interested with the 
current political state in Rome and their role in it, could exercise the option of 
remaining there. Neither Crassus or Pompey had taken provinces following their 
consulships in 70B.C. It has been plausibly suggested that the consuls of 77B.C., D. 
Iunius Brutus and Mam. Aemilius Lepidus Livianus, refused to go to the aid of 
Metellus Pius who was fighting Sertorius in Spain, because they were reluctant "...to 
undertake a difficult, dangerous and unrewarding war...". 49 In 69B.C. the consul 
Hortensius declined to take the command against the Cretan pirates because he wanted 
to stay in Rome to exercise his influence, and the command was then given to the 
other consul Metellus. 5° 
(iii) Glory Seekers 
A provincial command however could provide a magistrate with considerable 
opportunities, both for making money either illegally, by for example extorting money 
from the provincials, such as Verres' notorious exploitation for which he became 
infamous, or legally, by conducting a military campaign from which booty could be 
gathered. 51 Furthermore it also gave governors the chance of obtaining considerable 
honours through these military exploits, which were rewarded with public acclaim in 
Rome. This system made provincial commands more palatable by the possibility of 
the furtherance of his personal status for the magistrate. A triumph through the streets 
48 After the praetorship: Cic. Pro Mur. 42 (Murena also had been reluctant to go to a province); 
after the consulship: Cic. In Pis. 5; Ad Fam. 5.2.3; Sallust Cat. 26.4; Plut. Ctc. 12.4: Dio 
37.33.4. 
49 Seager (1979) p17; Cic. Phil. 11.18. 
5° Plut. Pompey 23.3-4; Veil. Pat. 2.31.1; Zonaras 10.2. Hortensius: Dio (Xiph.) 36.1a. Another 
instance of the refusal of provincial commands: in 109B.C. the praetor Cn. Cornelius Scipio had 
refused Spain, according to Valerius Maximus 6.3.3b. 
51 For example, see Cic. De imp. 64-68 on the plunder to be gained, and the money many praetors 
were making in the provinces from the public monies. 
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of Rome was the highest form of public acclamation that a commander could receive. 
A barely lesser triumph could be held on the Alban Mount outside Rome, particulary 
by generals refused a triumph in the city; and there was an ovatio, which was still a 
significant victory procession, but was regarded as a lesser form in which the 
commander wore a wreath of myrtle, not laurel, the toga praetexta, not the uestis 
triumphalis, and entered the city on foot or later on horseback, rather than riding in a 
chariot. 52 Preceding a triumph, though a triumph did not always follow afterwards, 
was a supplicatio, a feast of thanks-giving to the gods, which was requested by the 
commander, who sent a letter to the senate requesting such honours after a victory. 53 
Cicero declares that being a winner at the Olympic games was 'almost greater and more 
glorious' than to triumph at Rome. 54 An additional honour and perpetual reminder to 
all of a commander's victory was the adoption a cognomen which was derived from 
the region he had conquered, which for example, Scipio Africanus, Servilius 
Isauricus, and Metellus Baliaricus among others, adopted. 
There was in addition a general rule to decide whether a triumph or a lesser 
procession was received. Aulus Gellius wrote in the second century A.D. that 
successfully defeating a 'proper' enemy could earn the general a triumph, but defeating 
unworthy bandits or pirates or slaves only merited an ovation: "The reason for an 
ovatio and not a triumph is when either the wars were not declared properly and were 
not carried out with a proper enemy (iustus hostis), or when the name of the enemy is 
low and is not suitable, as of slaves or pirates, or, with a surrender quickly made, a 
'dustless,' as it is said, and bloodless victory occurred." 55 The origin of this rule is 
52 Versnel (1970) pp165 - 168; triumph on the mons Albanus, p28 if; Bonfante Warren (1970) pp50 
- 51; Plut. Marcellus 22. 
53 Versnel (1970) pp171-4. 
54 Cic. Pro Flacco 31: "hoc est apud Graecos, quoniam de eorum gravitate dicimus, prope maius et 
gloriosius quam Romae triumphasse." This was to emphasise how greatly the loss was felt of the 
former Olympic boxing winner Atyanas, from Adramyttium in Mysia, who had been killed by pirates. 
55 Gellius Noctes Atticae, 5.6.21: Ovandi ac non triumphandi causa est, cum aut bella non rite 
indicta neque cum iusto hoste gesta sunt, aut hostium nomen humile et non idoneum est, ut 
servorum piratarumque, aut, deditione repente facta,"inpulverea", ut did solet, incrues ntaque victoria 
obvenit." 
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uncertain. The proviso about a slave war is said to be dated to no earlier than the first 
century B.C., though Florus attributes similar motivation to Perperna in 132B.C. 56 
The sentiment of Florus is indicative of how such victories over the 'lesser opponents' 
were viewed. He is approving of M. Perperna's humility and his respect for the 
triumph; Perperna is said to have besieged the rebellious slaves in Sicily at Enna in 
132B.C. and subdued them once their supplies were exhausted, punishing the 
surviving 'bandits' as Florus put it, with chains and crucifixion. He is said to have 
been 'content' with an ovation, 'lest he injure the dignity of a triumph' by the servile 
inscription. This may indicate that a rule about lesser enemies was in force at the time, 
and that Perperna probably more or less gracefully accepted that he would not receive a 
triumph in any case. 57 
The powerful however had the influence to bend the rules. Crassus, after his 
defeat of Spartacus and the fugitive slaves celebrated an ovation in 71B.C. He was 
said to have used his influence to sway the senate to allow him to be crowned with a 
laurel crown, not the myrtle one normally used for ovations. 58 The propaganda 
disseminated by Octavian frequently portrayed his battle with his political enemy 
Sextus Pompeius as a struggle against 'pirates', 'slaves' and Pompeius as their 'pirate' 
leader. Even later in his Res Gestae he wrote mare pacavi a praedonibus. It may 
have been for this reason, and prompted by a strategic false modesty, that he only 
celebrated an ovation for his victory over Pompeius in 36B.C. Among his many other 
56 Versnel (1970) p165; cf Richardson (1975) p61. 
57 Florus 2.7.8: "..luitque de servis ovatione contentus, ne dignitatem triumphi servili inscriptione 
violaret." See Degrassi (1947) 558 for discussion of whether Florus was mistaken, and whether his 
successor P. Rupilius, who finished the subjugation, received a triumph. 
58 Cic. In Pis. 58; Gellius, Noc. Att. 5.6.23; Pliny N.H. 15.125; Degrassi (1947) 565 ; Plutarch 
Crassus 11.8 does not mention the wreath request, portraying Crassus as more modest, in not asking 
for a triumph, while Jerome, Chronicon ad ann. 70 has Crassus triumphing. Gellius 5.6.24 also 
notes that the consul of 189B.C., M. Fulvius Nobilior, was criticised for awarding his men crowns for 
the 'lightest reason', and even for building ramparts, rather than storming them. Florus 2.8.1-2 begins 
his episode on Spartacus with a discourse on the shame to Rome of fighting armed slaves, unworthy 
adversaries. See also his comments at 2.7.1. 
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honours however, he had been granted the right to wear the trimphator's laurel 
wreath.59 
With such great incentives, there was a certain cynicism concerning the reasons 
why men wanted commands in provinces even in antiquity. Triumphs were frequently 
sought by provincial governors, and to achieve this a sizeable battle in which the 
Romans were victorious was needed. This was best achieved by full-scale war. Other 
circumstances in which the Roman army was required to keep control, that is, against 
banditry and piracy, were less certain to bring any recognition. Paradoxically, while 
ambition for these rewards was acceptable, overt ambition for them was not, though it 
was not always concealed. 
It was not unknown for generals to send in false reports on the number killed in 
their victories in their ambition for a triumph. 60 Valerius Maximus writes that two 
laws had been introduced because of the triumph-seeking nature of many generals: 
Certain imperatores wanted triumphs to be decreed to themselves on account of 
levia proelia. Those to whom this occurred were warned by law that no one 
would triumph unless he had killed 5000 of the enemy in one battle: for indeed 
not from the number, but in the glory of the triumphs our ancestors thought the 
honour of our city would be more elevated. Moreover lest such an outstanding 
law be blotted out by the desire of laurel, it was supported with the help of 
another law, which L. Marcius and M. Cato, tribunes of the plebs [in 62B.C.], 
brought: for a penalty was threatened to generals who dared to send back by 
letters to the senate either a false number of enemies killed in battle or of citizens 
lost, and it orders them, when they first enter the city, to swear 
truly to the urban quaestors about the number [killed] on both sides from those 
written to the senate.61 
59 Res Gestae 25 and the ovation at 4; Degrassi (1947) 569 in which both the Fasti Triumph. and 
Fasti Barb. do not mention 'pirates' but refer to it as being ex Sicilia; Appian B.C. 5.130; Dio 
49.15; Suet. Aug. 22 who also refers to it as being post Siculum bellum; Orosius 6.18.34; Jerome 
Chron. ad ann. 33. 
60 Livy 33.22.9; at 33.22.7 Q. Minucius, who was granted a triumph in 197 for his activities in 
Liguria, is accused of having fought levia proelia. Versnel (1970) p304. 
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Appius Claudius Pulcher is said to have been denied a triumph even though he had the 
requisite number of slain enemies, because he had also lost 5000 of his own men. If 
Orosius is correct, this dates the law to at least 143B.C., and it has been suggested that 
two triumphs in 180B.C. which was awarded without a battle having been fought was 
the probable reason for this law.62 Strabo observes that there had been wars between 
the Salassi, a tribe which inhabited a valley among the mountains in Transpadane Gaul 
and owned rich gold mines, and the Ceutrones, who were downriver and resented the 
Salassi diverting the river for mining purposes. After the Romans had acquired the 
mines from the Salassi, they continued to have disagreements with the publicans. 
Thus, Strabo says, Roman commanders had 'plenty of pretexts for war'.63 Dio 
states that Claudius was one of these commanders. As governor of the province of 
Italy, he had been sent to resolve the dispute between the tribes, but began war against 
the Salassi, though no complaint had been made about them. 64 The Salassi however 
inflicted a defeat on him, which presumably was when he lost 5000 soldiers. 65 
Claudius' ambition for a triumph led him to hold his own triumph regardless, defying 
a tribunician veto by having his daughter, a Vestal Virgin, accompany him in the 
procession.66 
In 193B.C. one of the commanders of the war in Spain, the praetor Gaius 
Flaminius fought several battles during the winter, but because his opponents were 
considered to be bandits rather than soldiers, Livy regards this as unworthy of 
recording in any detail, "...through the winter several battles not worthy of memory 
were conducted against the attacks of bandits rather than enemies...". Directly 
61 Val. Max. 2.8.1. 
62 Orosius 5.4.7; Richardson (1975) p62. 
63 Strabo 4.6.7: "ob-na 8e aweliaive robs- crrparimo3v-rag ad ra, 'Pwaitut, Kai 
ireynolievous- erri robç ravous- ebnopelv IrpoOdcraup dO (iv iroAe-p4o-ovai." 
64 Dio 22 fr. 74.1. 
Obsequens 21; Orosius 5.4.7; Cf. Livy Per. 53. 
66 Cic. Pro Cael. 34; Val. Max. 5.4.6; Suet. Tib. 2.4, Dio 22 fr. 72.2; Macrob. Sat. 3.14.14: 
Degrassi (1947) p558. 
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following this is a description of the successes of his fellow praetor, M. Fulvius 
Nobilior, which Livy begins with: "Greater deeds were achieved by M. Fulvius." 67 
Fulvius fought the Vaccaei, Vettones and the Celtiberians, and captured the king 
Hilernus alive. The juxtaposition between the accounts of the deeds of the two men 
provides a useful example in the historian's selection of material for record. Like 
Camillus above, Flaminius had fought battles which were not worthy of memory. 
Flaminius' opponents were considered by Livy too insignificant to even name in a 
history, let alone include any further details about the battle. The work from that 
winter would not merit public acclaim for Flaminius. Unless such bandits were 
'newsworthy'; that is, they had a band of considerable size, and/or an infamous leader, 
and fought a substantial battle, against the Romans their Roman protagonist had little 
chance of achieving glory or hope of an aeternum nomen from his deeds. Livy 
transfers this Roman distaste for fighting unworthy opponents to the Numidian king 
Syphax, who did not pursue the former leader of the Massylians Masinissa into the 
mountains himself because, Livy explains, it was beneath him, since it was 'scarcely 
kingly to pursue a wandering bandit'. 68 Livy claims that a Lucius Furius fighting 
with his legions against the Aurunci tribe in the mid-fourth century B.C. found 
'bandits rather than enemies', and consequently finished the war in the first battle, 
"Ibi praedonum magis quam hostium animi inventi; prima itaque acie debellatum 
est."69 This battle was not only fought against bandits, but it was practically 
'dustless' as well. Consequently, there was considered to be little honour or reward 
gained in defeating such people. 
Strabo in his description of the peoples who lived by 'sea banditry' on the 
Armenian coast of the Black Sea, who would often practise kidnapping, comments that 
67 Livy 35.7.7-8: "per hiemem proelia aliquot nulla memoria digna adversus latronum magis quam 
hostium excursiones...sunt facta. Maiores gestae res a M. Fulvio. Is apud Toletum oppidum cum 
Vaccaeis Vettonibusque et Celtiberis signis collatis dimicavit, exercitum earum gentium fudit 
fugavitque, regem Hilernum vivum cepit."; Orosius 4.20.16 & 19. See also Braund (1993) p209 
on historians' concerns with higher themes than bandits and pirates. 
68 L .\ Pry 29.31.12 "Sed vix regium videbatur latronem vagum in montibus consectari. - 
69 Livy 7.28.3. 
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whereas local rulers would attack the pirates in coming to the aid of those who had 
been kidnapped, in the Roman ruled lands, sufferers were not so lucky, with little help 
because of the 'negligence' of the Romans. 7° The initial defeats inflicted on Roman 
forces in 73B.C. by Spartacus and his supporters were in part the result of the Roman 
underestimation of their strength. The Romans thought they were dealing with an 
outbreak of banditry, and so, Appian says, the praetor C. Claudius Glaber took 
'hastily picked forces', and was defeated. 71 Diodorus also imputes this reasoning to 
the Seleucid king Demetrius, who 'thought lightly of Diodotos Tryphon as a bandit', 
and only sent soldiers to arrest him, but was later forced to send a general to counter 
the threat from his army. 72 
Appian observes that there were those who took provincial commands because 
they were ambitious for 'glory, profit or a triumph'. 73 The man who inspired this 
comment, M. Aemilius Lepidus Porcina, the consul of 137B.C., had been sent to 
replace his fellow consul Mancinus. Mancinus had been conducting a war in Hispania 
Citerior, and was recalled to stand trial after he had been forced to sign a treaty with the 
Numantines, as Fabius Maximus in 140B.C. had been forced by Viriathus, when 
surrounded by the enemy. As in 140, the Senate again refused to ratify a treaty 
obtained in such an ignominious fashion. While Aemilius Lepidus was in Spain 
awaiting their decision on further action however, he decided on his own authority to 
attack the Vaccaei on a false charge of supplying the Numantines, and besieged the city 
of Pallantia. When the Senate learned of this, they sent messengers to deliver a decree 
to Aemilius, ordering him not to attack the Vaccaei, since there had been so many other 
defeats in Spain, it was futile to start another war. It was, as Orosius calls it, an 
iniustum bellum. Aemilius refused to comply and carried on with the siege but was 
70 Strabo 11.2.12. 
71 Appian B.C. 1.116 (Appian combines Glaber with his replacment, P. Varinius, MRR 
2.115n1); also on Glaber, Plut. Crassus 9.2; Florus 2.8.4; Orosius 5.24.1; cf. Livy Per. 95. 
72 Diod. Sic. 33.4a: "6 6 	11111iTptOT TTplaTOV 	thc X'001- 01) TLVOS' KaTcOpova...". 
73 App. Sp. 80; Richardson (1994) p594. Cf. Dio 54.12.1 commenting that some sought honours 
merely for rounding up bandits. 
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then forced to retreat through want of supplies. He was relieved of his command and 
finally, on his return to Rome was given a fine. 74 
Earlier in 171B.C., the desire for warfare rather than ordinary governor's tasks 
was taken to the extreme by a magistrate who was dissatisfied with the province he 
drew in the lot, which resulted in a ludicrous situation. It had been arranged that the 
consuls should draw lots for the provinces of Macedonia and Italy. 75 C. Cassius 
Longinus had expressed his preference for Macedonia, since a war was to be 
conducted there against Perseus. He received however the quieter provincia of Italy, 
while his colleague P. Licinius Crassus was allotted Macedonia. 76 Cassius' province 
also extended to Gaul, where, Livy says, he did not manage to achieve anything 
'memorable'. The senate was then informed somewhat to its disbelief by legates from 
Aquileia that Cassius and his army had actually left his province altogether and set out 
through Illyria, another magistrate' province, intending to travel to the war in 
Macedonia. Legates were hastily despatched with a senatorial decree to prevent him 
beginning a war against any people without the senate's permission. 77 
Appian is also dubious about the motives of the consul of 119B.C., L. Caecilius 
Metellus Delmaticus, who fought against the Dalmatians in Elyria and later celebrated a 
triumph in 117B.C. 78 Appian asserts that there was no reason for the war except that 
Metellus wanted a triumph, and that Metellus' only accomplishment, since he was 
received by the Dalmatians as a friend, was to spend the winter at Salona. Metellus 
and his army nevertheless must have conducted some sort of campaign, in order to 
merit the triumph. It is quite possible however that his activities did not justify a 
74 Livy Per. 56; Appian Sp. 80 - 83; Orosius 5.4.19 - 5.5.14. For other sources on Mancinus' 
defeat, see MRR 1.484. 
75 Livy 42.31.1. 
76 Livy 42.32.1-5. 
77 Livy 43.1.4-12. See the lex de provinciis praetoriis, Crawford et al. (1996) p239 Cnidos copy 
Col. Ill 111-15 for prohibition of magistrates travelling outside their own provinces with their armies 
or not. Crawford et al. p260 note that the Cnidos inscription refers to one of the plurimae leges 
veteres mentioned by Cicero, (in Pis. 50) which was the Lex Porcia of the Lex Antonia de 
Termessibus, also in Crawford et al. (1996) (Law 19) p331ff. 
78 Appian M. 11; Livy Per. 62; Eutropius 4.23.2. 
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triumph. The Dalmatians had been subdued once before on the basis of complaints 
about their raids (see below) and it is likely that Metellus' triumph for repression of 
their probable banditry was disapproved by some senators. 
Appian's suspicious sentiments are echoed in the midst of a tirade on the 
ambition for triumphs in Cicero's speech In Pisonem delivered in 55B.C.. 79 He 
returns Piso's taunts about his exile with his own, by playing with the fact that 
although Piso had been proconsul in Macedonia from 57 to 55B.C., he had not 
received a triumph and subsequently had declared he did not want one. Cicero 
manifests complete disbelief at the unlikelihood of this claim, declaring that he had 
often noticed that those who wanted a province were concealing their desire for a 
triumph, and moreover no-one who openly sought an army could conceal it. 8° 
(iv) Refusal of requests for triumphs 
Lacking a strong case that his conduct of operations while in command of a 
province was worthy of reward could result in the refusal of a triumph for a governor. 
A triumph was not solely based on merit however; it also depended on the political 
strength of the supporters or enemies of the hopeful commander. 81 
L. Licinius Crassus while governor in Cisalpine Gaul during his consulship in 
95B.C. carried out some minor operations which would otherwise be unknown if not 
for the noteworthy fact that he was refused a triumph. His request was blocked by the 
other consul for 95, Q. Mucius Scaevola. 82 Cicero explains that it was a rejection for 
crushing people too insignificant even to be called 'enemies of the Romans'. 83 He 
79 Cic. In Piso. 53 - 63. 
8° In Pis. 56. 
81 See also Richardson (1975) p6Off. 
82 Cic. In Pis. 62, Asconius 15C; Val. Max. 3.7.6. Marshall, (1985) p109 notes "Crassus had 
merely supressed bandits in Cisalpine Gaul, and Scaevola no doubt used the argument that a victory 
over these was hardly worthy of a triumph...". Nisbet (1961) p126 comments similarly, "Guerilla 
warfare did not justify a triumph." 
83 Cic. De Inventione, 2.111. 
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declares crushingly that Crassus had "...almost examined the Alps with a surgeon's 
probe to find where there was no enemy, another reason for a triumph...". He adds 
that C. Cotta, proconsul in the same province of Cisalpine Gaul in 74 B.C., also 
wanted (and gained) a triumph for his victories, though he too did not face a proper 
enemy. Cotta however died before it could be held.
Cicero from his reluctantly accepted province of Cilicia in 51B.C. bemoans the 
fact that the Pindenissitae, who surrendered to him after a siege, were an 'unknown' 
people. Operating in the Amanus mountains, between Cilicia and Syria, he conducted 
a battle in which he captured some strongly protected forts and burnt them. On the 
strength of this, he was hailed imperator by his soldiers. He finished by beseiging 
the town of Pindenissus, which was subsequently conquered. 85 These victories 
however were not in the course of an officially declared war. There was war 
threatening on the borders from the Parthians, and the Cappodocians were also stirred 
up, but Cicero and his army did not face them. He, of course, knew that his little 
campaign was not war, and since he could not technically refer to it as helium, and 
knew what inglorious terminology could be uncharitably applied to anything less than 
war, he avoided this term in his descriptions of his actions whilst nevertheless 
emphasising the war-like aspects of his campaigns in his letters. For example, he says 
he marched to the Amanus Mountains, which were always 'full of enemies' (plenus 
hostium), where they killed a great number of 'enemies'. 86 
He feigns disdain for the accolade imperator, particularly in view of his opinion 
that the governor of Syria in 51 - 50B.C., M. Calpurnius Bibulus, 'wanted to be 
equal with this empty title'. Bibulus was campaigning in the same mountains where 
Cicero had conducted his battles, and Cicero regarded him as merely being in search of 
84 Cic. In Piso. 62: "L. Crassus, homo sapientissimus nostrae civitatis, specillis prope scrutatus 
est Alpis, ut, ubi hostis non erat, ibi triumphi causam aliquam quaereret: eadem cupiditate vir 
summo ingenio praeditus, C. Cotta, nullo certo hoste flagravit: eorum neuter triumphavit. quod alteri 
ilium honorem conlega, alteri mors praeripuit...". 
85 Cic. Ad Att. 5.20; Ad Fam. 2.7; 2.10; 15.4; 15.14 (and prescripts of these letters ad fam. for 
the title imperator); Phil. 11.34; Plutarch Cic. 36; MRR 2.243. 
86 Ad Att. 5.20. 
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a triumph; looking, as he puts it, 'for laurel in the wedding cake'. Cicero was no 
doubt sorry to report to Atticus that Bibulus subsequently suffered an embarrassing 
reverse in his campaign.87 Nevertheless, despite Cicero's scorn for the title, he still 
employed it. He too was eager to secure a triumph himself, a hope which he did not 
conceal. His friend Caelius Rufus wrote to Cicero in the province not only enquiring 
about the possibility of obtaining wild animals for the arena, but also Cicero's chances 
for a triumph.88 Earlier in 66B.C. in his De lmperio Cn. Pompei, Cicero had 
acknowledged the 'difficulty' for a commander engaged in the provinces of Asia, 
Cilicia, Syria or the 'interior kingdoms' to think of 'anything else except the enemy 
and glory'. 89 Cicero, despite his scorn for Bibulus, is revealed to be no less affected 
by this preoccupation. 
Cicero's ambition however faced opposition from M. Porcius Cato. Cicero's 
comments to Cato demonstrate the high expectation that a provincial governor could 
achieve a triumph. He wrote to Cato with a description of his military operations in 
Cilicia, and asked him to support his aspiration for a triumph. At the same time 
however he was attempting to demonstrate his modesty, and declared that he was not a 
glory seeker, which was evident from his previous refusals of a province: "Thus I 
overlooked both an equipped province and the not uncertain hope of a triumph." 9° 
Cicero's arguments to support his triumphal hopes are weakened by the fact that he 
87 Cic. Ad Att. 5.20. On Bibulus lack of performance while governor: Cic. Ad Att. 6.1.13 & 15; 
6.5.3; 6.8.5 (in which Cicero accuses him of wanting a triumph); 7.2.6-7; 7.3.5; Ad Fam. 2.17 (in 
which Cicero reveals not only that Bibulus disliked him, but that he was (according to Cicero's not 
unbiased opinion) attempting to take the credit for some of Cicero's achievments); 8.6.4 (Caelius 
waxes sarcastic about Bibulus' losses in the Amanus Mts); for other references, but none that add any 
significant achievments to Bibulus' name: Caesar B.C. 3.31.3; Livy Per. 108; Plut. Ant. 5.2: APP. 
Syr. 51. 
88 Rufus' hopes: Ad Fam. 2.10.2 - 4; 2.12.3; Cicero's: Ad Fam. 2.12.3; 2.15.1; 15.4.13: 15.6; 
Ad Att. 6.8.5; 7.1.5&7; 7.2; 7.3.2; 7.4.1; 7.7.3-4 (here he also expresses his dislike of imperium, 
suggesting that if he was given it again, he would throw it out of the first gate he came to). 
89 Cic. De Imp. Gn. Pomp. 64: "Difficile est in Asia, Cilicia, Syria regnisque interiorum 
nationurn ita versari nostrum imperatorem, ut nihil aliud nisi de hoste ac de laude cogitet." 
Cic. Ad Fam. 15.14.13: " Itaque et provinciam ornatam et spem non dubiam triumphi neglexi." 
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could not actually refer to his own campaign as a bellum, though he does his best to 
accentuate the positive aspects of his magistracy. It is particularly noticeable since he 
refers to the imminent war with the Parthians, and the magnum bellum in Cappadocia. 
He claims that he was prepared to fight the Parthians, but in the meantime he decided 
'to pacify Amanus and remove the perpetual enemy' from it. At Erana, which he 
describes as 'not a vicus but like an urbs', a 'great multitude of the enemy' were 
killed, though obviously not 5000 or more, since he would have mentioned this in 
support of his case. At the end of the siege of Pindenissum, where he might be 
expected to say that he had 'completed the war', he can only say that after fifty-seven 
days, rem confeci. The closest he manages to mentioning 'war' is in a set phrase; he 
expresses his hope for the honour the Senate usually grants for 'warlike matters' (qui 
a senatu tribui rebus bellicis solet). Finally he is forced to argue that he prevented a 
war with the presence of his army, and falls back on his good administration of the 
province.91 Despite all his efforts however, Cicero could not hide the fact that he had 
fought only tribespeople. Plutarch states outright that he fought bandits. 92 Cato was 
not convinced and answered with a defence of his opposition to the motion for a 
supplicatio, informing Cicero in no uncertain terms that a 'triumph does not always 
follow a supplicatio'.93 Both Cicero and Bibulus were only voted a supplicatio.94 
Cicero was particularly bitter about this, since Cato had voted for a supplicatio of 
twenty days for Bibulus (who was also Cato's son-in-law), which Cicero considered a 
disgrace, since he felt Bibulus had achieved very little in comparison with his own 
successes.95 Despite Cicero's pride in his provincial administration however, the 
banditry (magna latrocinia) which he blamed partly for the slow arrival of the mail 
when he arrived in Cilicia, was still prevalent when he departed. 96 
91 Ad Fam. 15.14. 
92 Plut. Cic. 36. Plutarch also claims that he conducted a war. 
93 Ad Fam. 15.5. 
94 Cicero: Cic. Ad Fam. 2.15.1; 3.9.4; 15.5 (from Cato) 15.6; 15.10.2; 15.13.2-3; Ad Att. 7.1.7; 
7.2.7; Caelius Ad Fam. 8.11.1-2 describes the political opposition to the supplicationes being 
decreed, Bibulus: Ad Att, 7.2.6 -7. 
95 Cic. Ad Att. 7.2.6-7. 
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The importance of war to provincial governors 
On occasion the threat posed or the trouble caused by piracy and banditry was so 
great that it became a question of seeing it as war, rather than banditry. This created a 
different situation in regard to the willingness of Roman magistrates to assume a 
provincial command and to carry out a thorough suppression. In a war, there was a 
far greater chance of the commander achieving personal glory and a triumph, through 
victorious battles. There was a fine distinction between war and banditry, and it is not 
surprising that commanders are accused of provoking war in search of a triumph. One 
was considered a far nobler task than the other. The importance of the prospect of a 
triumph to a general should not be underestimated. 
The decision to declare war in the Republic was usually made by the senate 
alone. Rich observes that "...the decision to start hostilities must frequently have 
been taken by Roman commanders on the spot without reference of any kind to the 
authorities at home." 97 The decision therefore whether a conflict was a war against 
hostes or latrones could present more complications when a commander presented a 
petition for a triumph for a 'war' he had commenced on his own authority. 
Senatorial opinion on the nature of the conflict could decide the vote for a 
triumph. Gn. Manlius Vulso was provincial commander in Asia as consul for 
189B.C. and proconsul in 188 - 187B.C. In the first year he began a campaign on his 
own initiative against the Gauls in the interior. 98 He requested a triumph, but 
opposition sparked a senatorial debate on the matter. Livy has the consul of 187B.C., 
96 Cic. Ad Fam. 2.9 (cf. 10.31.1: Asinius Pollio in Spain also mentions the difficulty in receiving 
mail because of banditry); Ad. Att. 6.4.1. 
97 Rich (1976) pp13-15; he argues that the evidence for war votes suggest that the matter was 
generally put to the assembly for a war against an enemy overseas where no permanent Roman 
province existed. Eight war votes by the assembly are thought certain, in the period from 237 to the 
end of the Republic: to declare the first Punic War against Carthage in 237B.C., for the Second Punic 
War in 218, the Second Macedonian War in 200, the Syrian War in 191, the Third Macedonian War in 
171, the Third Punic War in 149, the Jugurthine War in 111 and the First Mithridatic War in 88. 
98 Polybius 21.33-39; Diod. Sic. 29.12-13; Livy 38.12-27; other sources, MRR 1.360. 
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M. Aemilius Lepidus protest in the senate that both consuls of 189, Manlius and M. 
Fulvius Nobilior (Lepidus was feuding with the latter), were 'wandering around 
threatening war on nations on whom no war had been declared' (quibus bellum 
indictum non sit), and 'selling peace'. 99 One of the arguments used against him was 
that since he couldn't 'find war' anywhere else, he used his army against the Galatians 
on his own authority rather than that of the senate and the assembly. He was asked 
which of the proper procedures, ie decrees voted, restitution demanded and delegates 
sent, had been followed by him so that it could be considered a "...public war of the 
Roman people and not your own private banditry...?" (...publicum populi Romani 
bellum et non tuum privation latrocinium...). 100  After the senate adjourned, Livy 
says, giving the impression that Manlius would be refused, his relatives and friends 
lobbied the senators, and the senior senators also extended their auctoritas in support 
of Manlius, arguing that never before had an imperator defeated the enemy, concluded 
matters in the province and brought home the army and not been honoured with a 
triumph. This appeal to tradition apparently worked, for Manlius celebrated a 
triumph . 101 
When war had been declared and the opponents were officially considered 
hostes, it was still acknowledged that slaves were 'lowly enemies' for example, by 
the use of the phrase bellum servile. Despite the fact that the commander's opponents 
were considered to be of lesser worth however, it was formally defined a war, and this 
carried a greater significance for the general. There was an immense difference in 
perception of a suppression of troublesome pirates or bandits and conducting a formal 
war, and this difference is reflected by the writers of the upper classes, who are 
reluctant to record anything not 'worthy of memory', which often meant bandits or 
pirates, but who will write a great deal on warfare. The prospect of a war could 
99 Livy 38.42.8-13. 
100 38.45.4-7. The entire debate: 38.44.9 - 38.50.3. 
101 Livy 50.3; 39.6.3-7.5; Degrassi (1947) 554; Pliny N.H. 34.14; De Vir. 111. 55; Florus 1.27.3 
claims he was refused a triumph because the senate did not approve the pretext for war; Augustine, 
Civ. Dei 3.21; MRR 1.369. 
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stimulate intense rivalry in the hope of gaining a magistracy and a provincia among the 
politically ambitious, and strong competition was incited in the attempt to achieve a 
command, such as the famous struggle to give Pompey the command against the 
pirates. Although he fought against pirates, it is the bellum half of the phrase which 
confers such importance. Cicero, when arguing for the appointment of Pompey to the 
command against Mithridates in 66B.C., refers to the pirates and Pompey's conduct in 
the bellum against them, and attempts to give it further dignity by the euphemistic 
phrases 'naval war', and 'maritime war'. 1 °2 Paradoxically, while it was considered 
demeaning to fight bandits and pirates, when fighting an enemy in a war, it was 
perfectly acceptable to call them 'bandits'. 
Cassius Dio claims that Julius Caesar, governor of Farther Spain in 61 - 
60B.C., might have cleared out banditry in the province 'without any great work', but 
was unwilling because he wanted glory from greater deeds. Instead he attempted to 
move the inhabitants of the Herminian Mountains to the plains, so that they would be 
unable to use their fortified position for banditry. Dio asserts that Caesar knew that 
they would refuse to move, and thus provide a legitimate 'pretext for war' (Troylektou 
-rtvci dcboppr)v). 103 Caesar led an army against the Lusitani and the Callaeci during his 
period as governor, eventually defeating them. He also settled disputes between cities, 
and brought in debt reforms. Did he however provoke the war? 
The sources do not report that Lusitania had taken up arms in open rebellion, as 
for example, the Allobroges had done earlier in Gallia Narbonensis. Cicero merely 
mentions that he will say nothing about the distinctions he then describes, which were 
given to the Spanish by Caesar: how he settled disputes, established laws, took a sort 
of inveterate barbarity from the customs and ways of the people of the city of Gades, 
and conferred the highest zeal and benefits on the state. 104 Livy notes that Caesar 
"...Lusitanos subegit...", which follows directly after a mention of the subjugation of 
102 Cic. De Imp. Gn. Pomp. 28 naval bellum; 58 maritime bellum; elsewhere he calls it war: 31- 
2; 34; 35; 63. 
103 Dio 37.52.3. 
104 Cic. Pro Balb. 43. 
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the Allobroges, "qui rebellaverant", but significantly he does not compare the two. 1 °5 
Velleius Paterculus only praises his wonderful 'virtus' and 'industria' in Spain. 106 
Suetonius' account is negative, depicting Caesar as eager to arrive and depart from the 
province once it had been 'pacified', without mentioning any need for this 
pacification. 107 Plutarch reports that Caesar raised 10 cohorts in addition to the 20 
already there, conquered the Callaeci and the Lusitani, (again, not mentioning any 
revolt on their part) then marched to the sea, subduing the tribes not complying with 
the Romans, carried out debt reforms, and settled disputes between cities. 108 
Appian's account has Caesar being sent into Farther Spain to make war 'where 
necessary'. Those who were 'stirred up' (craAezio)) or 'kept aloof/remained apart' 
(Ae.tn-to) from the Romans still, he subdued. Appian then notes that those who 
'revolted again' were subdued by Octavian, "Kat 7-cpa abOts- dOtardpeva 
'Orraatog...exciotharo." 1 °9 This last sentence seems to indicate a first uprising 
against the Romans. However this may be explained as a description of the response 
of these people being 'subdued' by Caesar as a 'revolt'. The pressure from Caesar 
was the cause of the reaction against the Romans, rather than Caesar and his forces 
responding to a rebellion. Appian is less ambiguous in the Civil Wars, stating that 
Caesar, since he considered administrative matters 'useless', neglected them, and 
attacked the tribes until the whole of Spain was tributary to Rome. 110 
It seems then that lacking a significant enemy, Caesar subdued tribes in Spain 
for his own ambitious purposes. The sources do not say that the province was entirely 
peaceful, but neither do they mention a rebellion against the Romans. There seems to 
105 Livy Per. 103. 
106 Vell. Pat. 2.43.4. 
107 Suet. Jul. 18. Later he repeats allegations of 'certain men' that Caesar had pillaged some 
Lusitanian towns even though they had not refused his orders and opened the gates to him. (ltd. 54.) 
While this is doubtless only slander, it probably reflects the lack of initial rebellion. 
108 Plut. Caes. 11-12. 
109 App. lb. 102. 
110 App. B.C. 2.8. 
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have been some dispute or unrest between cities; Suetonius at one point suggests that 
Caesar hurried to the province either to avoid his creditors in court or 'to help the 
imploring allies'. 111 The 'trouble' in the province would appear to be in the nature of 
'inter-tribal' disputes, carried out through bandit raids and perhaps, if Suetonius is to 
be believed, one side may have called on the Romans to intervene, though the other 
sources do not report this plea. Caesar had little to lose from attacking people who 
were not entirely sympathetic to Rome and who were fighting each other. He was 
heavily in debt, and the plunder from any victories would (and did) alleviate his 
financial difficulties, and to achieve a glorious triumph would hardly harm his chances 
of being elected consul. 112 Cicero had described in 66B.C. the hatred of foreign 
nations for some of the generals sent out by Rome, who looked for wealthy cities 
against whom they could find an excuse for war in order to plunder them. 113 Caesar's 
actions seem to follow this obviously well-used formula. 
There was moreover a precedent for moving people around a province and 
achieving a triumph. In 180B.C., M. Baebius Tamphilus and P. Cornelius Cethegus 
had merely transferred the Apuani from Liguria to Samnium without a fight, and were 
voted a farcical triumph by the senate. Livy's comment is that they were 'the first to 
triumph without conducting a war'. 114 The ridiculousness of the situation was evident 
from the paucity of booty or prisoners in the procession. They probably considered 
this their only chance of gloria, (though it seems to have become infamy) since Livy 
cuttingly says they did 'nothing memorable' in their consulships the previous year. 
Caesar ensured this would not be said of him. 
Dio's report that Caesar, as an ambitious man seeking glory for future 
advancement, while provincial governor provoked a war to achieve this aim, rather 
than carry out the more mundane 'governor's work' policing bandit raids, appears to 
be an unsympathetic but probably accurate account. In his biography of Caesar, 
111 Suet. Iu1.28. 
112 Suet. Jul 18; 54.1; Plut. Crass.7; Caes. 11; App. B.C. 2.8. 
113 Cic. De Imp. Gn. Pomp. 65-66. 
114 Livy 40.37.9; 40.38; Richardson (1975) p62. 
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Gelzer takes Dio' version as correct, saying that Caesar did try to move the bandits in 
the Henninian Mountains, and had originally hurried to the province because he 
"..knew that the Lusitanian part of the province was infested with bandits, and gave 
this as the official explanation for his premature departure, but in this way also avoided 
senatorial interference with his plans." 115 Even if Caesar did give this reason (and it 
seems unlikely; the Suetonian 'call of the imploring allies' has more credibility as an 
excuse for leaving Rome early), no-one would have believed it. A governor did not 
hurry off to fight bandits, particularly not an ambitious man like Caesar, looking to 
enhance his career. When the senate assigned to the consuls Caesar and Bibulus in 
59B.C. provinces consisting of forests and pastures, (silvae callesque), Caesar is 
said by Suetonius to have been 'greatly incited' by this iniuria. 116 There were no 
opportunities for triumphs in such areas. Significantly, he eventually chose the Gauls 
from all the provinces, specifically because they were more suitable places for gaining 
triumphs, "...cuius emolumento et oportunitate idonea sit materia triumphorum." 117 
Those who sought magistracies were ambitious politicians, and furthering a 
career and attaining personal glory was not easily achieved by performing essentially 
policing tasks in a province against the lowliest dishonourable criminals. Political 
enemies could seize upon the fact that although a battle or campaign may have been 
fought against an enemy, if the enemy was composed of people they considered to be 
pirates or bandits, the success was valued less than a campaign against honourable 
enemies. 
115 Gelzer (1968) p61 -2. 
116 Suet. Jul. 19.2. 
117 Suet. Jul. 22.1. Rolfe comments that the phrase 'silvae callesque' "...seems to designate 
provinces where the duties of the governor would be confined to guarding the mountain pastures and 
keeping the woods free from brigands". J. C. Rolfe (transl.) Suetonius, Loeb 1913, p23. Also 
Brunt (1971) p291 who suggests the justification for the allocation was the suppression of brigandage 
prevalent in the hills, which Octavian later assigned as a task for Sabinus; Appian B.C. 5.132. 
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(v) Wars against bandits and pirates in the Republic 
As a result of the Roman reluctance to perform a policing role, piracy or banditry 
was often a significant factor in Roman decisions to go to war. Prior to the first 
Illyrian War in 229B.C., the Ardiaean tribe under King Agron in Illyria had been 
extending their attacks both on land, and on sea in their small boats, or lembi, from 
about 231B.C. 118 Polybius tells us that they had also been active in large numbers on 
land. Agron is said to have been paid by Demetrius of Macedon to help the 
Acarnanians in the city of Medion against the Aetolians, in which Agron deployed an 
army of 5000 Illyrian men, transported by the lembi; that Elis and Messenia in the 
Peloponnese had been raided by them; and that they also attacked and plundered the 
city of Phoenice in Epirus under the general Scerdilaidas, also with 5000 troops. 119 
While at Phoenice, they are said to have also robbed and in the process killed many 
Italian merchant traders, and taken 'not a few' prisoner. 120 It is here that a well-known 
discrepancy in the sources, between Appian and Polybius, occurs over the precise 
cause for the Romans' decision to enter into the war with Illyria. 121 Polybius' 
version begins convincingly enough with the comment that the Romans had previously 
'taken no heed of those who had made complaints against the Illyrians', but now when 
approached they appointed two emissaries, Gaius and Lucius Coruncanius to 
investigate. 122 His narrative however, then diverges into drama. The ambassadors 
approached Queen Teuta, who had taken over the throne on the death of her husband 
Agron in 230, and was beseiging the island of Issa. Teuta, whom Polybius portrays 
as a haughty and arrogant character, listened to the ambassadors and then declared that 
118 Further on the causes of this piracy (essentially, poor resources), see Dell (1967) pp344 - 358; 
against Dell, Hammond (1968) p4n14. 
119 — ro- lyb. 2.2-7. 
120 Polyb. 2.8.1-3. 
121 See for example, Ormerod (1924) pp169ff who follows Polybius' version with the importance of 
Teuta; Badian (1964) ppl-10 (Polybius); Hammond (1968) p4-6 (Polybius); Errington (1989) p86ff 
(Appian). Rich (1976) pp72 - 73 argues against interpreting the comments Polybius attributes to the 
younger man's temper as a formal declaration of war. 
122 Polyb. 2.8.3 -4; Hammond (1968) p5n16 doubts even then that the Senate would have been 'much 
moved by individual complaints'. 
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'no public wrong' would come to Rome from Illyria, but that she would not stop 
'Illyrians plundering on the sea'. The incensed younger Coruncanius declared that 
Rome would force a halt to such acts, and at this, Teuta lost her temper, and as the 
legates left in their ship, sent assassins to kill him. The news of this at Rome provided 
the stimulus for the decision for war. Teuta in the meantime sent out more lembi, 
which made an attack on Corcyra, which was captured and placed under the command 
of Demetrius of Pharos and also besieged Epidamnos. 123 
Appian's version of the war is far shorter and less dramatic. He cites Agron as 
responsible for capturing a section of Epirus, and Corcyra, Epidamnus and Pharus and 
placing garrisons on them. At the threat of his fleet, Issa asked for help from the 
Romans, who sent ambassadors to investigate. Illyrian ships intercepted the 
ambassadors, killing the Issan envoy Cleemporus and the Roman ambassador 
c Coruncanius, and Rome then invaded Illyria. During this time Agron had died, 
leaving his son Pinnes in the regency of Teuta, and the war was fought with Teuta as 
leader. 124 
Ellington discusses some of the criticisms of Polybius' account. Among other 
things, he does not include details such as the existence of Agron's son Pinnes or of 
the Issan envoy Cleemporus, a name which is attested as coming from Issa, and which 
Appian would have no reason to invent. 125 In both versions nevertheless, the 
Illyrians' piratical activities on the sea and complaints to Rome, whether they came 
from Issa or individuals, had prompted the Romans into sending envoys to investigate. 
Most sources cite the killing of one ambassador or more on the sea as the reason for 
declaring war. 126 Teuta's claim, which Dio presents as a desperate attempt to stave off 
war with Rome, that they were killed lard Aucrn0 v, was indeed accurate. 127 This final 
123 Polyb. 2.8.4 - 10. 
124 Appian M. 7. 
125 Errington (1989) pp86-88. Both Dio 12.49.3 and Zonaras 8.19 feature Pinnes. 
126 Polybius and Appian, cited above; Dio 12 fr49.3-5 and Zonaras 8.19 have multiple ambassadors; 
OrOsius 4.13.2 cites 'legates' being killed. Eutropius 3.4 does not mention causes for the war. 
127 Dio 12.49.5. 
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'piracy' provided a convenient pretext for declaring a full scale war, since the Illyrians' 
recent activites had not been directed at Roman territory, though they had demonstrated 
that they were a powerful force which was threateningly close to Italy. 128 
Although this was the Romans' first foray into the East, it seems that the 
Romans had no interest in controlling Illyria, as suggested by the settlement after the 
Roman victory, which weakened the Illyrians' power, but did not totally destroy it, 
nor did they tax the Illyrians, or place governors or garrisons there. 129 The war was 
declared and concluded in 229B.C. by the commanders and consuls L. Postumius 
Albinus and Cn. Fulvius Centumalus. Territory was given to Demetrius of Pharos to 
control, as a reward for his desertion during the war to the Romans, when he had 
surrendered his command of Corcyra, and Teuta surprisingly was allowed to maintain 
control of 'a few places'. 130 The treaty also contained another significant clause, 
which Polybius says 'affected the Greeks the most', which ordered that Illyrians were 
not to sail south of Lissus with more than two vessels, and these were to be unarmed. 
Since this particular measure in a treaty between Rome and Elyria 'affected the 
Greeks', it strongly suggests the corroboration of the stories that 'unheeded 
complaints' had been made to Rome about Illyrian piracy. It was in fact Demetrius of 
Pharos' piratical trip against Greeks which decided the Romans to begin the 'Second 
Illyrian War' in 219B.C. The Romans had been reluctant to police such banditry 
before the war, and the treaty terms are another indicator of this reluctance. Notably 
however, Centumalus received a triumph. 131 
Prior to the second Illyrian war however, there are brief references to the 
subjugation in Istria of the Histri in 221-220B.C. Some writers call it a war, but 
significantly the campaign barely rates more than a sentence in any account. 132 Appian 
128 Badian (1964) p4-5; Errington (1989) p88. 
129 Badian (1964) pp9-10; Errington (1989) pp89 - 90. 
1 " Pol. 2.12.3-4; Appian 111.7; Errington (1989) pp89-90. 
131 Degrassi (1947) 549-550; Eutropius 3.4. 
132 'Livy Per. 20: "Histri subacti sunt.", (cf. Livy 21.16.4) while it is significantly not mentioned 
in Polynius at all. 
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says that the Istrians were involved in piracy with Demetrius of Pharos, and that after 
the Romans had finished the Gallic War in 222B.C., they 'sailed out and conquered 
the pirates'. Since Appian then goes on to say that the next year they fought with 
Demetrius, the 'pirates' dealt with seem to be the Istrians. 133 Eutropius says that a 
bellum was fought against them, because they had been attacking ships carrying 
grain. 134 Orosius mentions that the consuls of 221B.C. Minucius and Cornelius had 
conquered the Istrian enemies but with the loss of 'much Roman blood', while 
Zonaras adds the detail that they had taken parts of Istria by war, but other areas had 
surrendered. 135 It does not seem to have been a particularly auspicious episode, 
which accounts for the brevity of the references to it. The consuls were not only 
fighting against pirates, but they suffered apparently significant losses, yet were 
victorious in some places without a fight. This perhaps suggests that the Romans had 
underestimated the strength of their pirate opponents, and had been forced to ask for 
reinforcements to prevent a humiliating defeat. 136 There is also the possibility that it 
was not formally a war, and that the consuls had been assigned Istria as a provincia 
after complaints from merchants about the Histrians' piracy and after a brief campaign 
brought it under control, which only the later writers dignify by mistakenly calling a 
war. 137 
The consuls in 219B.C., who were the commanders in the second Illyrian War, 
were more politically astute. The event which triggered the war was a piratical raid by 
Demetrius and Scerdilaidas in 220B.C., which sailed well past Lissus with ninety 
133 App. ///. 8:"61 Se, brei rd Kara, 8t6-40a-ro, dais- pet, emirAfOcravre-s- alpacic roris 
134 Eutropius 3.7: "M. Minucius Rufo P. Cornelio consulibus, Histris bellum inlatum est, quia 
latrocinati navi bus Romanorumfuerant, quae frumenta exhibebant, perdomitique stint omnes." 
135 Orosius 4.3.16: "Deinde Histri novi hostes excitati sunt: quos Cornelius Minuciusque consules 
multo quidem Romanorwn sanguine subegerunt."; Zonaras 8.20, who confuses Ister with Istria; see 
also Dell (1970) pp30 - 38 for a discussion of the war. 
136 Dell (1970) p31 however views the campaign as a 'military success' which furthered Minucius' 
career, since he was master of horse and dictator in 217. 
137 Dell (1970) regards it as a war; Badian (1964) p13 refers to it as a campaign and Errington (1989) 
as an expedition. 
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lembi, and plundered many of the Cyclades. 138 In the intervening years since the first 
war, Demetrius had married Triteuta, the mother of Pinnes and thus in becoming 
regent, became ruler over the Ardiaeans. He had also contributed 1600 men to the 
forces under the Macedonian king Antigonus Doson who fought in the victorious battle 
at Sellasia against Sparta in 222B.C., though this did not directly impinge on Roman 
interests. 139 Demetrius' voyage was seized upon by the Romans as breaking the treaty 
of 228B.C. However it has been pointed out that if Polybius' account, following his 
Roman source Fabius Pictor, is to be believed, Demetrius' actions were foolhardy, if 
not foolish. It might be thought that Demetrius would have seen the Romans' power 
recently demonstrated in Gaul and Istria, and would not provoke it against himself in 
such a blatant manner. He had also seemed to attempt to avoid provocation by not 
attacking any 'friends of Rome' on his plundering voyage. 140  Nevertheless his 
expedition is depicted in the sources as having broken the treaty, and this is no doubt 
how it was argued in the senate. It is explicable then that Polybius' Roman source 
omits Scerdilaidas from the piratical raid, for he did not suffer from the Roman 
reprisals, and this would have reflected adversely on their reasons for initially 
declaring war. 
Errington suggests that as there were no other opportunities in 219 for the 
- 
consuls L. Amilius Paullus and M. Livius Salinator to conduct a military command, 
they exaggerated the seriousness of the raid and the broken treaty conditions. 141 The 
138 Polybius at 3.16 omits any mention of Scerdilaidas, and the forty ships he commanded, leaving 
Demetrius with fifty, but at 4.16.6-9 Scerdilaidas and his ships are included. (Cf. also 4.19.7-9 for 
Demetrius' return.) (Badian (1964) p30n62 notes that 3.16 derives from Roman sources.) Demetrius 
is also said to have attacked cities in Illyria under Roman protection. Appian /II. 8 mentions piracy 
as Demetrius' chief crime. Dio 12.53 and Zonaras 8.20 give Demetrius' plunderings of nearby tribes 
as the first matter which drew the Romans' attention towards him and then his attack on their 'allies' 
drew out the Roman forces. 
139 Polyb. 2.65.4, Errington (1989) p91. 
140 See Badian (1964) pl2ff; Hammond (1968) plOff; Errington (1989) p9lff. 
141 Errington (1989) p93. He also argues convincingly that the Macedonians were not particularly 
strong at this stage, and that if as Polybius says, the Romans acted in the face of fears of growing 
Macedonian power, to remove Demetrius and do little else was a remarkably ineffectual response. 
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subsequent ease of victory in their campaign bears out the notion of exaggeration. 
Demetrius had garrisoned Dimale (as Polybius calls it) or Dimallum, placed his friends 
in power in other cities and then barricaded himself at Pharos. Aemilius Paullus 
(Polybius omits the other consul Livius) arrived at Dimallum, and conquered it after 
only seven days of seige, after which other towns surrendered. The fleet then 
proceeded to Pharos, where Demetrius' forces were manoeuvred into fighting the 
advancing Romans in front and were then attacked from behind them, and were thus 
quickly defeated. 142 The settlement after the war left Elyria in much the same situation 
following the war of 229B.C.; Pharos and Dimallum became friends of Rome, and 
Pinnes remained leader of the Ardiaei. The Romans had not extended any more control 
over Illyria than previously. 143 After this victory, both consuls were given surely 
unmerited triumphs, but consuls who had the ability to persuade the senate of the need 
for war could obviously also argue convincingly for triumphs.I 44 The piracy of 
Demetrius seems to have been the barest pretext for a war, which was sought by 
influential consuls who were also blatant triumph seekers. 
Liguria seems to have become notorious as a hunting-ground for triumph 
hunters. The consuls of 182B.C., L. Aemilius Paullus and Gn. Baebius Tamphilus 
were both assigned to Liguria, where their 'matters were successful', but Livy does 
not supply any further detail about their campaigns, which suggests that they were 
thought to be negligible. This is supported by the fact that they were given the barest 
recognition for their actions, a supplicatio for one day. 145 The Ligurians disbanded 
their army, Baebius Tamphilus returned to Rome for the elections, and Aemilius 
wintered in Pisa with his army, since there was a report that 'Transalpine Gauls' were 
being armed, and it was thought they would enter Italy. 146  In 181B.C. both consuls 
142 Polybius 3.18-19; Hammond (1968) p12-15 for Dimallum not Dimale. 
143 Badian (1964) p17; Hammond (1968) p11-12; Errington (1989) p93-94. 
144 Also noted by Errington (1989) p93. 
145 Livy 40.1.1; 4 legions enrolled for the Ligurian campaign 40.1.5; 40.16.4. See Livy 39.1f; 
Onnerod (1924) p162ff; Harris (1989) pp114-118 for Roman wars in Liguria. 
146 Livy 40.17.6-8. 
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were again assigned the Ligurian province, because the Massilians had complained 
about Ligurian piracy, and Istria was added as a provincia since Tarentum and 
Brundisium had reported piracy from across the sea. 147 The consuls arranged for 
duumviri navales to organize twenty ships to be let down from the slips and crewed 
and to take command of ten ships each, one fleet to patrol as far as Massilia and one 
past Brundisium, to Barium. 148 That such ships needed to be removed from the slips 
demonstrates the manner in which those in Rome left communities to their own 
defences until they were no longer able to curtail the threat. It was also a purely 
defensive manoeuvre since the fleet does not seem to have joined Fabius in operations 
off Istria. However it was not the consuls, but the proconsul Aemilius Paullus who 
took the opportunity to attack the coastal Ligurian Ingauni on land. The campaign 
began disastrously, with the Roman camp being besieged and Aetnilius forced to send 
for reinforcements. The duumvir C. Matienus was directed to sail with his fleet to the 
assistance of Aemilius. 149 Aemilius however decided to attack the Ingauni before the 
reinforcements arrived, broke out and defeated the opposition, whom Livy admits 
were disorganized, with 15000 Ligurians killed and 2300 captured, and 32 ships were 
also taken by Matienus. After this defeat the Ligurians surrendered. 15° Aemilius was 
granted a three-day supplicatio and then a triumph, but his 'war' does not seem to 
have been a particularly auspicious one. Livy may be reliant on a source biased against 
Aemilius, for Plutarch portrays it more favourably, but Aemilius nevertheless seems 
to have been attempting to anticipate the consuls of 181 in any action in Liguria. I51 
The news that Aemilius was besieged is said by Livy to have caused magna trepidatio 
in Rome, since Fabius had started war with the Histtians and his army could not be 
recalled, the consuls were not in their province, and neither had their troops been 
147 Livy 40.18.3--4; Strabo Aemil. 6.3. 
148 Livy 40.18.7-8. 
149 Livy 40.25-26. 
150 Livy 40.27-28.8; Plutarch Aem. 6.1 -7; Frontinus Strat. 3.17.2. 
151 Livy 40.34.7 -8; Elogia C.I.L. 12 .1 pp194 & 198; Degrassi (1947) p554; Veil. Pat. 1.9.3; 
Auct, De Vir, 111, 56.1 Harris (1989) p115 is also sceptical about this war, suggesting that Aemilius 
Funds attacked with the 'reason or pretext being piracy'. 
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levied. It might also be thought that a campaign against pirates might have the fleet 
acting concurrently with the campaign, rather than hastily sent to help. 152 Plutarch 
says that he was hopeful of a second consulship, and it might well be suspected that he 
had wanted to receive a triumph for a victory as a great achievement in his first 
consulship, but since he had only received a supplicatio, took the opportunity to be 
the first to attack the Ingauni on the grounds of piracy while he had proconsular 
imperium in the hope of a triumph. 153 There were triumphs awarded over various 
Ligurian tribes throughout the second century B.C., in 197, 181, 180 (2), 179, 177, 
175 (2), 166 (2), 158, 155, 123, 122 and in 117B.C. That the lightweight nature of 
many of these triumphs was notorious emerges in comments by Cicero, in which he 
prefers to place the significance of a great orator's speech (i.e. Lucius Crassus) higher 
than two 'fortress triumphs' in Liguria. 154 
Little more is known about the Istrian campaign in 181: the praetor in Gaul Q. 
Fabius Buteo is said to have conducted a bellum there since the Istrians were 
'hindering the colony at Aquileia'. 155 The lack of any further detail about Fabius' 
campaign suggests 'nothing memorable' happened, though his imperium was 
prorogued for 180 in Gaul. It was not until 178/177 that a more significant war was 
conducted in Istria. 156 Livy's account says that Apulia was given to the praetor Lucius 
Duronius and that 'Histria was added' because of the complaints of piracy, which 
implies that it was added to Duronius' provincia, (L. Duronio Apulia; et Histri 
adiecti, quod Tarentini Brundisinique nuntiabant maritimos agros infestos 
transmarinarum navium latrociniis esse). 157 However as Sage notes, there is either a 
mistake, or this sentence is misplaced, since Buteo campaigned in Istria, (with no 
mention of province poaching) and Duronius had been in Apulia and later in 180 
152 Livy 40.26. 
153 Plutarch Aem. 6.8. 
154 See Degrassi (1947) p552ff for the triumphs; Cic. Brutus 255 -6. 
155 Livy 40.26.2-3. 
156 Livy 41.1-12. 
157 As MRR 1.384 lists the provinces. 
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returned from Illyria with ten ships, presumably the same ten which had been sent to 
patrol off the coast of Apulia. 158 In fact it might be wondered to what extent piracy 
from Istria caused it to be added as a provincia, or whether it was an excuse for 
repression of the natives near the newly founded colony at Aquileia, since the fleet did 
not sail there, but patrolled off Apulia and only a year later Duronius claimed that 'all 
the maritime banditry' was being caused by Genthius in Illyria. 159 Ormerod argues 
that the Istrians were considered Illyrians, but it seems incongruous that Brundisium 
and Tarentum should complain about 'Illyrian' piracy from Istria when there was an 
Illyrian area much closer to their coasts where pirates were active, and particularly 
since a fleet patrolled opposite that area. 16° 
Illyrian piracy was again the subject of Roman attention in 180B.C. Propraetor 
L. Duronius returned from his province to report that King Gentius in Illyria was 
responsible for 'all the piracy' in the Adriatic sea; that Duronius had sent legates who 
had not been received and that Roman citizens and Latin allies had suffered iniuriae in 
Illyria, and that some citizens were even prisoners. Ambassadors from Gentius at 
Rome excused the king's absence as a result of illness, and the Roman senate 
temporised by sending another praetor, C. Claudius, to investigate. 161 Nothing 
however is known to have resulted from this mission. In 170, after the beginning of 
the Macedonian war under Perseus in 172B.C., Gentius was regarded as 'suspect'. 
Ships were sent to Issa, and a force under Appius Claudius Centho was sent to Illyria 
as a reminder of the Romans' power. 162 Gentius' support however was sought by 
158 Livy 42.1; Sage, Loeb edn, Livy 1938 p58n2. Ormerod (1924) p180n3 similarly on the ten 
ships. 
159 Livy 39.55.4-6; 40.26.2-4 & 34.2-4. 
160 Ormerod (1924) p180-181. He suggests that Gentius in Illyria was 'encouraging' them, but the 
subsequent war with the Istrians was fought against their leader Aepulo (41.11.1), and Gentius would 
no doubt have suffered retribution if the Romans thought he had been supporting them. 
161 Livy 40.42.1-5. Livy 44.30.1-6 follows Polybius at 29.13 in accusing him of constant 
drunkeness, as well as murder and cruelty towards his subjects. 1 
162 Livy 43.9.4-7. It is not certain what operations Claudius carried out, if any, in Illyria, since Livy 
attributes to him a disastrous attempt to retake the town of Uscana, in which he suffered a defeat, 
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Perseus in 169, and after haggling over monetary terms for some time with Perseus, 
Gentius imprisoned two Roman ambassadors in 168. 163 By this act, he entered the 
war and the Romans finally responded in force to a now formal enemy. The praetor L. 
Anicius Gallus defeated some of Gentius' lembi on the coast and then turned to the 
land batt1e. 164 Some cities surrendered to Anicius, and after being beseiged for a short 
time at Scodra, the king surrendered also. The 'Illyrian war' was completed with 
thirty days, and Livy observes that the 'result of the war had been reported at Rome 
before its beginning'. 165 Anicius sent Gentius and his relatives back to Rome a few 
days after the news of the victory; they would feature in his triumph. Gentius had 
escaped Roman retribution for years because his activities were too insignificant, but 
by entering the war, he posed a greater threat. Livy admits that Anicius' triumph in 
167B.0 suffered by comparison to L. Aemilius Paullus' magnificent triumph over 
Perseus and the Macedonians, since Anicius was the lesser general, in nobilitas and 
rank (he was praetor to Aemilius' consul in 168), and Livy says that Gentius could 
not be compared' with Perseus, nor the Illyrians to the Macedonians, nor the amount 
of spoils, but the triumph was not to be scorned as it had its merits. 166 It must be 
wondered if this triumph would have been achieved without war being declared on 
Gentius. After the victory the Romans established loose authority over the area. Livy 
which Livy also later attributes to L. Coelius (Claudius 43.10 & 11.11; 43.21.4; Coelius 43.21.1-3), 
the latter version MRR 1.422 follows. The probability that he did very little is also suggested by 
Livy's comment (below) that the result of the war conducted by Anicius was reported at Rome before 
its beginning. The account of Livy 44.30.10-12 suggests that Claudius intended to begin the war but 
was overruled by Anicius. 
163 Negotiations: Polybius 28.8-9; 29.3-4 & 8; Livy 43.19.13-20.4 & 23.8; Diod. Sic. 30.9; Result: 
Livy 44.23, 27.8-12; Appian Mac. 18; Illy. 9; Plut. Aem. 13.1-3. The Romans had already 
previously tried to make Gentius an ally and failed, with the legate L. Decimus suspected of taking 
bribes, Livy 42.37.2 & 54.8. 
164 Livy 44.30.13-15 says that there were 80 lembi plundering the coast, and his account seems to 
suggest that some surrendered, but there is a lacuna at this point; Appian III. 9 reports also that 
Anicius had captured ships. 
165 Livy 44.30-32; 45.3.1-2; Appian III. 9 says 20 days; Plut. Aem. 13.3; Florus 1.29; Eutrop. 
4.6.4; , Zonaras 9.24. 
166 Livy 45.35ff for the debate over Aemilius' triumph and the descriptions of the triumphs; Polyb. 
30.22; Diod. Sic. 31.8.9-13; Vell. Pat. 1.9.5-6; Appian III. 9; Eutrop. 4.8. Degrassi (1947) p556. 
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reports that 220 Illyrian lembi were given to Corcyra, Apollonia and Epidamnos. 167 
Anicius and a commission of five legati announced in Illyria that the people would be 
free, but their country would be divided into three parts, and that those who were 
already loyal to Rome or had defected to it during the war would be exempt from 
taxes, but otherwise the rest would have to pay half the tax which they formerly paid to 
the Icing. 168 
The subjugation of the Dalmatians in 156-155B.C. is an example of how the 
Romans could justify a war so that it was on their own terms, so that the reasons for it 
appeared worthy, even if the opponent was not. The people on the island of Issa had 
complained several times about the Dalmatians' attacks, and there were also complaints 
about them from the Daorsi tribe. 169 This would have been considered as piracy and 
banditry, which explains the Roman reluctance to respond, but the complaints 
eventually prompted the senate to send a commission to investigate these claims in 
158B.C. The legates were said to have been rudely received, the Dalmatians did not 
listen to the legates or provide them with food or shelter, but confiscated their horses 
and threatened the legates with violence. The senate was annoyed at the treatment of 
its legates, but Polybius says 'other reasons' persuaded them to declare war, reasons 
which are notable for their silence on piracy or banditry or any complaints about them: 
But their chief motive for action was that for several reasons they thought the 
time a suitable one for making war on the Dalmatians. For to begin with they 
had never once set foot in those parts of Illyria since they had expelled Demetrius 
of Pharos, and next they did not at all wish the men of Italy to be utterly undone 
by the long peace, it now being twelve years since the war with Perseus and 
their campaigns in Macedonia. They therefore resolved by undertaking a war 
167 Livy 45.43.10. 
168 Livy 45.17.1&4; 45.26.11-15; Diod. Sic. 31.8.2f. It is not known how the three divisions were 
to be controlled; Derow (1989) pp317-318 suggests that it may have been similar to the Macedonian 
settlement which divided the land into four separate areas, with no intermarriage, ownership of land or 
buildings across the boundaries, though they governed themselves. 
169 Polyb. 32.9. 
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against the Dalmatians both to recreate, as it were, the spirit and zeal of their own 
troops and by striking terror into the Illyrians to compel them to obey their 
orders. These, then, were the reasons why the Romans went to war against the 
Dalmatians, but to the world at large they gave out that they had decided on war 
owing to the insult to their amabassadors. 170 
The consul of 156B.C., Marcius Figulus, was sent against them and after some 
reverses, he eventually besieged the city of Delminium. 171 The consul of 155B.C., P. 
Cornelius Scipio Nasica, then captured and destroyed Delminium and celebrated a 
triumph. 172 
The bind in which those glory seekers who were assigned to control banditry 
were caught is described by Appian. During the war against Viriathus, in 138B.C. the 
consul Decimus Iunius Brutus (later Callaicus) was sent against the many groups of 
'bandits' who were plundering Lusitania in 'imitation' of Viriathus. Iunius is said to 
have considered his task problematic, since it would be difficult to overtake the bandits 
through the country when they were moving swiftly from place to place. It was a 
thankless task, 'a disgrace if he failed, nor illustrious if he conquered.' 173 So in place 
of following the bandits, he attacked the towns with the aims (in Appian's order) of 
revenge, booty for the army and the thought that the bandits would disperse with the 
threat to their homes. He is described as 'laying waste' everything in his path, 
including women fighting with the men. It is hardly a flattering portrayal of the 
beginning of his campaign. He clearly achieved more success than Appian or his 
sources are willing to allow since even the descriptions of his further campaigns are 
not depicted as particularly glorious victories; for example, it is noted that there were 
towns which had surrendered to him and then rebelled, which it was then necessary 
170 Polyb. 32.13 (transl. Derow (1989) pp320-21); Zonaras 9.25. 
171 	• Livy Per. 47; Rona 2.25 says they were known for their latrocinia; App. //y. 11: Obseq. 16. 
172 Livy Per. 47; Strabo 7.5.5; Fasti Triumph. 155; Frontinus Strat. 3.6.2; Obseq. 16: Auct. De 
Vir. 111. 44.4; Ampelius 19.11; Zonaras 9.25. 
173 Appian, Sp. 71: "...alaxpdv oi KaraAa[36vri, ical viicijaavri 7-6 epyov ot Amin-pay...". He 
mistakenly calls him Sextus Iunius Brutus. 
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for him to subdue. 174 However if the beginnings were not auspicious he went on to 
other campaigns, particularly in Callaecia, since he is in other sources atttributed with 
conquering Lusitania and then Callaecia by 136, from which he took his cognomen. 
He then returned to celebrate a triumph over the two areas at some time between 136 
and 133B.C. 175 Appian's account however warns that to 'conquer Lusitania and 
Callaecia' was perhaps not as glorious as it might appear, and that some regarded it 
unfavourably. Appian does not report his triumph, though he seems well informed on 
other details, and perhaps the possible later dating may indicate that the opposition 
created delay. 
In 123B.C. the consul Q. Caecilius Metellus began a campaign against the 
inhabitants of the Balearic Islands, and the sources in this case acknowledge that it was 
caused specifically by the piracy which was being conducted from these islands. 176 
Morgan has demonstrated the validity of Strabo's observation, following his source 
Posidonios, that only a few native islanders were involved in the piracy, which was in 
fact carried out by newcomers, whose influx had resulted in a sudden outbreak of 
piracy from the islands. Morgan suggests that these recent arrivals were refugees from 
the Roman campaigns in Sardinia and Liguria, from 126 and 125B.C. respectively, 
and that the senate's primary reason for this campaign was to prevent support from the 
islands reaching those in the provinces and thus hasten the subjugation of these other 
areas. 177 Metellus does not seem to have faced particularly strong opposition in 
achieving this objective. The sources provide details about the use of the slingshot by 
the islanders, in which they were trained from childhood, but not any major battle. 
When the Roman fleet approached their ships, Metellus had the decks screened with 
hides to provide protection against the slingshot attacks. 178 The pirates are then said to 
174 Appian Sp. 71-73. 
175 For the other sources for Iunius' campaigns, and the dating of his triumph, see MRR1.483ff, 
from 138B.C. 
176 Strabo 3.5.1; Florus 1.43.2; Orosius 5.13.1. Livy Per. 60 does not mention piracy in the brief 
reference to the campaign. 
177 Morgan (1969) esp. pp221-2, 226-9. 
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have fled from close fighting with the Romans to the hills on the islands and had 'to be 
sought out to be conquered'. 179 Orosius reports this was accomplished with 'great 
slaughter' of the inhabitants. 180 Morgan suggests that this may have been enough to 
reach the '5000 dead enemies' limit, since Metellus achieved a triumph, however 
undeserving. 181  Metellus also placed 3000 colonists from Spain on the islands. 182 
The sources do not report a single large engagement on land because there wasn't an 
'engagement' as such, and Metellus would not have reported how he achieved his 
figures. 183 Metellus does not emerge creditably from this campaign. He no doubt 
knew that it was only a small campaign and furthermore, it was against pirates, so he 
made the best of his opportunity, and overran the two islands, not only killing the 
piratical newcomers, but some of the thirty thousand innocent and unprepared 
inhabitants, who are said to have been peaceful, despite their accuracy with the 
sling. 184 m  etellus not only received a triumph for this campaign in 121B.C., he also 
took the cognomen 'Baliaricus'. 185 The repression of the pirates and their few 
islander allies alone would not have been enough to justify a triumph. It was no 
wonder that a bitter source on the Balearic islands told Posidonios that a few 
wrongdoers had caused all to be tarred with the same brush. 186 
The Romans had expanded their loose hegemony over the east. They had not 
only weakened Rhodian power, they had destroyed Carthage in 146, and in the 
succeeding decades they assisted the weakening of other powers which had threatened 
their own interests, such as the Seleucids. 187 Furthermore Attalus III in Pergamum 
178 Strabo 3.5.1; Diod. Sic. 5.18; Florus 1.43.4-5; Morgan (1969) p219f. 
179 Florus 1.43.6. 
180 Orosius 5.13.1. 
181 Morgan (1969) p230. 
182 strabo 3.5. 1; Morgan (1969) p230-1. 
183 Morgan (1969) p230n57. 
184 Diod. Sic. 5.17.2-3 - that they were not generally known for their piracy is evident in the 
comment that they ransomed their women from pirates; Strabo 3.5.1. 
185 See the sources cited above and Cic. De Fin. 5.82; Degrassi (1947) 560; Val. Max. 7.1.1: Pliny 
N.H. 7.142; Auct. De Vir. 111. 61.6. 
186 swab() 3.5.1; for Posidonios' visit to the islands, Morgan (1969) p218-9. 
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had died in 133 and left his property in his will to the Roman people. This did not go 
unchallenged, and the Romans fought a war against Aristonicus until they were 
victorious in 129. This added a significant part of Asia Minor to Roman rule, in 
addition to Macedon and Greece. Roman policy in the east during the second century 
has been called "...aggressive, often treacherous, unpredictable, cruel and 
immorai.,,188 Their policies had led to the situation in which "...all major Hellenistic 
states, whether monarchies or republics, were either eliminated, reduced to the role of 
satellites of Rome, or henceforth entirely negligible... [and] political domination shifted 
to other powers, to the Romans, the Parthians, the Jews." 189 One power which 
emerged with the weakening of the other states in the late second century is significant 
for its role in supporting piracy. About 113B.C., Mithridates VI Eupator 'The Great' 
in Cappadocia by Pontus came to power and established himself as a new force in the 
east the Romans would have to reckon with for the next forty years. 190 
The next significant command against pirates was the first of several against the 
same foe; the infamous Cilician pirates. Ormerod claims that there was in effect a pirate 
war fought against them from 102 to 67B.C. 191 While this is an exaggeration, 
certainly there were several attempts to repress the piracy in the area. Both Strabo and 
Appian note that the geographical features of Cilicia Aspera or Rough Cilicia favoured 
the practice of banditry by land and sea, having little harbours and islands from which 
to attack, high cliffs which provided good defensive advantages for fortresses, 
mountains providing ships' timber, and large plains beyond the mountains which 
could be easily raided. 192 The Cilician mercenary pirates had been hired by the 
usurper Diodotos Tryphon about 145B.C., and he used the base of Coracesium, on 
the coast of Cilicia, in his struggle against the Seleucid king Demetrius 11. 193 Strabo 
187 See Habicht (1989) pp324 - 387, esp. 'The decline of the Seleucids' p356ff. 
188 Habicht (1989) p382. 
189 Habicht (1989) p386. 
1" Hind (1989) p129ff. 
191 Onnerod (1924) p192. 
192 Strabo 14.5.6; Appian Mith. 92. 
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attributes the rise of Cilician piracy from this time, as a result of Diodotos' organization 
of them. There are few other details about their piracy for some years after Diodotos. 
The Romans, Strabo says, were not overly concerned about people outside the 
Taurus. 194 A commission including Scipio Aemilianus was sent on a tour about 
140B.C., inspecting the peoples and cities in the east and they decided that the piracy 
was the fault of the rulers. Strabo declares that the Romans could not be judged 
harshly since they had other concerns closer to them which demanded their 
attention. 195 There is nothing known to have resulted from these tours. In the east as 
in the west, communities organized their own defence systems. An inscription in the 
late second century from Ephesus thanks the Astypalaeans for attacking and rescuing 
captives from pirates who were plundering the shrine of Artemis. 196 
In 102B.0 the Roman senate sent Marcus Antonius, the orator and grandfather 
of the triumvir, against the Cilician pirates. 197 Ormerod suggests that as Strabo claims 
their slave trading was rampant, complaints about the pirates' slave-trading activities 
had become so serious that they warranted repression. Their involvment in the slave 
trade will be discussed further below. 198 There is remarkably little evidence about 
Antonius' activities when praetor in Cilicia in 102. 199 If it was a significant 
expedition, more praise might be expected from the sources. When Cicero was 
prosecuting Verres thirty years later, he chose Servilius Isauricus as an example of an 
193 Snub() 14.5.2; Habicht (1989) p364. 
194 Strabo 14.5.2. 
195 Polybius and Posidonius in Athenaeus VI 105, p273 A; Strabo 14.5.2; Justin 38.8: Diod. Sic., 
33.28b.1 -4; Magie 1950 2.1160n11. Strabo 14.5.6 discussing Cilicia Tracheia notes the Romans' 
practical reasons for preferring that the region be controlled by kings rather than Roman 
administrators: the Roman magistrates were not constantly present, nor did they always have armed 
forces. 
196 1.G. 12.3.171. 
197 See Ferrary (1977) p657n138 for the suggestion there could be a predecessor to Antonius in 
Cilicia, though he acknowledges it is dependent however on uncertain epigraphic dating. 
198 Onnerod (1924) p208-9; Strabo 14.5.2. 
199 See Broughton (1946) pp35-40; Magie (1950) 2.1161n12; Ferrary (1977) pp624 -7 demonstrates 
contra Broughton, that Antonius' command lasted only a year. 
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exemplary successful campaign against pirates, though he admired Antonius for his 
oratory.W° Cicero has only brief references to Antonius' campaigns in Cilicia. He 
once refers to him as the man who 'fought a war (bellum) against the pirates', who 
had proconsular imperium, who visited Athens on the way to Cilicia, and also notes 
that one of his quaestors was C. Norbanus, and his prefect was M. Gratidius, who 
was killed in Cilicia. 2° 1 A Rhodian inscription records the name of another quaestor, 
Aulus Gabinius.202 Another inscription refers to his journey with a fleet through the 
Isthmus of Corinth, and relates that while he continued to Side on the Pamphylian 
coast near Cilicia, the pro praetorian legate Hirrus fitted out the fleet in Athens. 203 
The other literary souces give sparse details. Livy says "M. Antonius, praetor in 
Cilicia pursued the maritime bandits." 2°4 The phrasing 'pursued the pirates' is notable 
as it hardly indicates a crushing victory. Trogus says a war was conducted there by 
Antonius.205 Plutarch notes he received a triumph. 206 However as the references to 
200 See Cicero's De Oratore, for example. 
201 Cic. De imp. Gn. Pomp. 33: "...qui cum praedonibus antea ibi bellum gesserat...": De Orat. 
1.82; 2.3. 2.197-202 for C. Norbanus. M. Gratidius: Cic. Brut. 168; Broughton (1946) pp36n9. See 
Magie (1950) 2.1161n12 who summarises discussion on the nature of his command. It was given to 
Antonius as a military commander over the area, not as a governor of a formal province, and his 
command was essentially a naval operation. 
202 1.G.R.R. 4.1116. See Broughton (1935) p35-40 who argues that Antonius command lasted 
two years, on the grounds that he had two quaestors; Ferrary (1977) pp625-6 argues that Norbanus 
would have thus held two positions concurrently in Dec. 103, as he was tr. pl. in 103. He suggests 
therefore that Norbanus was probably Antonius' quaestor in his consulship. 
203 C.I.L. 1 2 .2.2662 11. 3-6: 'Auspicio <Antoni Marc>i proconsule classis Isthmum traductast 
missaque per pelagus. Ipse iter eire profectus Sidam, classem Hirrus Athenis pro praetore anni e 
tempore constituit...". Broughton (1946) p35f. Sherwin-White (1976) p4-5 argues that this does not 
refer to the Antonius of 102, but to his son who had a command against pirates from 74 - 71; refuted by 
Ferrary (1977) pp640-643. Tacitus Ann. 12.62 refers to a Byzantine embassy who mention their 
help to 'Antonius in the pirate war'. Given that Antonius 'Creticus' did not reach Cilicia, Tacitus 
seems to refer to the Antonius of 102, and this is also suggested by the order in which it is placed. 
Tacitus firstly mentions their help to Antonius, then their offers to Sulfa, Lucullus and Pompey; 
similarly, Ormerod (1924) p226n5. 
204 Livy Per. 68: "M. Antonius praetor in Ciliciam maritimos praedones persecutus est." 
Obsequens 44 boldly asserts that "Piratae in Cilicia a Romanis deleti." 
205 Trogus (Justin) Prolog. 39. 
206 Plutarch Plut. 24.6; Degrassi (1947) 561-2 who dates it to 102. Both Plutarch Lc. and Cicero 
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his campaign are marked by their brevity, it suggests that they were victim to editing 
by the writers in favour of other matters, being included in the category. of 'not worthy 
of mention', since they were not considered particularly memorable battles against 
ignominious pirates. The pirates' lesser status is perhaps also reflected by the fact that 
a praetor and not a consul was sent against them. Livy's summary for example, in 
which Antonius is given one line, focuses on the activities of Marius, and includes 
detail on his battles with the Teutoni, Ambrones, and the Cimbri, giving figures of the 
thousands of enemies slain and the thousands captured. 207 Antonius campaigns have 
perhaps gained more significance than they deserved because they are seen as the first 
in the series of Roman efforts against the later notorious pirates. He did enough to 
ensure that he would receive a triumph, though this may owe more to his political 
acumen and support. He was a successful candidate for the consulship of 99B.C., 
despite the fact as Ferrary comments, the law of 100B.C. on the praetorian provinces 
could be seen as reflecting badly on his magistracy. 208 It might be suspected that 
Antonius' supporters were also instrumental in the vote for his triumph. 209 
At this time a piece of Roman legislation was passed concerning a number of 
matters. The law has been reconstructed from Greek translations on two inscriptions, 
one found at Delphi and one found more recently at Cnidos. Earlier this century the 
Delphic inscription was thought to be the lex Gabinia, then was dubbed the 'Lex de 
piratis persequendis', and the 'piracy law', but the two inscriptions have recently been 
published under a more indicative title, the 'Lex de provinciis praetoriis' and its date 
has been established as belonging to early February 100B.C. 210 As Lintott has 
observed, the law is not major policy, consisting of essentially routine decisions. 21 I It 
De imp. Gn. Pomp. 33 note that ironically Antonius' daughter was later kidnapped by pirates. 
207 Livy Per. 68. 
208 Ferrary (1977) p657. 
209 Broughton (1946) p37n14 notes he did not assume a provincial command during his consulship, 
and is not known to have held one after it; Cic. De Or. 3.10. 
210 Both were published together by Hassall, Crawford and Reynolds (HCR) in 1974 and again 
recently by Crawford, Reynolds, Ferrary and Moreau (Crawford et al.) (1996) p234f, with Latin and 
English translations and a full bibliography relating to the law. 
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nevertheless provides important evidence for provincial administrative procedures and 
in particular Roman policy towards the suppression of piracy. 
Below are the full sections of the inscriptions particularly relevant to the province 
of Cilicia, and Roman measures against piracy. 212  
Delphi Copy Block A is very fragmented. 
Cnidos Copy, Column II 
11. 1-11 [---? it has seemed good?] to the Roman people according to this statute, so 
that to none of the nations may there befall injury or [insult], for [who]ever 9 shall have 
received a charge?, insofar as it shall be possible, to act without wrongful deceit, so 
that the citizens of Rome and the allies and the Latins, likewise those of the nations 
who are friends of the Roman people may sail in safety and obtain their rights. 
The remainder of Cnidos copy Column II, 11. 12-31 is a new clause which concerns 
directions to consuls about sending soldiers to the Macedonian governor, the 
provisioning of these soldiers with corn and contracting for it. 
Cnidos Copy, Column III 11. 1-15 states the prohibition on the provincial governor 
travelling outside his province or marching an army out without the senate's decree, 
except for transit or on a 'state matter', and this also applied to his staff. Lines 16-21 
permit the contribution of taxes to king or kings allied with Rome and lines 22-27 
notes that Lycaonia was the provincia of the governor of Asia. 213 
Cnidos Copy Column III 11. 28-41 
211 Linton (1976) p71. 
212 Crawford etal. (1996) p253ff. 
213 See Crawford et al. (1996) p260f. for the ambiguities contained in these lines regarding the 
holding of the provincia. 
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The senior consul is to send letters to the peoples and states to whom he may think fit, 
to say that the Roman people <will have> care, that the citizens of Rome and the allies 
and the Latins, and those of the foreign nations who are in a relationship of friendship 
with the Roman people, may sail in safety, and that on account of this matter and 
according to this statute they have made Cilicia a praetorian province. And likewise to 
the king holding sway in Cyprus and the king ruling at Alexandria and in Egypt and 
the king ruling at Cyrene and the Icing[s ---1 
Delphi Copy, Block B, 11. 8-27 
11. 8-14 
[--- And likewise] to the king ruling in the island of Cyprus and to the king [ruling at] 
Alexandria and in Egypt [and to the king] ruling at Cyrene and to the kings ruling in 
Syria [who have] a relationship of friendship and alliance [with the Roman people, he 
is to send letters] to the effect that it is right for them both to see that [no] pirate [use as 
a base of operations] their kingdom [or] land or territories [and that no officials or 
garrison commanders whom] they shall appoint harbour the pirates and to see that, 
insofar as [it shall be possible,] the Roman people [have (them as) contributors to the 
safety of all. And these] letters being sent to the kings according to this statute [he is to 
give] to the Rhodian ambassadors [? and he is to see? --- that] whoever has a charge in 
these matters see to [their] safety [according to the (relevant) statutes and] the law. 
11. 14-20 
[And if any other ambassadors] shall be presented and it shall be appropriate, as they 
choose, [in like manner] he is to report the business to the senate and the senate is to be 
consulted, [just as shall seem to him to be according to the public interest] and his own 
good faith. Whatever the senate decree concerning this matter, the magistrates and 
promagistrates [now in office, each of them is to see, as he shall deem it proper,] that it 
be put into effect. The consul, whose business it shall be - or whoever else [shall 
convene the senate] - that he [grant] to the embassies [access to the senate, to the 
ambassadors from the] Rhodian people who may be in Rome he is to grant access to 
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the senate extra ordinem. And he is to see that a decree of the senate be passed [when] 
he has brought them in [according to this statute, whether] it is a statute or a plebiscite; 
and it is to be lawful for him to do this without personal liability. 
11. 20-7 
The praetor [or the proconsul? designated?] to the province of Asia, <to whom> the 
province shall have fallen [in the consulship] of Gaius Marius and Lucius Valerius [is 
to send] letters to the peoples [and states and to] the kings written down above [and] 
likewise [to those to whom] the consul [shall think it proper] to write. [as he shall 
deem it proper,] according to this statute. [And] he is to send a copy [of this] statute to 
the cities and states, to whom [it is appropriate] to send [letters] according to this 
statute. [And he is to see, insofar as] it be possible, that whatever letters he send 
according to this statute, to whomever he send them, that they be delivered according 
to [this] statute, [and that, according to the customs of those] to whom letters may be 
sent according to this statute, the letters, engraved on a bronze tablet, [or if not either 
on a marble slab or even] on a whitened board, be openly [published] in the cities [in a 
sanctuary] or agora, in such a way that people shall be able to read (them) [properly] 
from ground level. [And] he is to write in this way [and in no other way] in order that 
this [may happen] everywhere, [and the others] over whom they may have command 
are to do this (also). And whoever [may have a charge] according to this statute, is to 
see that [this be done.] 
Cnidos Copy, Column IV, 11. 5-30 again refers to the duties of the governor of 
Macedonia, to arrange for the collection of revenue, to be in the province at least sixty 
days, to protect friends and allies of Rome and to establish the boundaries of the 
uectigal of the Chersonese. 
Lines 31-9 states that if a provincial governor of Asia or Macedonia were to abdicate 
his magistracy, he retained his imperium, to punish, to coerce, to administer justice, 
to judge, to appoint iudices and recuperatores, [registrations] of guarantors and 
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securities, emancipations, and immunity from persecution until he returned to Rome. 
Lines 40-2 states that in the event of the abdication of a quaestor or proquaestor from 
Asia or Macedonia, he is to take thought for public moneys.. ..This is where the text 
breaks off, but is thought to be continued in 
Delphi Copy, Block C 
11.4-8 which state that he has the ability to levy fines, and is also immune from 
prosecution until his return to Rome. 
Lines 8-10 state that the present governor of Asia or Macedonia is to give an oath to 
enact his dudes according to this statute. 
Lines 10-15: Other magistrates, except tribunes and governors are to swear to this law. 
Lines 15-19 forbid any action against the statute or not to give oath according to the 
law; lines 19-24 give a fine of 200,000 sesterces as punishment; and lines 24-30 
forbid blocking the prosecution of people under this law. 
Cnidos Copy, Column V 11.1-46 
This lays down procedures for a trial before recuperatores, with provisions for the 
selection of recuperatores and summoning of witnesses, and for fines to be paid if 
guilty, but not in the event of acquittal. 
Much of the discussion on the law has centred on Cnidos copy Col. 11111. 28-41 
for the importance it may have for the date of Roman annexation of Cilicia. 214 The 
general recent consensus is that "...these lines mean no more than that Cilicia is being 
made a praetorian province for the coming year...", which was not a permanent 
arrangement, and in any case had already been arranged previously in 102 for M. 
Antonius.215 
214 See Crawford et a/. (1996) for the bibliography. 
215 Lintott (1976) pp81-2; Crawford et al. (1996) p261-2. See Ferrary (1977) p627 on Cilicia's 
position as a province probably not until after Servilius Vatia's campaigns in the 70's: also 
Liebmann-Frankfort (1969) 447-454; Badian (1964) p161. 
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The law recognises that by making Cilicia a praetorian province again, there was 
still a problem with piracy after the campaigns of M. Antonius. The law also indicates 
that the senate felt some responsibility to extend an element of control in the situation in 
Cilicia, but the fact that there was no governor of Cilicia at the time of the passing of 
the law, as shown by the absence of an oath to be taken on his part, suggests that there 
was not a strong sense of urgency.216 Neither is there a record of there being a praetor 
for the province for that year. After all, as Ferrary notes, it was hardly a new 
problem.217 In the meantime Rome wanted its allies to share some of the burden of 
policing. The senior consul was to send letters to the allied kings in Cyprus, 
Alexandria, Egypt, Cyrene and Syria, not just requesting their help in 'contributing to 
the safety of all', but specifically to ask that they not allow pirates to use their land as a 
base, and to prevent their appointed officials or garrison commanders from 
receiving/harbouring pirates. 218 The law includes Syria in this command. Strabo 
suggests that Syria had been the target of slave-trading pirates, since he says that the 
kings of Cyprus and Egypt were aiding the pirates, and were cooperating in the slave 
trade, as they and also the Rhodians were enemies of Syria. 219 The inclusion of Syria 
with the other areas together in the law suggests that it no more than any other state 
was particularly targeted. The pirates' involvement in slave trading activites in any case 
does not appear as significant at this stage as Strabo suggests. This is indicated in the 
law, which reveals a concern with piracy on the sea, rather than with the numbers of 
people taken from areas on land by pirates to be sold into the slave trade. On the 
Cnidos copy, on columns II at 11.10-1 land III 11. 34-35 an intention to ensure safe 
conduct on the sea is expressed twice, and it specifically states that 'because of this' 
216 Lintott (1976) pp81-82; Crawford et al. (1996) p262. 
217 Feffary (1977) p657, citing Scipio Aemilianus' commission. 
218 Delphi Copy Block B 11. 10-11: "...[pdypara difourelle]nd Kai on A1 A 4' [ —KaL 	CIT,L 
ab]robs• Opovrlaat, 	771s. #aatAelas- atir[tiiv infre] ril[s] xoipas- 4 opiwp tretpartj[s- p178eis- 
6pinfcru go& ol dpxovres. 4 Opotipapxot oOs- K]araa-rtfcrovatv roi,[g] tretparcis-
titroOextdvrat...". 
219' Strabo 14.5.2; Westermann (1955) P65. 
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the decision was taken to make Cilicia a praetorian province. Strabo himself reports 
the pirate tactics of the Lycian Corycaeans, who were accustomed to enter other 
harbours, in order to overhear merchant conversations concerning their cargoes and 
destinations (methods later used by Bulla Felix) and then attack and plunder the ships 
once they had put out to sea. The Corycaeans' spying technique had become so well-
known that they were proverbial for nosiness. 220 Rickman notes that there had been a 
corn shortage in 104B.C., and suggests that Antonius was sent to deal with the pirates 
because they had been interfering with the corn supply for Rome.22 I This further 
suggests that Antonius' expedition was sent to deal with pirate interference with the 
ships on the corn supply routes, rather than their slave-trading. 
The law further suggests that there was at least a notable level of corruption on 
other coastal areas and that officials were paid to look the other way, either by the 
pirates directly, or by the people who were supplying them and buying their booty. 222 
Presumably if the Romans had felt that the kings were more directly involved, their 
reponse would have been stronger against them than sending letters with the Rhodian 
ambassadors who were in Rome at the time, asking them to clean up their coasts.223 
The governor of Asia was also to distribute letters to them and to see to it that the law 
was published. The piracy it seems was essentially emanating from the Cilician area, 
which the Romans acknowledge was their area to police by again making it a 
praetorian province. Antonius however was not replaced immediately, indicating the 
customary Roman upper-class reluctance for policing, though they had attempted to 
reduce the pirates' trading and supply opportunities through a crackdown on their 
associates on the coasts of allied kingdoms. 
Onnerod argues that the rise of Cilician piracy was caused not just by the 
'negligence' of the Roman policing in the east, but by the Romans' tacit acceptance of 
it because it was a source of slaves for the Italian farms, since pirates were acting as 
220 Strabo 14.1.32. 
221 Rickman (1980) p50. 
222 Cf. Strabo 11.2.12; Black Sea pirates supplied with mooring places, etc on the Bosporus. 
223 Crawford et al. (1996) p262. 
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slavers.224 He cites the oft-quoted section from Strabo, who claims that the pirates 
were 'pretending to be slave-dealers' because of the profits offered from this practice, 
using Delos, which was proverbial for its notoriety as a slave-market, and it is in this 
context that the famous statement occurs that ten thousand slaves could be passed 
through the port of Delos in a day. 225 Ormerod argues that "Posing as ordinary 
slavers, they frequented the port of Delos, where we are told that tens of thousands of 
slaves changed masters in a day, the principal purveyors being the pirates and the tax-
farmers."226 However Strabo claims that Delos had the ability to handle ten thousand 
a day, (however exaggerated this may be), not that pirates or slave dealers and 
publicani were providing these numbers by preying on the coastal areas. 227 The 
source which could provide such numbers was warfare, when great numbers of the 
conquered could be enslaved. Piracy has often been cited as a source of slaves and 
there is no doubt that there is evidence of kidnappings and ransom by pirates, though 
less of slave-trading. Finley rightly pointed out that silence on this matter proves little, 
"...Greek and Roman writers and epigraphical texts are as noisy about piracy as they 
are silent about the slave trade...[since piracy] was indiscriminate in its victims, seizing 
Greeks and Italians who fell its way as well as barbarians.". Appian for example does 
not mention the pirates' slave-trading, but says they attacked towns and kidnapped 
wealthy citizens for ransom and artisans, who seem to have been made slaves by the 
Cilicians themselves, who valued their skills. 228 Moreover Finley argues that piracy 
was a factor in the slave supply, but it was not the central method by which slaves 
224 Ormerod (1924) p207. Followed by Westermann (1955) pp65-66; Vogt (1974) p87: Starr (1989)— 
p62; see also Shaw (1984) pp39-40; Pohl (1993) Ch2. 
225 Strabo 14.5.2. 
226 Ormerod (1924) p207; Diod. Sic. 36.3 who quotes Nicomedes of Bithynia as refusing to provide 
men for the Cimbrian wars because so many of his people had been carried off by the tax farmers and 
were now enslaved. See Rostovtzeff (1941) p782-2, who notes Nicomedes himself probably sold off 
his subjects into slavery. 
227 Delos' ability to handle such numbers is also doubted by Westermann (1955) p65. GarIan (1987) 
p10 sounds a similar warning. 
228 Appian Mith. 92 -93, 96. See Dio 77.3 on Bulla's interest also in kidnapping artisans. 
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were supplied: "...even when it was most active piracy could not have been a complete 
explanation..."; the army "...was always a more significant factor in the picture than 
piracy."229 Victorious Roman armies could provide the slave-traders with many more 
captives than pirates. One example alone from the beginning of the first century B.C. 
gives enormous numbers of captives from war. In 102-101B.C. Marius conquered 
the Teutoni and the Ambrones, with ninety thousand captured, and his defeat of the 
Cimbri yielded sixty thousand captives. 230 
As discussed above, around 100B.C. the 'Cilicians' involvement in the slave 
trade at that point was probably to a lesser extent than has been claimed. Later the 
pirates certainly were more widespread and sailing in large numbers, and it is then that 
their dealing in slaves was probably most prominent. There are several examples in 
the sources of people, usually the 'rich and famous', who were kidnapped and held to 
ransom. It provided also a popular literary plot. 231 Caesar's kidnapping and ransom 
in 75/4 is well-known, not least for the poor response of the governor of Asia, M. 
Iunius Iuncus, said to have been more interested in selling the pirates Caesar had 
captured than executing them. Caesar's ransom was raised from nearby Asia Minor. 
The captain of a ship in the fleet which was pursued and then captured by the pirates 
off Sicily in Verres' governorship, who was said to be a homo nob ills from 
Haluntium, was ransomed by the Locrians at public expense. 232 Cicero comments 
229 Finley (1962) pp57-8. Also Harris (1980) p124; Bradley (1987) p43ff. See Finley and Garlan 
(1987) p9ff for the importance of trading in slaves in general as a source. Sherwin-White (1976) pp3- 
4 also suggests that the weakening of powers which had formerly provided fleets for policing greatly 
contributed to the increase in piracy. 
230 Livy Per. 68; cf. Plutarch Marius 21.2; 27.3. 
231 See for example, Apuleius Met. 4.23ff (On Apuleius also see Mackay (1963) 147-152); Plautus 
Miles Glor. 118; Poenulus 897; Rudens 40; Terence Eunuch 114; Statius Thebaid 496-8; 
Pseudo-Quintilian Dec. Min. 257; 311; 342; 343; 373; 388; Dec. Major. 5; 6; 9; Seneca Contr. 1; 
7; 9; (see Petronius' satirical comment on these 'declamation pirates' in general, Satyricon, 1.3; and 
Bonner (1949) p7ff.) In the Greek novels, kidnapping by pirates and bandits is a common theme: see 
Xenophon An Ephesian Tale, Achilles Tatius Leukippe and Kleitophon, and Heliodorus An 
Ethiopian Story, collected in Reardon (1989). For Heliodorus also see Morgan (1982) pp221-265. 
2321 Cie. In Verr. 2.5.90. Cf. Strabo 11.2.12 on the piracy of the Heniochi and their practice of 
kidnapping, and the response of the local rulers, who 'often attacked' the pirates, contrasted with the 
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that the generous were those who 'ransomed captives a praedonibus' at their own 
expense.233 In the early 60's the pirates were even taking captives from the coast of 
Italy. The daughter of M. Antonius the commander in 102 was kidnapped from 
Misenum. Roman legates were taken and held to ransom on their journey to Rome 
returning from other countries. Two praetors in 68B.C., Bellinus and Sextilius, were 
captured together with their retinues and lictors. 234 When Pompey captured Cilicia, 
there were captives there awaiting ransom, some of whom had been there so long that 
they returned home to find they had been given up for dead. 235 Cicero's enemy P. 
Clodius Pulcher was captured by pirates in 67, while he was (probably) prefect in the 
fleet of Marcius Rex in Cilicia. Clodius is said to have been annoyed at Ptolemy in 
Egypt for refusing to ransom him. The lack of a ransom is reported in several sources; 
Appian's account says Ptolemy contributed only two talents, apparently not enough, 
towards Clodius' ransom; Strabo develops the tale, saying the pirates disdainfully 
returned Ptolemy's money since the amount was pitifully small and released him 
without ransom; and Dio reports the pirates are said to have released him through fear 
of Pompey. Cicero of course seizes upon the kidnapping to claim that Clodius was so 
depraved that he had even 'satisfied the lusts' of the Cilician pirates. 236 Though most 
examples of the kidnappings by pirates mention the well-known, Cicero does however 
acknowledge the risk of enslavement in general by sailing with pirates on the sea. 237 
Roman-ruled territories and the poor response of governors. 
233 De Off. 2.56; cf. 2.63 on ransoming slaves. 
234 Antonius' daughter Plutarch Plut. 24.6; Cicero De imp. 33 (liberi); Appian Mith. 93 notes 
there were several upper-class women seized. Praetors and retinue: Cicero De imp.32-33: 53: Appian 
Mith. 93 cites the areas targeted as Brundisium and Etruria; Plutarch Pompey 24.6. 
235 Appian Mith. 96. 
236 Cic. De Harusp. Resp. 42; Crawford (1994) p301 in the commentary on fragment 20 of Cicero's 
speech De aere alieno Milonis, (Schol. Bob. 173.16St.) which also mentions the ransom, suggests 
that in the De Harusp. comment Cicero insinuates that Clodius couldn't obtain a ransom so was 
released after providing sexual favours to the pirates. Strabo 14.6.6; Appian B.C. 2.23; Dio 36.17.2- 
3; 38.30.5; on Clodius' command, MRR 2.148. 
237 Pro leg. Man. 31; See also Cic. In Verr. 2.5.63ff on the captives taken by Verres from the 
pira'tes; in Pro Flacco 31 he claims many were still captured by pirates from Asia even after 
Pompey's campaigns. Laws in the Digest record that it was possible to ransom kidnapped slaves and 
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It has been convincingly argued that Sulla's command as praetor in Cilicia in the 
90's (probably 96) was initially intended to be a command against the pirates, as 
Antonius' had been, but became a campaign to replace the king of Cappadocia on his 
throne, against Mithridates. 238 Magie doubts this attribution, partly because the earlier 
sources such as Livy and Plutarch, do not refer to his activities in Cilicia, only 
Cappadocia, and is sceptical that Plutarch could not find anything about this episode 
worth mentioning, particularly since he possessed Sulla's memoirs as a source. 239 
However, it is far from inexplicable that a commander sent to deal with Cilician pirates 
and then directed by the Senate against an obviously more important and more worthy 
enemy in Cappadocia should play down or ignore this fact when he was able to claim 
the more auspicious deed of placing Ariobarzanes in power in that region, nor that a 
writer should ignore the unmemorable fact that his command was originally in Cilicia, 
particularly since it was against pirates. However the fact that he was sent there, 
though did not campaign in Cilicia, suggests the persistence of piracy. 
Mithridates had retired from Cappadocia, but was far from defeated. 24° He 
advanced again into Cappadocia, while Roman attention had been turned away from 
the east by the Social War, in 91/90, ousting Ariobarzanes and installing Ariarathes, 
and also taking the opportunity to dislodge Nicomedes from the throne of Bithynia, 
and installing his own candidate Socrates. 241 Both exiled kings appealed to Rome for 
support, which sent an investigative commission under M'. Aquillius, who ordered 
Mithridates to withdraw.242 Mithridates acquiesced, and even had Socrates 
even a ship: for the latter: Dig. 14.2.2.3 (Paulus, quoting Servius, Ofilius (Ofellius) and Labeo, 
jurists from the late Republic/early Empire); slaves: Dig. 24.1.28.1 (Paulus); 24.3.21 (Ulpian). 
Crawford (1977)(a) pp121-122 suggests that the sudden fall in slave-trading caused by Pompey's 
campaigns in 67 was responsible for the increase in trading to the Dacian region. 
238 Badian (1964) pp157-178; Ferrary (1977) p627. MRR 2.15f lists the sources for SuHa's 
command. Hind (1994) p142 is still unconvinced as to the dating. 
239 Magie (1950) 1.284. 
240 See Hind (1994) pp129-164 for a recent full discussion of Mithridates, his ambitions and 
campaigns; also Magie (1950) pp199-231. 
241 Appian Mith. 15 & 57. 
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executed.243 The Roman pressure on Nicomedes to then attack Mithridates was a 
provocative move. Mithridates sent an embasy to the commissioners to protest, and 
with the Roman dismissal, sent Ariararthes in to dislodge Ariobarzanes again. A 
second embassy which listed Mithridates' many allies was interpreted as a threat, and 
the commissioner decided upon war in 89B.C. 244 Mithridates however defeated the 
Roman forces with his huge army, said to consist of 250,000 infantry, 40,000 cavalry 
and 400 ships, and replaced the Roman supremacy over Asia Minor with his own. 245 
Sulla was then sent against him. To counter Mithridates' control of the sea, Sulla sent 
his quaestor Lucius Licinius Lucullus to gather a fleet in 87/86B.C., and the 
difficulties he faced demonstrate the extent of Mithridates' power and the menace of the 
pirates. Sulla had asked the Rhodians to supply ships, but they were prevented by 
Mithridates' fleet. Lucullus travelled to Alexandria, Syria, Crete, Cyrene, and Rhodes 
and Pamphylia, not visiting the cities associated with piracy. On his journey to Egypt 
he is said to have been attacked by pirates, and lost most of his ships. Resupplied with 
ships by Ptolemy, at Cyprus he learnt that 'enemy ships' were aware of his movments, 
and were waiting for him, but by setting out unexpectedly from Cyprus and sailing 
with reduced sails during the day, he took the fleet to Rhodes. 246 He refused to help 
Fimbria in his siege of Mithridates at Pitane by blockading Mithridates' retreat by sea. 
The precise reason for this refusal is not known; it may have been a command from 
Sulla, or that he did not wish to allow Sulla's enemy to claim the credit for ending the 
war, or he may have wished to avoid confronting the might of Mithridates' fleet, as he 
had done before. Mithridates escaped to his fleet, and Lucullus proceeded to join Su11a; 
not without skirmishes with enemy ship s. 247 The subsequent terms offered which 
242 Appian Mith. 10f; Justin 38.3. 
243 App. Mith 11; Justin 38.5.8. 
244 Appian Mith. 11-17; Justin 38.3; Memnon 30.3. 
245 Appian Mith. 17; see Hind (1994) p144ff; Magie (1950) 1.210ff. Mithridates failed however to 
overcome Rhodes, Appian Mith. 24-27. 
246 Cicero Acad. 2.11 & 61; Plut. Luc. 2.2-3.3; Appian Mith 33; 51 (Sulla is said to have started 
building ships while waiting for Lucullus) 56; Josephus Ant. 14.114; Auct. De Vir. III. 74.2. 
247 Magie (1950) 1.228; Hind (1994) p160; Plut. Luc. 3.4-4.1; App. Mith. 52; Orosius 6.2.10. 
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Mithridates eventually accepted in 85B.C. included the surrender of seventy ships with 
their crews and equipment. 248 
Appian says that Mithridates had encouraged pirate raids on the coast in his 
initial conquest of Asia. It continued after his defeat and had become more organised, 
so that raiding pirate ships 'resembled fleets'. They were attacking not only ships, but 
harbours, fortresses and cities; Iasus in Caria; the island of Samos, and Claxomene in 
Ionia. Morever they stole from the temple on the island of Samothrace booty said to be 
worth 1000 talents, while Sulla was on the island. 249 With such large raiding parties, 
which probably carried off people as well as booty, it is more likely that it is during 
these years that the rise in slave-trading occurred, and when the city of Side in 
Pamphylia became known as a dock and a slave market for the pirates. 250 Cicero in 
the Verrines implies that Phaselis in Lycia had also relatively recently become a haunt 
for Cilician pirates; he says the pirates traded there, then were in partnership with 4. 251 
This probably occurred under the influence of Zenicetes. Sertorius in 81B.C. is said 
to have captured the Pityussae islands near the coast of Spain with the help of Cilician 
pirates, and they left him in search of more booty by fighting for a claimant to the 
throne of Mauretania. 252 
In the east, L. Licinius Murena left in Asia in 83-82B.C. by Sulla, gathered a 
fleet. for use against the pirates. However he then advanced inland and attacked the 
ruler Moagetes at Cibyra, in Lycia and also took the towns of Bubon and Balbura. 253 
Appian comments that Murena attacked the pirates but achieved little. Murena then 
went on to raid areas in Cappadocia, in a transparent attempt to win a triumph, which 
248 For the terms, see Plut. SuIla 23.5f; Appian Mith. 55 & 58; Licinianus p26f., Livy Per. 83; 
Veil. Pat. 2.23.6; Florus 1.40.12; Memnon 35.2. 
249 Appian Mith. 63; 92. 
2513 Strabo 14.3.2. 
251 Cic. In Verr. 2.4.21. Cf. Strabo's comments on the peaceful Lycians, 14.3.2 and their refusal to 
join the Cilicians in their piracy, 16.2.14. See also Maroti (1968) pp233-38 for discussion on an 
oracle against the pirates sought by the Syedrians in Pamphylia. 
252 ,Plut. Ser. 7-9. 
253 Cic. In Verr. 2.1.89; Strabo 13.4.17; Appian Mith. 64; 93; Auct. De Vir. HI. 74.2. 
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he received, though he is said to have been recalled by Sulla. 254 
The next known governor of Cilicia in 80179, the proconsul Dolabella was more 
interested in increasing his own wealth through extortion of the provincials during his 
command, for which he became notorious, (and Cicero emphasises that Verres was his 
legate at the time), than his military activity. 255 He too disregarded the suppression of 
piracy. Unfortunately the early sources for the campaigns of Servilius Vatia in 78- 
74B.C., the sections of the histories of Sallust and Livy, have been lost, and the 
evidence exists only in the fragments and epitomes of their works, and epitomes by 
later witers. Nevertheless Servilius' campaigns emerge as the first successful attempts 
against the pirates for over twenty years. 256 He was sent in 78B.C. with proconsular 
imperium following his consulship in 79 and collected a fleet for his first campaign, 
against the pirates on the coast. 257 The preparation delayed the beginning of the 
campaign probably until the spring of 77B.C. The pirates' light boats were said to 
have been no match for his fleet and he won a victory over them, though not without 
loss (incruenta).258 He then went on to conquer the Lycian cities of Phaselis, 
Olympus and Corycus. 259 During this he defeated Zenicetes, a man said by Strabo to 
254 Appian Mith. 64-66; 112; Cic. De Imp. Gn. Pomp. 8; Degrassi (1947) p563. See MRR 2.64 
for other mentions of Murena's raids in Cappadocia. 
255 Cic. In Verr. 1.11; 2.1.41-102; 2.2.109; 2.3.177; Asconius 26; 74C; Pseudo-Asconius 194; 
206; 208; 234; 236; 240; 242; 245 Stangl; Schol. Gran. 325; 329; 333 Stangl. See also Magie 
(1950) I.286f. 
256 See Onnerod (1922) pp35-56 for Servilius' campaigns, and Magie (1950) 1.287f; 2.11647f. 
257 Ormerod (1922) pp37-39 suggests that Servilius' active campaigning years were 77 - 75, and in 
74 was succeeded by Octavius, to reconcile the differences between Cicero In Verr. 2.3.211 that 
Servilius command lasted a quinquennium, and Orosius 5.23.22 and Eutropius 6.3 who give him a 
triennium. See also Magie (1950) 2.1167. Suet. Jul. 3 says Julius Caesar 'served under Isauricus 
in Cilicia for a short time', but in which capacity is not known; he is not listed in MRR. On 
learning of Sulla's death in 78 he returned to Rome. Gelzer (1968) p22 suggests it was 'military 
training'. 
258 Florus 1.41.4; obliquely referred to by Strabo 14.3.3. 
259 Cic. De Leg. Agr. 2.50; In Verr. 2.1.21; 2.4.22; Sallust Hist. frr. 1.115-119; 2.63 McGushin 
(= 1.127-132; 2.81 Maurenbrecher (M.)) Strabo 14.5.7; Florus 1.41.5; Orosius 5.23.22; Eutropius 
6.3, Ps.-Asc. 237 Stangl. He also conquered areas in Pamphylia: Cic. De Leg. Agr. (Attaleia) 1.5; 
2.50; Strabo 14.5.7; Eutropius 6.3. Livy Per. 90 erroneously says he achieved success against the 
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have controlled these Lycian cities and many places in Pamphylia. Zenicetes' 
stronghold was on Mt Olympus, near the Lycian Corycus, (not the Cilician city of the 
same name) and when it was captured by Servilius, set fire to his household and 
himself.26° Following these victories, Servilius went inland to Isauria for his next 
campaign. The Isaurians were said to be bandit-like, and this seems again to be a use 
of the customary term for tribal raids. 261 Servilius' invasion of the Isaurians led to the 
conquering of the two main towns, Isaura Vetus and Isaura Nova. 262 He did not 
however actually enter Cilicia Tracheia. The pirate towns on the Cilician coast itself 
were not fought in Servilius' campaigns. 263 It has been suggested that he wanted to 
conquer the new territory of Isauria, since the Isaurians would have had little contact 
with the piracy on the coast. The pride taken in his victories and in conquering the 
new area is demonstrated by his adoption of the cognomen Isauricus. As Syme 
notes, given Cilicia's association with piracy, a commander would hardly want the 
cognomen 'Cilicius' .264 
Servilius is one commander who seems to have deserved his triumph, though 
once again the pirate menace from Cilicia was not dealt with, despite the subjugation of 
their Lycian associates. 265 Magie comments that his victories seem 'more spectacular 
than real', since Isauria had no strategic or economic importance, and that their 
banditry could affect little in any case, as they were not near main trade routes. 266 
'Cilicians'; Veil. Pat. 2.39.2 says he conquered the Cilicians, cf. also Amm. Marc. 14.8.4. 
260 &Tab° 14.5.7. See also Ormerod (1922) p40f; Magie (1950) 2. 1168-9. 
261 Strabo 12.6.2; Sallust 2.67 (= 2.85 M.) See also Minor (1979) pp117 - 127 for discussion of 
Isaurians. 
262 Sallust 2.69 (=2.87 M.); 3.1 (.3.1 M.); Strabo 12.6.2; 14.3.3; Livy Per. 93; Frontinus 3.7.1; 
Florus 1.41.5; Vell. Pat. 2.39.2; Eutropius 6.3; Festus Brev. 1f.; Orosius 5.23.22. See also Syme 
(1987) pp131-134 for Servilius' campaigns. 
263 Onnerod (1922) p42ff Magie (1950) 2.1170; they also note that the sources claim he conquered, 
or subdued 'Cilicia'; in addition to the sources cited above, see Livy Per. 93; Vell. Pat. 2.39.2: Festus 
12.3. 
264 Syme (1987) p138. 
265 Appian Mith. 93 dismisses Servilius' efforts by saying that he achieved no great deed. 
266 mag_ie_ (1950) 1.290-1. 
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Onnerod argues that these victories in Iauria were preparatory to a combined land and 
sea campaign against Cilicia, for which Antonius' command was intended, but were 
delayed by the Mithridatic war. However it has since been pointed out by Sherwin-
White that the sources record that Servilius had opened up the first road through the 
Taurus Mountains, which then linked Pamphylia to the Cappadocian regions and he 
convincingly argues that this had little to do with the suppression of piracy, but instead 
was part of the Roman effort against Mithridates.267 
In early 74B.C. L. Octavius, the governor of Cilicia and successor to Servilius, 
died in office.268 The consul L. Licinius Lucullus, who had earlier collected the fleet 
for SuIla, was among those who were eager to receive the province, not because they 
intended to fight piracy, but because there was an impending third war with 
Mithridates. After some political manoevering, (i.e. by influencing Cethegus' mistress 
Praecia) Lucullus was given the province not only of Cilicia, but of Asia, and later the 
command against Mithridates, since he was still in Rome in late 74, and the war did 
not begin until 73B.C.269 During the war the other consul of 74, M. Aurelius Cotta, 
in his province of Bithynia was given command of a fleet, but in land battle with 
Mithridates' forces, he was soundly defeated and forced to retreat to Chalcedon. 
Mithridates' ships then entered the harbour, burned four of Cotta's ships and took the 
other sixty with them. 27° Later in the war Mithridates sent 50 shipsunder the 
Sertorian general Marius (Appian calls him Varius) to the Aegean, and Mithridates 
sailed with rest of the fleet to Nicomedia, and a storm is said to destroyed many ships 
in both fleets. Lucullus meanwhile had collected a fleet from the cities in Asia, (he is 
267 Ormerod (1924) pp219-20; Sherwin-White (1994) pp232-3; Orosius 5.23.22: Eutropius 6.3; 
Festus Brev. 12. 
268. Sallust Hist. 2.82 (=2.98M.); Plut. Luc. 6.1. 
269 Plut. Luc. 6-7.1; Appian Mith. 70; 72; Cic. Mur. 33; Flacc. 85; Acad. 2.1: Veil. Pat. 
2.33.1; Memnon 37; Sallust Hist. 2.82 (McGushin) (.2.98M.); see McGushin 2.24 & 73-74 for 
frag. 3.8 (= 3.17M.) which he argues refers to Lucullus' machinations to receive the command. For 
the dating, see Sherwin-White (1994) p234: Cic. Pro Clu. 90, 108, 136-7. 
270 Cic. Mur. 33; Sallust Hist. 3.12-13; 4.67.13 (= 3.23-24; 6.69.13M.); Livy Per. 93; CLL. 
1 2 .1, p196; Plut. Luc. 5.1; 6.5; 8.1-3; App. Mith. 71; Memnon 37-39; Eutrop. 6.6.2: Auct. De 
Vir. 111. 74.4; Oros. 6.2.13. 
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said to have refused the offer of a fleet from Rome), and divided some of it between 
two commanders who sailed to attack coastal and inland cities in the Propontis and 
Western Bithynia. Lucullus with the rest of his fleet captured 13 ships nearing 
Lemnos and their commander, a pirate named Isidorus was killed. He then defeated 
Marius' fleet in two battles on Lemnos and near Tenedos, capturing thiry-two 
ships.271 Lucullus then moved his fleet north, and attempted to prevent Mithridates 
entering the Pontus. Mithridates however was able to retreat into the Black Sea, 
where a storm destroyed sixty (Appian) or eighty (Orosius) of his ships and 10,000 
men were lost. Mithridates' own ship was in danger of foundering, so he was 
transferred to a pirate ship, (said to be that of the archipirata Seleucus, though he is 
only identified by Orosius) and was taken safely to the coast. 272 Oi inerod attributes to 
Lucullus 'most of the credit' for Pompey's sucesses against the pirates, because his 
victories over Mithridates at sea "...prepared the way for the subjuation of the 
pirates... "273  Mithridates' fleets however seem to have suffered as much damage 
from storms or more, compared to that caused by Lucullus. Moreover the pirate 
menace was later considered strong enough for the Romans to think it warranted 
assigning a massive campaign by land and sea to Pomepy. 
By 75 the pirates were widespread over the Mediterranean. A speech attributed 
to the consul in 75, Cotta, declares that the shores of the provinces and of Italy were 
beset with 'enemies'. 274 Appian describes their operations as having become more 
271 Nut. Luc. 12.2ff (Florus 1.41.2 mentions a pirate Isodorus who had been plundering the Aegean, 
and then goes on to describe Servilius' operations against the pirates. Ormerod (1924) p206n2 argues 
that Florus somehow implies that Isidorus' activities were before the Mithridatic Wars, but the 
reference to Servilius would seem to indicate otherwise. RE Bd. 9.2.260 no. 4 regards them as the 
same person. Other references to the capture of the ships in Appian Mith. 77, Memnon 42.2.) Other 
refs to the battles off the islands; Cic. Leg. Man. 21; Arch. 21; Appian Mith. 76-77: Eutropius 
6.6.3; Orosius 6.2.20-22. 
272 Cic. Leg. Man. 21; Mur. 33; Arch. 21; Sallust Hist. 3.35-38; 4.67.14McGushin (= 3.52- 
56;4.69.14M.); Livy Per. 95 Plut. Luc. 13.2f; App. Mith 76-78; Memnon 42.2f: Eutropius 6.6.3 
& 8.1-2; Orosius 6.2.22-24; cf. 6.3.2. 
273 Onnerod (1924) p221. 
274 Sall. Hist. 2.44.7 (= 2.47.7M.) (quoted below) 
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organized, with larger ships, no longer making raids like pirates with a few small 
ships, but in ranks of biremes and triremes with pirate leaders who were like 
commanders, and thus they regarded themselves as more like a military organization, 
with 'soldier's pay' instead of pirates' plunder. They were not just carrying out 
plundering raids, but were attacking islands and unfortified towns and if the walls of 
other towns could not be undermined or knocked down, they beseiged and then 
plundered them, taking the wealthy to hold for ransom or artisans to Cilicia to work in 
chains on various tasks, such as shipbuilding, since they were also bringing in timber, 
iron and brass materials. With such success it is not suprising that they saw 
themselves as akin to 'kings, tyrants and great armies'. Appian says there were 'tens 
of thousands' of them, and with retreats or harbors and their own signal fires, all over 
the Mediterranean, their sway reached the Pillars of Hercules, while their headquarters 
were in Cificia Tracheia. Their ships were numbered at 1000. 275 While the figures are 
probably exaggerated, there is no doubt of their prevalence. Plutarch's account lists 
details of the temples plundered round the Aegean at Claros, Didyma, Samothrace, 
Hermione, Epidaurus, the Isthmus, Tarnarum, Clauria, Actium, Leucas, Samos, 
Argos and Lacinium. 276 Cicero asserts that the cities of Samos, Colophon and Cnidus 
were captured, and that the port of Caieta on the coast of Latium was plundered by the 
pirates in front of a praetor. Plutarch comments that the ransoming of captured cites, 
said to be 400, was a 'disgrace to the Roman leaders'. 277 It was not safe to sail in 
winter, not only because of the dangers posed by the inclement weather, but because 
of the pirates, who were now operating in winter also. 278 They must have felt they 
could operate around Italy with impunity, since they were even going along the coastal 
roads of Italy on plundering raids, and Cicero mentions the fear of using the Appian 
275 Appian Mith. 92-93; Plut. Pomp. 24.3-4. 
276 Plut. Pomp. 24. Plutarch identifies the temple of Hera on Samos as the one plundered; it seems 
to have been a popular target; see Cic. In Verr. 2.1.50-52; 61 for Verres"plundering' of the temple of 
Juno on Samos when legate and legatus pro quaestore in Cilicia in 80-79 under Dolabella. 
277 Cic. De imp. 33; Plut. Pomp. 24.4. 
278 Dio 36.22.2; Cic. De imp. 31. 
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Way.279 Their scorn for Roman power is reflected in Plutarch's famous story that 
whenever a captive appealed to the fact that he was a Roman for protection, they would 
mock them by pretending to fear them and beg their forgiveness, kneeling as if 
suppliant, then dress the captive in a toga and boots, and let them go - by lowering a 
ladder over the side of the ship in the midst of the sea and saying that it was time to 
disembark, and would help by force if necessary. 280  Plutarch's imagination presents 
them as extravagantly revelling in their wealth, with ships equipped with instruments, 
'gilt-edged sails, purple hangings, and silver-plated oars', and drinking their way 
along the coasts.281 
By now the pirate menace was so widespread that it was necessary to create a 
command which covered the Mediterranean. This sort of command against pirates, in 
comparison to others, was regarded as conferring gloria upon the holder, and 
therefore became the object of much political competition. M. Antonius, the son of the 
praetor in 102, was given the command in 74B.C., with the support of the consul 
Cotta and Cethegus'factio in the senate. 282 Here too because of the missing sources, 
there is only fragmentary evidence for his campaigns, but Antonius has gained a 
reputation for incompetence. The nature of his imperiurn has been the centre of much 
discussion since the time of Mommsen. 283 This has been caused by passages in Cicero 
in which he refers to Antonius' imperium as infinitum and Velleius Paterculus, who 
states that Pompey's imperium was aequum to that of the proconsuls' in all 
provinces, and that similar power had been given to Antonius: "...Cn. Pompeius ad 
eos opprimendos mitteretur essetque ei imperium aequum in omnibus provinciis cum 
279 Plut. Pomp. 24.6; Cic. De imp. 55. 
280 Plut. Pomp. 24.6-8. As Ormerod (1924) p232 comments, the ancient method of walking the 
plank. 
281 Plut. Pomp. 24.3-4. Braund (1993) p198 notes mimicry of the Roman establishment in this 
behaviour. 
282 Ps. -Asc. 259 Stangl:" Hic es: M. Antonius, qui gratia Cottae consulis et Cethegi factione in 
senatu curationem infinitam nactus totius orae maritimae...". Cf. Plut. Luc. 5.3ff for Cethegus' 
influence at that time. 
283 For more recent discussions, see Jameson (1970) pp539-60 (who argues for maius imperium); 
Maroti (1971) pp259-272; Seager (1979) pp35-36: (argues for aequum imperium). 
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proconsulibus usque ad quinquagesimum miliarium a marl. Quo scito paene totius 
terrarum orbis imperium uni viro deferebatur; sed tamen idem hoc ante septennium in 
M. Antonii praetura decretum erat." 284 The discussion has centred on the nature of 
the imperium of both Antonius and Pompey in relation to that of other provincial 
magistrates in possession of imperium: was it aequum or maius? Those favouring 
the latter argument have cited as support Tacitus' statement that at the time when Cn. 
Corbulo was to fight the Parthians during Nero's reign, all the tetrachs, kings, 
prefects, procurators, and governors of neighbouring provinces were to obey his 
orders and his potestas was 'almost to the level of Pompey's power' during his 
command against the pirates. 285 Firstly, the matter of the imperium infinitum. Maroti 
argues that because it extended to every coast in the Mediterranean, it meant that it was 
"...not limited to the territory of one province." However as Jameson notes, 
Pompey's provincia was very clearly defined in the geographical sense: to the 
Mediterranean and the coasts for a limit of fifty miles inland.286 Thus his imperium 
was limited to his sphere of command, or provincia, be it a massive one, as was that 
of any magistrate. Jameson observes that Cicero's references are all in the context of 
contempt or disparagement, and that it is simply a matter of rhetorical exaggeration. 287 
As discused above, the law concerning praetorian provinces in 100 had restated the 
law that no governor was to leave his province without permission, and note also the 
284 Cic. In Verr. 2.2.8; 2.3.213; for other uses of the imperium infinitum, De Dorrzo 23: 55; cf. 
De Leg. Agr. 2.33 for infinita potestas. Ormerod calls Antonius' command maius imperium 
infinitum; MR R 2.101, an imperium infinitum. Veil. Pat. 2.31.2. Also Ps.-Asc. 202; 259 
Stangl (quoted above); Lactantius, Inst. Div. 1.11.32. The De Domo references are to Piso and 
Gabinius, who in 58B.C. as consuls supported Clodius' bill for Cicero's banishment, and with -
Clodius' help had arranged to receive the provinces of Macedonia for Piso and Syria for Gabinius, so it 
is not surprising that Cicero should sarcastically declare they had 'unbounded' imperium. See MRR 
2.193-4 for Piso and Gabinius' consulships. 
285 Tac. Ann. 15.25: Scribitur tetrarc his ac regibus praefectisque et procuratoribus et qui praetorum 
finitimas provincias regebant, iussis Corbulonis obsequi, in tantum ferme modum aucta potestate, 
quem populu.s Romanus Cn. Pompeio bellum piraticum gesturo dederat. 
286 Maroti (1971) p267 and see also p260 for Mommsen; Jameson (1970) pp544-5. For the ancient 
sources for Pompey's command, see below. 
287 Jameson (1970) pp542-3. 
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furore with which the senate learned that a provincial governor had left his province 
and crossed through another's with his imperium and his army. Governors were 
permitted to retain their imperium until they returned to Rome, and those with 
imperium were not permitted to enter the city gates. Carefully defined limits were 
given to imperium, for use within a specified province. However the commands 
which were given to Antonius and Pompey involved an imperium over a gigantic 
provincia, one which would overlap the provinces of other magistrates, over the 
boundaries of their imperium. Cicero's comments on Antonius occur because of his 
alleged 'oppression' of the Sicilians, in another governor's province: his comment 
imperium infinitum may also imply the sense that the holder's imperium was 
'unlimited' or 'unbounded' by the normal provincal boundaries and the laws 
concerning them. Velleius' statement may be accepted; Pompey's imperium was 
aequum to that of the proconsuls in terms of his 'provincial command', but it was 
maius in reality since it allowed him to pursue his command through other provinces 
also.288 If it had been formally maius then no doubt other sources as well as Velleius 
would have used this term. 
In 74 when M. Antonius was praetor he was appointed to the task of being the 
'guardian of the coasts under Roman rule'. 289 However despite the nature of 
Antonius' imperium, the effectiveness of his command seems to have suffered 
because of the lack of resources. The speech attributed to Cotta recorded in the 
fragments of Sallust's Histories declares that war and the lack of revenue depleted by 
war was responsible for a smaller fleet than the one which formerly protected the 
288 Lintott (1993) pp115-116 notes that Augustus had maius imperium proconsulare, which 
"...specifically permitted him to intervene in provinces of which he was not the appointed governor." 
This imperium maius may have been given to Agrippa: see V. Ehrenberg and A.H.M. Jones, 
Documents illustrating the Reigns of Augustus and Tiberius 2 , Oxford (1975) p167 no. 366; K. 
Chisolm and J. Ferguson, Rome The Augustan Age, Oxford (1981) p94 B57; D.C. Braund, 
Augustus to Nero: A Sourcebook on Roman History, London & Sydney (1985) p42 no. 73. 
289 Sallust Hist. 3.2 (= 3.2M.): "Qui orae maritimae, qua Romanum esset imperium, curator 
<nocent>ior piratis." See also Maroti (1971) pp259-272 on Antonius' command. 
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supply routes. 29° His power to draw on other Roman provinces for supplies was 
resented, probably in particular by the governors of other provinces, provoking 
Cicero's remarks that his requisitioning in Sicily was the result of his imperium 
infiniturn.291 This and his reputation of being overly generous or even careless with 
money helped create the image of Antonius a dissolutissimus largitor who was more 
harmful than the pirates'. 292 Antonius' deputies added to this reputation. Cicero 
reports that a praefectus under Antonius caused iniuria to a wealthy woman at 
Lilybaeum in Sicily named Agonis by taking some of her slave musicians because he 
'wanted to use them in the fleet'. 293 
VeLleius comments that the granting of this command to Antonius had not raised 
the concern Pompey's caused because Antonius' personality or power was neither 
feared nor envied; "Sed interdum persona ut exemplo nocet, ita invidiam auget aut 
levat: in Antonio homines czequo animo passi erant...". 294 
He began his campaign in the western seas, and attacked at a point on the 
Ligurian coast. The narrative of Sallust does not describe an auspicious beginning to 
the campaign. The attack on a narrow harbour entrance allowed the Ligurians' 
weapons to reach the ships, while Antonius' legate Mamercus was having trouble 
pursuing their ships safely on the calm summer ocean, and several days were wasted 
per dubitationem. This ended when the Ligurians apparently withdrew, possibly in 
290 Sall. Hist. 2.44.7 (= 2.47.7M.): "...Macedonia plena hostium est, nec minus Italiae marituma 
et provinciarum, cum interim vectigalia parva et bellis incerta vix partem sumptuum sustinent: ita 
classe, quae commeatus tuebatur, minore quam antea navigamus." 
291 Cic. In Verr. 2.2.8; 2.3.213; 215-216; Ps.-Asc. 259St. goes further, saying that Antonius 
"...Siciliam et provincias wnnes depopulatus est...". Cf. also Dio 36.23.2, for a remark that the 
Romans sent out fleets and commanders who achieved nothing but caused their allies hardship, and 
S/G3 748 for the provisioning from Greece. 
292 Sall. Hist. 3.2 (quoted above) &3 (= 3.2&3 M.); Ps.-Asc. 239. Cicero In Verr. 2.1.60 says 
that the reputation that Antonius did not keep accounts was false: "...narn fecit and 
Plutarch Ant. 1 while admitting that Antonius was not an illustrious man, he was 'kind and 
generous', and gives a story of his generosity in giving away a silver bowl. See Ormerod (1924) 
p223-7; Magie (1950) 1.292-3 for unfavourable accounts of Antonius' command. 
293 Cic. Div. in Caec. 55; Ps.-Asc. 202SL 
294 Vell. Pat. 2.31.2-4. 
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response to a summons from the Terentuni, and the Romans then sailed to Spain. 295 
There the pirates had a base at Dianium. 296 The fragment however only reveals that 
four days later Antonius attacked a town on the coast in the region of the Aresinarii 
tribe, which has been identified as the island town of Emporiae, near the river Dilunus. 
He made a combined land and sea assault in a surprise attack but it appears the locals 
were strongly fortified, and nothing more is known about this attack. 297 
The event for which Antonius is particularly notorious was his attack on the 
pirates operating from Crete. 298 Appian reports that Antonius sent legates to them, 
which received arrogant replies. 299 The leader of the Cretans fighting against Antonius 
is said to have been Lasthenes, a wealthy man from Cnossos who was later demanded 
by the Romans as a hostage with another man Panares, and who later when threatened 
by Metellus, placed his money in his house and set fire to it, then escaped himself. 3°13 
The fragments of Sallust reveal only fragments of disasters: one ship carrying a cohort 
was separated from the rest of the fleet and was 'surrounded' by two pirate boats; 
bodies hanging from prows of ships and a reference to three years of wasted time. 301 
295 Sall. Hist. 3.6 (= 3.5M.) (& see McGushin's commentary, 2.66ff) : "<Ligurum><co>pias 
Antonius ha<ud fa>cile prohibens a <navibus>, quia periaci telu<m pote>rat angusto intr<oitu, 
ne>que Mamercus host<ium navis> in dextera commu<nis> classis aestate qu<ieta> tutior in aperto 
s<eque>batur. iamque diebus al<iquot> per dubitationem <tritis> , cum Ligurum praes<idia 
cessissent> in Alpis,Terentun<orum ac>citu quaestio fac<ta ad> Sertorium perve <hi cum>Antonio 
ceterisque p<lace>ret, navibus in Hispa<niam> maturare. postqua<m vero> in Aresinarios ve<nere 
om>ni copia navium 1<onga>rum, quas reparat<as ha>bebant quaeque no<n> <tempestatibus 
eictae erant>." 
296 Sall. Hist. 1.114 (= 1.124M.), see McGushin, comm. 1.181; 3.69. The port had also been used 
by Sertorius with the pirates. Cic. In Verr. 2.1.87f asserts that Verres sold a fully armed ship he had 
• 
obtained from Miletus to two inhabitants, Lucius Magius and Lucius Fannius, who had recently been 
declared by the senate to be public enemies, and were said to be using it to carry messages from 
Dianium to Sinope (ie Mithridates) in the Black Sea. 
297 Sall. His:. 3.7 (= 3.6M.) and comm. 2.70-72. 
298 Appian Sic. 6.1 says the Cretans were supplying Mithridates with men, and thus they supported 
the pirates and their efforts against Antonius; see also Strabo 10.4.9; Diod. Sic. 40.1.2; Plut. Pomp. 
29.1; /.G.2 II 399 and 844 (=SI.G.3 535) for their piracy. For their connection with Mithridates, 
see also Memnon 48. 
299 Appian Sic. 6.1. 
300 Appian Sic. 6.1-2. 
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Florus relates that Antonius rashly attacked the island carrying 'more fetters than arms' 
on his ships and as a result of his overconfidence, the pirates intercepted ships and 
hung their prisoners' dead bodies from them on display. 3°2 Florus also claims that the 
'Creticum bellum' was due to the Romans' wish to conquer the island, though pirates 
were certainly operating from the island. Antonius may have hoped to conquer the 
island rapidly and gain a triumph, and the cognomen Creticus. 303 However he was 
forced to make a treaty with the pirates and he died before returning to Rome. 344 The 
reception the news of such a treaty would have received at Rome can be well 
imagined. 305 Cicero may have had this episode in mind when he said that no oath 
should be sworn with a pirate. 306 The cognomen Creticus can only have been given 
in derision of his hopes and the ignominous end to them. After a three-year command 
he had achieved little; his campaign barely affected the pirates. However Antonius' 
mistakes or deficiencies as a commander were not entirely responsible, since the 
resources he was given were scarcely on the same scale as Pompey's. 307 
Rome in the late 70's was occupied with other matters more pressing than 
piracy, such as Mithridates, Sertorius and Spartacus. In these years there were several 
famous incidents, attacks, or kidnappings by pirates. Caesar had been kidnapped in 
301 Sall. Hist. 3.74 (= 3.8M.): "Et forte in navigando cohors una grandi phaselo vecta a ceteris 
deerravit, marique placid° a duobus praedonum myoparonibus circumventa." 
302 Florus 1.1.42.1-3; Sall. Hist. 75 & 75 (.3.8 & 9M.). 
303 Plut. Ant. 1.1; Appian Sic. 6.1. 
304 Sall. Hist. 3.76 (= 3.16M.); Diod. Sic. 40.1; Cic. In Verr. 2.3.213; Livy Per. 97; Plut. Ant. 
2.1; Ps.-Asc. 202; 239St. Schol. Bob. 96St. 
305 See Diod. Sic. 40.1-3; Dio 35.fr 111; Appian Sic. 6.1-2 for the aftermath of this treaty. The 
Cretans sent an embassy to Rome; Appian says this was after a declaration of war, but this would 
seem to be too late; the account of Diodorus places it before the declaration. Cic. In Verr. 2.2.76 
notes the war was possible in late 70B.C., and Diod. Sic. 40.1 says they observed the terms of the 
treaty with Antonius for a time before sending their embassy. The Romans rejected any pacific 
overtures and demanded that the Cretans surrender all their pirate ships, return the Roman prisoners, 
gives three hundered hostages, hand over the leaders Lasthenes and Panares, and pay 4000 talents in 
silver. The Cretans refused such exorbitant terms, and in 68 war began with Rome. 
306 Cic. De Off. 3.107. 
307 Also McCushin (1994) pp67 -68. 
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late 75 or early 74B.C. while sailing to Rhodes. Spartacus was to have been taken by 
the pirates to Sicily.308 In 69 Delos was sacked by Athenodorus. 309 There were also 
the pirate attacks on Sicily, well-publicised by Cicero's prosecution of Verres. Among 
Verres' extortionate deeds in his province in his three years as propraetor from 73- 
71B.C., Cicero claims he was also responsible for the weakening of its fleets and thus 
its guard from the pirates. Cicero claims that he was in collusion with them, but 
Sallust is more cautious, suggesting that it could be his neglegentia. 310 In particular 
Cicero says that he had exempted the large town of Messana from providing a ship or 
crew to the fleet, contrary to the terms of a Roman treaty with Messana, and had 
demanded one from Tauromenium, which was exempt. 311 Cicero then gives an 
account of how the fleet expenditure was managed. Each city, not only in Sicily, but 
in every province, usually paid the money to the naval captain, the nauarchos, who 
then accounted for the expenses. Verres, Cicero claims, was the first to change this 
practice by arranging for the money to be given to him, who then appointed his own 
commanders. He also accepted money from cities for the exemption of sailors from 
naval duty, and from sailors for their release. This, Cicero proclaims, was done so 
openly that the pirates were aware of it.312 Sicily still possessed a fleet however, and it 
managed to capture a pirate ship, though Cicero does his best to denigrate the deed. P. 
Caesetius and P. Tadius were patrolling with ten undermanned ships offMegara near 
Syracuse when, Cicero says, they did not so much 'capture' the ship as happen upon it 
when it was overladen with plunder. The ship was taken for Verres' inspection at 
Syracuse, where he confiscated the plunder and captives, treating the 'old and ugly' as 
hostes, but took the young, beautiful or skilled for his own, distributing them to his 
friends, and sending six musicians to a friend in Rome. Then follows the declamation 
308 Plut. Crass. 10.3-4. 
309 Phlegon in Jacoby FGrH 257.12.13, p1164. 
310 Sall. Hist. 4.54 (= 4.53M.): "Suspectusque fuit, incertum vero an per neglegentiam. societatem 
praedarum cum latroni bus composuisse." 
311 Cic. In Verr. 2.5.42-59; cf. also 2.3.13; 2.4.3ff for his activities in Messana. 
312 Cic. In Verr. 2.5.60-62. 
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on Verres' failure to execute the pirate captain. 313 The other episode was more 
threatening. Verres gave the command of a fleet, formerly held by a legate, to 
Cleomenes from Syracuse, in order that, Cicero alleges, Verres could indulge himself 
with Cleomenes' wife on the shore. The fleet consisted of seven ships contributed by 
various towns in Sicily, though again undermanned, and which sailed out from 
Syracuse. Four days later it put in at the promontory of Pachynus for supplies. 
(Cicero has the men half-starved grubbing about for palm roots, while Clemones was 
drinking on the beach.) While there a message was received that the pirate ships were 
in the nearby harbour of Odyssea. It was apparently considered too risky to fight 
them, for Cleomenes directed his ship to the safety of Helorus. His ship was the 
swiftest of the fleet, and left the others behind; Cicero says that not only was it the 
fastest ship, it was the least undermanned. Two ships were overtaken by the pirates 
and captured; the captain of one was held for ransom, and the other captain killed. Of 
the remaining five ships which reached Helorus, Cleomenes' was left afloat while the 
crew escaped to the shore, while the other ships were run up onto the beach. All were 
set alight by the pirates, under the leadership of the archipirata Heracleo. Given the 
fact that there were only four pirate ships, Cicero may be interpreting events to suit his 
argument, since it might be thought that the seven ships would not be daunted by the 
pirates, particularly when as Cicero points out, Cleomenes' ship was a quadrireme, 
which would have towered over the pirates' ships. It may be more probable that the 
ships were proceeding to Helorus after gathering supplies and that the slower ships 
were simply caught, and that Cleomenes, being well ahead, may have been unaware of 
the pirates' presence, and thus left his ship. Cicero notes that it was ironically the fire-
signal of the flaming ships which alerted people to the presence of the pirates. The 
Syracusans armed themselves and awaited the pirates. The pirates, unhindered by any 
fleet, sailed in and around the harbour, brandishing the palm roots found on the 
Sicilian ships, Cicero adds, but they were no doubt aware that the inhabitants of 
313 In Verr. 2.5.63ff. Cf. Verr. 2.1.9f for Verres' behaviour with the property (handsome and 
educated men) of his pupillus when he was killed. 
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Syracuse were forewarned, and since they were only four myoparones, they did not 
attack, though Cicero makes much of the ignominy of their mere presence in the 
harbour. 314 Verres' governorship was hardly exemplary; there is no doubt that he was 
corrupt, but he was probably not actively in league with the pirates, though he had not 
helped defend Sicily from them, and as Cicero frequently notes, his behaviour was no 
better than theirs. As seen previously, policing piracy was not a high priority for many 
provincial governors, and Verres was no exception, enriching himself at the expense 
of the province and its defences, despite the prevalence of the pirates round the 
coastlines of Sicily and Italy at the time. 315 
One of the consuls of 69, Q. Hortensius Hortalus, chose not to take the 
provincial command of Crete, and it was given to the other consul, Q. Caecilius 
Metellus.316 The reports that the pirates were so undaunted by Roman power that they 
had the audacity to enter the Tiber and burn a consular fleet in Ostia, may refer to his 
fleet. 317 The war began in 68B.C. and lasted until 65. Metellus besieged and 
conquered Cydonia, which Appian reports was when he came to terms with the Cretan 
Panares, who surrendered it to him, while Lasthenes escaped to Cnossos. 3 I 8 Metellus 
then conquered other cities in Crete, including Cnossos and Lyctus. 319 He was helped 
by the differing opinions on the island; one group did not want war, and was in favour 
314 Cic. In Verr. 2.5.80ff. 
315 Crawford (1977b) cites the first episode in which Verres took the captives for his own as evidence 
of 'Roman complicity in the slave-trade'. 
316 Dio (Xiph.) 36.1a; Appian Sic. 6.2; Plut. Pomp. 29.1; Schol. Bob. 96St. 
317 Cic. De imp. 33; Dio 36.22.2 adds that this was done in other Italian harbours as well. 
318 Appian Sic. 6.2; Livy Per. 98; 99; Veil. Pat. 2.34.1; Florus 1.42.4-5; Phlegon fr. 12 (= 
FGrH, p1164.). Panares was one of the men originally demanded as a hostage by the Romans 
(Diod. Sic. 40.1.3), but only Lasthenes appears as one of the hostages in Appian. Velleius says that 
the leaders Lasthenes and Panares had collected a force of 24,000 men who for three years fought the 
Romans. Florus' account says that Metellus defeated Lasthenes and Panares. Phlegon only refers to 
the defeat of Lasthenes. It may be that Panares was conquered in the seige of Cydonia, early in the 
war, while Lasthenes carried on with the fighting. Dio 36.19.3 notes that Pompey prevented Metellus 
from having Panares and Lasthenes in his triumph. 
319 •Livy Per. 99; Appian Sic. 6.2; Florus 1.42.4. Cf. also Cic. Pro Flacc. 30; 63;100; Ad Brut. 
1.8; Val. Max. 7.6.ext. 1; Eutrop. 6.11.1; Oros. 6.4.2 for Metellus in Crete. 
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of acquiescing to the Roman demands for hostages, etc, against the opinion of 
Lasthenes and his supporters. 320 No source doubts the success of his campaign, and 
by 66B.C. he had conquered the island, which was to become a Roman province. The 
most famous aspect of his command is the interference in its conduct he received from 
Pompey when he was conducting his sweep of the seas in 67. Some of the Cretan 
towns wanted to surrender to Pompey who was in Pamphylia. Diodorus says that 
some Cretans prior to the war had been in favour of acquiescing to the Roman 
demands for hostages and money, in opposition to Lasthenes and his supporters. 321 It 
was probably these people who contacted Pompey, wanting to escape the ferocity of 
Metellus, noting that it was within his jurisdiction as all parts of the island were within 
the fifty mile limit. 322 Pompey accepted their surrender, and then demonstrated that he 
felt his imperium to be greater than the proconsul Metellus' by writing to Metellus to 
halt the war. Furthermore he sent one of his officers, L. Octavius, to receive the 
towns' surrender and hostages. According to Plutarch, not even Pompey's friends 
approved of Pompey's treatment of Metellus. 323 Metellus' reaction to this was to 
ignore Pompey's command to stop the war, but he did not ignore him altogether, for 
according to Dio, he deliberately attacked those towns which had surrendered to 
Pompey, ignoring their protests. He also paid no heed to Octavius, nor to Pompey's 
commander in Macedonia and Greece, L. Cornelius Sisenna, who travelled to Crete to 
attempt to persuade him otherwise. The reaction to Antonius 'Creticus' merely 
gathering supplies from other provinces was strong, so Metellus' reaction to Pompey's 
interference is not suprising. He went on to attack Eleutheria and Lappa, despite the 
presence of Octavius in the latter town. This provoked Octavius to take over 
command of the army of Sisenna, who had recently died, and to fight on the Cretan 
side with Aristion, occupying Hierapydna, and thus as Plutarch points out. Octavius 
320 Diod. Sic. 40.1.3. 
321 Diod. Sic. 40.1.3. 
322 Cic. De imp. 35; 46; Plut. Pomp. 29; Appian Sic. 6.2; Florus 1.42.6. 
323 Plut. Pomp. 29.1-5; Appian Sic. 6.2; Flows 1.42.6 (who says the envoy was called Antonius); 
Dio 36.17a-19; see also Seager (1979) pp38-9. 
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was seen to be fighting on the side of the pirates. Aristion had previously defeated 
Metellus' forces in Hierapydna led by L. Bassus in a sea battle. This occupation lasted 
until Metellus approached, and they attempted to escape by sea, but were caught by a 
storm and shipwrecked. By this time, Pompey had completed the pirate war, and was 
preparing to sail to Crete, but was given the Mithridatic command, which Dio says, he 
now preferred to the Cretan matters. Metellus completed his subjugation of the island, 
and according to Appian received Lasthenes' surender.324 He received a triumph, 
although it was delayed, no doubt by Pompey's supporters, until 62 and he took the 
name Creticus from this war. 325 
Pompey however dealt with the majority of the pirates. The speech Sallust 
attributes to Cotta in 75B.C. had alluded to the difficulties at that time in protecting 
corn shipments, and other sources report that the pirates were causing a serious 
problem. Appian describes the Romans as being pressed by famine'. 326 Livy's 
summary of these events begins with the statement that Pompey was given the 
command to 'pursue the pirates who had cut the grain trade', which implies that the 
shortages in Rome were a significant factor, rather than the problems pirates were 
causing elsewhere.327 On the day Pompey's appointment for the war was announced, 
grain prices dropped in Rome. Significantly, his first move according to Cicero when 
he was commander was to visit Sicily, Africa and Sardinia to establish troops and 
fleets there to protect the corn suppliers. 328 
The proposal for Pompey's command raised a massive outcry from the senate 
because of its sheer magnitude. 329 Moreover, unlike normal provinces, no lot was 
324 Livy Per. 99; Plut. Pomp. 29.1-5; Vell. Pat. 2.44.2; Appian Sic. 6.2; Florus 1.42.6: Dio 
36.17a-19; 45. 
325 Cic. In Pis. 58; Degrassi (1947) p566; Sallust Cat. 30-3-4; Vell. Pat. 2.34.2; 40.5; Florus 
1.42.6; 2.13.9; Appian Sic. 6.2; Dio 36.17a; 19.3; Asc. 15; 63C; Schol. Bob. 96S t. Eutropius 
6.11& 16. 
326 Appian Mith. 91; 93; Dio 36.23.1. See also Rickman (1980) pp50-51. 
327 Lviy Per. 99. Plutarch's account (Pomp. 25.1) of the reasoning is similar. 
328 Cic. De imp. 34; 44; Plut. Pomp. 26.2. 
329 For Pompey's command see also Jameson (1971) pp539-560; Seager (1979) pp30-39; for the 
distribution of his forces Onnerod (1923) pp46-51. 
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drawn for it as it was clearly intended for one man, the successful general Pompey, 
and was proposed by his ally, the tribune Aulus Gabinius. 330 Gabinius asked that 
there be a commander chosen from the former consuls, who would be appointed to 
this command with proconsular imperium against the pirates for three years, and who 
would have the ability to choose fifteen legates with praetorian imperium from the 
senate for the different areas, to have two hundered ships, to levy soldiers and sailors, 
to be empowered to draw from the treasury at Rome and publicani in the provinces 
'as he wished', and the provincia for this commander's imperium was to cover the 
whole of the Mediterranean, from the Pillars of Hercules to the east and furthermore 
fifty miles inland from the islands and coasts. 331 Lessons had been learnt from the 
example of Antonius and there were going to be abundant resources this time; Pompey 
had no intention of becoming a laughingstock. Complying with the ethos of the 
appearance of modesty, not to covet a command openly, Gabinius did not name 
Pompey, in order to allow the crowd to demand that he be appointed. Pompey could 
then 'reluctantly' accept, after making a speech initially 'declining the command'. He 
no doubt hoped that this performance would demonstrate to the senate that popular 
demand was the impetus behind the request for such a command. 332 
Senators reacted to the proposal to give a man who was moreover a privatus the 
largest command in the Roman world with strong opposition. Never before had a 
pirate command generated such feeling. Such a large provincia combined with the 
enormous powers to gather money, equipment and forces for one man was 
threatening, and they feared the consequences for the respublica in its imbalance. 
Plutarch describes the law as proposing a 'monarchy' and a power that was 
cfmnrc-Ouvor, absolute or irresponsible. Velleius explains that it was not considered 
330 Cic. De imp. 52; 57-58; Veil. Pat. 2.31.2; Plutarch Pomp. 25.2: "la':limos-, els-
Ilopmgou crmfOcup..."; Dio 36.23.4; Seager (1979) p33. 
331 nut. Pomp.25; Dio 36.23.4; 34.3; 36a; 37.1; Veil. Pat. 2.31.2; Appian Mith. 94; Zonaras 
10.3. Jameson (1970) p544 notes the discrepancies between the sources over the precise figures. 
332 Cic. De imp. 44; Dio 36.23.5-24.1. His desire for the command; Sall. list. 5.9: Dio 36.24.5- 
26; Seager (1979) pp33-4. 
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safe to bestow extraordinary commands on men who might retain them or put them 
aside at will.333 Feelings on both sides were running high; the senate almost lynched 
Gabinius, and the consul Piso barely survived the crowd's retaliatory attack on the 
senate. 334 However in spite of the violence, the attempts to obtain a tribunician veto 
and the reasonable speech from Catulus outlining the dangers of such a position being 
appointed, the lex Gabinia was passed. 335 Letters were written to every king, ruler, 
people or city to ask for their cooperation with Pompey in all matters. 336 The supplies 
given to Pomepy actually exceeded the original specifications. Plutarch says Pompey 
was able to ensure that he was provided with 120,000 men, 5000 cavalry, and 500 
ships, two quaestors and he gave 24 legates praetorian power. Appian adds that he 
was also given 6000 talents. 337 Pompey intended to carry out a proper suppression 
against the pirates this time; the ignominy if he had not would have ended his career. 
Pompey with methodical organization allocated his resources under thirteen 
propraetorian legates throughout the Mediterranean to the Hellespont and the Black 
Sea, with a number of ships each. 338 Pompey had 60 ships and intended to attack 
Cilicia himself and Florus comments "Sic Cilix dignus victoria Pompei visus 
est... ".339 The campaign began as Antonius' had done, in the western seas, after he 
had secured the corn suppliers' defenses. 34° The tactics were overwhelmingly 
successful, and the western half was considered cleared in forty days. Pompey was 
forced to make a detour to Rome to deal with the obstructions being caused by the 
333 Plut. Pomp. 25.2; Veil. Pat. 2.31.4. 
334 Dio 36.24.1-3; Seager (1979) pp33-34. 
335 Cic. De imp. 59; Cic. Phil. 11.18; Asc. 71; 72C; Schol. Bob. 98St.; Sall. Hist. 5.20 (=- 
5.24M.) and also 5.18 (= 5.22M.); Plut. Pomp. 25.3-7 (Caesar was the only senator not to oppose 
it, in order to win popular support); Dio 36.30-36a; Veil. Pat. 2.32.1 -2; Val. Max. 8.15.9: Seager 
(1979) pp34-5. 
336 Appian Mith. 94. 
337 Plut. Pomp. 26; Appian Mith. 94 adds one more legate and reduces the cavalry to 4000, and the 
navy to 270; also Seager (1979) p35. 
338 Plut. Pomp. 27; Appian Mith. 95; Florus 1.41.7-11; Ormerod (1923) p46ff. 
339 Florus 1.41.7 & 12; Plut. Pomp. 26.3. 
340 Cic. De imp. 34. 
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consul Piso, who was discharging men Pompey had recruited but this was quickly 
resolved, without Gabinius resorting to the law to deprive Piso of his consulship. 341 
Pompey then departed for the eastern seas from Brundisium, and after brief visits to 
Athens and Rhodes, sailed for the final effort against Cilicia. 342 The pirates had 
withdrawn into defensive positions in Cilicia, and engaged Pompey in a sea battle off 
the promontory of Coracesium. Pompey defeated them on the sea and after a short 
land campaign, the cities surrendered one after another, caught unprepared by the 
rapidity of the progress of his campaign. 343 Cicero says that within forty-nine days of 
setting out from Brundisium, he had conquered Cilicia. 344 There were said to be over 
eight hundred ships captured, 20,000 prisoners taken and about 120 towns and supply 
points and forts captured. 345 From the Cilicians arms, ships, vessels on the slips 
being prepared and quantities of building materials were confiscated, and the timber 
was burnt. 346 
Pompey's humanity towards captured pirates also contributed to his sucesses, 
as more were prepared to surrender quickly in return for being spared. This however 
did not mean all were treated in this manner. Plutarch notes that with the help of those 
spared, others were sought out and 'punished' by Pompey. Appian records that ten 
thousand pirates were killed. Pompey not only spared many, but he resettled them in 
various towns and areas. Many were settled at the city of Soli in Cilicia which had 
been attacked and devastated by Tigranes, and it was renamed Pompeiopolis. Other 
341 Hut. Pomp. 27; Dio 36.37.2; Seager (1979) p37. 
342 Athens: Plut. Pomp. 27.3; Rhodes: Strabo 11.1.5; cf. Florus 1.41.8 for the Rhodian contingent 
in the fleet. 
343 Plut. Pomp. 28; Appian Mith. 98; Livy Per. 99; Dio 36.37; Florus 1.42.12f; Strabo 11.1.6; 
14.3.3 & 5.2; Pliny N.H. 7.93; Eutropius 6.12.1-2; Auct. De Vir. III. 77.5; cf. Lucan Phars. 
1.121ff; 2.576-579; 8.24-27. See SJ.G.3 749A&B for Pompey's acclamation as imperator. 
344 Cic. De imp. 35. 
345 Appian Mith. 117; at 96 he says that 71 ships were captured and 306 surrendered; Plutarch 
Pomp. 28.2-3 says 90 ships with brass beaks were taken; at 45 he cites the figures from Pompey's 
triumphal signs: 800 pirate ships (also Zonaras 10.5); Strabo 14.3.3 claims 1300 boats were burned; 
Pliny N.H. 7.93 cites 846 ships captured, cf. 7.97-98; Diod. Sic. 40.4. 
346 Appian Mith. 96. 
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places in Cilicia to receive settlers were Mallus, Epiphaneia and Adana, and even 
Greece at Dyme in Achaea. 347 Such measures the sources describe as a sign of 
Pompey's humanity and wisdom. Plutarch waxes philosophical, avowing that it 
would allow violent men to be made gentle by agriculture. 348 Appian comments that 
those who had committed piracy through poverty and not 'depravity' were resettled, 
and Dio also notes that it would prevent poverty provoking such acts again. 349 This 
was indeed a humane move and an unusual one; the expected proceedure would have 
been to sell the captives into slavery. 350 It is not surprising that it was not without 
criticism at the time. 351 There may however have been another motive. Pompey was 
highly ambitious. He was not beyond interfering with Metellus' command in Crete, 
was eager to accept the responsibility for Cretans' surrender, and even deprived his 
rival triumphator of his captive leaders. 352 He may well have wanted to appear to 
have great dementia and wisdom, in professing to want to prevent such piracy 
occurring again. It was not without personal motive however. Such a move would 
not only make him appear magnanimous, it would give him enormous patronage over 
these resettled areas. Seager notes that he had during his time in Spain established 
influential links with clientelae by his beneficia.353 To have friendly towns in Cilicia 
347 Cic. De imp. 35; Livy Per. 99; Appian Mith. 96; 115; Plut. Pomp. 27.4-28; Vell. Pat. 
2.32.4-6; Florus 1.41.13-15; Dio 36.37.4-6; Strabo 8.7.5; 14.3.3 & 5.8. Servius In Verg. Georg. 
127 (cf. Prob.) says that the Virgilian reference to an 'old man of Corycian' peacefully tending the 
poetically idyllic land in Tarentum is one of the Cilician pirates Pompey settled on 'Calabrian lands'. 
It seems improbable that Pompey would settle Cilician pirates in Calabria; if based on a real figure, it 
may be that the man may have moved from Dyme in Achaea to Italy. 
348 Plut. Pomp. 28.3-4. 
349 Appian Mith. 96; Dio 36.37.5-6. 
3513 The sources' benevolent opinions have been followed by others, for example Magie (1950) 1.300; 
Seager (1979) pp37-38. 
351 Plut. Pomp. 29.1; Veil. Pat. 1.32.6; reflected in Lucan 1.346: "An menus fient piratae, Magne, 
colonir. 
352 Compare with his poaching of Crassus' triumph over Spartacus, Plut. Pomp. 21: Crassus 11; 
Seager (1979) p22. 
353 Caesar B.C. 1.29.3; 2.18.7: "Caesar...tamen constituerat nullam partem belli in Hispaniis 
relinquere, quod magna esse Pompei beneficia et magnas clientelas in citeriore provincia sciebat." 
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would also be a benefit in the impending final war with Mithridates. He also took the 
opportunity to establish his patronage over vast areas in the east in his settlements after 
the war with Mithridates.354 His resettlement of the pirates then may be seen less as a 
humane gesture, or an attempt to 'control violent men by fixing them in settled 
communities' (Appian records that thousands were killed in any case) than as a 
consistent part of his efforts to increase his sphere of patronage. 355 In fact such a 
resettlement of pirates would have to be portrayed as a more noble gesture in 
justification of it, given the prevailing attitudes towards pirates and bandits, and 
bearing in mind the outraged reaction of Caesar to the inclination of the governor 
Iunius Iuncus to sell the pirates who kidnapped Caesar, and the anger of the Sicilians 
and Cicero that Verres should spare a pirate captain. Pompey's humanity towards the 
conquered was also demonstrated by the fact that the majority of the prisoners who 
appeared in his triumphal procession were not executed following the parade through 
the streets, but were instead released. Such a move also increased his power as a 
patron. For example, King Tigranes, who had surrendered to Pompey, was permitted 
to keep control of Armenia, but his relatives were included in the triumphal procession. 
Pompey is said to have made it clear to Tigranes that he was worth more to Pompey as 
an ally than as a triumphal prisoner, thus establishing Tigranes' debt to Pompey. This 
message was also reinforced by the execution of Tigranes' son, the younger Tigranes, 
following his appearance in Pompey's triumph, and whose ambitions for his father's 
throne had been foiled by Pompey. 356 Moreover as a conqueror who had at that time 
achieved overwhelming victories over wide territories, Pompey could thus appear 
nobly magnanimous to the Roman people in this demonstration of dementia towards - 
vanquished enemies. 
This is not to undermine the magnificence of Pompey's achievements. In three 
months he had subdued the pirates who had been rampant over the Mediterranean for 
354 See Seager (1979) pp52-55. 
355 Shaw (1984) p28n70. 
356 'Plut. Pomp. 45.4; Comparison of Agesilaus and Pompey, 3.2; Appian Mith. 117; Seager 
(1979) pp49-50. 
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many years, and by virtue of the enormous range of his command, his imperium, his 
resources, military organization and rapid and overwhelming success it became the 
single most famous pirate command in Roman history. He was able to identify the 
organization needed for such an enormous task and carry it out highly successfully. 
Pompey could not, of course, rid the Mediterranean permanently of pirates, any more 
than anyone could prevent crime from happening again. 357 He did however reduce it 
to a manageable level. Cicero claimed in 66 that there were no pirate ships "...intra 
Oceani ostiunz...". 358 But Pompey himself acknowledged that he had not completely 
eradicated piracy even after his command. Cicero reports that on Pompey's 
suggestion in 62B.C., the senate decided "...ut classis in Italia navigaret.". The 
necessity for a fleet demonstrates the need to protect against the presence of piracy. 35 
Cicero says that in that year the senate spent 4,300,000 sesterces for the protection of 
the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian seas, and in 61B.C. money was also spent on a fleet. 
Moreover he states that equites were placed along the ora maritima. 360 Little 
however is known about measures around Italy after these years, and it may indicate a 
drop in the level of effort due to the customary disinterest in policing. 361 Pompey also 
arranged for a fleet to be levied from Asia. 362 
Cicero himself had to admit, and even argue, that pirate ships were still present. 
He defended L. Valerius Flaccus in 59B.C. on a charge of extortion while propraetor 
in his province of Asia in 62, a charge which included raising money for a fleet and not 
spending it all on the vessels. While praising Pompey, Cicero admits that he could 
not be held responsible for the appearance of a little pirate boat. 363 He could also cite 
357 Despite the extravagant claim in Florus 1.41.15; cf. Strabo 14.3.2. 
358 Cic. De imp. 34; cf. Strabo 3.2.5 and Braund (1993) p201. 
359 Similarly, Braund (1993) pp206-7 on assertions that piracy had disappeared during the first two 
centuries of the principate. 
360 Cic. Pro Flacc. 30. Gelzer (1968) p65 asserts the Mediterranean had been swept clear of the 
pirate plague" by Pompey. 
361 Starr (1960) p4 suggests the fleet was placed on the slips. 
362 Cic. Pro Flacc. 29 & 32. 
363 Cic. Pro Flacc. 28-29. 
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as an example of the need for the protection of a fleet the capture of 'many people' by 
pirates in Asia and the death of Atyanas of Adramyttium, an Olympic victor, in a pirate 
attack.364 Cicero however notes a weakness in his argument is that his brother, Q. 
Tullius Cicero, proconsul of Asia from 61 to 59, had not levied any money for rowers 
for a fleet, thus indicating that his client may have exaggerated the need for the fleet. 
Cicero however justified Flaccus' behaviour and he was acquitted. 365 There was 
however a resurgence of piracy from the people in Dyme. After being driven off their 
land during the civil war, it seems the pirates. had resorted to their former trade. Cicero 
comments in 44B.C. that it was easier to avoid the soldiers rather than the pirates at 
sea.366 
It has been thought that the report in Dio that Gabinius when in his province of 
Syria from 57 - 55B.C. as proconsul treated Syria badly, 'like the groups of bandits 
flourishing then', is a reference to continuing piracy on the coasts of Syria. 367 
However this seems to refer rather to internal unrest, which was resulting in banditry 
in Syria, than to piracy on the coast. Cicero in his criticism of his foe Gabinius does 
not take the opportunity to castigate him for the neglect of the coasts, but for the 
latrocinia, murders and so forth, which he alleges were happening in the province, 
and his treatment of the publicani in Syria. 368 Moreover Cicero notes that Gabinius, 
defending a charge of maiestas, in his argument that his invasion of Egypt by land and 
sea to restore Ptolemy Auletes to the throne was justified in the interest of the state, 
claimed that he feared the fleet of Archelaus, "...because he thought the sea would be 
364 Cic. Pro Flacc. 31. 
365 Cic. Pro. Flacc. 33. 
366 Cic. Ad Au. 16.1.3 and 16.2.4. Shackleton-Bailey (1967) p281 suggests that they had been 
dispossessed by Caesar. 
367 Dio 39.56.1: "6 rafltmos- nuAAd taw Kal 7-41.■ Zuplau eKthaaarv, tiare Kai /3 A T-1/ -7,7071K61/, 6 
Kal T6T 	Kmaer...". Also 39.56.5 & 39.59.2 in which Aricrrifc is also used; the latter reference 
contains the complaints of the Syrians about them, and the assertion that the publicani were having 
difficulty collecting taxes because of their presence; Onnerod (1924) p249; Seager (1979) p39: also 
MR1t 2.203 & 218. 
368 Cic. Prov. Cons. 9-13. 
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filled with pirates." 369 This is a pretext to justify his invasion; he argued that the fleet, 
unlike the army, was permitted to cross the borders of provinces, and that he had 
therefore not broken the law.37° Sherwin-White observes that Gabinius had spent 
considerable time suppressing revolts in Judea during his period as governor. 371 
Josephus, who praises Gabinius' performance as a governor, does not mention piracy, 
but notes that Gabinius found Syria in disorder after his return from Egypt, as a result 
of the second of these rebellions, which he also suppressed. 372 The 'banditry' in the 
province was probably the result of such unrest. This also accounts for the 
complaints of the publicani in Dio that as a result of the banditry they were unable to 
collect taxes. Widespread rebellions and banditry would affect their collections over 
the province in this way, whereas it seems unlikely that pirate raids on the coast would 
have the same effect.373 Cicero also would surely have mentioned this, but he only 
criticises Gabinius' relations with the publicani, which as Sherwin-White observes, 
were the result of Gabinius' control of the tax arrangements in Syria, which did not 
always favour the publicani.374 Thus it seems that the references to Aucrrai. in Dio 
have simply been misinterpreted as referring to piracy. 
Sextus Pompeius and his supporters were characterised in the sources as 
pirates. 375 History was 'written' by his conqueror Octavian, and since Sextus gained 
control of the sea, and lost the war in 35B.C., he is depicted as a pirate, just as Cicero 
called his political enemies bandits or pirates. If Pompeius had been acting on land, 
Augustus, as he later became, no doubt would have claimed that he had 'cleared the 
369 Cic. Rab. Post. 20. See In Pis. 50 for Cicero's criticism of Gabinius for crossing borders with 
his army without permission; see also Sherwin-White (1984) pp277-8. 
370 Sherwin-White (1984) p278 notes the weakness of this argument. 
371 Sherwin-White (1994) pp272-3. 
372 Josephus Ant. 100-104; (= B.J. 176-187); see also Sherwin-White (1994) 271-273 for a 
favourable account of Gabinius' proconsulship. 
373 Cic. Prov. Cons. 11 says the publicani suffered from the praedo Gabinius. 
374 Sherwin-White (1984) p276. 
375 e.g. Livy fr. 128; Strabo 5.4.4; Plut. Ant. 32; Florus 2.18.2; Appian B.C. 4.83ff; Dio 48.17ff; 
(cf. the decree that no senators could be tried for 'piracy', 49.43.5.); Vell. Pat. 2.73.3; Lucan Phars. 
6.422. 
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land of bandits'.376 The task of blackening his name was made easier by Pompeius' 
tactics, which included raiding the coast of Italy and controlling the grain supply, 
which would have revived the memories of a hungry public of the pirates at their 
worst. 377 Such labels were however political propoganda. 378 
After defeating Sextus Pompey, Octavian began a custom which was the 
forerunner to that which would be followed by Roman emperors throughout the 
centuries. He delegated the task of suppressing the banditry which was rampant 
throughout Italy and even Rome in the wake of the recent wars to a subordinate, in this 
case Calvisius Sabinus, while he went off to Illy-ria and Dalmatia to fight a war from 
35 to 33B.C. Prior to the civil war Julius Caesar had sent a force over in reposnse to 
a complaint from the Liburnians about the Dalamatians and other Illyrians, but this 
detachment was destroyed. The Illyrians had also taken the opportunity to attack and 
destroy an army under Gabinius in late 48, and had attacked Vatinius in 44B.C. There 
is also a claim that they were raiding Italy during the civil wars, perhaps taking the 
opportunity offered by the disorder in Italy. 379 There was however little justification 
for the war; Dio specifically states that the Illyrians had not provoked it, and that 
Octvian wanted to give his troops experience against a weaker foe. 38° Essentially his 
reasons were to win greater glory on his part and give his troops experience for the 
forthcoming conflict with Antony. Gruen observes that it was also part of a strategy to 
improve his military reputation and to contrast it with that of Antony. 38I The mere 
suppression of banditry in Italy was not great or glorious enough to achieve his 
ambitions. Calvisius receives a brief notice in Appian that he had many bandits 
executed and that he restored order in a year. 382 Octavian's campaigns however 
376 Res Gestae 25. 
377 See for example Appian B.C. 5.67-74. 
378 For a full and recent account of this period, see Pelling (1996) pp1-36. 
379 Appian ///. 12-13; at 15 Appian says he was drawing on information from Augustus account of 
his deeds; B.C. 5.145. 
380 Dio 49.36.1; cf. 37.1. 
381 Gruen (1996) p172. Pelling (1996) p46 describes it as "...winning some glory for himself with 
cheap foreign blood." 
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receive more extensive treatment, a task aided by his memoirs. 383 During this 
campaign he punished the islanders on Melita and Corcyra Nigra for their piracy, 
executing the young men and selling the others into slavery. He also confiscated the 
Liburnian ships because they had been committing piracy. 384 Given the lack of 
justification for the campaign reported in Dio, however, it might be suspected that the 
extent of their piracy and plundering of the Italian coast was exaggerated for Octavian's 
own purposes. 
(vi) Piracy and banditry under the empire 
Augustus established several measures which provided more effective policing 
of both banditry and piracy. Under the principate, the responsibility for policing and 
suppressing banditry and piracy devolved down the ranks of officials. An emperor 
could not, nor did he want to, attend to the policing of banditry or piracy over the 
entire empire.385 He could disregard upper-class objections to such matters: those 
who wanted public offices could apply themselves to the given task. 
On land, Suetonius notes that bands of grassatores had been seizing travellers, 
placing them in slave-prisons (ergastula) and putting them to work. Augustus 
established guard posts in 'suitable places' in Italy and investigated the ergastula. 386 
Such measures contributed to local efforts to protect themselves against bandits. 
382 Appian B.C. 5.132. 
383 Appian III. 16-28; B.C. 5.145; Florus 2.23; Suet. Aug. 20 & 21; Dio 49.36-38: 49.43.8; cf. 
Strabo 7.5.4; Gruen (1996) p172-4. 
384 Appian 111. 16. 
385 For a similar view, Shaw (1984) p34. 
386 Suet. Aug. 32. Appian also asserts that about 35B.C. a system of night-watchmen was 
established, B.C. 5.145. The reference to people used in the prisons may perhaps suggest a labour 
shortage. Sextus Pompey had used many slaves to crew his fleet. (Augustus in the Res Gestae 25.1 
claimed that after this war 30,000 were returned to their owners, and he moreover crucified 6000 
slaves; Brunt and Moore (1967) p66). A story of slave-snatching is told by Appian, B.C. 4.30, who 
cites the story of a young man called Atilius, who fled when he found he was proscribed, but was then 
captured by 'a man accustomed to commit banditry on passers-by and bind them to work'. Atilius 
escaped in his chains but was killed when discovered by soldiers. 
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Tiberius is said to have established more stationes in an effort to guard against 
latrocinia in Italy.387 Strabo records Augustus' building of roads through the Alps to 
control the passes. 388 He sent A. Terentius Varro Murena in 25B.C. to subdue the 
Salassi in Transpadane Gaul. He had tried twice previously through his commanders 
to attempt to defeat the Salassi, who had a 'custom of banditry', and who during the 
civil wars had taken the opportunity to charge tolls on people passing through their 
area, for example taking a drachma per man from Decimus Brutus, as he was fleeing 
from Mutina. Varro finally conquered them and sold them into slavery, and the colony 
of Augusta Praetoria was established in the area. 389 
Another of Augustus' measures was the creation of permanent fleets and 
commands. This provided a more active defence system for the coasts of Italy. 39° 
One fleet was stationed at Ravenna, and the other at Misenum, with subsidiary bases 
along the coasts, each with a praefectus classis in command. 391 Other fleets were 
also established during the period of the empire at Syria, Egypt, Mauretania, the Black 
Sea, on the Danube and Rhine rivers and the English Channe1. 392 
There are reports in the sources to outbreaks of latrocinia under Augustus. Dio 
mentions Augustus' deal' made with the Spanish bandit Corocotta. 393 Strabo 
387 Suet. Tib. 37.1: "In primis tuendae pacis a grassaturis ac latronciniis seditionumque licentia 
curam habuit. Stationes trzilitum per Italiam solito frequentiores disposuit.". 
388 Strabo 4.6.6. 
389 Appian III. 17; Dio 49.34.2; 49.38.3; 53.25.2-5; Strabo 4.6.7; cf. Gruen (1996) p169-161 for 
Augustus' subjugation of the Alps. 
390 Starr (1943) p62ff. The navy was used on land as well as sea. Tacitus Ann. 4.27 records that 
sailors were used by the quaestor Cutius Lupus to put down an attempt by Titus Curtisius to raise the 
pastores into rebellion around Brundisium; CIL XI.6107 (A.D. 246) records the use of sailors from — 
Ravenna and praetorian soldiers against banditry: "Aurelius Munatianus evocatus ex cohorte VI 
pr(a)etoria p(ia) v(indice) Philippiana agens at latrunculum cum militibus n(umero) XX clas( sis pprr 
Ravennatis p(iae) v(indicis) Filipporum." 
391 Suet. Aug. 49; Strabo 4.1.9 cites also a station at Forum Iulium in southern Gaul. Tac. Ann. 
4.5 (cf. also Hist. 3.43) says the fleet was sent to Forum Iulium soon after Actium. See further Starr 
(1960) chapters 1-2 for a discussion of these fleets and their commanding officers. 
392 See Starr (1960) chapters 6-7; he dates the beginnings of the Syrian, Egyptian and the river fleets 
to the Augustan period, the Mauretanian to the time of Claudius, the classis Britannica to Gaius and 
the Pontic fleet to Nero. For a more recent discussion, see Keppie (1996) pp383-4; 393. 
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suggests that the region of Cilicia Tracheia was given over to the control of King 
Archelaus of Cappadocia in about 24B.C. -b-ecause it was well suited to banditry on 
land and sea, and the Romans thought the constant presence of a local ruler would be 
more effective than Roman magistrates who were periodically stationed there.394 A 
similar effort to give local rulers more responsibility for policing may be seen in the 
suppression of banditry in Syria. Inhabitants from Damascus complained to Varro, the 
governor of Syria in 23B.C., about the raids of bandits from Trachonitis. The bandits 
were being encouraged by Zenodorus, tetrach of Ituraea, who is said to have been 
taking a share of their booty. Varro wrote to Augustus, who replied that the governor 
should suppress the banditry, and also assigned the territory of Trachonitis to King 
Herod to ensure it would not be used as a base for banditry again. 395 
Dio briefly notes that in A.D.6 Sardinia was overrun by Avcrral. The province 
was then to given a military governor for many years, rather than a senatorial one, until 
Nero returned Sardinia to the senate. However Dio tantalisingly does not say any 
more because it was not 'worthy of record'.396 It seems however that he refers to 
banditry rather than piracy on Sardinia. Varro had noted its unsuitability for cultivation 
due to the prevalence of bandits. 397 Furthermore Tacitus records that a senatorial 
decree was passed in A.D.19 to send 4000 freedmen who practised Jewish or 
Egyptian rites to Sardinia to suppress banditry on the island. 398 
393 Dio 56.43.3. 
394 Strabo 14.5.6 (cf. 12.1.4 & 2.7). See also Magie (1950) 2.1138n24 for the grant of Cilicia 
Tracheia. 
395 Jos. B.J. 1.398-99 = Ant. 344-349; Strabo 16.2.20. On Herod's efforts to control them, see 
Ant. 16.271-292. Other references to Roman suppression of bandits in Judea and Syria in the first 
century A.D. have been discussed elsewhere; see also Horsley (1981) pp409-432; Issac (1984) pp171- 
203; Goodman (1996) pp750-761. 
396 Dio 55.28.1-3. On the return of Sardinia to the senate, Paus. 7.17.3. Ormerod (1924) p257n2 
thinks Dio refers to banditry; Braund (1993) p201 sees it as piracy; Crook (1996) p106 calls it a 
'recrudescence of the corsairs." 
397 Varro R.R. 1.16.2; cf. Strabo 5.2.7 for the mountainous Diagesbes' plundering of arable districts 
on Sardinia. 
398 Tac. Ann. 2.85. 
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Dio provides a similarly brief note to report that the Isaurians also in A.D.6 
began 'bandit raids' which led to war, until they were subdued. He does not say by 
whom. 399 Another passage in Dio states that after the rebellions in Illyricum in A.D.6- 
8 had been subdued, banditry continued for some time, which, Dio comments, was to 
be expected from such tribes after such disturbances:4W 
Velleius claims that under Tiberius the pax augusta, as he calls it, spread to 'all 
corners of the world', keeping them safe from the fear of latrocinia.401 Epictetus also 
claims that there were "...no longer wars, or battles or great banditry or piracy...", and 
that it was safe to travel by land or sea at any hour of the day .402  It has been rightly 
pointed out that he is careful to say 'no great banditry' and that with the exception of 
Epictetus, such statements are usually accompanied by fulsome praise of emperors. 
The suppression of these criminals had become part of the imperial ideology, with the 
emperor portrayed as the protector of society. 403 
Though there are references, albeit usually brief, to banditry, there are 
notoriously few references to piracy under Augustus and indeed during the principate 
for the most part of the first two centuries. The responsibility for the paucity of 
information particularly about piracy in the first two centuries of the principate partly 
lies with the sources. As seen previously, insignificant battles against pirates and 
bandits were not considered worthy of record during the Republic. With the advent of 
the principate, the attention of the writers was centred on the emperor and his 
associates, discussing for example their concerns, intrigues and wars against proper 
399 Dio 55.28.3. 
400 Dio 55.34.7. C.f. Veil. Pat. 2.90.1-4 for Augustus' efforts in Dalmatia, the Alps and Spain in 
particular freeing the provinces from banditry. 
401 Veil. Pat. 2.126.3: "Diffusa in orientis occidentisque tractus et quidquid meridian° aut 
septentrione finitur, pax augusta omnis terrarum orbis angulos a latrociniorum metu servat 
immunes." For a similar claim about the four quarters being cleared from piracy and banditry. Philo 
Embassy to Gaius 145-6. 
402 Epictetus 3.13.9. 
403 Braund (1993) p199-201. He also notes that the passages in Strabo 3.2.5 and Pliny N.H. 2.118 
which Onnerod (1924) p257 cites in mentioning peace at sea do not indicate the complete eradication 
of piracy. 
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enemies. Suppression of such criminals by subordinate officers in the provinces was 
peripheral to the central topic of the emperor, unless the outbreak was large enough, 
when it also attracted the attention of the emperor or, as discussed previously, if the 
bandits themselves came into contact with the emperor. Moreover triumphs came to be 
held by the imperial family only , and thus there was less incentive for governors to 
incite a war against bandits in the hope of a triumph.404 The emperor could appoint 
men to certain positions and failure to perform their tasks effectively could harm their 
careers. This would also have an effect on the provision of more effective policing. 
The measures put into place to improve communications, transport, and security, such 
as roads, stationes and patrolling fleets, all contributed to the reduction of banditry 
and piracy on a large scale, and thus the smaller scale outbreaks or attacks were not 
considered worth putting on record.405 It is improbable however that "...piracy had 
been eradicated from the sea lanes..." by such measures. 406 The very presence of the 
fleets suggests that there was piracy which needed policing. 407 
Despite the above, there are some references which indicate the presence of 
piracy. The jurist Labeo, writing in the late Republic and under Augustus, is attributed 
as noting a number of legal ramifications arising from the problem of pirates. These 
include the possibility of losing property transported by sea through shipwreck or 
pirates, the ransom of a ship from pirates, and the recognition that both on sea and 
land it was possible to be attacked by bandits. 408 It has been argued that since there 
are no legal interpretations discussing matters associated with the Rhodian sea law until 
the time of Paulus in the early third century, this is an indication that piracy had been 
cleared from the seas.4°9 It has however been noted that there is a section dealing with 
this law which is possibly attributable to the second century A.D. writer L. Volusius 
404 The last triumph in the Fasti Triumphales was in 19B.C. See also Crook (1996) p91. 
405 Similarly, Braund (1993) p207; 209. 
406 Starr (1989) p74; cf. also Starr (1941) 172-3; Rostovtzeff (1957) p146. 
407 Braund (1993) p206-7 
408 Dig 4.9.3.1; 14.2.2.3; 47.9.3.2. Similarly, Braund (1993) pp204-5. 
409 Starr (1941) p173; (1989) p74. 
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Maecianus.41° An inscription from Ilium in Mysia records the inhabitants' gratitude 
for the suppression of X13 cvr -ripta in the Hellespont during the reign of Tiberius.411 
There was an outbreak of piracy at Joppa during the time of the Jewish revolt from 
A.D.66 - 70. The Jews were raiding along the coasts of Syria, Phoenicia and on the 
route to Egypt. Vespasian entered the city with his troops in A.D.67, and found that 
the inhabitants had taken to the sea in their boats. They were hit by a storm, and most 
were shipwrecked. There were said to be 4200 people killed as a result. Vespasian 
had the town razed and left a contingent of cavalry and infantry there to prevent the 
pirates returning.412  Piracy had not disappeared; smaller outbreaks had merely been 
placed further into the periphery of notable events. The episode recorded by Tacitus in 
Cilicia in A.D.52 seems to refer to bandit-like activity rather than piracy. The Cietae 
tribe in Cilicia under Troxoborus descended from the hills to the coast to attack 
farmers, townspeople, merchants and shipowners. They do not seem to have put to 
sea. The city of Anemurium was besieged, and the prefect Curtius Severus with his 
cavalry troop were forced to retreat, a manoeuvre due in part to the nature of the rough 
ground. Antiochus of Commagene eventually subdued them and executed Troxoborus 
and other leaders.413 It must be noted that examples of piracy in the Mediterranean in 
the later empire are sparse in any case, with literary sources noting the depredations of 
land bandits.414 
Under the principate there are references to magistrates whose job was 
specifically aimed at the prevention of banditry. 415  It might be thought that some 
410 • Dig 14.2.9; Braund (1993) p205, who also draws attention to Digest 47.9.7 which gives 
Hadrian's judgement that those who plunder shipwrecks were to be given the penalty appropriate to 
latrones; cf. Dig. 47.9.4 Antoninus Pius' rescript on the collection of booty from wrecks. 
411 IGRR 4.219. 
412 Josephus B.J. 3.414-431. 
413 Tac. Ann. 12.55; (he does not call them bandits) cf. Hopwood (1989) 173-5; Braund (1993) 
p205; see alsoWiseman (1982) pp56-67 for the ideology of security. 
414 See also Starr (1941) ch8 for discussion of the activities of the fleet during the empire. 
415 Many of the later laws relating to banditry and piracy have been listed and discussed in other 
contexts: see Chinni.; 41; 68; 70; 75; 76 136; 144; 146; 164; 166; Ch2 nn 41; 42; 53; 78; 83; 162 - 
4; 166-7; 201; and Ch4. 
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would regard it a as a black day when they were appointed to the position of 
praefectus arcendis latrociniis.416 One law mentions another official, a latrunculator, 
who was not permitted to judge on pecuniary matters. 417 However the evidence for 
such positions is sparse, and probably indicates that the policing of bandits was not 
regarded as being any more glorious than during the republic. The task of suppressing 
bandits was in any case included as part of other officials' jurisdiction, such as that of 
the provincial governors. The presence of bandits in Asia in the mid-second century 
A.D. is indicated in a letter by Fronto. He wrote to Antoninus Pius in the early to mid 
150's A.D. and in the letter informs him of his preparation for his time as provincial 
governor in Asia. One of the men on whom he calls to accompany him was a friend 
called Julius Senex from Mauretania. Senex was not only summoned for his 'loyalty 
and diligence', but also for his skill in hunting and repressing latrones. 418 The fact 
that it was necessary to state in law during the empire that the governors' duties 
included the pursuit of bandits suggests that magistrates needed to be reminded about 
the obligations of their command in this respect.419 Commodus was certainly annoyed 
at the governors' failure in this respect, which he called 'negligence' or 'laziness', in 
allowing Matemus and his band to rampage. It was necessary for him as emperor to 
remind them of their duty to send troops against the bandits. 42° 
The acceptance of the universal prevalence of bandits is evident in a comment by 
Tertullian. He notes that the hunting of bandits was allotted to stationes in all the 
provinces.421 An example of stationarii performing this task is given in a letter from 
416 praefectus arcendis latrociniis: CIL XIII 5010 = ILS 7007 Nyon: "C. Lucconi Co[r.1 Tetrici 
praefeciti] arcend. latroc[inis], praefect. pro Ilvir[o] , Ilvir. bis, flaminis August." (see Flam- — 
Zuckerman (1970) pp451-473 for a discussion of this); CIL XIII 6211 Nava, Germany: "M. 
Pannonius Soluitus praef(ectus)] latr(ociniis) ar[c(endis)]...etc.". If the reading is accepted, there is a 
reference to a praefectus adversos latrones: AE (1968) 109 Satrium, Italy. 
417 Dig. 5.1.61.1: "Latrunculator de re pecuniaria iudicare non potest." 
418 Fronto Ep. Ad Antonium Pium 8 (= Loeb edn. vol. 1 p237). 
419 Dig. 1.18.13; 48.13.4. 
420 Herodian 1.10.3. 
421 'Tertullian Apol. 2.8: "Latronibus vestigandis per universas provincias militaris statio sortitur." 
P. Ant. 87 has a fragmentary reference to a stationarius in the context of the interrogation of a 
218 
prefects of the praetorian guard. Betweeen A.D.169 and 172 prefects Bassaeus Rufus 
and Macrinius Vindex wrote to the magistrates of Saepinum to order them to stop their 
harassment of the lessees of flocks of sheep on an imperial estate. The stationarii and 
magistrates of Saepinum and Bovianum had been detaining shepherds of the lessees, 
thinking that they were runaway slaves and that the animals were stolen.422 Some 
epigraphic evidence tells of battles by such police against bandits. One soldier in an 
inscription from Phrygia is recorded as being held in repute because he 'killed many 
bandits with his hands'. 423 Similarly a strategos of the Chersonese was praised for 
his efforts against piracy in the late second centu ry.424  A certain e'rrapxos- or prefect 
named Metrodorus was killed in a struggle with bandits. 425 Papyri provide evidence 
of the efforts by officials in Egypt to prevent banditry. M. Sempronius Liberalis, 
prefect of Egypt in A.D.154 offered an amnesty for those people who had fled from 
paying liturgies to prevent them from becoming bandits or associating with them. 426 
Prefect L. Baebius Aurelius Juncinus wrote to the strategi of the Heptanomia and 
Arsinoite nomes in the period between A.D.210-214 emphasising the importance of 
the suppression of banditry. 427 Another papyrus notes the Anaromacrrai organised to 
hunt bandits.428 
The edict of Antoninus Pius while in Asia in A.D.134/5 emphasises that it was 
the responsibility of eirenarchs to interrogate bandits they had captured. 429 The 
bandit. Further on the duties of the stationarii, see MacMullen (1963)(b) p55ff. 
422 CIL IX 2438 = FIRA 1.61. 
423 1GRR 4.886 (= Robert (1937) p96): "Abp. E1pivwoc elcrrpantirns. eurparcOuero ev8666-, 
taecre [Ag]ards- &dr  
424 AE (1948) 201. 
425 Robert (1937) p97 (= De Ruggiero & Barbieri (1942) 462), Bithynia, Prusa; cf. the Lycaonian 
inscription recording the death of the 6po06,1ae killed by bandits, Robert (1937) p96 (= De Ruggiero 
& Barbieri (1942) p462). Also discussed by MacMullen (1966) p257-8. 
426 BGU 372; cf. BGU 159, A.D.216. 
427 P. Oxy. 1408. 
428 BGU 325; Cf. also Libanius Or. 18.104; 25.43 for similar searches for bandits. 
429 Dig. 48.3.6.1. Further on the eirenarchs and diogmitae, see Robert (1937) p103f; Magie 
(1950) 1.647; 2.1514n46; Hopwood (1989) pp177-78, who also notes the avoidance of Aelius 
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eirenarchs had responsibility for public peace, particularly in the cities of Asia, and 
had under their direction a force of men called the diogmitae. One group of 
diogmitae in A.D.368 was lead by the vicarius of Asia, Musonius, against 
praedones from Isauria. The Isaurians had been making raids on villas and towns 
over Pamphylia and Cilicia. Musonius and the diogmitae however were ambushed 
and killed, and it was then necessary for troops to be used to suppress the bandits. 43° 
Literary sources notes the bandits who managed to attract the attention of the 
emperors in the late second and early third centuries; Maternus in Gaul A.D.186, 
Claudius in Syria in the early 190's, and Bulla Felix in Italy in A.D.205-6. An 
inscription from Intercisa in Pannonia testifies to the building of a fort during the time 
of Commodus to prevent 'clandestine crossings of bandits through suitable places'. 431 
Writers in the later empire describing the incursions and raids of barbarians employ the 
same terminology used to describe bandit raids, and thus there appears to be a 
proliferation of banditry during that period. Concern at the state of the empire 
prompted mention of banditry everywhere. A letter from the emperor Gordian in 
A.D.238 notes the existence of a latro called Barsagoras at that time. 432 There is a life 
in the Historia Augusta of a certain Trebellianus who during the reign of Gallienus 
(A.D.253-268) became a leader in Isauria and called himself imperator, though 
'others' called him an archipirata, and who is supposed to have minted coins and set 
up a palace.433 His existence has been queried and given the lack of other supporting 
evidence, the episode must be viewed as fictitous, but that a usurper from the 
Isauria/Cilicia region would be called an archipirata by his enemies or the Romans 
Aristides, (Sacred Discourses 4.31.601) of such policing positions; Shaw (1984) p18. 
430 Amm. Marc. 27.9.6-9. Cf. also the group of diogmitae led by an eirenarch who set out to 
arrest the Christian martyr Polycarp armed as if on their way to arrest a bandit, The Mart ydom of St. 
Polycarp 6-7, in Musurillo (1972) pp6-7. 
431 CIL III 3385 = ILS 395 = De Ruggiero & Barbieri (1942) 464: "...per loca opportuna ad 
clandestinos latrunculorum transit us...". 
432 C.J. 8.40.13: "Si Barsagoram latronem Lysanias decurio inventurum se spopondisset. aut 
exhibere compellendus aut transmittendus ad praefectwn praetorio vel ad praesiderrz provinciae. 
433 HA Tyr. Trig. 26. 
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however reflects the common prejudices towards the inhabitants of the area. 434 An 
inscription records the building of a fort as an observation post for bandits for the town 
of Montanesium in Moesia in A.D.256.435 Another inscription from Termessus in 
Pisidia honours the efforts of Valerius Statilius Castus in providing peace on 'land and 
sea' during the reign of Valerian (253-260). 436 The emperor Probus suppressed 
banditry in Isauria in A.D.277-78. The Historia Augusta claims that Probus captured 
and killed a potentissimus latro, the Isaurian Palfuerius, before entering the places 
where 'barbarians' lived among the Isaurians. He is quoted as saying that it was 
'easier to prevent bandits from entering these places than to remove them.' 437 
Zosimus however says that Probus campaigned against an Isaurian bandit called 
Lydius, who probably may be identified as Palfuerius. It is possible that two powerful 
men controlling their own bands could operate in the Isaurian region, but it seems too 
much of a coincidence that they were both subdued by Probus on his campaigns in the 
region at the same time.438 Lydius and his band had been plundering in Pamphlyia and 
Lycia, and when the Romans approached, took control of Cremna in Lycia. Lydius 
held out in the ensuing seige for some time, but after his death due to the betrayal of 
one of his men, the other bandits surrendered. 439 The banditry of the Bagaudae in 
Gaul was first recorded for the year A.D.285, and the history of their activities has 
been discussed at length in chapter three. 44° 
Ammianus Marcellinus presents an empire in the fourth century beset by 
barbarians and bandits on all sides and within the frontiers as wel1. 44 1 The 
434 Doubt expressed by Magie, (transl. Loeb edn. SHA (1932)), p65 & 128 and Matthews (1989) 
p362. 
435 CIL III 12376. 
436 IGRR 3.481. Cf. IGRR 1057 Cos: P. Sallustius Sempronius Victor was honoured for his 
efforts in ensuring peace on the sea, dated to between A.D.222 and 238. 
437 HA Probus 16.4: "quae cum peragrasset, hoc dixit "Facilius est ab istis locis latrones arceri 
quam tolli." " 
438 Ridley (1982) p148 in his commentary on Zosimus argues that they were separate men. 
439 Zosimus 1.69-70. 
440 See S/G3 900 Panamara 11.23ff for a reference to banditry in the early fourth century. 
441 See Matthews (1989) ch. 14 'Barbarians and bandits' for a full discussion of Ammianus' narrative 
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anonymous author of the De Rebus Bellicis presents a similar picture of the pressures 
of barbarians and of the banditry he regards as caused by poverty. 442  Ammi anu s 
describes three outbreaks of Isaurian banditry in the middle of the fourth century. The 
first in A.D.353-4 began, as noted previously, when some of the Isaurians were 
thrown to the wild beasts in the arena at Iconium in Pisidia. The other Isaurians then 
made attacks on ships on the coast and carried off cargoes. Following this they left the 
coasts and went inland to the bordor of Lycaonia and Isauria. There they raided 
properties and travellers. Soldiers sent against them were unsuccessful, because of the 
difficulty in pursuing them through the rough terrain. However the bandits withdrew 
from these troops into Pamphylia. The legions at wintering at Side were sent against 
them and the Isaurians then were forced to retreat. They attempted to besiege Palaea 
but its defences were too strong. Their numbers were large enough to daunt the 
commander at their next target, the comes Castricius, who was holding Seleucia with 
three legions.443 The soldiers were sent out to face the'enemy in battle, but were then 
withdrawn behind the fortifications in the city. The Isaurians besieged Seleucia and it 
was threatened with starvation. When news of this situation reached the Caesar 
Gallus, he sent order to Nebridius, comes Orientis, to provide help. When the 
Isaurians learnt that Nebridius was approaching with his troops, they retreated into the 
mountains.444 This was hardly a crushing victory, though Ammianus claims they 
were quiet for a time after these events. In A.D.359 however, Lauricius was sent as 
rector or governor of the province to suppress the furta et latrocinia' which the 
on those felt to threaten the security of the empire in the fourth century: the Alamanni, Goths, Huns, 
Saracens, Isaurians and Moors. CIL III 12483 = ILS 724 records an attempt to provide protection 
against barbarian bandit attacks in Moesia, c. A.D.337 - 340. See also Starr (1941) p194-8 for the 
barbarians' attacks by sea and the response of the imperial fleet. 
442 Anon. De Reb. Bell. 6.1: "In primis sciendum est quod imperium Romanum circumlatrantium 
ubique nationum perstringat insania et omne latus limitum tecta naturalibus locis appetat dolosa 
barbaries." For the poor committing banditry, 2.3. 
"3 Matthews (1989) p363 notes that in terms of scale, rather than any declared aims of the Isaurians, 
these outbreaks were more akin to a rebellion or civil war. 
444 Amm. Marc. 14.2.1-20. 
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Isaurians were perpetrating on their neighbours. Ammianus says he was successful in 
pacifying the province by subduing them with 'threats rather than harshness'. 445 The 
next outbreak was in A.D.368, when the Isaurians were overrunning Pamphylia and 
Cilicia, and inflicted a defeat on Musonius and the diogmitae. After the troops had 
defeated them and driven them back to the mountains, the Isaurians called for peace, 
which was granted with a handover of hostages. 446 The Isaurians had a long history 
of 'banditry' and Ammianus describes the provinces of Cilicia and Isauria as 'mixed 
with crowds of bandits'. 447 He describes the Germanic Sarmatians and the Quadi 
similarly, as tribes suited to banditry. The Austuriani, prior to his description of their 
attacks on cities of Tripolitana, are noted as another people accustomed to live to 
robbery and murder. They, like the Isaurians, were provoked into making attacks on 
cites when a member of their community, a certain Stachao, was considered to have 
'betrayed the province' and was burnt to death. 448 Arnmianus also mentions the 
outbreak of banditry in Gaul in A.D.369, the banditry of the Maratacupreni in Syria 
and the destruction of a maruauding band of Saxon bandits, of which he approved. 449 
Larger attacks by 'bandits' were considered more worthy of record during this period, 
as they could be used together with barbarian raids to demonstrate the problems 
445 Amm. Marc. 19.13. CIL 3.6733 = ILS 740 Cilicia provides an example of Lauricius' activities: 
"Iussu dd. nn. Constantii triumfatoris Augusti et lulian nob. Caesaris castellum diu ante a latronibus 
possessum et provinciis perniciosum Bassidius Lauricius v(ir) c(larissimus) com(es) et praeses 
occupavit ad[q] ue ad perpetuam [q]uietis firmitatem militum praesidio munitum .4ntiochiam 
nuncupavit." 
446 Amm. Marc. 27.9.6-7. Zosimus 4.20 also says there was an outbreak by the Isaurians in A.D. 
376, though this may refer to the events of 368 in Ammianus; Zosimus' account has the Isaurians 
plundering cities in Lycia and Pamphylia, and troops being sent against them, but unable to follow 
because of the rough ground; cf. Ridley (1989) p190n57. See also Hopwood (1989) pp171-187 for a 
discussion of the role of local patrons in the outbreaks of Cilicia and Isauria. 
447 Amm. Marc. 14.8.4. Further references to 'saurian violence in the fifth-century: A.D.403 
Zosimus 5.25; Sozomen 8.25; Philostorgius 9.8; John Chrysostom Ep. 9.4; Jerome Ep. 114; and 
in A.D.469, see John of Antioch fr. 206. Cf. also CTh. 9.35.7 (A.D.408) which permitted torture of 
Isaurian bandits even on special days. 
448 Amm. Marc. (Sarmatians and Quadi):16.10.20; 17.12.2; 29.6.8; Austuriani: 28.6.2. Further on 
the Austuriani, see Matthews (1989) p383ff. 
449 Amm. Marc. 28.2.10; 28.2.11f; 28.5.1-7. Cf. Sulpicius Severus Life of St. Martin 5.4ff. also 
for the banditry in the Alps in the mid-fourth century. 
perceived to be facing the empire in the fourth century. 45° In A.D.399 Valentinus of 
Selga in Pamphylia gathered slaves and farmers who had been trained through their 
experience in fighting bandits to resist the advance of Tribigildus and the Goths. 451 
Other references to banditry in the fourth century have been noted in the context of 
desertion from the army and the patronage of powerful men. 452 
The Romans' policing of piracy in particular has been described as laissez-
faire, and negligent.453 An examination of events in the history of Roman policing of 
banditry and piracy reveals the importance of the Roman ethos of ambition for honour 
and glory in their dealings with such criminals. There was a traditional reliance on 
self-defence for the protection of the individual and small communities, but as Rome 
became a major power, it was called upon to provide armed forces to counter larger 
threats to security. However suppressing bandits and pirates was not considered a 
noble task for the Roman commander. It was not simply a policy of laissez-faire. they 
were personally reluctant to carry out such tasks. In a society in which the upper-class 
sought eminence through glory and an aeternum nomen, merely subduing the raids of 
the lowliest criminals was not considered sufficient to achieve these rewards. 
Skirmishes against bandits and pirates were often beneath the notice of writers, 'not 
worthy' of memory in a written record. Nevertheless this unworthy task was often the 
lot of provincial commanders. Some governors carried out their policing duties 
conscientiously, but the situation often occurred in which governors would either 
ignore these tasks, or would provoke a war in the hope of greater personal glory from 
a victorious battle, which was always 'worthy of memory', and a triumph. During 
the last century of the Republic a number of factors, such as the diminished powers of 
450 See also Whittaker (1993) p277 - 281. 
451 Zos. 5.15.5. 
452 Libanius Or. 18.104; Zosimus 3.7; 5.22; St. Basil Ep. 268 (A.D.377); Symmachus Ep. 7.38, 
(A.D.398); see also Ch2n.53 for laws on patronage. 
453 See Ormerod (1924) p190 negligence; Starr (1989) p61; the Romans unwillingness to accept 
burdens which came with power; Morgan (1969) p222-3 mentions their laissez-faire policy; similarly 
Strasburger (1965) p50. 
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the nations in the East, the rise of Mithridates, and the Romans' ethos for glory 
seeking led to the situation in which huge commands were eventually needed to combat 
the numbers of pirates raiding throughout the Mediterranean. Under the principate this 
situation changed. The emperor ensured that he commanded the greatest interest from 
the sources by virtue of his immense power. Subordinate governors who did not 
perform their duties satisfactorily while provincial governors risked their future 
careers. Moreover a number of other measures, including the establishment of 
stationes and the fleets also improved the policing of banditry and piracy. During the 
later empire bandit raids are mentioned by the sources together with the descriptions of 
barbarian attacks as part of the evidence for the view that there was a general malaise 




It can be seen that the Roman views on banditry and piracy thus play a 
significant role in determining their response to it. Despite the close association 
between war and banditry in practical terms, such as the employment in both of 
plundering tactics and both the soldier's and bandit's love of booty, there was however 
a large gap between banditry and proper war in the minds of Romans. Moral 
judgements on the nature of a conflict often determined the labelling of it as war or 
banditry. Piracy was defined essentially as banditry which could occur on the sea or 
land. The reputation for treachery, cruelty and betrayal among these criminals 
contributed to their placement in the criminal ranks at the lowest level of infamy. 
The interpretations and terminology of Hobsbawm are shown to be inappropriate 
in the context of ancient banditry. Bandits and pirates were more concerned with the 
procurement of booty through robbery for their own purposes, than with expressing a 
form of social protest or rebellion, as in the example of the Bagaudae. Thus the 
disregard of bandits and pirates for the poor does not indicate that they supported the 
poor or that this support was returned; rather the evidence suggests that the poor were 
ignored for the pragmatic reason that they did not have property worth stealing. The 
wealthy were a more profitable target. Indeed it was often the poor who were forced 
to turn to banditry for a livelihood. These bandits however did not support their fellow 
poor who had remained on the side of legality within society, though perhaps 
'support' could be construed as helping them not to become poorer by refraining from 
attacking them. The support for bandits and pirates generally within the local 
communities was usually restricted to those who were involved as receivers or 
harbourers or wealthy patrons of these criminals. 
The Roman hatred for these criminals was expressed in the severity of the 
punishments considered appropriate for bandits and pirates. If they were not killed in 
the heat of battle or capture, then cruel, humiliating and inventive deaths, often 
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preceded by tortures were the lot of the condemned criminal. The only reason a 
commander normally spared the life of a captured bandit or pirate was to save him for 
future crowd entertainment, when either the robber could appear in the arena, as 
popular crowd entertainment, or until a triumph could be held in which the prisoner 
could feature. 
Unfortunately the attacks by inglorious bandits or pirates were often not 
considered worth reporting by the literary sources, or worth pursuing by Roman 
commanders who hoped for a more glorious enemy. Thus when the local community's 
policing possessed insufficient strength to repel any attacks, the Romans were often 
reluctant to respond quickly. Often a community complained several times before the 
Romans even considered sending an investigative embassy. Moreover when the 
Romans decided to send a commander, the system of rewarding those who performed 
well in victorious battles with the honour of a triumph and personal glory often had the 
effect of motivating the commander to incite a war for his own purposes. Among the 
reasons suggested for the Roman disinclination to have a significant policing role in 
banditry and piracy is that they had an attitude of laissez-faire. The importance of 
personal reputation, the acquisition of wealth and gloria in particular to the upper-class 
Romans however has been demonstrated as a significant factor in their reponse to 
bandits and pirates. Few commanders were immune to the thought of the possibility of 
a triumph from a provincial command. Fewer were immune to the opportunity to 
acquire or maintain their spheres of influence, which prompted some to refuse 
provincial commands. Even Pompey, who was known as Magnus for his military 
achievements, used the famous settlement of the pirates in the late republic to increase 
his sphere of influence. Thus the provincial governors who were sent against bandits 
and pirates often had their own motives for their effective or ineffective response to 
banditry. Under the principate a number of changes to the system of defences were 
introduced, which had the effect of providing more effective policing against bandits 
and pirates, and moreover there was no longer the incentive of a triumph for 
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commanders to incite wars. Such measures contributed to policing, but the 
proliferation of laws against bandits and pirates together with the literary and 
epigraphic evidence demonstrates that the problem had not disappeared, and neither 
had attitudes towards banditry changed. Crime prevention then as now was a constant 
necessity against persistent criminals. 
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